Rebel Parties Research Articles

Between the ballot and the bullet: rebel-to-party transformations and the structure of the competitive field

ABSTRACT When rebel groups transition to electoral parties and participate in the democratic process, the prospects of peace are often fragile. We argue that rebel parties’ capacity to effectively participate in the electoral arena and contribute to post-conflict stability is contingent on the nature and legacies of the wartime competitive field. Where rebels and politicians shared claims of representation over their constituents in wartime, we argue that elections-related violence is likely in postwar elections when the rebels transition towards political parties. These former rebel parties challenges established electoral holds of political actors who previously represented the community at the ballot box while collaborating with insurgents. The transformation from wartime allies to direct electoral competition creates new incentives for violence, especially where violence is already normalized. Conversely, where established politicians maintain hegemonic representation of their constituency, they create strong barriers to entry for former insurgents in the electoral realm. As a result, the incentives for violence are much reduced. We analyse the Moro Islamic Liberation Front’s transformation into the United Bangsamoro Justice Party after the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro.

Transitioning Guerrillas: An Analysis of the Internal Cohesion of the Former FARC in Their Transit from War to Democracy

ABSTRACT The emergence of ex-rebels’ political parties after peace accords creates a vehicle for political reintegration, which in turn has positive effects on peace and democracy consolidation after war. However, many of these parties tend to break apart and disappear, elevating the risk of renewed cycles of political violence. In times of war, cohesion plays a pivotal role in maintaining the bonds among members of armed organizations. It empowers them to perform effectively even in the face of challenging conditions and continues to be a critical factor during postconflict transitions. By means of a quantitative analysis of former FARC guerrillas in Colombia, now part of a newly founded legal political party, we test whether ideology, organizational dynamics, or individual perceptions and motivations help to explain their levels of cohesion. Our results show that even if all dimensions add up to the observed cohesion levels, perceptions of internal democracy, and inclusion, are the most relevant. We argue that assistance to former rebels in their organizational reengineering efforts after war will help to reduce the risk of the negative effects of rebel party collapse.

Women’s Political Representation in African Rebel Parties

Previous articleNext article No AccessWomen's Political Representation in African Rebel PartiesElizabeth L BrannonElizabeth L Brannon Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Politics Just Accepted Sponsored by the Southern Political Science Association Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/723808 Views: 19Total views on this site HistoryAccepted October 14, 2022 © 2023 Southern Political Science Association. All Rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

Born out of civil wars: Are former rebel parties an organizationally distinct type of party?

In recent years, there has been a considerable amount of work on the transformation of formerly rebel groups into political parties. However, there is little work that examines the organizational types of parties that formerly armed groups become. Are these parties more likely to exhibit certain organizational characteristics when compared to other parties? This is an important question especially as scholars consider the role these former rebel parties play in the development of peace and democracy in post-civil war politics. Using data from Daly (2020) and Tuncel and Manning (2022) , as well as recently released data from V-Dem on political parties (Coppedge et al 2020) we find that former rebel parties are more clientelistic and personalistic than other parties, even compared to parties in countries where they compete. We suggest that these parties are unlikely to play a constructive role in post-conflict democratization.

Internal Politics and Activism in Former Rebel Parties

AbstractWho are the supporters of former rebel parties? Drawing on the classical party literature, we argue that the support base of former rebel parties consists predominantly of activists. These supporters are dissatisfied with intra-party politics because the benefits and costs of a rebel-to-party transformation are unequally distributed between them and the leadership. We test our arguments by examining the case of the novel FARC party (Comunes) in Colombia. Based on a unique sample of FARC supporters, we obtained unprecedented insight into the internal affairs of the FARC. Our survey design allowed us to generate an over-time comparison between FARC and other party supporters in the Colombian political system. The empirical analysis shows that in comparison, FARC supporters tend to be more politically active as well as more dissatisfied with internal politics. Furthermore, dissatisfaction with democracy and the peace agreement increased after their first electoral cycle.

Are former rebel parties more likely to engage in electoral violence in Africa?

ABSTRACT In this paper, we examine whether former rebel parties are more likely to engage in electoral violence than other parties. Using an original data set of 236 parties in 18 countries in Sub Saharan Africa (of which 47 were former rebel groups) from 1990-2018, we find that former rebel parties in Africa are more likely to engage in electoral violence than other political parties. Further, we do find, after conducting an analysis of the Burundian case, that former rebel parties that possess “violence capital” are more likely to engage in electoral violence than other rebel groups that have less or no violence capital. We discuss the implications of these findings regarding the impact of rebel party inclusion on the post-conflict political process.

What structures ex-combatants’ political participation? Exploring the dynamics of identification and groupness in rebel-to-party transformations

ABSTRACT Academic literature on post-conflict peace-building and democratisation has established the important relevance of rebel-to-party transformations on the one hand, and of the political engagement of individual former combatants on the other hand. Yet, little is known about the interrelation between these two dimensions. This paper aims to address this knowledge gap, by proposing a framework to scrutinise former rebel parties’ ways of mobilising their former combatants politically. Based on a review of theoretical and empirical literature, we suggest three broad mobilisation strategies: the employment of material incentives, control and coercion, and strategies to nurture a sense of identification or even groupness. Given that this last dimension is less tangible than the first two, we further explore and conceptually dissect it, by discussing – what we argue to be – three of its main inherent components: ideology, emotions and patronage. By doing so, we hope to conceptually guide and inform future empirical research on the topic.

A Rationalist Explanation for Violence and Peace in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh

ABSTRACT Despite a checkered history of conflict, Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) has failed to attract scholarly attention to the fundamental questions of the onset and duration of violence, timing of a settlement with a peace treaty, and longevity of such a settlement. This paper addresses these questions within game-theoretic models offering a unified analytic narrative of the conflict. It argues that while engaged in a protracted insurgency with the Bangladesh state, Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS)—the rebel party—had to solve two collective action problems: first, with the state, and second, with the ethnic groups that required assurances before joining the costly fight against the state.

Born to run: where rebel parties participate in post-conflict local elections

ABSTRACT Where do newly formed rebel parties run their candidates for local elections? Most work on rebel parties examines the factors that explain rebel party success on the national level. However, few studies look at where rebel parties run candidates in elections and at the local level. We develop a dataset to analyze the activity of FARC (Fuerzas Alternative Revolucionaria del Común) in the 2019 local elections in Colombia. Using both a Firth Logit regression and Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial model, we found that former rebel parties are more likely to candidates in locations where they have had a historical presence, where ideologically similar parties also ran candidates, where there is a larger field of candidates, and in areas with less institutionalized elections.

The implementation of random survival forests in conflict management data: An examination of power sharing and third party mediation in post-conflict countries.

Time-to-event analysis is a common occurrence in political science. In recent years, there has been an increased usage of machine learning methods in quantitative political science research. This article advocates for the implementation of machine learning duration models to assist in a sound model selection process. We provide a brief tutorial introduction to the random survival forest (RSF) algorithm and contrast it to a popular predecessor, the Cox proportional hazards model, with emphasis on methodological utility for political science researchers. We implement both methods for simulated time-to-event data and the Power-Sharing Event Dataset (PSED) to assist researchers in evaluating the merits of machine learning duration models. We provide evidence of significantly higher survival probabilities for peace agreements with 3rd party mediated design and implementation. We also detect increased survival probabilities for peace agreements that incorporate territorial power-sharing and avoid multiple rebel party signatories. Further, the RSF, a previously under-used method for analyzing political science time-to event data, provides a novel approach for ranking of peace agreement criteria importance in predicting peace agreement duration. Our findings demonstrate a scenario exhibiting the interpretability and performance of RSF for political science time-to-event data. These findings justify the robust interpretability and competitive performance of the random survival forest algorithm in numerous circumstances, in addition to promoting a diverse, holistic model-selection process for time-to-event political science data.

Causal Pathways of Rebel Defection from Negotiated Settlements: A Theory of Strategic Alliances

While it is widely accepted that negotiated settlements are prone to breakdown, our understanding of the processes through which signatories defect lacks precision. A growing qualitative literature recognizes the potential for rebel group fluidity, yet the conflict field’s converging reliance on dyadic data obscures pathways of defection that result in splintering or merger in quantitative studies. An in-depth case study of a failed peace process in Uganda—which is misclassified in the extant data—helps to illustrate the ways in which excluded groups can lower the opportunity cost of defection for splintering factions, resulting in a strategic alliance. I test the generalizability of this argument against the full sample of rebel parties to settlements in Sub-Saharan Africa (1975–2015) using a large-N qualitative analysis of causal process observations (CPOs). The aggregated results provide strong evidence that the defection-by-alliance pathway is much more prevalent than previously recognized, accounting for more than one-third of all defections in the sample. Where settlements create shared incentives for stakeholders inside and outside the peace process to spoil, rebel elites appear more willing to bear the costs of an alliance with a rival, rather than surrendering under adverse conditions.

The Legacy of a Revolution that Never Happened: The Post-War Politics of Former Rebel Party RUFP in Sierra Leone

AbstractThe former rebel party Revolutionary United Front Party (RUFP) in Sierra Leone has struggled with a discredited wartime reputation and electoral defeats throughout the post-war period. In spite of this, the party has remained loyal to its wartime revolutionary ideas, symbols and political rhetoric. Why is this the case? In this article, I argue that the answer lies in the premises of party politics in war-torn states and new democracies on the African continent. In a political landscape where brokerage is power, retaining wartime identities can sometimes serve as a valuable source of (potential) patronage. With few other options for access to resources and opportunities, the core of the party membership has clung to its past as a means to both rally electoral support among the marginalized ex-combatant community and to get access to the long-awaited funds that were promised to them in the peace negotiations.

From “bush bureaucracies” to electoral competition: what explains the political success of rebel parties after civil wars?

ABSTRACTIn this paper, we examine the factors that explain the political success of former rebel parties in electoral competition after the end of civil wars. We develop a theoretical framework derived from the existing literature on the “new” political parties. This literature emphasizes three dimensions that have been cited as affecting party success – (1) the characteristics of the party organization as an “agent”; (2) the “supply” of political support; (3) the “structure of opportunities” or openings provided to political parties by the political environment. In particular, we examine the hypothesis that rebel groups that have developed organized wartime bureaucracies are more likely to succeed politically in the post-war electoral environment. Using a data set that includes 27 countries that experienced a civil war, with a total of 42 rebel groups over the period 1996–2013, we examine whether relatively more bureaucratized groups are more electorally successful than less bureaucratized groups. This study sheds light on the characteristics of rebel groups that are more likely to politically succeed following conflict.

Transforming State Visions: Ideology and Ideas in Armed Groups Turned Political Parties – Introduction to Special Issue

How do the visions of the state articulated by armed movements during conflict change when they become political parties after war? We show that ideas about the state are often central to the strategies and direction of these new parties, but there is variation in the extent to which these ideas have changed. The first part of this article shows why a focus on former rebel parties provides valuable insights into the role of ideas in post-war politics. The second part draws on the literatures on civil wars and political parties to highlight their relevance for former rebel parties. The third part provides a framework for understanding the variation in the role of ideology in former rebel parties, by focusing on ideological content and explanations of post-war ideological continuity and change. This part also introduces the other articles in the special issue and wider collection. Finally, we discuss the effects of these ideologies when they encounter other logics of post-war politics.

Adapting to Peacetime Politics? Rebranding and Ideological Change in Former Rebel Parties

How do rebel groups turned political parties adapt their ideological profiles after war? Do they continue to mobilize along the main conflict cleavage or do they adopt new issues that are conducive to peace? This article develops an analytical framework that captures the extent to which parties adapt along two dimensions: conflict cleavage issues and peacebuilding issues. It conducts a qualitative content analysis of party manifestos and related discourse of three former rebel parties with backgrounds as secessionist rebel groups: the Aceh Party, the Serb Democratic Party (Bosnia Herzegovina) and the Tamil National Alliance. It finds that while some parties adopt the language of peace settlements to legitimize themselves and actively downplay wartime divisions, others continue to seek support based on ethnic differentiation. It is argued that the programmatic message that former rebel groups mobilize around has implications for how they contribute to forging more peaceful inter-ethnic relations after war.

Identity Change and Rebel Party Political Success

Does a rebel party’s identity change impact its political success after civil wars end? Most work on political parties examines why parties change identities but does not examine the effects of such changes. In this article I examine whether identity change (indicated by party name changes and the official renunciation of violence) affects the political success of rebel parties in terms of seat shares won in the legislature, and inclusion into the executive. Using an original data set on rebel party identity change, I conduct both Prais–Winsten and logit regression analyses and find that although name changes have little impact on political success, renunciation of violence significantly increases the likelihood of both increased seat shares and inclusion in the executive. This finding has important implications regarding the impact of identity change and the transformation of rebel groups into political parties.

Foreign Rebel Sponsorship: A Patron–Client Analysis of Party Viability in Elections Following Negotiated Settlements

This project examines long-term viability of former rebel parties in postconflict elections following negotiated settlements. Building on a growing literature examining the environmental and organizational factors affecting insurgent-to-party transformations and emergence, this project asks why some insurgent organizations remain politically viable as party labels in postsettlement environments while others do not, despite facing similar costs of entry. I propose that revenues from foreign patrons provide political opportunities to desperate rebel groups, easing their transition into viable political parties. However, I also propose that the connection between foreign sponsorship and rebel party development is not ironclad. Utilizing the principal–agent model and the two-level game, this piece argues that the political development of rebel clients may be constrained by the rational and institutional pressures that potential foreign patrons face. Using binary logit models and marginal effects postestimation, this piece finds that rebel parties with authoritarian patrons are more likely to regularly participate in national elections and accumulate governing power.

Does political inclusion of rebel parties promote peace after civil conflict?

ABSTRACT Does the inclusion of rebel parties into the post-conflict political process help contribute to peace after the end of conflict? In this article we examine whether the transformation of rebel groups into political parties actually leads to the development of a durable peace after a civil war. Examining the likelihood of recurrence of civil wars in a country and recurrence of conflict in government–rebel group dyads after a settlement, we find that the inclusion and participation of former rebel parties in national government has an important impact on the likelihood of a durable post-settlement peace. Most importantly, not excluding major rebel parties from access to governing institutions is the most important factor in promoting post-conflict peace.

In whose interests? Former rebel parties and ex-combatant interest group mobilisation in Aceh and East Timor

An important factor shaping rebel-to-party transformations and post-conflict party governance pertains to how these groups relate to their former rank and file. While drawing on veterans of the war provides for stable source of support and organisational stability for the former rebel parties, ex-combatants may also pose challenges to such parties as they expect continued political influence, material rewards and social recognition for their contribution to the armed group. By identifying ex-combatants as a distinct interest group this argues that party-ex-combatant interaction directly shapes intra-party dynamics as well as policy formulation. Focusing on former rebel parties and ex-combatant interest group mobilisation in Aceh and East Timor, and this articles asks: How does rebel group mobilisation affect how former rebel parties mobilise political support? How do parties address and integrate demands made by ex-combatants?

What explains former rebel party name changes after a civil conflict ends? External and internal factors and the transition to political competition

The transformation of rebel groups into political parties has captured the attention of scholars of both conflict studies and of party transformation. In this paper we examine the question of rebel party image change by investigating the causes of name changes adopted by a rebel organization as it transforms into a political party after the end of a civil conflict. We develop an analytical framework based upon the extensive literature on party identity change in the West, and apply it to the name changes of rebel parties. Using an original data set of 54 former rebel organizations, we find that factors internal to the organization (such as the degree of inclusivity and the origins of the rebel organization) explain name change more than factors related to the post conflict environment.