Very recently, the experimental demonstration of quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) with state-of-the-art atomic quantum memory has been reported (Zhang et al. in Phys Rev Lett 118:220501, 2017). Quantum dialogue (QD) falls under QSDC where the secrete messages are communicated simultaneously between two legitimate parties. The successful experimental demonstration of QSDC opens up the possibilities for practical implementation of QD protocols. Thus, it is necessary to analyze the practical security issues of QD protocols for future implementation. Since the very first proposal for QD by Nguyen (Phys Lett A 328:6---10, 2004), a large number of variants and extensions have been presented till date. However, all of those leak half of the secret bits to the adversary through classical communications of the measurement results. In this direction, motivated by the idea of Lo et al. (Phys Rev Lett 108:130503, 2012), we propose a measurement device-independent quantum dialogue scheme which is resistant to such information leakage as well as side-channel attacks. In the proposed protocol, Alice and Bob, two legitimate parties, are allowed to prepare the states only. The states are measured by an untrusted third party who may himself behave as an adversary. We show that our protocol is secure under this adversarial model. The current protocol does not require any quantum memory, and thus, it is inherently robust against memory attacks. Such robustness might not be guaranteed in the QSDC protocol with quantum memory (Zhang et al. 2017).