Foreign Rebel Sponsorship: A Patron–Client Analysis of Party Viability in Elections Following Negotiated Settlements

Abstract

This project examines long-term viability of former rebel parties in postconflict elections following negotiated settlements. Building on a growing literature examining the environmental and organizational factors affecting insurgent-to-party transformations and emergence, this project asks why some insurgent organizations remain politically viable as party labels in postsettlement environments while others do not, despite facing similar costs of entry. I propose that revenues from foreign patrons provide political opportunities to desperate rebel groups, easing their transition into viable political parties. However, I also propose that the connection between foreign sponsorship and rebel party development is not ironclad. Utilizing the principal–agent model and the two-level game, this piece argues that the political development of rebel clients may be constrained by the rational and institutional pressures that potential foreign patrons face. Using binary logit models and marginal effects postestimation, this piece finds that rebel parties with authoritarian patrons are more likely to regularly participate in national elections and accumulate governing power.