Abstract Research on the Mongol conquest of Iran and the Transcaucasus has focused most heavily on the campaigns of Chinggis Khan and his nephew Hülegü, in 1219–1224 and 1256–1260 respectively. Significantly less attention has been given to the nearly four decades that separate these two invasions, during which Mongol control was consolidated by a tamma (garrison) army numbering roughly 30,000 soldiers. This garrison occupied a liminal position on the frontier of the Mongol empire, linking the great khan to regional vassals in Iran, Greater Armenia, Georgia, and eastern Anatolia. This paper will use the history of the tamma to illuminate the web of personal relationships that allowed the Mongol empire to project its authority into the Middle East. It will demonstrate that this network was extremely brittle during the first three decades after Chinggis Khan’s death, during which time the Mongol empire was still taking shape. Founded by Chinggis Khan, the tamma owed its loyalty to the great khan in Mongolia, yet long interregnums and political instability at the heart of empire forced the Mongol garrison to identify regional princes and princesses as suitable substitutes for political authority. This collaborative approach embroiled the tamma in the factional politics at the heart of the Mongol empire and ultimately brought about its destruction in 1261.