Why the EU's common foreign and security policy will remain intergovernmental: a rationalist institutional choice analysis of European crisis management policy

Abstract

Critics have suggested communitarizing the European Union's common foreign and security policy in order to increase its effectiveness. Drawing on rationalist theories of regimes and institutional choice, this paper argues that the delegation of competencies to the EU's supranational institutions is unlikely to make European crisis management more effective. Crisis management policy is best understood as a fast co-ordination game in which member states react to international crises under tight time pressure. From this perspective, agreements are self-enforcing and strong institutions are not required. In particular, none of the functions that a delegation of competencies is expected to perform - i.e. formal agenda- setting, monitoring and sanctioning, executing as well as locking-in agreements - plays a pivotal role in crisis management. In contrast, the extension and application of qualified majority voting can speed up decision-making which is the key to a more effective common foreign and security policy.