Reid's View Research Articles

Tło filozoficzne teorii percepcji Thomasa Reida

The subject of this article is not explicity the theory of perception that Reid propounded. To present it would go beyond his modest framework because an essential part of Reid's view was the so-called common sense principles. The nature, number and cognition role of these principles would require a separate discussion. In this text, therefore, I concentrate on the specific preliminaries of the philosophy proposed by the founder of the Scottish school of common sense, which can be interpreted as a "negative reference point", which is the starting point for "positive" solutions, i.e. Reid's proposed theory of perception. He thus began with a critique of the "theory of ideas", which, in Reid's view, was the main reason for the failure to formulate a satisfactory philosophy of mind. Within this critique, we find his reflections on the method of philosophising itself, the differences that occur in the study of such different objects as material objects and cognitive mind, and his interpretation of the consequences of the adaption of the theory of ideas by the philosophers of modernity. The result of Reid's theoretical analyses is the rejection of the assumption of any mutual interaction between matter and mind, the questioning of the possibility of perception of material objects based on similarity of sense impressions and the things perceived, and the accusation of the proponents of this theory of dooming philosophy to idealism and scepticism.

Why Thomas Reid Matters to the Epistemology of the Social Sciences

AbstractLittle attention has been paid to the fact that Thomas Reid's epistemology applies to ‘political reasoning’ as well as to various operations of the mind. Reid was interested in identifying the ‘first principles’ of political science as he did with other domains of human knowledge. This raises the question of the extent to which the study of human action falls within the competence of ‘common sense’. Our aim is to reconstruct and assess Reid's epistemology of the sciences of social action and to determine how it connects with the fundamental tenets of his general epistemology. In the first part, we portray Reid as a methodological individualist and focus on the status of the first principles of political reasoning. The second part examines Reid's views on the explanatory power of the principles of human action. Finally, we draw a parallel between Reid's epistemology and the methodology of Weberian sociology.

Thomas Reid's View of Memorial Conception

Thomas Reid believed that the human mind is well equipped, from infancy, to acquire knowledge of the external world, with all its objects, persons and events. There are three main faculties that are involved in the acquisition of knowledge: (original) perception, memory, and imagination. It is thought that we cannot understand how exactly perception works, unless we have a good grasp on Reid's notion of perceptual conception (i.e., of the conception employed in perception). The present paper argues that the same is true of memory, and it offers an answer to the question: what type of conception does it employ?

Thomas Reid and the Problem of Secondary Qualities by Christopher A. Shrock

Reviewed by: Thomas Reid and the Problem of Secondary Qualities by Christopher A. Shrock Rebecca Copenhaver Christopher A. Shrock. Thomas Reid and the Problem of Secondary Qualities. Edinburgh Studies in Scottish Philosophy. Series editor, Gordon Graham. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017. Pp. 192. Cloth, £75.00. Philosophers from the modern age and current philosophers share some common concerns. One is whether the ordinary objects of human perception—the objects humans see, hear, feel, taste, and smell—exist independently of our perception of them in a shared, stable, spatially-localized environment that also exists independently of perception. Another is whether a particular range of properties—colors, flavors, odors, sounds, feels—are (a) properties of the ordinary objects of human perception, (b) relations whose relata are properties of ordinary objects and types of typical human experiences, or (c) properties of, or identical with, types of typical human experiences. Because both modern and current philosophers have these concerns, one way to investigate these topics is to put the two in conversation with one another. Shrock's book does so in a unique way. Part I begins with direct realism—one answer to the question of whether the ordinary objects of perception exist independently of perception. Direct realism is introduced as one of three alternatives, each of which has a modern representative. We learn that Berkeley and Hume are idealists and that each privileges "cool reason" over perceptual experience (10). We learn that idealism holds that ordinary objects are ideas in our minds and that Hume and Berkeley demand that we reject our irresistible belief in the permanence and subject-independence of ordinary things. Locke represents indirect realism; and we are told that he, Hume, and Berkeley are motivated to hold their positions "in order to solve theoretical problems with illusions and hallucinations" (18). Reid represents direct realism, which is introduced not by the extensive literature on Reid's direct realism, but by recent work from Michael Huemer and Noah Lemos. Direct realism is defended by assessing the views attributed to Locke, Berkeley, and Hume as implausible, using G. E. Moore, P. F. Strawson, John Foster, Howard Robinson, and other twentieth- and twenty-first-century philosophers. The remainder of part I uses a similar method. As the title suggests, Reid, along with other modern philosophers, struggled with Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities. And many Reid scholars have recognized and addressed the particular problem secondary qualities pose for Reid's direct realism. Schrock identifies the problem of secondary qualities as one variant of the argument from illusion, and provides brief assessments of twentieth- and twenty-first-century views that engage these problems, from adverbialism and behaviorism, to disjunctivism. He concludes that a direct realist must commit herself to the position that secondary qualities are scientific properties of objects if she is to avoid the problem—a position he goes on to identify with Reid in part II. Part II promises to cover Reid's views on "the conceptual nature of perception, the contingent connection between sensations and perceptions, and the role of sensations as natural signs"—topics at the core of Reid scholarship for the last thirty years (54). Shrock acknowledges a portion of this literature while focusing on his own account of these matters, leaving chapter 6 and part III for "interpretive minutiae" (54). Shrock argues that Reid recognizes no metaphysical distinction between primary and secondary qualities: both are "physical-causal, scientific properties … possessed by physical objects" (89). In other words, there is no primary-secondary quality distinction for Shrock's Reid, metaphysically speaking, which puts Reid in a unique position relative to "the traditional primary/secondary guru John Locke" whom we are told takes "secondary qualities to be mental" (66). Reid holds that perception is direct; secondary properties are scientific properties of the objects of perception (i.e. real); the problem of secondary qualities for direct realism is solved. Reid does draw an epistemic distinction, however, between qualities humans conceive directly and distinctly in the course of perception (primary qualities), and those that humans conceive relatively and obscurely in the course of perception (secondary qualities), which Shrock recognizes as the only primary-secondary quality distinction in Reid. We conceive of...

Thomas Reid on Signs and Language

AbstractThomas Reid's philosophy of mind, epistemology, and philosophy of language all rely on his account of signs and signification. On Reid's view, some entities play a role of indicating other entities to our minds. In some cases, our sensitivity to this indication is learned through experience, whereas in others, the sensitivity is built in to our natural constitutions. Unlike representation, which was presumed to depend on resemblances and necessary connections, signification is the sort of relationship that can occur without any intrinsic ties between the sign and the thing signified. Of particular interest is the priority Reid gives to natural signs (in contrast with artificial signs, that is, those signs instituted by humans). Reid deploys his robust account of natural signs in a way that allows him to sidestep some skeptical worries common in the early modern period, as well as in grounding “artificial” human languages like English or Cantonese on a more basic human capacity for communication, that is, itself, the result of our sensitivity to natural signs of other people's minds.

“Ungovernable Feelings and Passions”: Common Sense Philosophy and Mental State Defences in Nineteenth Century Scotland

During the nineteenth century, changing conceptions of mental disorder had profound implications for the way that criminal responsibility was conceived. As medical writers and practitioners increasingly drew attention to the complexities of insanity, the grounds on which mentally abnormal offenders could be excused began to seem unduly restrictive. By way of a contribution to our understanding of this development, this article examines how the growing disparity unfolded in Scotland. The author argues that the requirements of the insanity defence, as set out within judicial directions, reflect core facets of Scottish Common Sense philosophical thought, including Thomas Reid's view of human agency and understanding of ‘common sense’. Building on this contention, the author suggests that Scottish Common Sense philosophy played an important role in the development of Scottish mental state defences more broadly, and can provide an original interpretation of the way the doctrines of provocation and diminished responsibility changed during this era.

Thomas Reid on Causation and Scientific Explanation

We argue that there is no tension between Reid's description of science and his claim that science is based on the principles of common sense. For Reid, science is rooted in common sense since it is based on the (common sense) idea that fixed laws govern nature. This, however, does not contradict his view that the scientific notions of causation and explanation are fundamentally different from their common sense counterparts. After discussing these points, we dispute with Cobb's ( Cobb 2010 ) and Benbaji's ( Benbaji 2003 ) interpretations of Reid's views on causation and explanation. Finally, we present Reid's views from the perspective of the contemporary debate on scientific explanation.

The extension of color sensations: Reid, Stewart, and Fearn

According to Reid, color sensations are not extended nor are they arranged in figured patterns. Reid further claimed that ‘there is no sensation appropriated to visible figure.’ Reid justified these controversial claims by appeal to Cheselden's report of the experiences of a young man affected by severe cataracts, and by appeal to cases of perception of visible figure without color. While holding fast to the principle that sensations are not extended, Dugald Stewart (1753–1828) tried to show that ‘a variety of colour sensations is a necessary means for the perception of visible figure.’ According to John Fearn (1768–1837), two motives appear to be central to Reid's views about color sensations and extension: his commitment to the Cartesian doctrine of the immateriality of the soul, and his attempt to evade ‘Hume's dilemma’ about the existence and immateriality of the soul.

Reid on the moral sense

Some interpret Reid's notion of a moral sense as merely analogical. Others understand it as a species of acquired perception. To understand Reid's account of the moral sense, we must draw from his theory of perception and his theory of aesthetic experience, each of which illuminate the nature and operation of the moral faculty. I argue that, on Reid's view, the moral faculty is neither affective nor rational, but representational. It is a discrete, basic, capacity for representing the real moral properties of humans and human conduct.

Des femmes en littérature (review)

Reviewed by: Des femmes en littérature Anne Hajek Reid, Martine . Des femmes en littérature. Paris: Bélin, 2010. Pp. 331. ISBN: 9782701155661. In Des femmes en littérature, Martine Reid seeks to contribute to our scholarly understanding of the gendered nature of literature written by women in France. She reminds us that French women have been both writing and publishing since the Middle Ages. Their existence as producers of literature is not in question. In fact, Reid points to a large body of scholarly work devoted to the study of French women's writing. Nonetheless, she cautions that women's place in overarching descriptions of literary history and in collective memory is still problematic: regardless of the large numbers of texts they produced, relatively few women writers are typically represented today in university curricula or in scholarly reflections on literature. Reid explains this absence by hypothesizing a systematic erasure of women's literary contributions. She argues that during the mid- to late-nineteenth century, male critics capitalized on widely-accepted ideas of gender to marginalize progressively and eventually erase the works of women authors from literary history. Reid adopts a two-fold corrective approach to re-thinking women's place in the literary historical record. She first explores the reception of women authors after the Revolution and then analyzes a variety of post-revolutionary women's novels. Throughout the text, she convincingly argues that women's writing is always "singulière;" each text should be approached as a unique literary creation, not reductively categorized under a monolithic label. The first part of her book, "Discours," aims to sketch a history of the reception of post-revolutionary women authors and to highlight the obstacles facing them as they embarked upon literary careers. In her first chapter, "Défenses et illustrations," Constance Pipelet, Germaine de Staël, and Félicité de Genlis serve as examples of the various ways in which women writers defended their own involvement in literary pursuits given the social constraints of gender. In chapter two, "Bas-bleus," Reid turns her attention to pictorial representations of women writers in the nineteenth century. She examines criticism of the bas-bleu in the illustrations of Jules Janin, Frédéric Soulié, and Honoré Daumier. For her, these images represent commonly held perceptions of women writers as a threat to social order because of their perceived transgression or rejection of socially accepted gender roles, especially those of wife and mother. By creating laughable images of women authors, caricaturists took the first step in what Reid views as a process aimed at erasing women's literary contributions. The third chapter, "À Titre d'hommage," examines works by Sainte-Beuve and Lamartine to illustrate further the nineteenth century's growing hostility toward women's literary involvement. At the end of part one, Reid turns to the field of literary history, to demonstrate definitively the existence of a slow process aimed at expunging women writers from the French literary record. She shows how, by the end of the nineteenth century, [End Page 329] women writers had been successfully relegated to the margins of literary history. For Reid, the effects of the process are felt even today: although a significant number of Anglophone and Francophone scholars have excavated and explored many forgotten works, women authors have been only weakly integrated into the broad scope of literary history and have yet to occupy their true place. In the second half of her book, "Fictions," Reid turns to literary texts, primarily novels, to illustrate the ways in which gender affected women's literary production. By using gender as a critical lens, Reid hopes to begin the process of fully integrating women's writing into the literary historical record. Before beginning her in-depth textual analyses, she explores the implications of publication for women. Then, she examines and questions the common association of women with the novel, suggesting that persistent association of women with the genre was yet another effort to keep women on the margins of literature. In chapters seven through twelve, Reid carefully analyzes novels of varying lengths by a diverse selection of nineteenth- and twentieth-century women writers. Her goal is to reveal the extreme...

A Puzzle Regarding Reid's Theory of Motives

In Essays on the Active Powers, Thomas Reid offers two different accounts of motives. According to the first, motives are the ends for which we act. According to the second, they are mental states, such as desires, that incite us to action. These two accounts, I claim, do not fit comfortably with Reid's agent causal account of human action. My project in this article is to explain why and then to propose a strategy for reconciling these two accounts with Reid's views about action.

Reid and Moral Emotions

The name of Thomas Reid rarely appears in discussions of the history of moral thought. This is a pity, since Reid has a lot of interesting ideas that can contribute to the current discussions in meta-ethics. Reid can be understood as an ethical intuitionist. What makes his account especially interesting is the role affective states play in his intuitionist theory. Reid defends a cognitive theory of moral emotions. According to Reid, there are moral feelings that are the result of a moral judgment made by reason. The judgment and the feeling together constitute what Reid calls sentiments. Reid thinks that affective states (feelings and sentiments) play the role of helping reason to guide and control the egoistic feelings and passions. The affective states are particularly important, in Reid's view, because the motivating force of reason is often defeated by the stronger motivating force of the passions. So without affective states, we would often not be able to do what is morally good or right. In this paper, I will argue that the role of the affective states is still too limited in Reid's approach. He takes affective states to have a merely motivational function, namely, to help reason to control the passions and motivate to action where reason is too weak. Reid thinks that in making moral judgments we do not need to have feelings, feelings are at most a result of a judgment. Instead, I will argue that affective states also play an epistemological role.

INTUITIONISM'S BURDEN: THOMAS REID ON THE PROBLEM OF MORAL MOTIVATION

Hume bequeathed to rational intuitionists a problem concerning moral judgment and the will – a problem of sufficient severity that it is still cited as one of the major reasons why intuitionism is untenable.1Stated in general terms, the problem concerns how an intuitionist moral theory can account for the intimate connection between moral judgment and moral motivation. One reason that this is still considered to be a problem for intuitionists is that it is widely assumed that the early intuitionists made little progress towards solving it. In this essay, I wish to challenge this assumption by examining one of the more subtle intuitionist responses to Hume, viz., that offered by Thomas Reid. For reasons that remain unclear to me, Reid's response to Hume on this issue has been almost entirely neglected. I shall argue that it is nonetheless one that merits our attention, for at least two reasons.In the first place, Reid's response to Hume's challenge to rational intuitionism bears a close affinity to the type of response that he offers to Hume's broadly skeptical challenge to realist views regarding our perception of the external world. Since Reid's strategy in the latter case is widely regarded as exhibiting significant promise, it is natural to wonder whether, when applied to the moral domain, this type of strategy displays similar promise.2I will suggest that it does. That is, I will suggest that since Reid's broadly nativist position in perception is one well worth considering, then so also is his broadly nativist account of moral motivation. Second, Reid's position regarding moral motivation represents an intriguing attempt to blend a broadly intuitionist view with important insights from the sentimentalist tradition. In this respect, Reid's view is a genuine hybrid position unlike that offered by other intuitionists such as Richard Price. The synthetic character of Reid's position, I claim, gives it a unique type of theoretical richness, since it incorporates some very attractive features of both rational intuitionism and sentimentalism.

Consciousness AND REGRESS

Thomas Reid has a theory of consciousness that is central to his philosophy of mind but which raises a regress problem. I have two tasks in this paper. The first is to give an account of Reid's views on consciousness and the avoidance of the regress based on textual analysis. The second is to expand the theory of consciousness Reid gives to offer a deeper explanation of how the regress is avoided that is based on Reid's philosophy of mind but goes beyond any text from Reid that I know. The distinction is important. Philosophers are inclined to attribute to a philosopher views that they have invented by studying the philosopher. Both textual analysis and invention based on a philosopher's writings are legitimate uses of the history of philosophy. When they are confused, however, arguments about what the philosopher held generate confusion. If you invent something from his or her philosophy, even something implied by it, that is your philosophy, not the philosopher's. The distinction is important for avoiding useless disputes. This first part of my paper is an attempt to remain true to the texts of Reid. The second part goes beyond the text, though it is what I extrapolate from Reid.

Thomas Reid: Context, Influence, Significance (review)

Reviewed by: Thomas Reid: Context, Influence, Significance Ronald E. Beanblossom Joseph Houston , editor. Thomas Reid: Context, Influence, Significance. Edinburgh: Dunedin Academic Press, 2004. Pp. 192. Cloth, $45.00. The impetus for this volume was a 1996 conference at Glasgow University marking the bicentennial of Reid's death. Topics addressed range from Reid's refutation of skepticism [End Page 126] to M.A. Stewart's "Sources for Reid's Views on Personal Identity." Stewart is at his best addressing Reid's indebtedness to Butler and Clarke on personal identity. What is not well developed are the arguments supporting Stewart's claim that in following the logic of Butler and Clarke, Reid fares no better than others. For example, contrary to Stewart's claim, Reid does not contend it is a "manifest absurdity" for the self to have "bodily parts" any more than it would be absurd for the self to have memories. However, "having" either one does not entail they are part of self identity. Stewart's second contribution, "Rational Religion and Common Sense," is a revision of his narrative presented in a 1995 Gifford lecture. Stewart convincingly argues that development of Reid's thought was precipitated by the challenge of Hume's views. Their competing views on the possibility of rational religion are used to make this point. "Reid's Defense of Freedom," by R. F. Stalley, is a suggestively argued account of Reid's refutation of the compatibilism of Hume and Priestly, and of Reid's view of freedom. Stalley finds problematic Reid's concept of "power over the will." Reid's 6th first principle of contingent truths is "that we have some degree of power over our actions and the determinations of our will." Moreover, Reid objects to Hume's compatibilism, which extends freedom only to our power to act but not to our power to determine the will. Thus, it would seem a straightforward interpretation that Reid regards human freedom as consisting of our ability to act otherwise in concert with our ability to choose otherwise. Stalley, however, rejects this interpretation because "it is not a natural reading of the text" (39). Stalley opts for an alternative interpretation of "power over the will" as acting on reasons we understand and accept. He then points out that this interpretation creates more serious (and obvious) problems for Reid. Would not these be prima facie reasons for rejecting this interpretation? In his introduction, Joseph Houston discusses Reid's use of ridicule and analogy to refute objections rather than to support his own views. However, in "Testimony, Contrasted with Judgment and Opinion," Houston reveals another use of analogy by Reid—to explicate his views. Reid uses the tribunal analogy to explicate the difference between judgment and testimony. Houston cogently argues in defense of Reid against Coady's claim that Reid is unable to account adequately for the relation of judgment and testimony. Nicholas Wolterstorff calls Reid a philosopher "Sinking wisely in the darkness" (101). He argues that for Reid, true wisdom consists in the practical rather than theoretical use of our powers. However, in making his case Wolterstorff underestimates the importance Reid attaches to the intellectual powers, since they are necessary for the proper exercise of active power. Nonetheless, in the end Wolterstorff feels justified in changing Reid's comment about what is laudable in man from "the proper exercise of that human power" to "[active] power" (101). The "darkness" details Reid's refusal to speculate about what cannot be known, e.g., how willing causes the body to move and how God causes the world to work. Perhaps in Reid's "darkness" we find not simply "piety" but wisdom of a Socratic sort. Reid does not pretend to know more than he does or can know. Paul Helm in "Reid and 'Reformed' Epistemology" offers a lucid and well-argued refutation of Plantinga and Wolterstorff, who interpret Reid as a reformed epistemologist. This is relevant for their own argument that there can be rational belief without argument—especially belief in God. Helm concludes that "Reid, if not a classical foundationalist . . . is a foundationalist in the sense that he is a universal externalist and a particular internalist" (120). His able analysis...

Reid's Foundation for the Primary/Secondary Quality Distinction

Reid offers an under-appreciated account of the primary/secondary quality distinction. He gives sound reasons for rejecting the views of Locke, Boyle, Galileo and others, and presents a better alternative, according to which the distinction is epistemic rather than metaphysical. Primary qualities, for Reid, are qualities whose intrinsic natures can be known through sensation. Secondary qualities, on the other hand, are unknown causes of sensations. Some may object that Reid's view is internally inconsistent, or unacceptably relativistic. However, a deeper understanding shows that it is consistent, and relative only to normal humans. To acquire this deeper understanding, one must also explore the nature of dispositions, Reid's rejection of the theory of ideas, his distinction between sensation and perception, and his distinction between natural and acquired perceptions.

Reid, Kant and the Philosophy of Mind

I suggest a possible rehabilitation of Reid's philosophy of mind by a constructive use of Kant's criticisms of the common sense tradition. Kant offers two criticisms, explicitly claiming that common sense philosophy is ill directed methodologically, and implicitly rejecting Reid's view that there is direct epistemological access by introspection to the ontology of mind. Putting the two views together reveals a tension between epistemology and ontology, but the problem which Kant finds in Reid also infects his own system, as his weaker ontological claims are undermined to such an extent by the necessary reintroduction of self‐consciousness that the justification he seeks for reason fails to be reached epistemologically. Plausible solutions to these parallel tensions imply that both Reid and Kant have a pre‐systematic concept of mind, and may lead to the conclusion that Reid's method is more economical in the elaboration of an ontology for the philosophy of mind.

Reid's Anti-Sensationalism and His Realism

I wish to discuss Thomas Reid's defense of and case for realism with respect to mind-independent bodies (material objects). While Reid's realism has received a good deal of attention lately, what I believe to be the centerpiece of Reid's case for his realism his anti-sensationalist view of our concepts of bodies and their qualities-has been largely neglected. In what follows, I show the connection between Reid's anti-sensationalism and his realism, and I then critically assess Reid's anti-sensationalism. Reid's views are developed largely as a reaction to the views of Berkeley and Hume. It will be important, therefore, to examine some of the relevant aspects of these philosophers' thought and Reid's interpretation of them.

Thomas Reid on the Moral Sense

In this paper, I state Thomas Reid's views about the and his criticism of the moral-sense theories of Francis Hutcheson and David Hume. I argue that Reid's views about the has a distinct advan tage over Hutcheson's while they offer a viable alternative to Hume's. 1. The Words moral sense are associated with the ethical theories of Hutcheson and Hume, and one must have some acquaintance with the con ception of a embodied in these theories to appreciate fully why Reid advances a quite different conception. These ethical theories advance accounts of the nature of some of our ethical ideas. One such is the idea of goodness or virtue. The precise account of the nature of goodness advanced by either Hutcheson or Hume is a controversial matter, but it is generally agreed that the notion of a feeling of approval is an essential part of any account that can plausibly be attributed to Hutcheson or Hume. The sense, according to Hutcheson and Hume, is our capacity to have feelings of approval and disapproval; it disposes us to approve of some things and disap prove of others. (Thus both Hutcheson and Hume thought we were innately disposed to approve benevolently motivated actions.) It is important to realize that Hutcheson especially regards the capacity to have feelings of approval and disapproval as a similar to the of sight. He posits a to solve a problem for empiricism that he did not think Locke's empiricism satisfactorily solved: the problem of ex plaining the origin of our ideas.

Reid's direct approach to perception

Reid's criticism of the theory of ideas is regarded as his most important philosophical contribution, while his sensation — perception distinction is considered to be his most important psychological contribution. This is surprising since the sensation — perception distinction is one of the basic tenets of the traditional theory of ideas. In order to face this difficulty, I compare Reid's formulation of the sensation — perception distinction with the traditional approach. Contrary to the prevailing opinion, I show that the two formulations differ on essential issues. Consequently, Reid's criticism of the theory of ideas is compatible with his mature view of the sensation — perception distinction (Section I). Understanding Reid's stand in this matter enables us to discuss some features of his direct approach to perception (Section II), and to compare it to a recent psychological formulation of the direct approach as expressed in the Gibsonian, ecological approach (Section III). The discussion shows the relevance and importance of Reid's view for an adequate description of perception.