Comrades in Arms? Rebel Leadership Roles and Coups in Rebel Regimes

Abstract

Abstract Why do some winning rebel groups build loyal postwar militaries, while others do not? Surprisingly, though victorious rebel political and military elites cooperate successfully to seize sovereign power, they often struggle to share it. In roughly one-third of rebel regimes, military elites attempt to depose their leaders through military coups. I contend that postwar coup risk is primarily shaped by the wartime roles of rebel leaders. Rebel leaders that occupy a frontline role—exposing themselves to the hazards of the conflict theater—establish regimes less likely to suffer postwar coups. Frontline leaders win greater prestige and stronger legitimacy among military audiences. Further, frontline leaders’ greater proximity to their military commanders allows them to develop institutional structures that more effectively reduce military autonomy. However, remote leaders, who are absent from the conflict theater, exercise weaker postwar control over the armed forces, resulting in greater coup risk. I find support for this theory using original cross-national data on all rebel regimes and the wartime roles of victorious rebel leaders between 1945 and 2010. A controlled case comparison of civil–military relations in two rebel regimes—Guinea-Bissau and Uganda—further illustrates the mechanisms tying wartime roles to postwar coups.