Radical Left Parties Research Articles

The rise and retreat of Syriza: an interview with Michalis Spourdalakis

Syriza is the only radical Left party to be elected a national governing party since the worldwide economic crisis began in 2008. In this interview with political theorist Michalis Spourdalakis, a founding member of Syriza, we discuss the unique strategic relationships between social movements and the new radical Left parties such as Syriza, the struggle to maintain the party’s independence amid co-optation into the Greek state and broader European Institutions, and what the Syriza experience can teach us about attempts to transform capitalist states.

The Paradox of Well-being: Do Unfavorable Socioeconomic and Sociocultural Contexts Deepen or Dampen Radical Left and Right Voting Among the Less Well-Off?

Radical left and right parties are increasingly successful—particularly among the less well-off. We assess the extent to which this negative effect of well-being on radical voting is moderated by contextual factors. Our study suggests that less well-off citizens vote for radical parties mainly under favorable aggregate-level circumstances. We distinguish two possible mechanisms underlying this effect—relative deprivation and risk aversion—and find support for relative deprivation only among radical right voters and for risk aversion for both types of radical voters, yet with predictable differences between the radical left and right supporter bases. Economic hardship leads to radical right voting when the socioeconomic circumstances are favorable and to radical left voting when net migration is modest. Our findings suggest a genuine paradox of radicalism: individual economic suffering might foster left and right radicalism, but mainly when that suffering takes place amid favorable conditions at the aggregate level.

Intra-party democracy from members’ viewpoint: the case of left-wing parties in Portugal

Focusing on the Portuguese case, this article aims to examine how members evaluate items of intra-party democracy and the ways in which their evaluations vary significantly across parties and key individual-level factors. It uses data from online surveys conducted in 2014 to grassroots members of three left-wing parties that differ in their organisational and participative profiles: the centre-left Socialist Party and the radical left Left Bloc and Livre. The results reveal more positive evaluations among members of radical left parties and for those featuring higher levels of activism and ideological congruence with the party. However, appraisals tend to be more negative when there are higher expectations of influencing the candidate selection process and of gaining professional benefits through membership. The findings suggest that democratising reforms may be a double-edged sword by attracting members who value this kind of change but at the same time fostering critical appraisals.

Radical distinction: Support for radical left and radical right parties in Europe

Support for radical parties on both the left and right is on the rise, fueling intuition that both radicalisms have similar underpinnings. Indeed, existing studies show that radical left and right voters have overlapping positions and preferences. In this article, however, we focus on the differences in the voting bases of such parties. We show that radical left and right voters have sharply diverging ideological profiles. When it comes to the historical traditions of the ‘left’ and ‘right’, these voters differ radically from each other. Both groups express the traditions associated with their mainstream counterparts—particularly with respect to (non-)egalitarian, (non-)altruistic, and (anti-)cosmopolitan values. Such differences also explain why radical left voters tend to be more, not less, educated than mainstream or radical right voters.

Beyond the 2008 Great Recession: Economic factors and electoral support for the radical left in Europe

One of the most striking political developments occurring during the Great Recession has been the growth of the radical left in some European countries. Though the literature is far from conclusive, it has generally been argued that the economy is not a main reason driving people’s support for non-mainstream parties (particularly the Greens and the radical right). In this article, we contend that this is not the case for radical left parties (RLPs), which despite pursuing other agendas do still compete very strongly on economic issues. Using individual-level data for 56 elections taking place between 1996 and 2016 in 15 European countries, we find a positive effect of unemployment on support for RLPs, and only very weak evidence that this effect depends on voters’ ideology or whether the mainstream (Social Democrats) left is in office. We conclude that unemployment enables the radical left to increase its support regardless of the political context but does not significantly change by itself the ideological makeup of its electorate.

The Electoral Success of the Radical Left: Explaining the Least Likely Case of the Communist Party in Graz

Recently, scholars have shown a growing interest in radical left parties (RLPs). In terms of electoral success, the rise of the KPÖ Graz, the Communist Party in Austria’s second biggest city, represents perhaps the most counterintuitive case in Western Europe. Adding to previous studies, the rise of the KPÖ Graz contradicts many of the claims made and patterns found about the conditions for the electoral success of RLPs. While the national KPÖ was voted out of parliament in 1959, the Graz branch has been a member of local government since 1998. Since then, the party has managed to gain 20 per cent of the vote in three out of four elections. In 2017, the KPÖ defended its place as the second largest party in local legislature and stayed ahead of the radical right FPÖ, on the rise at the national level. In stark contrast to the Communists’ current strength, however, they did not gain even 2 per cent of the vote in 1983. This analysis shows how the party has managed to ‘own’ the issue of housing and to exploit local political opportunities in order to be electorally successful. The findings point to the importance of agency and the subnational level for RLPs, and highlight more general questions in the study of this party family.

Gender, populist attitudes, and voting: explaining the gender gap in voting for populist radical right and populist radical left parties

Empirical studies have demonstrated that compared to almost all other parties, populist radical right (PRR) parties draw more votes from men than from women. However, the two dominant explanations that are generally advanced to explain this disparity – gender differences regarding socio-economic position and lower perceptions regarding the threat of immigrants – cannot fully explain the difference. The article contends that it might actually be gender differences regarding the conceptualisation of society and politics – populist attitudes – that explain the gender gap. Thus, the gap may be due, in part, to differences in socialisation. The article analyses EES 2014 data on voting for the populist radical right and the populist radical left in nine European countries. Across countries, the gender gap in voting for the PRR is indeed partly explained by populist attitudes. For populist radical left parties, the results are less clear, suggesting that populism has different meanings to voters on the left and on the right.

How the Greek Radical Left and Extreme Right are Perceiving Democracy: A Research Attempt at a Social Epistemological Explanation

The outbreak of the unprecedented financial crisis in Greece and the ensuing fundamental change of the political landscape have brought to the fore serious problems in the functioning of the democratic order and institutions. Two political actors have played a major role in the challenging of democratic principles, namely the Radical Left Party SYRIZA and the extreme neo-fascist party Golden Dawn. The former has advanced from a small radical left party to the main opposition and - recently - the governing party, while the latter has become established, from a formerly old neo-nazi pariah party, as the third political power in parliament. This study tackles the long addressed problems of democratic order building in Greece. It is based on the working hypothesis that the malfunctioning of the democratic institutions in Greece is connected with the “pre-political” cognitive infrastructure of the Greek society, which originates in the past and is an integral element of the self-instituting political community “texture”. Our research method includes qualitative comprehensive interviews with party members and voters of SYRIZA and Golden Dawn. The main research objective is to reach an in-depth understanding of the interviewees, in the sense of uncovering their indigenous concepts concerning the democratic idea and practices, and to interpret the material in a permanent interaction between the interpretation frame and the facts concerning the research object. It will be asked, how the interviewees comprehend the key prerequisites for the construction of a democratic order, what is their socially-historically founded ideological horizon, how the links are formed between the ideas, images, models in mind and the incorporated collective memory with respect to the democratic principle. It will also be asked whether these problems with democratic understanding could be valid across party lines.

Outsiders at the ballot box: operationalizations and political consequences of the insider–outsider dualism

Recently, developed economies have witnessed an emerging dualism between the so-called labor market ‘insiders and outsiders’—two groups facing divergent levels of employment security and prospects. Those on the ‘inside’ occupy stable jobs, while those on the ‘outside’ confront increased levels of social and economic risks. There are, however, various prominent, but divergent, operationalizations of the insider–outsider phenomenon. While some scholars opt for indicators rooted in current labor market status of individuals, others prefer to consider occupational class groups as bases of the insider–outsider divide. As these operationalizations of outsiderness capture different profiles of outsiders, we test the extent to which they lead to consistent or inconsistent conclusions about electoral behavior. The article yields two consistent findings that are robust across all the operationalizations: that outsiders are less likely to vote for major right parties than are insiders, and that outsiders are more likely to abstain from voting. Additionally, we find that occupation-based outsiders tend to support radical right parties, while status-based outsiders rather opt for radical left parties—a finding supported by the association between social risk and authoritarian preferences. We test our expectations using multinomial logit models estimating vote choice on the first five waves of the European Social Survey from 2002 to 2010 across western Europe.

Spain: The Forward March of Podemos Halted?

Impressive electoral performances by Podemos in its first European, municipal and regional elections have not been sustained in the Spanish general elections of December 2015 and June 2016. In the context of government austerity policies and systemic political crisis, this radical left populist party has certainly attracted much support among youth and disadvantaged sectors, and had a great impact on Spain’s political life, yet so far Podemos has not managed to become the main alternative to the conservative Popular Party. Its alignment with the old United Left has proved unproductive and controversial. There have been tensions between the organizational centralism of the Podemos leadership and a desire for more decentralized expressions of radical politics in places such as Catalonia, as well as more generally from defenders of citizen politics or the original protest orientation of the party. For some currents of the left, Podemos has become too electorally oriented. Other critics point to a failure to reconcile left-wing objectives with the desire to capitalize on initial transversal appeal, extending beyond the traditional support base of the radical left. None the less, with Spain in a period of political stasis, there are still opportunities for Podemos to play a more influential role in the future, if it can address the challenges it faces without suffering schisms in the process.

Nonmainstream left parties and women’s representation in Western Europe

Ideology is one of the most relevant variables in explaining the level of women’s representation attained by political parties. While left-wing parties are typically the best performers, extant research has tended to overlook the diversity of the left block and predominantly focused on mainstream left-wing political parties, namely the Social Democrats. Yet, the Left also includes both Green parties and radical left parties. This article analyzes the differences that exist within this largely heterogeneous group of parties across Western Europe. In particular, it explores how the diverse ideological background of radical left and Green parties leads to varied ways of engaging with feminism, diverse forms of organizing women within their ranks as well as dissimilar positions toward gender quotas. These shape different levels of women’s numerical representation in public office and in party decision-making positions. Generally, we find that ideology is a greater determinant of representation than geographical region. Our findings also show a significant convergence among distinct party subgroups in terms of their share of elected women in both party and public office.

Red Europe versus no Europe? The impact of attitudes towards the EU and the economic crisis on radical-left voting

The 2014 European Parliament election saw a relatively large increase in the size of radical-left parties (RLPs), particularly in Western Europe. This article aims to provide new ways of thinking about the dynamics of radical-left voting by analysing the changing role of attitudes towards the European Union in explaining support for RLPs at European Parliament elections during the Great Recession. It is argued that the Europeanisation of economic issues during the financial crisis, together with the particular kind of Euroscepticism advocated by these parties, have enabled them to successfully attract a heterogeneous pool of voters. Using the 2009 and 2014 European Election Studies, it is shown that the effect of negative opinions about the EU on support for RLPs increased significantly during the crisis. In addition, support for RLPs also increased among voters with positive views of the EU who were nevertheless highly dissatisfied with the economic situation.

On the (non) distinctiveness of Marxism-Leninism: The Portuguese and Greek communist parties compared

The study of parties that label themselves as Marxist-Leninist has, for the most part been subsumed in the exploration of the broader radical (or, far) left tradition in the post-1989 period. In an attempt to bridge this gap in the recent literature on radical left parties, this article attempts to uncover the (non) distinctiveness of Marxism-Leninism by studying empirically two European parties that are self-labelled as Marxist-Leninist – the Greek (KKE) and Portuguese (PCP) Communist parties. The central question we explore is whether there are significant similarities between these parties, so as to allow us to speak of Marxism-Leninism's distinctiveness today. Overall, the two parties studied here have enough in common to testify to Marxism-Leninism's ongoing distinctiveness with several qualifications, especially concerning ideology.

What is left for the radical left? A comparative examination of the policies of radical left parties in western Europe before and after 1989

The fall of the communist regimes in central and eastern Europe was a shattering event for the western European radical left, causing many parties to change their names and strategies. Despite prophesies pointing to the death of radical anti-capitalist politics, radical left parties (RLPs) still exist in all parts of Europe, and in many countries they have even been able to increase their influence. This paper seeks to provide a comparative mapping of the policies and policy positions of western European RLPs before and after the fall of communism. The results of the examination indicate that although leftward trends can be observed in many RLPs in the early 2010s, the general, long-time, trend shows that the radical left family – and especially democratic socialist parties – has become less radical with regards to the core left–right dimension. Moreover, the study also shows that many RLPs – and, again, especially democratic socialist parties – have become more interested in other, non-socioeconomic, issues. Despite the rise of new left issues, the radical left is, however, still distinguishable from other parties mainly through their comparatively strong emphasis on old, traditional, left issues.

The (non) particularities of West European radical left party supporters: comparing left party families – ERRATUM

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The (non) particularities of West European radical left party supporters: comparing left party families

So far little has been done to explore similarities and differences between radical left parties and other traditionally perceived party families of the left at the societal level. A noticeable gap thus remains in the study of the European radical left: whether and in what ways social divides form the basis of radical left party support. Using data from the fourth round of the European Social Survey (2008), for five West European countries, we investigate radical left party supporters’ socio-demographic and attitudinal characteristics, juxtaposing them with those of social democratic party supporters and green party supporters. Our approach departs from related studies by distinguishing three cognitional operations within the economic left-right axis, that are based on the distinction between ideals and their effects on reality; and by testing for intra-left divides revolving around trust. Based on insights from cleavage research, we devise a number of hypotheses, most of which test positively. Our findings suggest left party families across Western Europe do reflect certain lines of division in society, albeit with qualifications. While structural divides are not found to be significant, there appears to be correspondence between political and attitudinal divides on a three-dimensional space. These concern the cognitive divisions within the economic left-right axis, issues of political trust, and attitudes towards the environment. Our findings have conceptual and empirical implications both for the left and for investigations into cleavage politics.

The Radical Left in Britain

During the 1990s, Europe saw the emergence of electorally significant radical left parties, drawing from the communist and other left and progressive traditions to form qualitatively new political ...

Varieties of Radicalism: Examining the Diversity of Radical Left Parties and Voters in Western Europe

Radical left parties (RLPs) are diverse and several RLP subtypes have been distinguished in the literature. However, the degree to which these subtypes are linked to significantly different policy proposals has not been analysed, and little is known about whether subtypes are associated with differences in their respective voters’ characteristics. This article analyses the policy positions of RLPs across a number of issues, using manifesto and expert survey data, allowing insights into the differentiation between types of RLPs. RLPs differ in the extent to which they adopt New Politics issues, and the article proposes a classification of Traditional and New Left RLPs. Using cross-national survey data from the European Election Studies series and multilevel multinomial models, the article examines the ideological, policy and social differences in the electorates of the various types of RLPs. It finds socio-demographic and attitudinal differences between the voters of Traditional and New Left RLPs that are consistent with the programmatic differences of the parties.

Flank attacks

How is populism distributed over the political spectrum? Are right-wing parties more populist than left-wing parties? Based on the analysis of 32 parties in five Western European countries between 1989 and 2008, we show that radical parties on both the left and the right are inclined to employ a populist discourse. This is a striking finding, because populism in Western Europe has typically been associated with the radical right; only some particular radical left parties have been labeled populist as well. This article suggests that the contemporary radical left in Western Europe is generally populist. Our explanation is that many contemporary radical left parties are not traditionally communist or socialist (anymore). They do not focus on the ‘proletariat’, but glorify a more general category: the ‘good people’. Moreover, they do not reject the system of liberal democracy as such, but only criticize the political and/or economic elites within that system.

Times of Crisis : Success or Decline of the Left

The crisis that especially since the 2008 has shown the deep weakness of the capitalistic economic model induces to reflect on the role of the radical left parties and on their capacity to propose alternative policies, interpreting the citizens’ demands. Starting from these premises this article analyses three parties of the radical left party family- United Left, Left Freedom and Ecology and Syriza- that act respectively in Spain, Italy and Greece, three of the European democracies most affected by the social consequences of the crisis. The article proposes a diachronic comparison of the three parties’ policy pro-posals, organizational model and strategies in order to explain their greater or lesser ability to attract con-sensus in the last years.