Regional Security Architecture Research Articles

Иран на пути к региональной интеграции: политические и экономические аспекты взаимоотношений с государствами-членами ШОС

The article examines Iran’s relationship with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), analyses the process of establishing cooperation with the member states of this organization, primarily Russia and China, in the field of regional security, as well as the political and economic spheres. The history of Iran’s inclusion in the SCO, the dynamics of cooperation, as well as the impact of this interaction on regional and world politics are explored. The focus is on joint projects, diplomatic, trade and economic relations, as well as potential challenges and prospects for cooperation between Iran and the SCO. The work notes that Iran’s desire for full membership in this organization was reinforced by the confrontation with the leading Western powers led by the United States and fit into the framework of Eastern policy with the prospect of an alliance with Russia and China. It is emphasized that due to opposition to Iran’s desire to strengthen its independence and sovereignty, Western powers prevented its inclusion in the regional or international security architecture. Under these conditions, Iran has intensified its efforts in search of its place in the international security system, relying on the idea of national identity and drawing closer to Russia and China. It is noted that the negative consequences of sanctions, threats of military intervention, cyber warfare and attempts to destabilize the Islamic regime were the main methods of Western policy towards Iran. Based on this, accession to the SCO was considered by the Iranian leadership as the most important task to neutralize Western sanctions and become one of the leaders in the regional security system.

Vietnam-China and the Indo-Pacific

This research paper delves into the intricate relationship between Vietnam and China in the Indo-Pacific region, offering a multifaceted exploration across various dimensions. The study commences with an examination of Vietnam's demographics. The paper proceeds to underscore the growing relevance of the Indo-Pacific for Vietnam, on a strategic perspective. Vietnam's standing in the region is meticulously analysed, taking into account its historical and contemporary positioning amidst evolving regional dynamics. Vietnam's perception of the Indo-Pacific is a pivotal focus, examining its outlook and its strategic priorities within the broader context of regional challenges and opportunities, notably in the South China Sea. The study further delves into the development of Vietnamese South China Sea policy, encompassing territorial disputes and economic interests, culminating in an exploration of Vietnam's grand plan for the South China Sea. A central theme is Vietnam's "THREE NOS" policy, reflecting its judicious and pragmatic approach to regional complexities. The paper delineates Vietnam's efforts to enhance strategic partnerships with major Indo-Pacific powers, including the USA, Australia, India, and Japan, positioning it as an integral player in the regional security architecture. In addition to discussing strategic alliances with powerful nations, the paper offers details on Vietnam-China relations from the 1970s until their postCold War normalisation. In conclusion, the research provides a set of policy recommendations for Vietnam to navigate its complex relationship with China in the Indo-Pacific, emphasizing continued engagement with major powers, strengthening strategic partnerships, and adopting a balanced and pragmatic approach. This comprehensive analysis offers valuable insights into Vietnam's evolving role in the Indo-Pacific and its strategic imperatives.

The peace formula of Volodymyr Zelenskyy before and after the Vilnius NATO summit

Abstract. The Peace Formula put forward by Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the G20 Summit was a response to the challenges caused by the russian-Ukrainian war and the destruction of the existing world order that followed it. Undoubtedly, the Formula stirred great resonance both among diplomatic circles and the entire international environment since the old system of regional and global security was destroyed, and the global world now faced the problem of finding the contours of a new architecture of international security. Therefore, the Formula represented an attempt to simultaneously solve a whole set of different-scale and multi-directional strategic tasks: urgent and long-term, regional and global, etc. The level of priority of those tasks depends not just on the course and outcome of russian-Ukrainian war but also on the challenges and threats that subsequently emerged at the global level of international security. The article describes the conditions and factors that preceded the emergence of the Peace Formula, as well as the process of filling the sessions and content of the document. The author emphasises the Formula’s significance for potential negotiations with russia to end the war and analyses the positions of key geopolitical actors regarding the implementation of the Peace Formula and its role in formulating security guarantees for Ukraine. Other aspects covered in the study include the influence of the decisions of the Vilnius NATO Summit on the fulfilment of the items of the Peace Formula, the prospects of security guarantees for Ukraine, and the ultimate formation of a new regional security architecture. Key words: Peace Formula, security guarantees, NATO, regional security.

Some Trends in the Development of Regional Integration Processes in Southeast Asia in the 2020s.

This study discusses the long-term impact of the newly created institutions of the Indo-Pacific region (IPR) on the main regional integration institution of Southeast Asia (SEA), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and assesses the consequences of the implementation of the IPR concept by ASEAN countries.Aim . Determine the main trends in the development of regional integration processes in Southeast Asia in the 2020s. in the context of the Indo-Pacific process.Tasks. Determine the role of SEA countries in the Indo-Pacific process; identify the nature of the influence of AUKUS on the development trends of the regional security architecture of SEA; establish the impact of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) on the sustainable economic development of SEA countries.Methods. The methodological basis of this study is based on general scientific methods (system analysis, forecasting), political science methods, approaches to the analysis of regional security complexes existing in international relations studies (B. Buzan [3], O. Waver [5], J. De Wilde [4], A. Acharya [2]) and to the analysis of regional economic integration and its stages (J. Pelkmans [10]).Results . The inclusion of ASEAN countries in the Indo-Pacific process initiated by the United States of America (USA) and its allies in the future in 2030 leadsto 1) an increase in military spending, which may indicate a reduction in the level of trust in the region, 2) a reduction in the rate of convergence of the economies of Southeast Asian countries, which may indicate a growing imbalance in the level of development of ASEAN countries.Conclusions . The implementation of the IPR concept by ASEAN countries leads to the erosion of the “ASEAN-centricity” of regional institutions in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as to the projected reduction in the effectiveness of ASEAN in achieving the goals of a regional integration institution, namely: 1) an increase in military spending in the countries of the Asia-Pacific region in the 2020s, including in the ASEAN countries, indicating about the declining level of trust in relations with the PRC, leading to a decrease in the effectiveness of ASEAN diplomatic mechanisms to resolve existing disputes with China over the South China Sea; 2) the pace of catching-up development of poor Southeast Asian countries in the 2020s. are reduced, the implementation of IPEF will only be able to ensure some uneven economic growth in the most developed countries of Southeast Asia, it is becoming increasingly difficult for poor countries to catch up with the more developed countries of Southeast Asia in their level of economic development, and ASEAN’s goal of ensuring equitable economic development is becoming less achievable.

Southeast Asia in the context of the rivalry between the USA and China

The article examines the specifics of the situation in Southeast Asia (Southeast Asia) from the point of view of military security issues and in connection with the situation in the Indo-Pacific region (ITR). The author proceeds from the fact that a serious destabilizing factor in the region remains the presence of intraregional contradictions - political, territorial and ethno-confessional, which are used by extra-regional actors under the auspices of the United States. Having identified China and Russia as the main rivals, Washington improved its Indo-Pacific strategy, activated the activities of existing ones and began to form new military-political alliances, on the basis of which it is envisaged to create an Asia-Pacific branch of NATO to contain them. The author believes that Washington's policy in Southeast Asia is opposed by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which proceeds from its central role in the evolution of the regional security architecture. In the context of the escalating rivalry between the United States and China, ASEAN sees a way to overcome the complex of regional contradictions in creating a security system based on mechanisms associated with ASEAN. In the ASEAN concept, the ITR appears as a region of dialogue and cooperation, not competition, open to China and other interested states to participate in the project. The author comes to the conclusion that such a statement of the question is justified both from the point of view of the strategic interests of the Southeast Asian countries themselves, and in general of the entire ITR. Analyzing the strategy adopted by Washington, the author believes that it becomes a long-term factor of strategic planning in the Pentagon. Its main goal will be to forcefully counter China's policy and put pressure on Russia and ASEAN, which seek to resist the dominance of the United States in the IT. In his opinion, in the current conditions of the situation, it is necessary to further strengthen the comprehensive strategic partnership between Russia and China and deepen cooperation with ASEAN on the basis of common interests in order to ensure regional security and stability.

The impact of political, military, and social factors on the repositioning of Belarus within the regional security architecture

The next phase of Russian aggression against Ukraine demonstrated that despite lacking a large military, territorial, population, or raw material potential, Belarus could play a significant role in the project to construct a new regional, continental, and even global security architecture. The purpose of this article is to discuss the problem of repositioning Belarus, which was affected not only by the multidimensional change in Belarusian-Ukrainian relations as a result of the war but also by long-term efforts to elevate Belarusian-EU relations. In this area, the fundamental research question is whether the war in Ukraine, the breach of the so-called Budapest Memorandum and the deepening of the multifaceted Russian-Belarusian integration within the Union State (including the militarisation of Belarus and the allocation of tactical nuclear weapons) will cause the projects for the redefinition of Belarus-EU relations (which are instrumental in reducing the intensity of political turbulence in the region) to disappear from the EU diplomatic agenda for a long time, with a direct negative impact on the future of European security. The article verifies the hypothesis that due to the specificity of the Belarusian authoritarian model, despite the systematically deepening Russian-Belarusian integration and the ever-expanding sanctions policy towards Belarus, (2) due to the shape of Belarusian-Ukrainian relations after 2014 and the periodically satisfactory Belarusian-EU relations, (1) there are still prospects for Belarus to pursue foreign policy diversification and repositioning of the European vector in it.

The Challenges of Regional Integration and Effective Implementation of African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Policy in Africa

The paper is an investigation of the challenges of regional integration in Africa and their effects on the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) policy. The major objective of the paper is to proffer solutions to the challenges for the effective actualization of the policy. The assumptions of the neo-liberal theory were used to support the AfCFTA initiative to promote economic growth and development in Africa. The data used to advance the argument were obtained from secondary sources of data collection. The study finds that language barrier, multiple currencies, porosity of borders, foreign interference, political instability and insecurity, poor human development, over-lapping of membership of sub-regional organizations, poor state of infrastructure, and state-centric nature of integration initiatives are some of the core challenges hindering the effective execution of the AfCFTA policy. The study recommends that the African Union (AU) should intensify effort at realizing a single currency policy for Africa; design comprehensive regional security architecture to include high technological surveillance, joint air and ground border patrol among member states of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to address trans-border crimes and insecurity. There should also be institutionalization of counterpart funding among AU member-states for infrastructural development; and encouragement of private and civil society participation in the integration initiative, among others. In concludes that if the challenges identified are not effectively addressed, it will be very difficult for the AU to successfully realize the objectives of the AfCFTA policy.

India and Australia: Strategic Maritime Partners in the Indo-Pacific

In this article the author analyses the strategic, security and maritime aspects of cooperation between India and Australia and describes how this relationship is underpinned by growing economic and people to people ties. It addresses a number of important questions including, what are the strategic drivers in the Australia-India Relationship? What are the areas of convergence in the strategic outlooks of the two countries? What are the areas of divergence in the strategic outlooks of the two countries? Why both countries must cooperate within the Regional Security Architecture. What are our doubts and reservations about each other? What common challenges are Australia and India likely to face in the future? How can we develop the Regional Security Architecture for the Indian Ocean region? What is the Evolving Asian Maritime Landscape in the Eastern Indian Ocean? How do we assess the development of India-Australia Defense and Security Ties? How has Civil Nuclear Cooperation consolidated the Strategic Ties between the two countries? What are the prospects for India-Australia Economic and People to People Ties? How does India look at Australia?

ASEAN, Chinese and US legitimation strategies over the Indo-Pacific security architecture

Abstract As growing Sino-US tensions have led to increasingly contested architecture in the Asia–Pacific, rival actors have become more vocal in legitimizing their preferred structures. Yet supplanting existing, accepted structures requires legitimation, and raises questions this article seeks to address: how do competing actors legitimize their preferred architectures and what influences their legitimation strategies? This article looks at US-, China- and ASEAN-led legitimation strategies through Lenz and Söderbaum's three analytical perspectives (agent-, audience-, or environment-based approaches). The article argues that legitimation strategies will correlate with relative power in that established, rising and weak powers will source their strategies from agent, audience and environment bases respectively. The empirical basis is explored through three questions concerning the regional security architecture: the dispute over regional demarcation (‘Indo-Pacific’), the relevant structures of security provision and the idea of a ‘rules-based order.’ Assessing these issues against domestic sources of influence, adjustment for international audience demands and attempts to reconcile other actors' preferences, the article finds that actors' legitimation strategies correlate with their relational power: the US relied on agent-based legitimation, China usually pursued audience-based strategies and ASEAN used environment-based legitimation. These present distinct policy constraints for their respective goals.

Sino-Indian Dynamics in South Asia: A Systemic Security Environment Approach

The complex strategic scenario as a resultant of the Sino-Indian dynamics in South Asia require a comprehensive outlook that encompasses various theoretical underpinnings of the broader security school in International Relations. This article bases the conceptualization of such a reality upon Tang’s formulation. He outlines four major aspects to describe an approach to ‘security complex’ or regional security architecture. These are geographical barriers, state-to-state interaction, international structure and military technology. This article examines all four aspects in a comparative analytical format. Considering the flaring up of regional tensions as a resultant of the intermingling of factors outside the realm of traditional security conceptualization, a limitation of the framework espoused by Tang is observed. The article concludes that the limitations of Tang’s formulation, that is the exclusion of non-traditional security issues, often create similar systemic pressure on the regional security system as the traditional factors mentioned by Tang and require inclusion in the systemic security environment approach.

Europe Vis-À-Vis the Changing Regional Order in the MENA

Europe’s relations with the states of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are facing a critical juncture. When looking at a regional security architecture, Europe’s overarching interest is stability as it prevents conflict and state vacuums from menacing trade and energy supply routes, creating safe havens for terrorist organizations or hostile powers and fueling refugee flows toward Europe. However, compared to the past, European actors are confronted with a sharply new scenario in MENA that challenges these interests, given a progressive retrenchment of the United States, the rise of China, and MENA actors playing a more assertive role in regional politics and conflicts. The February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine is further accelerating these trends. Against this shifting background, MENA countries have intensified efforts to diversify their partnerships with rising global and regional players. European actors still struggle to come to grip with the multipolar scenario in the making—and to design an appropriate strategy to respond.

Jordan and the Abraham Accords

This article argues that Jordan should advocate for transforming the Abraham Accords’ regional integration initiatives into a regional security architecture that brings prosperity and security to all its members—including the Palestinians. Jordan is well positioned to influence the Accords’ strategic planners given its credibility, diplomatic assets, and strategic location; it will continue to be a lynchpin in regional security and future integration plans.

Turkey in Poland’s Foreign Policy

Polish-Turkish relations have a rich history. Both states have played an important role in the regional security architecture. The geopolitical aspirations of the two countries also have deep historical roots and continue to retain their importance in the foreign policy of both countries. In the current circumstances, Polish-Turkish relations are of interest as an example of cooperation between two states whose key interests are focused on gaining a new status in the international system. The emerging model of interaction between Poland and Turkey represents a segment of the system of international relations, the process of renewal of which is currently being realised.

The US View of the Transforming Strategic Context in the MENA

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently reiterated US support for the expansion of the Abraham Accords and called for renewed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. As highlighted by this volume’s authors, the Accords are the most significant regional peacemaking achievement in decades, having already reduced Arab-Israeli tensions—particularly at the government level—and provided opportunities for Arab states to mediate between Israel and the Palestinians. The changing regional security architecture can only be welcomed by the United States. Yet, due to political authoritarianism in the region, the Accords may fall short of their potential if the economic gains fail to reach marginalized populations. This essay contends that trade relations that support job creation and access to water and energy may increase public support. Just as a return to Israeli-Palestinian negotiations is important, political reform in the Arab countries is needed to make the Accords successful by bringing more economic benefits to the Arab streets and ensuring that there will not be a “Cold Peace.”

Russia and India in Central Asia: Review of Foreign Policy Directions and Formation of Joint Approaches

The article is devoted to an overview of the foreign policy attitudes of Russia and India in Central Asia, as well as the possibilities and limitations of the formation of joint approaches to solving various problems of sustainable development of the Central Asian mega-region. The article attempts to answer the following questions: – how can one assess the place of Central Asia in bilateral relations between Russia and India?; – does India's policy aimed at strengthening interaction with the countries of Central Asia contradict Russia's national interests?; – how can such associations as the SCO, BRICS, CSTO and EAEU contribute to the development of the Central Asian direction of Russian-Indian relations? The above-mentioned questions were put to 7 employees of research organizations that specialize in various aspects of Indian foreign policy. According to experts, the promising practices initiated by India in relation to the states of Central Asia are inferior to the emerging Chinese-Pakistani connection in the region. If India, entering Central Asia, seeks to represent itself as a Pan-Asian player, then Russia, reformatting its system of interactions with the countries of Central Asia, resolutely secures the status of a Eurasian leader. For India, Central Asia is part of an extended neighborhood, whereas for Russia it is the near abroad, where Moscow is focused on forming the closest possible relations. It is concluded that the presence of India in Central Asia does not contradict Russian interests due to the fact that this presence on the part of India cannot be increased to the critical point when the situation in the mega-region can get out of Moscow's control. At the same time, the common interest of Russia and India in maintaining the regional security architecture, the desire of both states to build trade and economic projects in Central Asia by expanding the region’s transit potential, in combination with the inability of New Delhi to enter into allied relations with Beijing, allow us to speak about the high prospects of the Сentral-Asian vector of Russian-Indian relations.

The PRC’S Military Strategies on the Security Architecture of East and South China Sea under President Xi Jinping

Abstract:
 This article analyses the four main military strategies of the People's Republic of China toward the South and East China Seas Security architecture under President Xi Jinping. These strategies of Beijing have been applied mainly to the region, which has been under the US alliance system's security umbrella since the Cold War. The article demonstrates that the People's Republic of China, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, seeks to reorder the regional security architecture to its favour by leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and diplomatic-economic power to push out the US and allies’ countries' influence outside East and South China Seas. This article argues that the successful conclusion of the rising power's strategies over the East and South China seas will translate the current geopolitical rivalry to result in a power transition to the detriment of the rising power.
 Keywords: China, Xi Jinping, East China Sea, South China Sea, Power Transition

The Quad as a Security Actor

The Quad as a Security Actor Tanvi Madan (bio) When the Quad briefly emerged in 2007–8 among Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, this minilateral was referred to as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. Although some member states occasionally still use that term—often casually—it has been eschewed as a formal designation. Indeed, Quad members have gone out of their way to highlight a softer purpose rather than a security framing for the coalition. They have emphasized the idea of the group as a solutions provider for regional problems, including the Covid-19 crisis and climate change, while simultaneously officials have either denied or downplayed the grouping's security dimension.1 In September 2021, for instance, a senior U.S. official emphasized that the Quad "is not a regional security organization." The official further added that "there is not a military dimension…or security dimension" to the grouping.2 However, while the Quad is not a regional security organization or alliance and does not involve formal security commitments or treaty obligations, it does have security and even some military dimensions. This element may not be evident in members' public statements, but as this essay argues, it is a key component of the Quad and the cooperation between its members. The Quad's resurrection lay in the need to respond to a security challenge—a more assertive and powerful China. This was not the only driver, but without it, the Quad was neither necessary nor possible. The member states' desire to respond to this challenge by shaping a [End Page 49] favorable balance of power and building resilience in the region has led to several lines of effort, including in the defense and security domains. Among other elements, these interactions have involved building on a relatively low base of member-state interconnection in these sectors, particularly with India. Members' engagement in these realms has been evident in three areas: (1) security consultations and activities via the Quad, (2) sub-Quad activities, involving the deepening of ties between the Quad partners bilaterally and trilaterally, and (3) supra-Quad activities, consisting of member-state cooperation with other like-minded partners. The China Driver The Quad re-emerged in 2017 in the context of Beijing's increasing assertiveness, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. Each of the member states had growing concerns about China's intentions, expanding capabilities, and footprint, as well as the region's vulnerabilities. In addition, it was neither feasible nor desirable for strategic, economic, or political reasons for any of these countries to tackle the China challenge alone. The regional security architecture was also underdeveloped and unequal to the task, while U.S. bilateral alliances and regional partnerships were insufficient to deal with the challenge, as were international organizations. Moreover, some of the United States' allies did not share either the same concerns or its risk tolerance toward China—and those that did were linked through a hub-and-spoke alliance system that connected each ally with the United States but not closely with one other. Finally, although it was a like-minded ally, Japan, for largely historical reasons, had been a reticent and limited security actor, while India, a key country that also shared concerns about China—and was willing to do something about the challenge—stood outside the U.S. alliance system. These willing and capable countries felt a need to broaden and deepen their consultation, coordination, and cooperation to help address the challenge that China posed. For Australia, Japan, and the United States, a collective security solution might have been the answer, but not for non-ally India. The next best option, to tweak Charlie Lyons Jones's framing, was collaborative security.3 Enter the Quad. [End Page 50] Since 2017, with a shared (though not identical) threat assessment in the region vis-à-vis greater Chinese assertiveness, several of the Quad's activities seem to be devised around two lines of effort: shaping a favorable balance of power so that a unipolar, China-dominant Asia does not emerge, and building resilience in the region. Both have involved an element of bolstering individual member capacity, their collective capacity as a minilateral grouping, and regional capacity to detect...

"No One Can Force Vietnam to Choose Sides": Vietnam as a Self-Reliant Middle Power

executive summary: This essay examines how Vietnam is adapting to U.S.-China rivalry and argues that Vietnam's room for strategic maneuverability is diminishing as it faces growing internal and external pressure for policy adjustments. main argument In the past few years, Vietnam has been increasingly labeled as a middle power. Vietnam's emerging middle-power status coincides with a shifting strategic environment marked by China's expansionism that has nudged Vietnam toward closer U.S. relations. However, Vietnam's persistent foreign policy of self-reliance and independence, informed by the country's historical experiences and concerns over regime security, ensures that Hanoi stays nonaligned. Thus, while retaining autonomy in developing closer U.S. ties, Vietnam strikes a delicate balance between the two superpowers. Instead of relying on a single security guarantor, Vietnam has actively sought to promote rules-based principles and multilateralism in advancing its national interests, particularly vis-à-vis the South China Sea and the Mekong River. However, external and internal developments have strained Vietnam's ability to balance between the two superpowers. policy implications • While increasingly wary of China's behavior, Vietnam is unlikely to enter a formal alliance with the U.S. due to its firmly held values of self-reliance and independence. • Vietnam will continue to leverage multidirectional diplomacy to shape regional security and economic architectures in an effort to counterbalance China's influence and reduce Vietnamese dependence on China. • Vietnam should exercise more flexibility and show greater resolve in protecting its national interests. To this end, without abandoning its foreign policy of self-reliance and independence, Vietnam should explore new options to advance security cooperation with other major and middle powers with which it shares strategic interests.

Elite role conceptions and Indonesia’s agency in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific: reclaiming leadership

In June 2019, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) issued a shared regional vision, the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). The document ended a debate about how to respond to the concept of the Indo-Pacific, the United States’ Indo-Pacific Strategy, and new additions to regional security architecture, especially the Quad. Indonesia, traditionally a leading voice in ASEAN, exerted significant diplomatic capital developing and securing agreement on the AOIP after a period of diminished leadership from the organisation. Dominant explanations for this behaviour cannot fully address why the country led in constructing AOIP despite what most analysts agree was the disengagement of President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo (2014 -) from foreign policy. Developing an original ‘role integration’ model, this article argues that Indonesia was able to lead on AOIP because President Jokowi’s preference for maritime cooperation and economic diplomacy integrated with the Indonesian Foreign Ministry’s efforts to maintain ASEAN unity and centrality in this instance. The findings of this research offer both new empirical insights into the domestic decision-making processes that shaped Indonesia’s agency in AOIP and add to the role theory literature by shifting the analytical focus from domestic contestation to cooperative dynamics that can shape the national role conception.

Japan in the Gulf: Hedging between Washington and Tehran?

Whereas Japan’s hedging vis-à-vis China in the Indo-Pacific has predominantly been the focus of academic analysis, hedging also explains Tokyo’s policy choices in the Gulf to a significant degree. Yet, existing literature has largely overlooked Japan’s hedging behaviour in the Gulf, which had to navigate the uncertainties generated by two competing powers, the United States and Iran. As hedging theory is above all concerned with risk, Japan’s policies demonstrate a concern with managing risks and the adverse consequences of misalignment or alignment. Tokyo’s attempts to serve as what former Foreign Minister Kono Taro called an “honest broker”, however, have not enabled it to shape the evolving regional security architecture. Japan’s propensity to deploy hedging more effectively in the Gulf may be shaped by domestic political considerations, pressing security challenges closer to home and personalities of key Japanese politicians such as late former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo.