Abstract
We provide a simple(r) solution to the problem of efficiently providing public goods in a warm-glow economy. Compared with Allouch (2013), our solution is closer to Lindahl (1958), which requires only one personalized price for each consumer. This innovation is important in that it makes the techniques developed to deal with the pure public goods provision applicable to the warm-glow case. As an application, we show that under our solution concept, the implementation mechanism of Tian (1989) can be modified to implement Lindahl allocations.
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