Punishment Power Research Articles

On the Effectiveness of the System of Delegating the Power of Administrative Punishment

The system of "delegating the power of administrative punishment" established in Article 24 of the "Administrative Punishment Law" breaks through the level restriction of the exercise of administrative punishment power and extends the power of administrative punishment to the grass-roots level to a certain extent, which is an important institutional way to improve the predicament of administrative enforcement power at the grass-roots level. However, with the continuous application of this system, the problem of its effectiveness has become increasingly prominent. In terms of the way and content of empowerment, "urgent need of grass-roots management" and "able to effectively undertake" should be used as the judging criteria for the delegation of administrative punishment power, and provincial subjects should establish a differentiated list of administrative punishment power delegation according to relevant provisions. In the operation of power, we should enhance the undertaking ability of the undertaking subject from the perspective of the establishment of law enforcement agencies in townships (streets) and the allocation of law enforcement personnel, so as to ensure the effective operation of power. In terms of system supervision, we should make clear the subject and way of supervision to prevent the abuse of the power of administrative punishment.

The promoting effect of the absence of second-party's punishment power on third-party punishment in maintaining social fairness norms: An EEG hyper-scanning study

Third-party punishment (TPP) plays an irreplaceable role in maintaining social fairness. Punishment power is a significant area of study within economic games. However, the impact of whether or not the second-party possesses punishment power on TPP remains unexplored. The present study utilizes the high temporal resolution of EEG and time-frequency analysis, intra-barin functional connectivity analysis, inter-brain synchronization (IBS) analysis, and granger causality analysis(GCA) to comprehensively explore the neural mechanism of TPP from the perspective of third-party individual's decision-making and IBS in the real-time social interaction. Time-frequency results found that, the absence of the punishment power activated more theta-band and alpha-band power compare to when second-party has punishment power. When second-party has no punishment power, functional connection results observed stronger functional connectivity in theta band for medium unfair offers between rTPJ and PFC. Dual-brain analysis revealed that when the second-party has no punishment power, there is a significantly higher IBS in the alpha band between the frontal and frontal-central lobes of the second-party and the parietal and parietal occipital lobes of the third-party. GCA results further showed that the direction of IBS from third-party to second-party was significantly stronger than from second-party to third-party. This study demonstrates that the absence of the second-party's punishment power promote TPP, and similar cognitive process of thinking on how to maintain social fairness enhances IBS. The current study emphasizes the influence of punishment power on TPP, broadens the research perspective and contributes crucial insights into maintain social fairness.

Abuse of power: An experimental investigation of the effects of power and transparency on centralized punishment

Punishment institutions are a major guarantor of prosocial behavior. At the same time, their asymmetrical power structure may lead to antisocial behavior itself. We investigate power abuse, understood as the use of power for personal gain, of a single punisher in a public-goods game subject to variations in punishment power and contribution transparency. Using a laboratory experiment we find a high amount of abuse across all conditions. More power led to more abuse over time, while transparency could only curb abuse in the high power conditions. These findings highlight the dangers of power centralization but suggest a more complex relation of power and transparency.

Organizational Commitment among the Top-Level College Basketball Players in Japan: Focused on Bases of Power and School Stages at High School and University

This study examined the degree of organizational commitment, the content of bases of power, and the relationship between organizational commitment and bases of power of high school and university stages of elite university basketball players in Japan. One hundred sixty-six (166) university basketball players from the Kanto University Basketball Federation Men's Division 1 League took part in this study. They completed questionnaires about their high school and university coaches. For organizational commitment, affective commitment was significantly higher for the high school stage than the university stage (p 0.001). For bases of power, the university stage had significantly higher scores for expert power (p 0.001), while closeness-trust power and punishment power scores were significantly higher in the high school stage (p 0.001). For the high school stage, motivational power and for the university stage, motivational and expert powers showed as determinants of organizational commitment. In the relationship between organizational commitment and bases of power in the high school stage, it was noteworthy that no significant influence of expert power was confirmed. The results suggested that it is important for coaches to rely on motivational and expert powers to increase organizational commitment. To nurture players who want to contribute to a team, it was speculated that coaches should constantly have strong motivation for coaching and make efforts to maintain relationships with their targets so that their attitude is understood by players, and also not neglect daily information gathering, training, and interaction among coaches to maintain high expertise in coaching.

Insufficient construction of administrative punishment power at the grassroots level and countermeasures

Insufficient construction of administrative punishment power at the grassroots level and countermeasures

영상녹화조사물의 지위 회복을 위한 소고

The video recording investigation, which began with the digital revolution as an innovation in documentary culture, brought present and former Defendant together in one court and made it possible to savor their statements. The separation of prosecution and trial adopted by the modern criminal law had the side effect of increasing the difficulty of discovering the substantive truth due to the time lag, but video recording investigations that maintain the freshness of statements like a refrigerator help overcome this. It is a gift brought by the development of science and technology. However, the reality of our law has fallen into the dogma of trials that have settled for the past, and has deprived the admissibility of evidence of video recording investigations through legislation and interpretation. It is regrettable that there has been a lack of consideration about whether it is possible to deprive certain types of evidence of the admissibility of evidence through legislation and whether the reasons are reasonable. The national punishment power, which is a means of realizing the rule of law, must be exercised correctly, appropriately, and impartially, which is a constitutional requirement. In particular, the power to punish as a judiciary must be fair and appear fair. To this end, all evidence, which is the data for finding the facts, must be allowed to enter the courtroom if it meets the general requirements for admissibility of evidence without being biased. Advanced criminal justice systems such as the UK, the US, Germany, and Japan all operate criminal justice systems with the possibility of using evidence open, and this is a global standard. In practice, video recordings such as CCTV and black boxes are recognized as evidence, and transcripts, which are hearsay evidence, are also recognized as evidence if they fall under the exception of the hearsay rule. There is no reason to treat it differently as a video recording investigation. Prohibiting the use of this certificate on the grounds that it is a video recording investigation is unconstitutional as it hinders the correct and fair exercise of The national punishment power. The speed of change in the world is dazzling. In order to prevent criminal justice from becoming an obstacle in a rapidly changing society, the status of video recording investigations must be restored as evidence. We should not be buried in exhausting debates anymore, but respond in time to new crimes emerging in a rapidly changing environment and crimes that are increasingly becoming more intelligent, organized, and internationalized. Now is the time for each of us to use our creativity for an effective future criminal justice system.

Decentralized or Centralized Governance in Social Dilemmas? Experimental Evidence from Georgia

The vast majority of experimental studies on the effectiveness of punishments in promoting cooperation in social dilemma situation examine decentralized incentive systems where all group members can punish each other. Cross-societal experimental studies suggest that while decentralized incentives can successfully promote cooperation in one society, they fail to do so in another. So, how is social order, as a large-scale cooperation problem among strangers, maintained in such societies? Many modern societies overcome this problem through well-functioning top-down formal enforcement institutions. In the experimental setting of the public goods game, we compare a strong and weak exogenous centralized incentive system with a decentralized incentive system in the case of Georgia. Our experimental evidence suggests that in Georgia, self-governed groups are doomed to suffer from high inefficiencies under a decentralized peer-to-peer punishment incentive system. They are better off when punishment power is given to an external centralized authority that is not exposed to power abuse risks.

The significance and scope of application of the principle of legality in criminal law

This article discusses the significance and scope of application of the principle of legality for crimes and punishments in China. With the development of China's reform and opening up, as well as the socialist market economy, and the strengthening of the foundation of the market economy, it is necessary to further establish and improve the principle of legality in criminal law from the perspective of protecting human rights and limiting the country's punishment power.

The value analysis of educational disciplinary policy from the perspective of three dimensions

In recent years, "educational punishment" has gradually become a hot issue of social concern, and the policy of educational punishment is constantly advancing. This paper analyzes the value of educational punishment policy from the three dimensions of phenomenon form, ontology form and policy process, and finds that: it is the value choice to solve the problem of "three neglect" of teachers and promote the all-round development of students; Its legitimacy is embodied in the legal existence of educational punishment power and reasonable educational punishment behavior is conducive to the maintenance of teaching order. The effect and room for improvement of educational punishment policy show its effectiveness.

법원의 직권심판의무의 범위

The criminal trial begins with a prosecution by the prosecutor submitting the indictment. The fact of the charge stated in the indictment is said to be the subject of judgment by the court. However, the dual theory that even criminal facts recognized as identical to the facts charged are potentially subject to judgment is valid. The dual theory is an attitude of orthodoxy and precedents. It is an interpretation consistent with the criminal procedure legislation. Under the criminal procedure legislation, the effectiveness of prosecution and res judicata are exercised within the identity of the facts charged is recognized. Meanwhile, the indictment modification system serves as a key that makes the potential subject of judgment enter into the real subject of judgment, which enables the appropriate state punishment power and protects the Defendant’s right to defend. Nevertheless, according to the theory of ‘facts stated in the indictment,’ it is unnecessary to modify the indictment if the facts that are different from the facts stated in the indictment do not cause disadvantages to the Defendant’s exercise of the right to defend. In this case, the fact to be recognized is no longer a potential subject of judgment but a real subject of judgment, and the court is obligated to judge a real subject of judgment, which is also in line with the judiciary’s obligation to discover the real truth.
 The attitude of the established precedents and the precedent covered in this paper argues that the court has no obligation in principle to confirm the criminal facts that do not require a modification of the indictment as the identity between the criminal facts and indictment is recognized. Instead, the attitude claims the court has an exceptional obligation to confirm the criminal facts if not confirming the facts is noticeably contrary to justice and equity. The attitude is not valid. The criterion of “whether it is noticeably contrary to justice and equity” violates the predictability and legal stability of the people on a very abstract and arbitrary basis. Rather, applying these judgment criteria itself is remarkably contrary to justice and equity. In conclusion, it is valid that the verdict covered in this paper judged that the court has to judge ex officio a crime of adultery by deception on motivation or associated consideration for adultery without the modification of indictment even if the case is prosecuted for the adultery by deception on adultery itself. However, as in conventional precedents, there is a problem in the process of judging according to the criteria of ‘discretion in principle, recognition exceptionally,’ and thus, the verdict needs to be reconsidered.

THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTIGUOUS ZONE FOR THE COASTAL STATE

The United Nation Convention on the law of the sea recognizes that the coastal states have the right to establish contiguous zone in which the coastal state may exercise the limited control necessary to prevent or punish infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary laws and regulations that occurs within its territory or territorial sea. Under international law the maximum breadth of the contiguous zone is twenty-four nautical miles. Regulation of irregular migration, illegal traffic in drugs, environment, terrorism at sea or underwater cultural heritage increase the importance of the contiguous zone. Accordingly, the contiguous zone as a legal institution may be subject to future changes in the international maritime law. This article describes the importance of contiguous zone in the law of the sea. Key words: contiguous zone, coastal state, convention, control, punishment power, state’s interest

A Book Reviews of Foucault’s Discipline and Punish with Educational Refletions

Foucault is the original author of the book (Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison), and the original edition is written in French . And then the English translation of its title was changed to Discipline and Punish by translator Alan Sheridan %%%. At the suggestion of the original author Foucault, the title of the book uses “discipline” because Foucault was interested in the richness of the word to express both “standardized training” as a technique of social power and “discipline” when appropriate. The book’s heart discusses the operation mechanism of control in modern society with punishment and discipline. Based on the birth of the prison process, detailed and profoundly discusses the how as a form of punishment power to change. According to Foucault’s theory, the punishment ways have changed from direct destruction of the flesh to control the soul’s transition. At the same time, in Foucault’s view, modern society is essentially a disciplined society. It can make people obedient without actually punishing them. The philosophical wisdom in this also brings a lot of educational reflections.

Criminal Law Protection of Cybersecurity Considering AI-based Cybercrime

As the development of artificial intelligence (AI) is unfolding, cybersecurity faces the invasion of AI. AI-based cybercrime becomes a product of technological development, posing a threat to national security, public security, and the protection of citizens’ personal property rights and privacy rights. In particular, the derivation of cybercrime that follows the development of science and technology leads to a qualitative change in the patterns of cybercrimes, expanding the scope and depth of the harm caused by cybercrime, producing a series of impacts on the conviction rules of traditional criminal law in China. The defects such as the features of the principal offender being weakened, the definition of the responsibility for accessory to the principal offender not clear, the narrow scope applicable to one-sided accomplice are present. To this end, in the era where AI and cybercrime have deep integration, given the derivative trend of AI-based cybercrime, it is urgent to adjust the focus of criminal strategy against cybercrime. The horizontal docking of domestic substantive law and legal interpretation is performed to achieve a gradient balance between judicial interpretation and legislative amendment and adjust the criminal boundary in cybercrime evaluation, thereby changing the current high threshold of conviction in the cybercrime governance and late launch of punishment power.

Recuperar o espaço público e proteger os direitos fundamentais dos comerciantes informais:

O artigo jurídico tem como objetivo o exame dos acórdãos da Corte Constitucional da Colômbia de 2010 a 2017 que tiveram de balancear o dever do Estado-Administração de recuperar o espaço público com a salvaguarda dos direitos fundamentais dos comerciantes informais, negativamente, por tal espécie de exercício, nas esferas locais, das potestades fiscalizatória e punitiva do Poder Público. Inferiu-se que a Corte Constitucional colombiana, reiteradamente, tem reformado decisões do Poder Judiciário que desconsideram a omissão do Poder Executivo, em âmbito distrital e municipal, de proporcionar aos vendedores informais medidas administrativas concretas que viabilizem a sobrevivência financeira desses particulares e, uma vez que a Administração Pública recalcitra na conduta de não lhes providenciar programas estatais de capacitação, formalização de atividades econômicas e realocação ajustados às especificidades dessa parcela da população urbana, incorre em iterativo comportamento contraditório e desleal, ao frustrar a expectativa e a confiança legítimas de vendedores informais que desempenharam o seu ofício com a aquiescência dos entes estatais locais, que depois os surpreenderam com linha de ação oposta, marcada pela postura higienista e punitivista.

Leadership with individual rewards and punishments

Leading by example is considered an important means to influence followers. In most organizations, however, to influence followers, leaders use a variety of instruments. Most frequently, leaders possess the power to administer rewards or punishments to team members. Do individual rewards or punishments reinforce the impact of leading by example on team members’ contributions? Because of confounding factors, it is difficult to research leading by example using field data. Here, we investigate the effects of leading by example and the effect of rewards or punishments on contributions in controlled lab experiments. We find that both rewards and punishments are more effective in fostering contributions than leading by example as such. When leading by example comes together with reward or punishment power, it does not improve on the effects of rewards or punishments as such in increasing contributions.

Abuse of Power An Experimental Investigation of the Effects of Power and Transparency on Centralized Punishment

We investigate power abuse of a single punisher in a public-goods-game subject to variations in punishment power and contribution transparency. We find a high amount of abuse across all conditions. More power led to more abuse over time, while transparency could only curb abuse in the high power conditions. These findings highlight the dangers of power centralization, but suggest a more complex relation of power and transparency.

Small Criminal Lawmaking and Principle of economy

본 논문은 작은 형사입법만들기를 주제로 하여, 그 구현원리로서 경제성의 원리가 형사입법에도 적용될 수 있는지를 살펴보았다. 작은 형사입법만들기란 해석을 통하여 해결될 수 있는 법영역에 입법의 칼을 휘두르지 말 것을 요구하며, 비록 정의가 발견된다고 하더라도 처벌의 공평성이 담보되지 않은 영역에의 입법을 포기하도록 한다. 작은 입법만들기가 수반하는 효과는 다양한 측면에서 찾아질 수 있을 것이다. 우선, 법적 안정성이다. 기존의 형법 틀을 최대한 제·개정함이 없이 해석만으로 형법의 손길이 필요한 영역을 포섭한다면, 법의 외형적 틀이 변하지 않음으로서 법적 안정성을 유지할 수 있을 것이다. 둘째, 입법권 남용의 방지이다. 법의 변화는 연쇄되는 변화들을 요구하게 되고, 그러한 변화의 연결고리들은 기본권침해작용에 있어서의 법률주의를 바탕으로 하기 때문에 더 많은 법들을 파생적으로 양산할 수 밖에 없다. 이는 불가피하게 입법권의 과잉행사 또는 남용으로 이어질 우려가 있음을 간과해서는 안 될 것이다. 셋째, 경제성의 원리이다. 경제성의 원리는 사회현상 전반에 적용되는 원리이며 입법 역시 예외가 아니다. 따라서 작은 입법만들기는 형사입법에서도 경제성의 원리가 구동한다는 의미의 다른 표현이라고 보고자 한다. 그리고 경제성의 원리가 형사입법에도 작동되어야 하는 이유를 법률간의 양립성과 모순, 중복의 문제점 및 국가형벌권의 비대화 및 남용우려에 면에서 살펴보았다. 또한 수범자의 예측가능성과 국가형벌권의 공평성의 면 및 법적 안정성에 관하여도 분석해 보았다. 국가형벌권이나 형사입법을 포함한 권리는 사용하면 할수록 비대해지는 경향이 있다. 또는 반대로 잘못 사용된 권리는 그에 대한 불신으로 인하여 약화되기 마련이다. 반대로 적절한 입법권의 사용은 입법에 대한 수범자의 신뢰를 강화시킨다는 점을 상기하여야 한다. 마지막으로 형사입법의 구체적인 원리들 역시 경제성의 원리로 설명할 수 있음을 살펴보았다. 죄형법정주의의 근간이 되는 심리강제설은 이성적 인간의 합리적 선택이라는 경제성에 바탕한 인간의 행위양식을 전제로 하고 있으며, 법치주의 역시 비교우위라는 일면의 경제성을 담고 있다. 형법의 최후수단성 또는 보충성의 원칙 역시 형법의 탈윤리화 요청과 비범죄화를 통해 경제성의 원리가 구현될 수 있음을 확인할 수 있다. 형사입법이나 법치주의는 가치지향적이라는 점에서 전적으로 경제성의 원리만으로 설명되어질 수 없음은 물론이다. 다만, 여기에서 경제성의 원리를 언급함은, 논문의 출발점과 같이 작은 형사입법을 만들기 위한 또 하나의 논거로서 경제성의 원리가 작동할 수 있음을 확인하기 위함이다.The distinctive characteristics of modern society are summarized by information flood, safty desire and cross-border problems that have been occurred in various areas and efected to society by itself. Especially these characteristics demand to decline abstract and potential risk and the more and more risk members of society feel, they misunderstand that more and more criminal laws the legislative enact, they are safe. As the result, almost today s societies sink deluge of criminal laws which have been generated in recent decades placed a burden on society and its members themselves. So in this study aims to reduce legislative hyperactivity syndrome in respect of criminal justice matters. The name of s so-called small criminal lawmaking means that the sword of legislation should not be brandished in the area where the social problems can be solved by interpretation of existing criminal laws. And then it should be abandoned to legislate if state punishment power can t be execute impartially. It s very important because impartiality, rapidity and validity of punishment system can lift to abide by the criminal laws. Among of methds for small criminal lawmaking this study focuse on principle of economy. Principle of economy originally means a rule in science and philosophy stating that entites should not be multiplied needlessly, This rule is accepted by meaning that simplest of two or more competing theories is preferable and that an explanation for unknown phenomena should first be attempted in terms of what is aleady known. And this principle is able to applied for small criminal lawmaking. Moreover, this theory can be harmonized with legal stability, subsidiarity of criminal law, and principle of proportion in criminal legislation.

Domestic politics and the power to punish: The case of national human rights institutions

Why do states give institutions the ability to legally punish them? While past research focuses on international pressure to delegate authority to third parties, I argue that domestic politics plays a key role. By viewing domestic politics through a principal–agent framework, I argue that the more accountable individual legislators remain to the public, the more likely it is that the legislature will delegate legal punishment authority. I focus on National Human Rights Institutions—domestic institutions tasked with protection and promotion of human rights—to build the argument. Electoral institutions that decrease monitoring of legislator agents, or institutional makeup that allows the executive to displace the public as the principal lead to National Human Rights Institutions without punishment power. Using Bayesian logistic analyses I test four hypotheses, all of which are in agreement with the argument.

Race for Power in Public Good Games with Unequal, Unstable Punishment Power

AbstractDecentralized punishment can maintain contributions to a public good at a high level. This positive effect holds even for situations involving inequality in punishment power, meaning that the relative costs for punishment differ between persons. We extend this line of research by examining the additional influence of instability of and thus potential competition for punishment power in public good experiments. As in previous research, inequality is operationalized by assigning the role of a ‘strong player’ to one group member, who can punish others at a reduced cost compared to other players. Instability is operationalized by the fact that the role assignment can change across rounds and is contingent on behavior in previous rounds. Three experiments show that under unequal, unstable (punishment‐) power, individuals behave more competitively and engage in a race for power resulting in detrimental effects for the group. Specifically, we find that (i) unstable power goes along with a disproportionate use of punishment; (ii) not inequality by itself but rather the combination of instability and inequality causes this effect; and (iii) this excessive use of punishment is found not only when the role of the strong player is assigned to individuals who previously behaved rather selfishly but also when prosocial behavior leads to the top, speaking for a generalizability of our findings. Implications for organizational settings are discussed. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Building the Leviathan--Voluntary centralisation of punishment power sustains cooperation in humans.

The prevalence of cooperation among humans is puzzling because cooperators can be exploited by free riders. Peer punishment has been suggested as a solution to this puzzle, but cumulating evidence questions its robustness in sustaining cooperation. Amongst others, punishment fails when it is not powerful enough, or when it elicits counter-punishment. Existing research, however, has ignored that the distribution of punishment power can be the result of social interactions. We introduce a novel experiment in which individuals can transfer punishment power to others. We find that while decentralised peer punishment fails to overcome free riding, the voluntary transfer of punishment power enables groups to sustain cooperation. This is achieved by non-punishing cooperators empowering those who are willing to punish in the interest of the group. Our results show how voluntary power centralisation can efficiently sustain cooperation, which could explain why hierarchical power structures are widespread among animals and humans.