Mind, July.—This number has very little of interest for the general reader. Helmholtz, on the origin and meaning of geometrical axioms, maintains that geometrical axioms, in the form in which it maybe maintained that they are not derived from experience, represent no relations of real things, that they have real import only when certain principles of mechanics are conjoined with them, and that then they are amenable to experience, and may be matters of inference.—Prof. Flint makes a clever fight for the non-derivative origin of moral ideas. He is very hard on the associationist philosophers. The laws of association, he says, will not explain how virtue, if at first loved merely as a means to happiness, comes subsequently to be loved for its own sake, apart from happiness. He denies that transformations of this kind are ever performed, and tries to show that in the case of avarice, the typical instance of the associationists, there is no such thing as the love of money for its own sake.—Mr. Pollock attempts to show, in reply to Mr. Sidgwick, that the doctrine of evolution is not quite without ethical value. He doubts whether the problem of the ultimate sanction of ethics in individual thought can strictly be deemed even rational. This is rather sad from our moral philosophers; with theology it has always been rational and simple enough.—Under the title, “The Original Intention of Collective and Abstract Terms,” Max Müller endeavours to make out that Mill in his definitions of mind and of matter lost himself among word?, and only jumped out of the frying-pan into the fire.—Mr, Shadworth H. Hodgson concludes his papers on philosophy and science. He opposes to pure ontological speculations the psychological impossibility of ever transcending the duality of subject and object. He retains for philosophy, however, a region avowedly beyond science, the same supra-sensible that Lewes rejects.—Mr. Lindsay gives an appreciative account of the Philosophy of Hermann Lotze, whom we are called on to admire as taking account of the spiritual no less than of the mechanical side of the universe. The history of philosophy at Dublin is written by Mr. Monck. —Among the Critical Notices is a reply by Prof. Bain to the arguments by which Mr. Alexander tries, in his “Moral Causation,” to establish the doctrine of human freedom. Prof. Bain is exactly in his element, and the argument is exquisitely neat.—In each of the three numbers of Mind there have been notes on a question between Mr. Lewes and Prof. Bain, as to the warrant for our belief in the uniformity of nature, which show how difficult it is for philosophers to make themselves understood by one another.