On Katz and Indeterminacy of Translation

Abstract

In Word and Object, Quine sets forth and defends the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation. 1 The indeterminacy thesis is designed to reveal the empirical emptiness of the pre-critical notion of meaning. Quine also believes himself to have exposed (though, strictly speaking, not argued for) the shortcomings of the pre-critical notion of meaning 2 by subjecting it to the empirical, behavioristic spotlight of radical translation. If Quine is correct, if radical translation is impossible, then the indeterminacy thesis must therefore be accepted as a consequence. Moreover, once such indeterminacy and the consequences which accompany it are fully appreciated, our widespread, common-sense notions of meaning and sameness of meaning must be discarded. Quine's indeterminacy thesis has been the target of much criticism. 3 Yet many of these criticism are the result of misunderstanding (or perhaps simply missing the point of) Quine's work. Jerrold Katz is one such critic who claims to refute Quine's thesis. In his recent article, 'The Refutation of Indeterminacy, Katz ventures to say that if he is correct, there is a straightforward sense in which the indeterminacy thesis is refuted. 4 I will attempt to show that Katz is not correct, the refutation he proposes is neither straightforward nor a successful refutation of Quine's indeterminacy thesis. Thus, I contend that Quine's indeterminacy thesis can easily withstand Katz's alleged refutation. This paper will consist of two main sections, the first of which will outline Quine's indeterminacy thesis and provide concomitant arguments, while the second section will evaluate Katz's proposed refutation of the indeterminacy thesis. The former section is intended to serve as a basis for evaluating Katz's charges against Quine. In the latter section 1 will point out precisely where and why Katz's alleged refutation fails.