Thomas Reid: Context, Influence, Significance (review)

Abstract

Reviewed by: Thomas Reid: Context, Influence, Significance Ronald E. Beanblossom Joseph Houston , editor. Thomas Reid: Context, Influence, Significance. Edinburgh: Dunedin Academic Press, 2004. Pp. 192. Cloth, $45.00. The impetus for this volume was a 1996 conference at Glasgow University marking the bicentennial of Reid's death. Topics addressed range from Reid's refutation of skepticism [End Page 126] to M.A. Stewart's "Sources for Reid's Views on Personal Identity." Stewart is at his best addressing Reid's indebtedness to Butler and Clarke on personal identity. What is not well developed are the arguments supporting Stewart's claim that in following the logic of Butler and Clarke, Reid fares no better than others. For example, contrary to Stewart's claim, Reid does not contend it is a "manifest absurdity" for the self to have "bodily parts" any more than it would be absurd for the self to have memories. However, "having" either one does not entail they are part of self identity. Stewart's second contribution, "Rational Religion and Common Sense," is a revision of his narrative presented in a 1995 Gifford lecture. Stewart convincingly argues that development of Reid's thought was precipitated by the challenge of Hume's views. Their competing views on the possibility of rational religion are used to make this point. "Reid's Defense of Freedom," by R. F. Stalley, is a suggestively argued account of Reid's refutation of the compatibilism of Hume and Priestly, and of Reid's view of freedom. Stalley finds problematic Reid's concept of "power over the will." Reid's 6th first principle of contingent truths is "that we have some degree of power over our actions and the determinations of our will." Moreover, Reid objects to Hume's compatibilism, which extends freedom only to our power to act but not to our power to determine the will. Thus, it would seem a straightforward interpretation that Reid regards human freedom as consisting of our ability to act otherwise in concert with our ability to choose otherwise. Stalley, however, rejects this interpretation because "it is not a natural reading of the text" (39). Stalley opts for an alternative interpretation of "power over the will" as acting on reasons we understand and accept. He then points out that this interpretation creates more serious (and obvious) problems for Reid. Would not these be prima facie reasons for rejecting this interpretation? In his introduction, Joseph Houston discusses Reid's use of ridicule and analogy to refute objections rather than to support his own views. However, in "Testimony, Contrasted with Judgment and Opinion," Houston reveals another use of analogy by Reid—to explicate his views. Reid uses the tribunal analogy to explicate the difference between judgment and testimony. Houston cogently argues in defense of Reid against Coady's claim that Reid is unable to account adequately for the relation of judgment and testimony. Nicholas Wolterstorff calls Reid a philosopher "Sinking wisely in the darkness" (101). He argues that for Reid, true wisdom consists in the practical rather than theoretical use of our powers. However, in making his case Wolterstorff underestimates the importance Reid attaches to the intellectual powers, since they are necessary for the proper exercise of active power. Nonetheless, in the end Wolterstorff feels justified in changing Reid's comment about what is laudable in man from "the proper exercise of that human power" to "[active] power" (101). The "darkness" details Reid's refusal to speculate about what cannot be known, e.g., how willing causes the body to move and how God causes the world to work. Perhaps in Reid's "darkness" we find not simply "piety" but wisdom of a Socratic sort. Reid does not pretend to know more than he does or can know. Paul Helm in "Reid and 'Reformed' Epistemology" offers a lucid and well-argued refutation of Plantinga and Wolterstorff, who interpret Reid as a reformed epistemologist. This is relevant for their own argument that there can be rational belief without argument—especially belief in God. Helm concludes that "Reid, if not a classical foundationalist . . . is a foundationalist in the sense that he is a universal externalist and a particular internalist" (120). His able analysis...