Quine's Thesis Research Articles

Indeterminacy and interpretation

This paper contains a discussion of Quine's thesis of indeterminacy of translation within the more general thesis that using and understanding a language are to be conceived of as a creative and interpretative‐constructional activity. Indeterminacy is considered to be ineliminable. Three scenarios are distinguished concerning, first, the reasons for indeterminacy, second, the kinds of indeterminacy and, third, different levels of a general notion of recursive interpretation. Translational hypotheses are seen as interpretational constructs. The indeterminacy thesis turns out to be a consequence of the externalizing of language, meaning, and epistemology. By means of a three‐leveled interpretation model one can substantiate the crucial aspects, first, that indeterminacy is not an indeterminacy of facts of the matter and, second, that there is a significant difference between indeterminacy and underdetermination. In addition, the relationship between indeterminacy, interpretation, and charity is elucidated. Indeterminacy is seen not as an obstacle to but as a condition for communication. Charity and empathy in dialogue are conditional upon indeterminacy. All three components reveal the interpretative‐constructional character of the inseparable connection of meaning and experience.

On Katz and Indeterminacy of Translation

In Word and Object, Quine sets forth and defends the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation. 1 The indeterminacy thesis is designed to reveal the empirical emptiness of the pre-critical notion of meaning. Quine also believes himself to have exposed (though, strictly speaking, not argued for) the shortcomings of the pre-critical notion of meaning 2 by subjecting it to the empirical, behavioristic spotlight of radical translation. If Quine is correct, if radical translation is impossible, then the indeterminacy thesis must therefore be accepted as a consequence. Moreover, once such indeterminacy and the consequences which accompany it are fully appreciated, our widespread, common-sense notions of meaning and sameness of meaning must be discarded. Quine's indeterminacy thesis has been the target of much criticism. 3 Yet many of these criticism are the result of misunderstanding (or perhaps simply missing the point of) Quine's work. Jerrold Katz is one such critic who claims to refute Quine's thesis. In his recent article, 'The Refutation of Indeterminacy, Katz ventures to say that if he is correct, there is a straightforward sense in which the indeterminacy thesis is refuted. 4 I will attempt to show that Katz is not correct, the refutation he proposes is neither straightforward nor a successful refutation of Quine's indeterminacy thesis. Thus, I contend that Quine's indeterminacy thesis can easily withstand Katz's alleged refutation. This paper will consist of two main sections, the first of which will outline Quine's indeterminacy thesis and provide concomitant arguments, while the second section will evaluate Katz's proposed refutation of the indeterminacy thesis. The former section is intended to serve as a basis for evaluating Katz's charges against Quine. In the latter section 1 will point out precisely where and why Katz's alleged refutation fails.

Indeterminiertheit, Iterabilität und Intentionalität

In his recent paper “Indeterminacy, empiricism, and the first person” John R. Searle tries to refute Willard V. O. Quine's famous “indeterminacy of translation thesis” by arguing that this thesis is in fact areductio ad absurdum of Quine's own “linguistic behaviorism”. Searle accuses Quine of being (irrationally) “antimentalistic” and suggests that the “absurdity” of Quine's thesis might be avoided if a full-fledged “intentionality” were tolerated in the debate on meaning. — This anti-Quinean approach in some respects reminds of the “improbable debate” between Searle and Jacques Derrida ten years ago, when Derrida had split and “deferred” intentionality by showing that the essential “iterability” of signs inevitably infects every intentional act with an unremovable “non-presence”.

Quinean indeterminacy and forcing

Levin uncontroversially takes Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of trans? lation to be that 'there can be two translations 5" and S" of a sentence S, both faithful to all data about the occasions of use of S, such that S' is obviously inequivalent to S"" (p. 25). He goes on to outline the relevant features of Cohen's notion of forcing, an implication-like relation holding between finite consistent sets of sentences ('conditions') and sentences of ZF. (His special interest in an example of indeterminacy not involving inscrutability of reference requires him to say a little more than this about forcing, but further specification here would be irrelevant to the simple points I want to make.) The forcing relation can be defined (via G?del numbering) by a two-place predicate F(c, p) of ZF itself, but it suits Levin's purpose to deal in terms of ZFF, the system which results from adding the predicate F as a new primitive to the vocabulary of ZF, and the definition of forcing as a class of axioms. Since the only primitive predicate of ZF is 6, the only primitive predicates of ZFF are g and F, so that any trans? lation of e and F determines a translation of every sentence of ZFF via the recursive formation rules for wffs of ZF.

Mind–Body Problem and Indeterminacy of Translation

i. In what follows I argue that a chronic tension exists between three of Quine's philosophical thesis, namely his thesis of indeterminacy of translation (or, rather, a certain inference from it), his account of the mind-body problem, and his restriction of the underdetermination of physics to an epistemological or inductive one. Though for brevity I subsequently refer to this tension as a contradiction, I hasten to point out that Quine's philosophical system is too loose-jointed and too schematic to justify a claim that in this paper a contradiction is deduced from the author's texts. But if my various attributions of views to Quine are correct (and my arguments sound) then a contradiction is implicit in his system. Sections z and 3 establish preliminaries, section 4 describes the crucial case, section 6, supplemented by section 7, spells out the contradiction. Various acronymic abbreviations are used; these are explained as they are introduced, and are explained again in a glossary at the end of the paper.

Physicalism and the Indeterminacy of Translation

Quine's thesis of indeterminacy of translation is probably most well known and most widely discussed thesis in contemporary philosophy. It seems to me, however, that despite its widespread discussion both content of thesis and arguments for it remain relatively unclear. I think main reason for this unclarity is that thesis characteristically takes two different forms: (a) an epistemological form, in which it concerns relation between translation manuals and possible evidence or data which we use to choose between such manuals, and (b) an ontological form, in which it concerns relation between translation manuals and the totality of facts or the whole truth about nature-it is this latter form which is expressed by saying that there is no fact of matter about correct translation. Because indeterminacy thesis takes two different forms, it is difficult to evaluate arguments for it. Is a given argument an argument for indeterminacy in first sense or second sense? Do arguments for indeterminacy in first sense support indeterminacy in second sense? Etc. The first form of indeterminacy thesis treats issue from an epistemological or methodological point of view. The problem is relationship between our data and methods for selecting translation manuals, on one hand, and translation manual we ultimately select, on other. In this form, thesis makes claim that our data and methods do not determine a unique choice of translation. There will always be incompatible translation manuals equally well supported by totality of our evidence. This epistemological reading of indeterminacy thesis is supported by such passages from Quine as following:

On Quine's Relativity of Ontology

Quine's essay, “Ontological Relativity” [2] has brought about not a little confusion and disagreement. What is Quine's doctrine, and what are his arguments for it? The following paragraphs search for an answer. First a word about my aims. I will avoid adding to the already extensive discussion of Quine's older thesis of the indeterminacy of translation. Instead, where connections between the old and new doctrines become apparent, I will focus on the connections themselves and their repercussions for ontological relativity.

Scepticism about meaning: Quine's thesis of indeterminacy

Scepticism about meaning: Quine's thesis of indeterminacy

Quine on translation

Against Quine's thesis of the ‘indeterminacy of translation’, in Word and Object, it is argued that the extension of terms, where determinable at all except by arbitrary decision, is determinable by empirical means other than comparison of ‘stimulus meaning’, that translation of terms does not presuppose prior translation of syncategoremata, that parallelisms of function of syncategoremata in different languages can in part be discovered on the basis of stimulus meanings, that it is incorrect to speak of bilinguals’ necessarily using ‘analytical hypotheses’, that in one form the thesis is correct and uncontroversial, that in another it is controversial but both unacceptable and at variance with Quine's own views on language.