Pure Public Goods Research Articles

Deciding for others: Local public good contributions with intermediaries

Given that pure public goods' broader use is often limited by distance, congestion, or borders, local public goods are prevalent. The decision for the provision of these local public goods is often made by individuals who do not get to consume them. It is, therefore, not clear whether the classic free-riding problem result holds in this framework. We study the provision of a local public good where the public good contribution decisions are made by non-local intermediaries who neither contribute from their own endowment nor directly benefit from the local public good. Each intermediary decides for only one public good beneficiary. Intermediaries make decisions under two compensation mechanisms where their incentives are either non-aligned (fixed), or aligned (variable), with those of the beneficiaries they represent. We find that the use of intermediaries, regardless of the compensation mechanism, significantly increases contributions to the provision of the public good.

Information economies with taste diversity and bounded attention spans

We consider an economy with a countably infinite number of consumers and pure public information goods. Each of these differentiated products is produced by a single monopoly firm that enters the market if it can cover costs. Thus, the product space is endogenous. We assume that the population of agents has diverse tastes, but bounded attention spans for content. We show that this implies that at all Pareto efficient allocations, all agents consume a finite number of public goods, and that each public good is consumed by a finite number of agents. In effect, these two taste assumptions turn pure public goods into what amount to club goods, despite the lack of rivalry in consumption or crowding of any type. Unfortunately, the equilibrium outcomes of Tiebout-like competition between public good providers do not satisfy the First Welfare Theorem. Even non-anonymous Lindahlian price systems are not sufficient to signal all profit opportunities to firms. We conclude that information markets are likely to be inefficient, and there will always remain opportunities for economic profits in an information economy.

On the issue of categorical formalization of the public good phenomenon

Methods. The scientific results presented in the paper were obtained through the application of such general scientific research methods as: abstraction – used to establish the essence of the concept of «pure public good»; induction and deduction – employed in the formation of criteria for identifying economic goods; grouping – utilized in creating an improved classification of economic goods; generalization and specification – applied in distinguishing between pure and mixed public goods. Results. The study led to conclusions regarding the fact that traditional notions, shaped by primitive economism with the market as a self-sufficient and independent sphere separate from the functioning of other components of social organization, cannot explain the existence of such types of goods that society needs irrespective of the presence of effective demand. This necessitates a gradual departure from the neoclassical paradigm of economic research. It has been revealed that earlier scientific inquiries into the study of the phenomenon of public goods did not address the question of its essence but relied solely on signs. Therefore, the problem of identifying deep interconnections that determine public goods and complement previous interpretations of its nature becomes relevant. The category of «pure public good» has been defined, and the reasons for its existence have been demonstrated. Criteria for classifying a good as a publicpurpose commodity have been identified, and an improved classification of economic goods has been provided. The essential differences between pure and mixed types of private and public goods have been discussed. Novelty lies in providing an original definition for the category of «pure public good», which, unlike existing definitions, emphasizes the direct reasons for the existence of the phenomenon of public goods. Criteria for the classification of economic goods have been identified. Practical value lies in establishing the essence of the concept of «pure public goods», as well as identifying additional criteria, allowing for a more precise classification of economic goods with a lower probability of misclassification. This serves as a foundation for implementing more effective government policies regarding the functioning of the public sector and its financing directions.

Common Asset Trusts for blue commons stewardship

There are critical direct and indirect, positive and negative links between the ocean and human wellbeing at multiple scales. Many of the ecosystem services the ocean provides to humans, including fisheries, are common pool resources that are non-excludable but rival or subtractive. Others, including climate regulation, are non-rival and non-excludable pure public goods. Resources without any restriction or condition for their use, are known as open-access resources. Unrestricted access generally leads to unsustainable use. Many ocean ecosystems are open access, blue commons. They range in spatial scale from national, such as mangroves and coral reefs, to the open seas within Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), to Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (ABNJ). There are also many species that migrate between national jurisdictions or between national and global blue commons. The sustainable stewardship of these blue commons is one of the most important current global governance challenges. We describe in detail how to create a Common Asset Trust (CAT) for blue commons and how such a system would operate. Finally, we propose CATs to manage blue commons at different spatial scales, including coastal reefs, EEZs, and ABNJ.

IMF and Global Public Goods: seeking a new role in the global economy

Current global economic challenges have stimulated public demand for coordinated activities at a transnational level (as evidenced by the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic crisis). In this context, academic discourse and the forums of various multilateral organizations have invoked the concept of global public goods (GPGs). This paper explores the practical realization of the GPGs concept within the global structures of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), assessing the extent to which the wealth of services provided by the Fund may actually be considered GPGs. Approaching the subject from a theoretical perspective, the paper draws on analytical evaluations of relevant documents and IMF data sources, as well as empirical findings derived from semi-structured in-depth interviews (IDI) with representatives of international organizations (including the IMF) in Washington, DC. The findings suggest that the IMF provides a diverse array of products supportive of international financial stability (particularly ‘best-shot public goods’), and may therefore be regarded as exemplifying the GPGs concept. During times of relative global economic stability, IMF expenditure shifts toward technical support and monitoring, placing the organization in a role more akin to a provider of pure public goods. However, despite the IMF enjoying a number of competitive advantages (and resources) that would seem to preordain a role as a major GPGs provider, the GPGs concept is only marginally evoked in the organization’s publications and activities. Moreover, certain elements of the IMF’s model of operation drastically reduce the organization’s current operating capability as a GPGs provider.

Seguridad y defensa, de bienes públicos puros a un enfoque de bienes comunes

Facing the crisis of the modern State derived from global changes and emerging threats, facing the limitations and gaps that it currently has in order to provide security and defense, facing the devaluation and criticism that contemporary societies have regarding these functions for being undemocratic and usually unilateral, it is convenient to carry out an analysis that considers a broader understanding of these concepts as pure public goods, to begin to contemplate them as common goods, which would allow a new relationship between State and society.

Does the Effectiveness of Budget Deficit Vary between Welfare and Non-Welfare Countries?

Government intervention is imperative in the mixed economic system due to market failures, imperfection, pure public goods, and economic externalities. To this end, we measure the comparative impact of budget deficits on economic growth, incorporating the moderating role of quality of governance (QOG) for welfare and non-welfare countries. We apply a newly developed econometric model, namely Panel Quantile Regression via Moment Conditions, considering the scale and location effect due to high heterogeneity in our panel time series data over 1990–2020. Our empirical investigation shows that the budget deficit promotes economic growth sustainability in the overall sample countries. The comparative analysis confirms that budget deficit promotes economic growth for welfare countries while it impends for non-welfare countries. Furthermore, QOG augments sustainable economic growth in different economic circumstances in welfare countries and non-welfare countries. Finally, the results also demonstrate that the QOG plays a supportive role in the nexus between budget deficit and economic growth in the full sample countries. The findings indicate that the effectiveness of the budget deficit varies across welfare and non-welfare countries. In general, QOG promotes economic growth, but its stringent rules and restrictions somewhat slow down the wheel of the growth process. We provide several policy implications.

Social Perception of Justice Services in Turkey as a Pure Public Goods and Service: An Empirical Study

Tam kamusal mal ve hizmetler; faydasının tüm topluma yayıldığı ve bu faydanın bireyler arasında bölünemediği, tüketiminden hiç kimsenin dışlanamadığı, tüketiminde rekabetin olmadığı, arzının siyasal süreç içerisinde şekillendiği, finansmanının vergilerle sağlandığı ve üretiminin devlet tarafından gerçekleştirildiği mal ve hizmetlerdir. Devletin temel fonksiyonlarından biri olarak adalet hizmetleri taşıdığı nitelikler itibariyle tam kamusal mal ve hizmetlerden birisidir. Literatürde adalet hizmetleri genel olarak tam kamusal mal ve hizmet olarak kabul edilse de adalet hizmetlerini yarı kamusal mal ve hizmet olarak kabul eden görüşler de mevcuttur. Uygulanan kamusal hizmetlerde devletin başarısını belirleyen en önemli ölçütlerden biri; o kamusal hizmetin toplum tarafından nasıl algılandığıdır. Bu çalışma Türkiye genelinde adalet hizmetlerinin toplumsal algısını belirlemek amacıyla yapılmıştır. Çalışmada öncelikle ölçeği tarafımızdan oluşturulan anket yardımıyla adalet hizmetlerinin toplum tarafından tam kamusal mal ve hizmet olarak mı, yarı kamusal mal ve hizmet olarak mı algılandığı hususu araştırılmıştır. Adalet hizmetlerinin toplumsal algısını etkileyen değişkenleri belirlemek amacıyla da bir dizi regresyon analizi yapılmıştır. Analiz sonuçlarına göre; adalet hizmetleri daha ziyade tam kamusal mal ve hizmet olarak algılanmaktadır. Bu algıyı etki eden faktörler ise; yaşanılan yer, adil yargılanma, makul sürede çözümlenme, devletin temel fonksiyonu, yararlanma, memnuniyet, adalet ve güven hissi, sadece toplumsal fayda ile hem bireysel hem toplumsal fayda olarak tespit edilmiştir.

Rich forests, rich people? Sustainable finance and its links to forests

Investment products labelled as sustainable, as well as regulations on sustainable finance, such as the EU taxonomy for sustainable activities, are on the rise globally. While some of these products and regulations include forests and forestry, the forest–sustainable finance nexus is largely unexplored in academic research. This paper systematically analyses the emerging expert debate spanning across the financial and forest sectors. We conducted 51 in-depth qualitative interviews with experts from financial institutions, timberland and impact investors, international organizations, civil society organizations and academia. We chose mainly experts from Europe, as one of the regions spearheading the topic globally. Based on these, we identify five main narratives on the nexus between sustainable finance and forests. These narratives are strikingly different regarding such dimensions as emphasis on risks versus opportunities, preference for public versus private governance and investments, as well as on the sustainability of forest-related investments per se. While financial sector experts are mainly concerned about financial risks, and only partially about deforestation risks, forest sector experts with financial expertise promote investment opportunities either for the asset class, or to increase private investment in tropical forests. In contrast, some experts from both the forest and financial sectors explicitly exclude forests as investable assets for the private sector, seeing them instead as pure public goods. We conclude with underlining the importance of more cross-sectoral dialogue, but also research, to both critically assess and advance the role of sustainable finance policy and practice in supporting forest conservation, restoration, and sustainable management.

On the determinants and interrelationship of components of government spending

AbstractThe paper examines the determinants and interrelationship of components of government spending using data for up to 142 countries over the period 1990–2017. We make use of two‐way fixed effect estimator with Driscoll‐Kraay standard errors, which accounts for cross‐sectional dependence and a system generalized method of moments estimator to examine the determinants of components of spending. We then adopt the seemingly unrelated regression estimation technique to examine the interrelationship between government spending types. From our results, there is little evidence of Wagner's Law as the coefficient of income is negative and statistically significant for most measures of spending. Further, we find that a reduction in overall government spending tends to reduce the share of almost all components of government spending except spending on economic services, non‐productive spending, and spending on transfers. In examining the interrelationship between government spending types, we find that government spending types under the Classification of Functions of Government (COFOG) classification, which may be described as “pure public goods” and “merit public good provision,” have complementary relationships. However, government spending on pure public good vs merit public goods, pure public goods vs economic services, and pure public goods vs transfers could be considered substitutes.

Conditions for Successful Local Collective Action in Mangrove Forest Management: Some Evidences from Eastern Coastal Area of South Sulawesi, Indonesia

Resource management characterized by Common Pool Resources (CPRs) requires collective action for its sustainable management. CPRs with “rivalry” and “non-excludable” features face overexploitation problems because unlike the nature of pure public goods, the use of CPRs by one user will reduce the chances of other users taking advantage of it. This study aims to analyze the most appropriate local institutions and tenure arrangements for sustainable mangrove management in Eastern coast area of South Sulawesi, Indonesia. Data and information were collected through in-depth interviews involving key informants selected by using snow-ball method and continued by Focus Group Discussion. Design principles for sustainable management of common pool resources of Ostrom has been used in this study as an analytical framework which illustrate the structure of rules established and imposed by the local CPR’s institutions. The findings show that collective action in sustainable mangrove management can be achieved through accepted rules and agreements that are participatory formulated. The agreed norms and rules have enacted as a benchmark for collective action in maintaining mangrove and to enforce sanctions for violators. The success of the community in sustainable mangrove resources management is mainly supported by the existence of several prerequisites that facilitate collective action. It is necessary to strengthen regulations both at the local and higher level through socialization to the community along with the development of incentive and disincentives system.

A simple(r) Lindahl solution to the provision of public goods with warm-glow: Efficiency and implementation

We provide a simple(r) solution to the problem of efficiently providing public goods in a warm-glow economy. Compared with Allouch (2013), our solution is closer to Lindahl (1958), which requires only one personalized price for each consumer. This innovation is important in that it makes the techniques developed to deal with the pure public goods provision applicable to the warm-glow case. As an application, we show that under our solution concept, the implementation mechanism of Tian (1989) can be modified to implement Lindahl allocations.

Influence of Government Information on Farmers' Participation in Rural Residential Environment Governance: Mediating Effect Analysis Based on Moderation.

Rural revitalisation in China relies heavily on the rural residential environment and is vital to the well-being of farmers. The governance of rural human settlements is a kind of public good. The external economy of governance results in the free-riding behaviour of some farmers, which does not entice farmers to participate in governance. However, current research seldom considers the public good of rural human settlements governance. This research is based on the pure public goods attribute of rural human settlements governance. It begins with government information and, using structural equation modelling (SEM), researchers construct the influence mechanism of government information, attitude, attention, and participation ability on the depth of farmers’ participation. The empirical results show that ability, attention, and attitude all have a dramatic positive influence on the depth of farmers’ participation, and the degree of impact gradually becomes weaker. Additionally, government information stimulus is not enough to promote farmers’ deep participation in governance. It needs to rely on intermediary variables to indirectly affect the depth of participation (ability, attention, attitude), and there is a path preference for the influence of government information on the depth of participation. As an important organisation in the management of rural areas, the village committee can significantly adjust the effect of the degree of attention on the depth of participation of farmers. Therefore, the government not only needs to provide farmers with reliable and useful information, but also needs to combine necessary measures to guide farmers to participate in the governance of rural human settlements.

Маяк после Коуза: альтернативные способы предоставления благ и функции государства

This article attempts to answer the question of what determines the choice of the method to provide one or another public good. Why is one good given as a private one, another one as a club good, the third one as a purely public good, and the fourth one as a mix of different forms. In fact, this question includes the question of what the state should (and should not) do. The main part of the article presents a review of the discussion concerning the good, which played a special role in economic theory - the lighthouses. Although the classics of political economy of XIX - early XX centuries considered them as a striking example of pure public goods, the famous article by R. Coase [Coase, 1974] concludes that the services of lighthouses in England and Wales were not funded from general taxes, that is, they were not provided as public goods until the second third of XIX century. Further development of this discussion, which is still incomplete and relevant, leads to the understanding that lighthouse services are provided in different countries and/ or at different times as goods of various types. The same applies to almost any other goods. The concrete way of providing this good depends not only on the country and time, but also on how to estimate the specific offenses it provides. We conclude that there exist no private, public, etc. benefits by themselves, and a socially effective way of delivering benefits depends on the technologies and institutions available in the society.

Study on the Classification of Forestry Infrastructure from the Perspective of Supply Based on the Classical Quartering Method

Abstract Complete forestry infrastructure is the material basis for the realization of forestry production, ecology, and social functions. In order to clarify the scope of duties of forest infrastructure suppliers, this paper analyzes the characteristics of forestry infrastructure from the perspective of main suppliers, and summarizes forestry infrastructure as a material engineering facility that provides public services for forestry production, forestry economics, and social and ecological functions. The classical quartering method of goods was used to classify forestry infrastructure, which is divided into four categories: private goods, crowded public goods, club goods, and pure public goods.

Evidential Analysis of Terrorism and I-VEO Knowledge Matrix in the Context of Security as Pure Public Good: The case of Pakistan from 1990 to 2010

The case of Pakistan has presented if security provision is a pure public good in the light of the I-VEO Knowledge Matrix hypotheses. Evidential analysis of the data from 1990 to 2010 from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) suggests that terrorism incidents are not reduced with the increase of public expenditure on defence, and instead, more fatalities and injuries are witnessed during the years. The analysis is based in isolation to terrorist attacks, defence expenditure and relating hypotheses of Influential Violent Extremists Organization Knowledge Matrix (I- VEO Knowledge Matrix) and counterterrorism operations, at ceteris paribus. The I-VEO Knowledge Matrix shows there is a lack of a comprehensive set of strategy based on the collection of relevant hypotheses more productive than the existing and likely less effective counterterrorism strategies to ensure security provision as a pure public good in the case of Pakistan

The Conceptual Overlap Between Public Goods, Externalities And Merit Goods

In a given situation, any good has the following characteristics: rivalry, exclusion, space, and time. The last two are the physical variables of position in space and time. Rivalry may be seen as an intrinsic physical quality of any good and appears as a binomial variable with the categories yes and no, denominated as rival or non-rival. Exclusion reflects the institutional handling of the allocation of a good and appears as a continuous variable that measures the resource cost for enforcing property norms. With these two characteristics, most goods may be classified from pure private goods to pure public goods, with an infinite number of intermediary cases. Space is associated with local public goods. Externalities may be considered as a joint production of a rival and non-rival good that results from a market transaction. Finally, merit goods may be seen as a form of externality.

NEAR-MARKETS AND MARKET GAMES

Abstract : The market game, both in its side payment and no side payment versions, has provided a valuable tool for the utilization of game theoretic analysis for the study of exchange economies. It is known that exchange economies map into totally balanced games for both side payments and no side payments. It is known that totally balanced side payment games map into exchange economies and it is conjectured, but not yet proved or counter-exampled, that every totally balanced no side payment game is representable by an exchange economy. In this paper the author consider the relationship of market games and near-market games to economies with complexities beyond that of the exchange economy. They argue that a broad class of economies generate near-market games, including private goods economies with non-convexities, coalition production economies, and economies with local public goods. It is also suggested that economies with pure public goods do not, without special restrictions, give rise to near-market games. More specifically, they say that a sequence of replica games is a sequence of near-market games if the games are superadditive and the sequence satisfies a near - minimum efficient scale for coalitions property -- all increasing returns to coalition size are eventually exhausted.

Nędza koncepcji globalnych dóbr publicznych

The Poverty of the Concept of Global Public Goods
 The concept of global public goods (GPG) reflects an attempt to replicate a microeconomic theory of public goods to the domain of international relations (IR). According to economic definition of public goods, which have two properties – non-rivalry and non-exclusivity, pure GPG can be consumed universally and simultaneously by (ideally) all global citizens; at the same time, no society can be excluded from its consumption. Classic examples of GPG include earth atmosphere, knowledge or financial stability. Notwithstanding the fact that pure public goods are incredibly rare, the very definition of GPG is highly problematic. This article is intended as an intervention in a critical debate about the true meaning of the GPGs. Its authors argue that to date the academic community has failed to agree on an intersubjective understanding of GPG. They also claim that the current functioning of the concept in the discourse within IR is “poor”, i.e. it is insufficiently rigorous, blurred and methodologically inconsistent. On the flip side, the way GPG has found its way to IR reflects some of the main problems that the field has been recently immersed in.

Military conscription, external security, and income inequality: The missing link

This article seeks to analyze the political economy of military conscription policy and its relationship with a country’s external security environment. National security is modeled as a non-rivalrous and non-excludable public good, whose production technology consists of either centrally conscripted or competitively recruited military labor. Conscription is construed as an implicit discretionary tax on citizens’ labor endowment. Based on this, I propose a simple political economy model of pure public goods provision financed by two policy instruments: a lump-sum income tax and a conscription tax. Constraint optimization of a quasi-linear utility function gives rise to three general classes of preferences: high- and low-skilled citizens will prefer an all-volunteer army, albeit of different size, whereas medium-skilled citizens will favor positive levels of conscription. These derived preferences allow me to tease out an explicit relationship between military manpower procurement policy, a country’s level of external threat, and its pre-tax income inequality levels. One of my key findings is that more egalitarian countries are more likely to use conscription as a military manpower procurement mechanism.