Rebel Leadership Research Articles

‘Playing the System’: Agency and Everyday Negotiations during LTTE Rule

ABSTRACT This article focuses on the ways in which civilians and members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Eastern and Northern Sri Lanka negotiated their demands with the rebel leadership and exercised agency. While much of the rebel governance scholarship emphasizes the top-down, rationalistic and instrumental approach of rebel regimes, we argue that the everyday negotiations we investigated were never simply one-directional, top-down or oppositional. Despite LTTE governance being coercive, our empirical evidence based on fieldwork reveals a more complex and relational form of agency. Here, the everyday roles, identities and practices of those involved were intermingled and co-constitutive, sometimes even cooperative and supportive. We contend that the conduct and outcomes of negotiations depended on several factors: the sympathy for the movement among the civilians, the need of the LTTE to garner local support, the position and (family) networks of the persons involved, the risk and sensitivity of the issue, and the timing. In conclusion, we present a depiction of agency that was co-constitutive and relational, often hidden, indirect, or secretive, but clearly beyond a simple oppositional or one-sided relationship.

Peace Versus Profit: Rebel Fragmentation and Conflict Resurgence in Colombia

Abstract Why do rebel splinter groups emerge during peace processes, and who chooses to defect? Since Colombia's landmark peace agreement with the FARC in 2016, roughly half of the territory once controlled by the group has seen a resurgence of rebel activity by FARC splinter groups. I argue that the FARC's return to arms is a case of “middle-out fragmentation,” whereby opportunities for profit induce mid- or low-ranking rebel commanders to establish splinter groups. In Colombia, I argue that profits from the cocaine trade incentivized local-level FARC officers to defect from the peace agreement and allowed them to rapidly mobilize viable splinter groups. I offer several lines of evidence for this argument. I first construct a chronology of splinter group formation, which demonstrates that mid- and low-level commanders, rather than high-level commanders, were the key drivers of fragmentation. Second, I show that splinter groups emerged in areas where opportunities for profit were greatest. Among areas previously controlled by the FARC, those with coca cultivation prior to the peace agreement were up to thirty-seven percentage points more likely to see splinter groups emerge by 2020 than areas without significant production. Using soil and weather conditions to instrument for coca cultivation produces similar results. Further, I use a novel measure of how critical each municipality is to drug trafficking to show that areas that are theoretically most important for drug trafficking are also more likely to see FARC resurgence. I also address competing explanations related to state capacity, terrain, and popular support for the rebels. These findings highlight an important challenge to peacebuilding: satisfying the political demands of rebel leadership is a necessary but insufficient component of peace agreements in cases where opportunities for profit motivate fragmentation from the middle out.

Comrades in Arms? Rebel Leadership Roles and Coups in Rebel Regimes

Abstract Why do some winning rebel groups build loyal postwar militaries, while others do not? Surprisingly, though victorious rebel political and military elites cooperate successfully to seize sovereign power, they often struggle to share it. In roughly one-third of rebel regimes, military elites attempt to depose their leaders through military coups. I contend that postwar coup risk is primarily shaped by the wartime roles of rebel leaders. Rebel leaders that occupy a frontline role—exposing themselves to the hazards of the conflict theater—establish regimes less likely to suffer postwar coups. Frontline leaders win greater prestige and stronger legitimacy among military audiences. Further, frontline leaders’ greater proximity to their military commanders allows them to develop institutional structures that more effectively reduce military autonomy. However, remote leaders, who are absent from the conflict theater, exercise weaker postwar control over the armed forces, resulting in greater coup risk. I find support for this theory using original cross-national data on all rebel regimes and the wartime roles of victorious rebel leaders between 1945 and 2010. A controlled case comparison of civil–military relations in two rebel regimes—Guinea-Bissau and Uganda—further illustrates the mechanisms tying wartime roles to postwar coups.

Palmares e Cucaú: O aprendizado da dominação

Palmares e Cucaú: O aprendizado da dominação

Foundations of the Vanguard: the origins of leftist rebel groups

What explains the emergence of leftist rebel groups? I provide one explanation for their origins in colonized and recently decolonized countries during the Cold War. In this context, I argue that imperial assimilatory education programs terminating in the metropole facilitated the rise of a would-be rebel leadership cadre committed to leftist ideas and connected to leftist activists, and this cadre ultimately made the formation of a leftist rebel group more likely. Relying on archival and primary materials, I focus on variation in educational experiences of rebel leaders in Eritrea’s Independence War to qualitatively evaluate different explanations for the formation of groups with different ideologies. I probe generalizability quantitatively with a global sample of civil wars, as well as qualitatively with an overview of cases colonized by Portugal using archival data from three countries.

Beyond transformational leadership in nursing: A qualitative study on rebel nurse leadership-as-practice.

Most nurse leadership studies have concentrated on a classical, heroic, and hierarchical view of leadership. However, critical leadership studies have argued the need for more insight into leadership in daily nursing practices. Nurses must align their professional standards and opinions on quality of care with those of other professionals, management, and patients. They want to achieve better outcomes for their patients but also feel disciplined and controlled. To deal with this, nurses challenge the status quo by showing rebel nurse leadership. In this paper, we describe 47 nurses' experiences with rebel nurse leadership from a leadership-as-practice perspective. In eight focus groups, nurses from two hospitals and one long-term care organization shared their experiences of rebel nurse leadership practices. They illustrated the differences between "bad" and "good" rebels. Knowledge, work experience, and patient-driven motivation were considered necessary for "good" rebel leadership. The participants also explained that continuous social influencing is important while exploring and challenging the boundaries set by colleagues and management. Credibility, trust, autonomy, freedom, and preserving relationships determined whether rebel nurses acted visibly or invisibly. Ultimately, this study refines the concept of rebel nurse leadership, gives a better understanding of how this occurs in nursing practice, and give insights into the challenges faced when studying nursing leadership practices.

A scoping review of rebel nurse leadership: Descriptions, competences and stimulating/hindering factors.

AimsTo (1) give an overview of rebel nurse leadership by summarising descriptions of positive deviance, tempered radicals and healthcare rebels; (2) examine the competences of nurse rebel leadership; and (3) describe factors that stimulate or hinder the development of rebel nurse leadership.BackgroundResearch shows nurses have lower intention to leave their jobs when they can control their work practices, show leadership and provide the best care. However, organisational rules and regulations do not always fit the provision of good care, which challenges nurses to show leadership and deviate from the rules and regulations to benefit the patient. Three concepts describe this practice: positive deviance, healthcare rebels and tempered radicals.DesignScoping review using the Joanna Briggs Institute methodology and PRISMA‐ScR checklist.MethodsPapers describing positive deviance, healthcare rebels and tempered radicals in nursing were identified by searching Scopus, CINAHL, PubMed and PsycINFO. After data extraction, these three concepts were analysed to study the content of descriptions and definitions, competences and stimulating and hindering factors.ResultsOf 2705 identified papers, 25 were included. The concept descriptions yielded three aspects: (1) positive deviance approach, (2) unconventional and non‐confirmative behaviour and (3) relevance of networks and relationships. The competences were the ability to: (1) collaborate in/outside the organisation, (2) gain and share expert (evidence‐based) knowledge, (3) critically reflect on working habits/problems in daily care and dare to challenge the status quo and (4) generate ideas to improve care. The factors that stimulate or hinder the development of rebel nurse leadership are as follows: (1) dialogue and reflection, (2) networking conditions and (3) the managers’ role.ConclusionsBased on our analysis, we summarise the descriptions given of rebel nurse leadership, the mentioned competences and provide an overview of the factors that stimulate or hinder rebel nurse leadership.Relevance to clinical practiceThe descriptions produced in this review of rebel nurse leadership and the stimulating or hindering factors listed should help nurses and managers encourage rebel leadership.

Rebel Leadership and the Specialisation of Rebel Operations

ABSTRACT Rebels groups adopt different organisational structures, emerging in various shapes and sizes. Some rebel groups construct distinct military and political wings, delegating their military and political operations to specialised units. While recent studies have made great strides towards understanding militant groups’ activities on and off the battlefield, the literature has been less attentive to the root causes of the structural arrangements which groups form for these purposes. I argue that rebel leaders’ pre-war military and political experiences shape the structure of the organisations they lead into war. Using original data, I find that differences in leaders’ pre-war military experience, rather than political experience, are associated with discernible probabilities of rebel operational specialisation. In addition to offering practitioners and academics a comparative framework with which to evaluate the patterns of militant leadership, this study demonstrates how leaders wield independent agency over group structure and operations in the civil war environment.

A Motion of No Confidence: Leadership and Rebel Fragmentation

AbstractWhy do rebel organizations splinter into competing factions during civil war? To explain this outcome, I leverage variation in rebel leadership. I argue that rebel leaders draw on their pre-war experiences—i.e., their military and political experiences—to manage their organizations during conflict. These experiences bear unique patterns of rebel management and, thus, corresponding risks of fragmentation. Empirical evidence comes from a two-stage research design and original data featuring over 200 rebel leaders from 1989 to 2014. In the first stage, I estimate the probability of group fragmentation with a series of logistic regression models. In the second stage, I use Cox proportional-hazards models to estimate leadership effects on the rate of group fragmentation. Results indicate that variation in rebel leadership corresponds with unique risks of fragmentation. In particular, the results suggest that leaders with real military experience are best equipped to maintain group cohesion. This study offers insight into the processes by which rebel groups splinter into armed factions. In addition, it makes an important contribution to the broader discussion on the roles of structure and agency in shaping the dynamics of civil war.

Conflict negotiations and rebel leader selection

The international community often calls for negotiations in civil wars. Yet, we have limited understanding of when and why specific rebels enter into negotiations. The emergence of a new leader in a rebel group can provide an opportunity for the state seeking to end war, but this is conditional on how leaders take power. Rebel leaders who come to power through a local selection process (such as an election) provide information to the state about the likely cohesion of the rebel group. This affects state perceptions of the viability of a rebel group as a bargaining partner in civil war negotiations. Using original data on rebel leaders in civil wars, we show that new leaders coming to power through a local selection process are more likely to get to the negotiating table than leaders coming to power in other ways. We find that the election of a rebel group leader has a particularly strong and positive effect on the chance of getting to the table. Rebel leaders that founded their own group or brought together disparate rebels to create a single group are less likely to get to the negotiating table. This article advances our understanding of conflict dynamics by offering a novel argument of rebel leader ascension and its impact on conflict bargaining and has critical implications for parties external to the conflict interested in conflict resolution. External actors seeking to facilitate lasting peace may benefit from observing patterns of rebel leadership.

Community Leadership in Rural Tourism Development: A Tale of Two Ancient Chinese Villages

Researchers are paying increasing attention to questions of community leadership and rural tourism development. Based on leadership theories and the literature on community leadership and tourism development, this study developed a framework for community leadership in rural tourism development and used it to examine two ancient Chinese villages. We used the longitudinal case study method to collect data, and we used textual analysis to analyze these data. The results show that the rebel leadership characteristic of confrontational actions played an important role in starting the tourism industry in both villages. However, this leadership was difficult to maintain because community leaders and residents had limited power compared to that of outsiders. Losing control of tourism development in the two villages led to banal management, which prevented the emergence of strong community leadership. In the future, we argue that resilient community leadership should be nurtured in the two villages to address more complex problems occurring in tourism development, such as those characterized by vision tensions and conflicts of interest among the stakeholders affected by tourism development. Finally, we suggest that, based on the longitudinal method, future research can focus on the relationship between resilient leadership and the resilience of tourism communities.

From the Black Square to the Red Square: Rebel leadership constructed as process through a narrative on art

The contribution this paper makes to leadership studies is to advance leadership theory towards a process based perspective based on an appreciation of art. The article does this by using a narrative on art in Russia. The narrative forms the basis for discussing the role that symbolism and aesthetics play in (re)interpreting rebel leadership. The article also explores James Downton’s work alongside the narration to develop a socially constructed process based interpretation of rebel leadership. Building on this interpretation fundamental aspects of process-based leadership so far missing from the literature are highlighted. One such aspect is the ridicule (in this case through caricature) of existing leaders and leadership by the incumbent leader and/or leadership process – a pre-stage to the emergence of rebel leadership. Other aspects include stages of social and organizational liminality and introspection. From here suggestions are made for further theoretical and empirical enquiry and practical implications are highlighted.

Conflict Resolution and Rebel Leader Selection

The international community frequently calls for negotiations when civil wars break out, encouraging combatants to come to the table to resolve their differences. Despite the critical role that getting to the table plays in the negotiated settlement of civil conflicts, little attention has been paid to the question of which rebels get negotiated with in the first place. We argue that the character of rebel leadership plays a key role in determining which rebels get to the table. Specifically, the election of rebel leaders provides a signal to the state of the legitimacy of the leader and coherence of the rebel group. Consequently, these leaders are better equipped to make promises on behalf of rebel constituents and are more likely to be negotiated with than leaders who came to power through other means. Using an original dataset on rebel leadership from 1989-2011 and two-stage modeling, we demonstrate empirically that elected rebel leaders are more likely to be negotiated with in the first place and that, in turn, these negotiations are more likely to lead to successful conflict termination. Survival analysis shows that leaders that are selected through some democratic process see negotiations and conflict end sooner than all other types of rebel leaders.

Revaluation of Tradition in the Ideology of the Radical Adivasi Resistance in Colonial Eastern India, 1855–1932—Part I

The study has two parts, the rise of a radical ideology in the resistance, and cultural implications of this ideology for the adivasi world. This part (Part I) discusses the rise of a radical ideology in the adivasi resistance, taking the cases of Munda, Oraon, Santal and Ho tribes. The ideology of radical movements of the adivasi society necessitated an assessment which is partly a judgment on whether an effective mobilisation could be built on the basis of traditional institutions and culture, and hence a revaluation of the tradition. The rebel leadership assured the followers of the inevitability of the triumph of their cause, because a Supernatural Being had willed it. The leader also claimed that God directly conveyed to him His blessing for the rebel cause. After presenting the three elements of the radical adivasi movement and defining tradition and ideology, the present and first part of the article discusses the radical build-up and main features of the Santal, Munda, Oraon and the Ho movements, which believed in the supernatural intervention and reposed faith in their rebel leaders as redeemers.

War and culture in Nationalist Spain, 193639: testimony and fiction in the narrative of the Red Terror

This article aims to contribute to our knowledge of the relationship between war and culture in the twentieth century by reconstructing the accounts of the so-called Red Terror that circulated with profusion in the Nationalist zone of Spain during the Civil War of 193639 and the early 1940s. Contrary to the thesis that regards this literature as an appendix of the rebel leadership's official propaganda, this article argues that it was an original literary genre, born of the experiences of the real and potential victims of Republican repression and popularized by recognized authors of the period, although its political utility was immediate. The dramatization of the testimonies about the terror realized by authors such as Jacinto Miquelarena, Concha Espina and Agustn de Fox, often inspired by classic works such as The Scarlet Pimpernel, explains the popularity that they enjoyed during the early Franco era.

“Men of Influence”– The Ontology of Leadership in the 1914 Boer Rebellion

Abstract This paper raises questions about the ontology of the Afrikaner leadership in the 1914 Boer Rebellion – and the tendency to portray the rebel leadership in terms of monolithic Republicans, followed by those who shared their dedication to returning the state to the old Boer republics. Discussions of the Rebellion have not focused on the interaction between leadership and rank and file, which in part has been obscured by Republican mythology based on the egalitarianism of the Boer commando. This paper attempts to establish the ambitions of the leaders for going into rebellion and the motivations of those who followed them. It traces the political and economic changes that came with union and industrialization, and asks why some influential men felt increasingly alienated from the new form of state structure while others adapted to it. To ascertain the nature of the support for the leaders, the discussion looks at Republican hierarchy and the ideology of patriarchy. The paper further discusses the circumscribed but significant role of women in the Rebellion. This article seeks to contribute to a wider understanding of the history of leadership in South Africa, entangled in the identity dynamics of masculinity, class and race interests.

Ending Ethnic War: The South Asian Experience

AbstractUnderscoring the linkage between war strategies and peace processes in seven ethnic wars in the South Asian region, this article examines the conditions under which two wars have ended in military victory, another two in negotiated settlement and the remaining three wars still continue. War strategies of the South Asian governments have effectively combined military tactics with a wide range of political measures to strengthen war processes that, in turn, determine the result of peace processes. This article finds that the pattern of ending a war or its effective prolongation is determined by the nature of power relations between the adversaries, which is factored into the level of mobilization of support in the society, structural cohesion of rebel groups, patterns of goal setting, and the nature of rebel leadership and its commitment to the declared goal.

An Interview with Comandante David, a Tzotzil Member of the Zapatista Delegation to Mexico City, 2001

Nicholas Higgins (*) On December 2, 2000, only one day into new presidency of Vicente Fox, Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) announced their intention to send a delegation to Mexico's capital city to seek ratification of law of indigenous rights and culture. In this way Zapatistas ensured that Mexican Indian conflict that has remained unresolved for seven years would stand at top of presidential agenda. They named this latest nonviolent rebel initiative the march for indigenous dignity. From very first, controversy, speculation, and concern surrounded proposed march. Although Zapatistas had sent delegates out to capital and even abroad in past, this was first time that a collective delegation of general command (the GG-CCRI) had left their rebel bases. In addition to this, inclusion of Subcomandante Marcos, who, at least theoretically, had not left his jungle hideout for some seventeen years, gave march an added profile, but one that also involved an added risk. Initially it appeared that security would be provided by International Red Gross (IRC). However, while Zapatistas made an official request for organization to participate, Mexican government did not. This failure of protocol on part of new Fox administration thus prevented involvement of IRC, leading Zapatistas to call upon members of national and international civil society to accompany them and act as their security. Although anonymous death threats were issued, in end Zapatista march, which began on February 25, passed off without any major security threat. Instead, Tutti Bianchi, from southern Italy, who were given task of protecting unarmed comandancia, found that their greatest challenge was to hold back thousands of enthusiastic well-wishers who sought personally to greet masked rebels as they made their way toward capital. Much like marches of Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, to whom Zapatista initiative has been compared, as caravan passed from state to state support grew. By time delegation reached central square in Mexico City, two weeks after leaving southern state of Chiapas, such was popular backing that a crowd of more than two hundred thousand people turned out to greet them. In days that followed their arrival in capital, rebel delegation was hosted in south of city by staff and students of National School of Anthropology and History (ENAH). There they waited for news of whether or not they would be able to speak before Mexico's Congress of Union. On March 13, congress suggested rebel leadership meet with a subdelegation from congress and senate. The Zapatistas rejected this offer next day, demanding instead a historic opportunity to speak openly before whole congress. The interview printed below was conducted following day, March 15, with Comandante David, a Tzotzil Indian from highlands of Chiapas. David explains why Zapatistas undertook march and why they sought to speak before congress. Nicholas Higgins (NH): To begin, could you please tell me your rank and rank and role of your fellow companions that make up Zapatista delegation? Comandante David (CD): Those that are here are representatives of General Command of Revolutionary Indigenous Clandestine Committee [CG-CCRI] (1) of Zapatista Army of National Liberation. We do not work alone, however, and we share responsibility of CG-CCRI among many. We that are here are therefore only a delegation from general command formed of twenty-four members-that is twenty-three comandantes and one subcomandante. NH: Could you explain objectives of march and why comandancia have come to capital? CD: In first instance, well before we began this march of indigenous dignity as we call it, that is well before new President Vicente Fox began to announce so loudly his willingness to resolve problem of Chiapas by peaceful and political means, we wanted to express our recognition of new political situation in Mexico. …

Mountain Rebels: East Tennessee Confederates and the Civil War, 1860-1870

Mountain Rebels: East Tennessee Confederates and Civil War, 18601870. By W. Todd Groce. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1999. Pp. xviii, 218. Preface, illustrations, maps, tables, notes, bibliography, index. $28.00.) Civil War Tennessee, like other border states (including Arkansas), was deeply divided in sentiment between Federal and Confederate loyalties. On whole, secessionists dominated western and central sections of state, while East Tennessee remained staunchly Unionist. In each region, of course, there existed a sizable minority opposition, and this was especially true in East Tennessee. W. Todd Groce, in his well-written and scholarly Mountain Rebels: East Tennessee Confederates and Civil War, 1860-1870, has examined this forgotten Confederate minority, observing that the Confederate experience of East Tennessee was distinctive, if not unique, differing not only in degree but also in kind from that of other Southerners (p. 153). According to Groce, executive director of Georgia Historical Society, these East Tennessee rebels were reluctant warriors, motivated to arms by economic and political self-interest, and were never fully accepted (or trusted) by Confederate authorities in Richmond. After war, they returned home only to experience a reign of terror and intimidation on part of a hostile Unionist population. In all, Groce gracefully intertwines social, economic, political, and military history to answer three basic questions: Who were secessionists of East Tennessee? Why did they chose separation over union? What happened to them during and after war that had made them so invisible to us today? (p. xvi). In analyzing identity of these secessionists, author draws extensively on primary sources-including government reports, newspapers, and diaries-to render a very detailed and convincing portrait of rebel leadership in East Tennessee. Presenting a collective profile of one hundred high-ranking Confederate officers from region, Groce concludes that East Tennessee Confederates were, typically, slave owning, Democratic city-dwellers who came from commercial and professional ranks. They were younger and wealthier than their Unionist neighbors. Integrated into southern economy and culture after completion of East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad in 1858, these East Tennessee townspeople soon became oriented toward states of future Confederacy. Indeed, East Tennessee secessionists chose separation over union because of economic benefits reaped from a profitable trade with Deep South. Groce also considered East Tennessee service in Confederacy, observing that no more than 25,000 East Tennesseans (or 13. …

Integrating the Ideas of Dissenting Economists into a Theory of Transformational Leadership

Dawson, L. Self Affirmation, Freedom and Rationality: Theoretically Elaborating 'Active' Conversions, Journal for Scientific Study of Religion, 29, 2, 1990, pp. 141-63. Downton, J.V. Rebel Leadership: Commitment and Charisma in Revolutionary Process, New York, Free Press, 1973. Dugger, W.M. Economics: One Perspective, Review of Social Economy, December, 1977. Etzioni, A. Dual Leadership on Complex Organizations, American Sociological Review, 30, 1965, pp. 688-98. An important project for Social Economics is to explain phenomena which are unintelligible within framework of theory built up from neoclassical first principles of rationality. Leadership represents an example of this type of phenomenon. Despite fact that leadership has received considerable attention from other disciplines and has been found by researchers such as Avolio and Bass (1987) and Yukl and Von Fleet (1982) to make a significant contribution to worker productivity and organizational performance, this phenomenon has received scant attention from economists. An exception in this regard is Casson (1991), who demonstrates how leadership can reduce transactions costs of pairwise trading encounters and may therefore be a significant factor in pushing back limits to growth described by Hirsch (1977). The purpose of this paper is somewhat different. Its aim is to construct a theory of leadership on theoretical foundations laid by economists such as Hirschman (1982), Scitovsky (1976) and Boulding (1956, 1989), all of whom have rejected economic man as a limited and artificial construct and have tried to incorporate other dimensions of rationality into their analysis of individual and group behavior. It is thereby hoped that theory which is developed will complement rather than compete with extensive literature on this topic in philosophy, psychology, sociology, management, politics and anthropology. This literature has generated a wide range of definitions of leadership. It is, therefore, necessary to now examine those definitions which will be relevant to theory of leadership presented in this paper. I. Definitions of Leadership Writers on leadership typically point to wide range of definitions of this phenomenon and proceed to examine a sample of them. However, as Bryman points out, problem is that there is no consensually agreed one. Nevertheless, this writer does suggest that there is a fair degree of concordance concerning nature of leadership in literature which focuses on study of leadership in organizations. He proposes that the common elements in these definitions imply that leadership involves a social influence process in which a person steers members of a group towards a goal (Bryman, 1986, p. 2). As an influence process leadership integrates purposes of leaders and followers into a symbiotic mutually interdependent relationship. It, therefore, constitutes type of integrative relationship which Boulding (1989) distinguished from threat and exchange as a category of social relationship and source of power. This paper will use concept of a to describe common pursuit which binds both leaders and followers together in this type of integrative relationship. It is characteristic of leaders that they invite followers to join them on a particular quest. The appeal of a often lies in significance of contribution it can make both to a follower's own life and to communities within which this life is imbedded. However, as MacIntyre has argued, this contribution may only become apparent during course of although without some at least partly determinate conception of final telos, there could not be any beginning to quest (1981, p. 219). Although leaders and followers are bound together by a common quest, leader is distinct from his(1) followers in that he takes initiative in making leader-led connection (Burns, 1978, p. …