Qualified Majority Voting Research Articles

The New Constitution for Europe: The European Union as a Global Actor

Rome, October 29, 2004-the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed. One of its new and important features is its institutional strengthening of the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) including the security and defence component through the establishment of the “double hated” European Foreign Minister.Already the founding fathers of the Union had envisioned a united and therefore internationally strong Europe. As usual in the history of European integration, the idea evolved slowly overcoming quite a few setbacks. After the milestone of the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) which founded the European Union and the CFSP, the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam strengthened this new common policy and clarified its role. Procedurally the CFSP was made more effective through increased Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) and the creation of the office of the High Representative which gave a human face to this new common policy.Under the impression of the war in Kosovo where a NATO intervention cruelly demonstrated the EU's incapacity to enforce peace and security in its own backyard and the dissipating willingness of the United States to be the European peacemaker of last resort the EU was pushed to set up another new policy, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).This paper analyses the latest development of CFSP as reflected in the Constitution for Europe. Has the European Constitution brought about an important change in the nature of the common policy or is it just another functional modification of the status quo with an ambitious name? Although the EU is finally granted legal personality, the treaty has not significantly increased the supranational element in foreign policy making—neither through pooling of sovereignty through the increase of qualified majority voting nor through the transfer of sovereignty to the European foreign ministers. Nevertheless, although both, the CFSP and ESDP, remain intergovernmental, the Constitution was another important step in shaping the common policy in a way which could enhance the Union's capacity to act effectively on the international scene. The Constitution is flexible, dynamic and has the potential to Europeanising national foreign policies—if Member States allow this to happen. Different speeds and endeavours will be able to move forward within the Union. Some Member States may be entrusted to perform a task within the Union framework as a group. In case of military capabilities fulfilling higher criteria and having made mutual binding commitments they may establish “permanent structured cooperation”. While this flexibility can be a useful tool to get a process started and to build up capacity, it will need vigorous steering to avoid disintegration rather than integration in the long run.Furthermore, the European Union has gained enhanced actor recognition in international politics. The Constitution does not only call for a fully fledged Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, but it also creates a European External Action Service (EEAS) —a European Diplomatic Service— as well as a European Defence Agency. In clarifying the institutional structure it makes the CFSP potentially more coherent and Europe could gain a clearer international profile. However, the new set-up does not respect the building principles of the Union in mixing the tasks of the Council with those of the European Commission through the at least double hatted EU Foreign Minister, who potentially is in competition with the President of the Union who is also entrusted with representing the Union at his/her level. Thus, institutional squabbling—in addition to the sword of Damocles of referenda in countries like the UK, France, Denmark, Sweden, the Czech Republic and Ireland—could endanger a project necessary to better equip the Union of 25 and the challenges ahead.Unfortunately, France and the Netherlands rejected the

Accession and Reform of the European Union

This study examines how the institutional provisions of the Nice Treaty and the constitutional reform of the European Union (EU) will affect agricultural decision-making in the enlarged EU. Although the agricultural sector is a core EU policy domain, we have little knowledge about the effects of institutional reform following the accession of 10 relatively small and poor countries, each having a large primary sector. Based on an input–output taxation model, we identify the positions of old and new member states in the twodimensional space of EU agricultural politics. This allows us to investigate whether and how Council decision-making will change if the Nice Treaty’s provisions for qualified majority voting are replaced by those of the draft constitution of 2004. Our analysis shows that the constitution is an advance providing for more policy change but it falls behind the Laeken proposal, which would have effectively reformed EU agricultural decision-making.

Italy as a negotiator in the EU equal opportunities policy process

SummaryThe creation of both a Ministry and a Department for equal opportunities has been Italy's main institutional response to EU pressures in the field of equal opportunities policy. Nevertheless, the impact of Italian negotiators in the EU depends not only on the institutional resources available to them, but also on the political credibility acquired by presenting well-defined and clear preferences during the bargaining process in the Council. This article considers how the Italian position was presented, and how successful it was, in two recently approved Directives, one decided by qualified majority vote, the other on a basis of unanimity. The aim of the analysis is to assess Italy's capacity to influence EU social affairs. Information was gathered by conducting qualitative interviews with the main political actors involved in the decision-making process at the national and European levels.

Challenging a Commission Refusal to Allow the Introduction of ‘More Stringent National Measures’

The introduction of qualified majority voting in the EC Treaty raised the possibility of some uncomfortable restrictions on Member States’ national environmental policies. The fact that legislation passed under Article 175 EC has a dominant aim of protecting and improving the environment means that it is consistent to allow Member States the possibility of introducing or maintaining more stringent national environmental measures, subject to supervision by the Commission. For legislation produced under Article 95 EC the position is somewhat different. The principal aim of such legislation is the harmonisation of divergent national laws and practices to promote the functioning of the internal market. To allow divergent national legislation would seem to undermine the rationale for harmonisation. To insist on absolute harmonisation under conditions of qualified majority voting, on the other hand, may result in a harmonised standard below that of a Member State or, in a Member State being unable to respond to an environmental problem, demanding a higher standard than the harmonised level. Article 95(4) and (5) EC represent the compromise between these competing concerns. This was the first case in which the Court was called upon to interpret and apply Article 95(5) EC.

Delegating Powers in the European Community

The theory of delegation developed by Epstein and O'Halloran for the US federal system is used here to generate original hypotheses on the politics of delegation in the European Community (EC). It is argued that two institutional features of the Community, namely the decision rules of the Council of Ministers and the possibility of relying on both the Commission and the member states for policy implementation are at the core of the choices of delegation of EC legislators. Using an original dataset of 158 major EC legislative acts, it is demonstrated that the Council delegates greater policy authority to national institutions if legislation is adopted unanimously or in issue areas that require specialized and technical knowledge, while it relies to a greater extent on the Commission when acts are adopted by qualified majority voting or require general managerial skills at the supranational level.Results also show that national administrators are the main providers of policy expertise, while the informational role of the Commission appears to be secondary, though not negligible. Finally, these findings qualify propositions on the relation between veto players and bureaucratic autonomy and on that between conflict within the legislature and delegation outcomes.

The Importance of Voting in International Organizations: Simulating the Case of the European Union

Simulations can have many advantages over the standard lecture format. This is particularly true with respect to topics that are not as exciting as, say, a major international crisis. The single-class session simulation described in this article takes an important but less than jazzy topic (for students) and brings it alive. It centers on the importance of voting rules, notably in the European Union’s Council of Ministers. Students play the roles of government ministers from the fifteen European (EU) countries who must vote on issues using majority and qualified majority voting (QMV) rules. The simulation will teach students about, among other things, the implications of different voting rules and their implications for a country’s sovereignty. The article provides a brief description of the importance of voting rules in general and of QMV in particular, guidelines for instructors on how to adapt the simulation to different class sizes, and an informative in-class handout that may be provided to students.

The International Affairs interview

In this the first of a regular series of interviews to appear in International Affairs, Peter Hain, Leader of the House of Commons, talks to Martha Kearney, Political Editor of BBC television's Newsnight about Britain's role in the Convention on the Future of Europe. He talks of the vision Europe can offer to the world, describing it as one of ‘progressive internationalism … regulated by multilateral agreements’, and the idea of Europe as a union of nation-states rather than a Brussels-based superstate. Key issues facing Europe such as enlargement, qualified majority voting and security and defence are also included in this incisive discussion.

Why the EU's common foreign and security policy will remain intergovernmental: a rationalist institutional choice analysis of European crisis management policy

Critics have suggested communitarizing the European Union's common foreign and security policy in order to increase its effectiveness. Drawing on rationalist theories of regimes and institutional choice, this paper argues that the delegation of competencies to the EU's supranational institutions is unlikely to make European crisis management more effective. Crisis management policy is best understood as a fast co-ordination game in which member states react to international crises under tight time pressure. From this perspective, agreements are self-enforcing and strong institutions are not required. In particular, none of the functions that a delegation of competencies is expected to perform - i.e. formal agenda- setting, monitoring and sanctioning, executing as well as locking-in agreements - plays a pivotal role in crisis management. In contrast, the extension and application of qualified majority voting can speed up decision-making which is the key to a more effective common foreign and security policy.

The New Germany and Migration in Europe

Part 1 West Germany and migration, 1945-1989: refugees, foreigners, ethnic Germans and seekers. Part 2 The impact of migration in the new Germany: who migrates? some facts and figures - general trends - foreigners, irregular migration, temporary labour, ethnic Germans, resettlers, Jews, seekers the socio-economic impact of migration - migrants in the economy and the labour market, migrant and the welfare state security aspects. Part 3 The problem of control: background - means of control - national controls, control mechanism I - ethnic Germans, control mechanism II - seekers the political context - the role of Lander, coalition government, the political parties move towards compromise, the asylum compromise the implementation of the new legislation return policies. Part 4 The European dimension: background fortress Europe - intergovernmental co-operation before unification, after unification - immigration and border controls migration and Europe - closer integration or re-nationalisation? - qualified majority voting, burden-sharing, after Amsterdam. Part 5 Citizenship and immigration law: German citizenship for foreigners - some general remarks foreigners and the development of citizenship policy problems of naturalisation the political debate the immigration law controversy. Part 6 Conclusions.

The Legal Basis of European Union Policy: The Case of Environmental Policy

The choice of the legal basis for a given measure can influence the procedure by which legislation is adopted, and thereby the scope and content of EU policy. The ambiguity surrounding the choice of legal basis for environmental acts based in Articles 130s and 100a opened the way for a ‘legal-basis game’, where EU institutions chose the legal basis partly on the basis of political considerations. In the period 1987–93, the two most important legal bases for environmental acts (Articles 130s and 100a) were subject to very different procedures for adoption (unanimity and qualified majority voting, respectively). From 1993 onwards, both articles were subject to qualified majority voting. After a general discussion of the choice of legal basis and its significance for policy, this paper examines the choice of legal basis for environmental legislation during the period 1987–99. I conclude that, although the legal-basis game is played out with respect to certain acts, there is little evidence that it is a regular and systematic feature of the policy process in the EU.

Annexations and alliances: When are blocs advantageous a priori?

For any simple voting game (SVG), we consider the question posed in the title from two different points of view as to what voting power means. We also distinguish between blocs imposed by annexation and those formed voluntarily, and present some general theoretical results concerning these notions. We illustrate our theoretical findings with examples using both toy SVGs and the Qualified Majority Voting rule of the Council of Ministers of the European Community (CMEC). We show that when voting power is understood as influence (I-power), forming a voluntary bloc may be advantageous even if its voting power is smaller than the sum of the original powers of its members; and it may be disadvantageous even if its voting power is greater than that sum.

The size of second chambers and European assemblies

Abstract. Second chamber sizes (in terms of seats) tend to increase with increasing population like first chamber sizes. Population seems to affect first chamber size directly, while the size of the first chamber goes on to affect second chamber size. When selected on the basis of territorial sub‐units, the second chamber size tends to be around the geometric mean of first chamber size and the number of sub‐units. From the viewpoint of representing the total population and the constituent sub‐units, the European Parliament is more akin to a first chamber and its size has been approaching the cube root of population typical of first chambers. The Council of the European Union (CEU) is more akin to a second chamber and its size, in terms of qualified majority voting (QMV) votes, was approaching the size typical of second chambers at a given population. However, the Treaty of Nice has boosted the CEU to a size comparable to that of the European Parliament (EP), which may not be functional. Analogies to domestic first and second chambers suggest that the optimal size for the 27‐country CEU might be 150 to 190 seats (Nice proposes 345), while that for the EP might be around 780 seats (Nice proposes 732).

Designing the voting system for the Council of the European Union

This paper examines thesystem of Qualified Majority Voting, usedby the Council of the European Union, fromthe perspective of enlargement of theUnion. It uses an approach based on powerindices due to Penrose (1946), Banzhaf (1965) and Coleman(1971) to make two analyses: (1) the question ofthe voting power of member countries fromthe point of view of fairness, and (2) thequestion of how the threshold number ofvotes required for QMV should bedetermined. It studies two scenarios forchange from 2005 onwards envisaged by theNice Treaty: (1) no enlargement, the EUcomprising 15 member countries, and (2)full enlargement to 27 members by theaccession of all the present twelvecandidates. The proposal is made that fairweights be determined algorithmically as atechnical or routine matter as themembership changes. The analysis of how thethreshold affects power shows thetrade-offs that countries face betweentheir blocking power and the power of theCouncil to act. The main findings are: (1)that the weights laid down in the NiceTreaty are close to being fair, the onlysignificant discrepancies being theunder-representation of Germany andRomania, and the over-representation ofSpain and Poland; (2) the thresholdrequired for a decision is set too high forthe Council to be an effective decisionmaking body.

EUにおける人権と民主主義

The European Union has regarded the concept of “democratic principles” as important, which includes human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The purpose of this article is to examine the implication of these principles from the point of view of political conditionality.The typical form of the EU conditionality was the inclusion of “essential element clause” and so-called “non-compliance clause” in some agreements between the European Community and the third countries. The formulation of conditionality in this line has developed after the mid-1990's. First, these two clauses were more universally included. Second, the concept of “good governance” has been linked with the non- compliance clause in the new agreement with the African, Caribbean and Pacific states (ACPs). Third, various external assistant programmes under the Community have become conditional.In parallel with these trends, the EU has become a global actor in the field of democratic principles. Acceptance of qualified majority voting in the internal procedure of the Community made the non-compliance clause more applicable. This led unific sanctions at EU level in the case of some ACP countries. On the relation to neighboring countries, the strict political conditions have been established, especially in the context of enlargement policy toward Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). In addition, the sharing of image of the democratic principles among the Member States through some effort to define them shall increase the actorness of the EU.While the conditionality toward the third countries has been strengthened, there is any possibility of “internal” conditionality for the Member States. It seems unclear whether suspension clause of Article 7 TEU introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty is applicable, although new Article 7 (1) TEU by the Nice Treaty will provide some opportunity that EU concludes a risk of breach by a Member State of democratic principles.The powers which relate to the conditionality have been transfered from the Member States to the EC/EU level not only in the foreign policy but also in the internal one.

ニース条約によるEU主要機関及び政策決定の改革

In December 2000, the Nice European Council agreed on a new treaty for the EU: the Treaty of Nice. The treaty was signed in February 2001 and is in the process of being ratified by the 15 member states of the EU. The treaty concerns institutional adaptation of the EU for enlargement within a few years.This article analyze the reforms in the Treaty of Nice, in particular, the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, and the decision-making system of the EU.1) The European ParliamentThe number of MEPs (Member of the European Parliament) of existing member states will be reduced at next election of the European Parliament in 2004. 302 seats are to be allocated to new member states.2) The Council of MinistersThe treaty re-allocates the voting strength of individual existing member states and new member states in the Council of Ministers. Two qualified majority thresholds are to be introduced. The new qualified majority requires assent of at least 62% of the total population of the EU and a majority of the members.3) The European CommissionThe Treaty of Nice amends the appointment procedure of the Commission. The nominee President is to be chosen by the Council (composed of Heads of State or Government) by a qualified majority. The list of other members of the Commission is to be adopted by the nominee-President and the Council, acting by a qualified majority. The Commission is to be appointed by the Council by a qualified majority.The composition of the Commission is also to be amended. If there are fewer than 27 member states, the composition of the new Commission from 2005 will have the same number of member states. When the EU consists of 27 member states, the number in the Commission is to be less than the number of member states. Membership in the Commission will be by rotation.The treaty of Nice also reinforces the powers of the Commission President by amending article. 217.4) Decision-makingThe qualified majority voting of the Council and the co-decision procedure are to be extended to new areas. But those areas needing the unanimity of the Council still remain.This Treaty represents the largest possible modification within the existing EU framework. However, the EU also is in need of fundamental institutional reform.

The Treaty of Nice: The Sharing of Power and the Institutional Balance in the European Union—A Continental Perspective

This paper presents an initial response to the conclusions of the Nice Summit and the new EU Treaty which emerged from it. It consists of two parts: in the first I discuss the climate in which the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) took place and the opening positions of the Institutions, the Member States, and the applicant countries. The results achieved at Nice are set out in the second part, with special emphasis on the themes that mark a shift of power within the Community's institutional architecture; i.e. the extension of qualified‐majority voting in the Council and the co‐decision procedure with the European Parliament, the reweighting of votes and the composition of the Institutions with a view to an enlargement which is both imminent and unprecedented in the history of the EU. I conclude that while the results of the IGC and the new Treaty of Nice fall short of what is needed in an EU with ambitions on a continental scale, they do mark another stage in the process of European integration and the permanent evolution of its constitution. In this sense, the balance of power is likely to be different from what it has been in the past. The Franco‐German axis has been severely weakened, the UK and Spain seem to be determined to play a central role, and the smaller countries are seeking to retain some influence over how the process works. New alliances are likely to emerge, particularly after enlargement, with Germany in search of a dominant position, France desperately trying to preserve the status quo, and the UK wanting to influence the direction of moves towards integration from the inside. Nice seems to mark an interim stage in this process. A new IGC has already been scheduled for 2004. There is no doubt that the post‐Nice period will be one of transition towards a new distribution of power within the EU, sanctioned by a new, highly constitutional treaty.

The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting

We analyse and evaluate three decision rules for the Council of Ministers of the EU, which are prescribed by the `definitive form' of the Treaty of Nice. The first will apply from 2005 to the present 15-member EU, if it will not have been enlarged by then. The second or third will apply to an enlarged 27-member EU. We conclude that the first of these is an improvement on the current decision rule; but the other two have extremely undesirable features.

Enlargement and Institutional Reform in the European Union: Separate or Connected Issues?

In this paper, I analyze how the enlargement process is connected to the currently proposed institutional reforms in the European Union. Although the ‘official’ claim is that enlargement requires reform, the relationship between both processes needs clarification. The use of unanimity voting for policy issues leads to substantial deadlock in the current Union, a problem that could be solved by the introduction of (qualified) majority voting. Moreover, in view of its current ‘inflexibility’ enlargement would only marginally decrease the Union's capacity to make decisions. Under qualified majority rule, enlargement is likely to have little or no effect on ‘flexibility’ given the distribution of preferences of the member-states. Also, if qualified majority voting is used, enlargement would decrease the power of the current member-states in a future Union, especially the larger ones. This, and the possibility for current member-states to link enlargement with specific policy demands, could be the crucial factors in the timing and shaping of the enlargement process.

Voting Powers and the Efficiency of the Decision-Making Process in the European Council of Ministers

We analyse the efficiency effects in combination with some accepted “fairness” criteria for the voting games in the European Council of Ministers (ECM) under the qualified majority voting (QMV), before and after the Nice new scheme, in comparison with hypothetical simple majority voting rules (SMV), by jointly examining voting weights and voting powers. The differences between the voting weights and the voting powers increase considering the attitude of the Governments of the Member States of the ECM, to form voting-blocs'—historically that among France, Germany and Belgium and, more recently, the bloc between the United Kingdom and Spain. Their voting powers by blocking proposals result in stalemates and weak compromise with likely benefits for existing well organised interest groups. Unexpectedly, the enlargement of EU from 12 to 15 States, with the diminution of the voting weights of the member countries has not reduced the decisional deficit of QMV, basically because the incentive toward blocs' formation has been reinforced. And, while the power of getting a proposal approved has diminished, the veto-power has remained very high. The effects of the new dual QMV rule, based on a new distribution of votes and correcting the unbalance against the big countries with their demographic weights, for the enlargement to 27 States, seems to go in the same direction. The adoption of a dual SMV, would solve the problems of decision efficiency, with a fairness constraint to protect the major countries. To make this voting rule acceptable one might adopt the Buchanan and Tullock (1962) distinction between constitutional principles to whom the unanimity or QMV might be reserved and post constitutional rules suitable to SMV. Clubs of “enhanced co-operation” among countries with more homogeneous preferences could also ease the application of SMV.

Much Ado about Amsterdam: CDU-CSU Politics, Länder Influence and EU Treaty Reform

“Not a year goes by without some fresh blueprint being drawn up and fed into the continuing debate. Each succeeding blueprint can be likened to the way in which some artists go over their work again and again, gradually building up a deep richness to the emerging picture.”“Old paint on canvas, as it ages, sometimes becomes transparent. When that happens it is possible, in some pictures, to see the original lines: a tree will show through a woman's dress, a child makes way for a dog, a large boat is no longer on an open sea. That is called pentimento because the painter ‘repented,’ changed his mind. Perhaps it would be as well to say that the old conception, replaced by a later choice, is a way of seeing and then seeing again.”The aim of this article is to contribute to our understanding of the legal and political dimensions of treaty reform in the European Union (EU). It raises a conceptual issue by addressing the conditions under which Chancellor Kohl yielded to an increase in sub-national influence and the extent to which Länder (Federal State) politicians were able to exercise that influence to determine the outcome in a key area during the Amsterdam European Council, 16–18 June 1997. (3) The initial section highlights a political and legal analysis of German politics and European treaty reform during the 1996 process. The second section explores emerging asymmetrical specificity on the German political and institutional landscape post-Maastricht. The closing section offers an explanation of the results in qualified majority voting (QMV) for the treaty provisions on freedom, security and justice at Amsterdam, and the implications for our understanding of treaty reform in the Union.