Thomas Reid on the Moral Sense

Abstract

In this paper, I state Thomas Reid's views about the and his criticism of the moral-sense theories of Francis Hutcheson and David Hume. I argue that Reid's views about the has a distinct advan tage over Hutcheson's while they offer a viable alternative to Hume's. 1. The Words moral sense are associated with the ethical theories of Hutcheson and Hume, and one must have some acquaintance with the con ception of a embodied in these theories to appreciate fully why Reid advances a quite different conception. These ethical theories advance accounts of the nature of some of our ethical ideas. One such is the idea of goodness or virtue. The precise account of the nature of goodness advanced by either Hutcheson or Hume is a controversial matter, but it is generally agreed that the notion of a feeling of approval is an essential part of any account that can plausibly be attributed to Hutcheson or Hume. The sense, according to Hutcheson and Hume, is our capacity to have feelings of approval and disapproval; it disposes us to approve of some things and disap prove of others. (Thus both Hutcheson and Hume thought we were innately disposed to approve benevolently motivated actions.) It is important to realize that Hutcheson especially regards the capacity to have feelings of approval and disapproval as a similar to the of sight. He posits a to solve a problem for empiricism that he did not think Locke's empiricism satisfactorily solved: the problem of ex plaining the origin of our ideas.