Public Governance System Research Articles

Introduction: Governance in South, Southeast, and East Asia

This special issue explores and analyzes governance and policy issues in South, Southeast, and East Asia. The nine papers in this issue were presented at a similarly titled conference in Dhaka, Bangladesh in 2012. The authors map governance challenges and analyze its current trends from the perspectives of politics and administration. Public administration and governance systems in these regions have witnessed some phenomenal changes during the last three decades and have played a key role in the economic progress, especially in the Southeast and East Asian nations. Rich with evidence and analyses, these papers use empirical and other research methods to examine contemporary bestpractice paradigms. Their additional aim is to develop the understanding of changes in the forms of governance, both within the national context and in a comparative perspective. The regions of South, Southeast, and East Asia contain enormous geographical, cultural, religious, and ethnic variation. They are also “diverse in political and constitutional systems and their performance in managing the economy is uneven” (Haque 2001:1290). Some countries in Southeast and East Asia may already qualify as developed nations, but most of South Asia is beset with poor governance, lack of rule of law, and widespread corruption. This is the case despite these countries, in the last decade or so, witnessing steady and impressive economic growth. In the context of governance, the huge differences in the South, Southeast, and East Asian countries reflect the countries’ unique cultures, history, demography and geography, political Public Organiz Rev (2013) 13:341–347 DOI 10.1007/s11115-013-0256-5

Beyond Public and Private in International Investment Law: An Integrated Systems Approach

Members of the invisible college of international investment lawyers are engaged in a fierce battle over the conceptual foundations of their common legal enterprise. The debate centers on whether the international legal regime governing foreign direct investment is a de facto transnational public governance system or merely an institutional support structure for the settlement of essentially private investment disputes. These attempts to establish the public versus private nature of the regime are misconceived. International investment law deals with both public and private concerns, impacts upon both public and private actors, and crosses over traditional divides separating public law from private law and public international law from private international law. In light of these overlaps, the regime should instead be analyzed from an integrated systems perspective. This approach better comports with the regime’s complex interlocking nature. It is also better suited to the pragmatic challenge of accommodating the conflicting claims of diverse stakeholders within the confines of an outmoded but rapidly evolving legal schema. I illustrate this with concrete examples of minor interventions at three different levels of the regime that could produce major shifts in the prevailing balance between investor and non-investor rights at other levels of the regime. I argue that this strategy represents at once a more feasible and more sensible means of improving international investment law than other alternatives.

Analysis of County Governors’ Administrations Reform of 2010 in Lithuania

While 1970s were marked by creation of intermediary (regional) levels of government in Western Europe the wave of administrative reforms reached Eastern Europe in the end of 1980s and beginning of 1990s. Lithuania was not an exception. From 1994 until July, 2010 the public administration system was deconcentrated to County Governors' Administrations and decentralized to local governments in Lithuania. As it was declared in political and legal documents, the reform of County Governors' Administrations abolishment was aimed to improve public administration and decentralize public governance system in Lithuania, but its results were quite controversial. The main aim of this paper is to analyze the reform conducted in Lithuania in 2010s. The main sources of information are semi-structured expert interviews and secondary data. http://dx.doi.org/10.5755/j01.ppaa.10.3.641

Need for a New Public Governance System: Issues and Challenges

Need for a New Public Governance System: Issues and Challenges

Conflicts of Interest and Governance Mechanisms in Italian Local Public Utilities

Stemming from different theoretical perspectives the article examines the conflicts of interest arising among the actors (citizens, local governments, private shareholders, service providers) that at various levels are involved in local public utilities governance systems. The main results of a multiple case study analysis on 10 Italian listed local public utilities are summarized. Different and coexisting situations of conflicts of interest among multiple principals and agents are identified. In this context, governance mechanisms (e.g., the board of directors) have different roles and functions and may prevent and mitigate such conflicts. However, our findings suggest that the ownership structure influences board composition and functioning and that higher numbers of independent directors do not necessarily mean “actual” board independence. The article contributes to the debate on conflicts of interest and governance mechanisms in local public utilities.

Conflicts of Interest and Governance Mechanisms in Italian Local Public Utilities

Stemming from different theoretical perspectives the article examines the conflicts of interest arising among the actors (citizens, local governments, private shareholders, service providers) that at various levels are involved in local public utilities governance systems. The main results of a multiple case study analysis on 10 Italian listed local public utilities are summarized. Different and coexisting situations of conflicts of interest among multiple principals and agents are identified. In this context, governance mechanisms (e.g., the board of directors) have different roles and functions and may prevent and mitigate such conflicts. However, our findings suggest that the ownership structure influences board composition and functioning and that higher numbers of independent directors do not necessarily mean “actual” board independence. The article contributes to the debate on conflicts of interest and governance mechanisms in local public utilities.

Private Actors and Public Governance Beyond the State: The Multinational Corporation, the Financial Stability Board, and the Global Governance Order

Transnational corporations are at the center of extraordinary and complex governance systems that are developing outside the state and international public organizations and beyond the conventionally legitimating framework of the forms of domestic or international hard law. Though these systems are sometimes recognized as autonomous and authoritative among its members, they are neither isolated from each other nor from the states with which they come into contact. Together these systems may begin to suggest a new template for networked governance beyond the state, but one in which public and private actors are integrated stakeholders. This provides the source of the questions explored in this article: Is it possible to detect this new template for transnational governance of economic activity (in general) and corporations (in particular) developing through principles of transnational private governance? Is public governance in the twenty-first century taking on the characteristics of transnational corporate governance? The questions suggest three objectives. The first is to examine the organization of communities of states through the normative lens of private transnational governance. A secondary objective is to suggest the importance of communication—structural coupling—between developing private governance systems and emerging transnational public governance systems. That communication suggests the development of the institutional intermeshing of both autonomous systems of governing communities of private actors and communities of states. The third objective is to consider whether emerging governance frameworks, public and private, might be arranged together in a way that credibly suggests a system of coordinated metagovernance. After an introduction, Section I of this article examines the governance constitutions of multinational economic actors. Section II then turns to a consideration of corporate constitutionalism within a metagovernance framework. The focus is the governance framework of the G-20's Financial Stability Board (FSB). The G-20-FSB framework points to the future of governance systems in which the state participates in a collaborative governance structure, but in which states share rulemaking power with public and private nonstate actors. The FSB template points to the organization of governance as a collegial enterprise in which states and traditional law-based systems interact with nonstate actors and their norm-based systems to develop integrated governance with global reach. Thus reconstituted, a new set of arrangements might well arise, one in which amalgamations of the most powerful states and private regulatory bodies assert authority once reserved to states alone.

The Construction of Local Public Governance System Related to the Management of Local Public Enterprises - An Analysis and Its Implications -

The Construction of Local Public Governance System Related to the Management of Local Public Enterprises - An Analysis and Its Implications -

Private Actors and Public Governance Beyond the State: The Multinational Corporation, the Financial Stability Board and the Global Governance Order

Transnational corporations are at the center of extraordinary and complex governance systems that are developing outside the state and international public organizations, and beyond the conventionally legitimating framework of the forms of domestic or international hard law. Though these systems are sometimes recognized as autonomous and authoritative among its members, they are neither isolated from each other nor from the states with which they come into contact. Together these systems may begin to suggest a new template for networked governance beyond the state, but one in which public and private actors are integrated stakeholders. This provides the source of the questions explored in this article: Is it possible to detect this new template for transnational governance of economic activity (in general) and corporations (in particular) developing through principles of transnational private governance?; Is Public governance in the twenty-first century taking on the characteristics of transnational corporate governance? The questions suggest three objectives. The first is to examine the organization of communities of states through the normative lens of private transnational governance. A secondary objective is to suggest the importance of communication - structural coupling - between developing private governance systems and emerging transnational public governance systems. That communication suggests the development of the institutional intermeshing of both autonomous systems of governing communities of private actors and communities of states. The third objective is to consider whether emerging governance frameworks, public and private, might be arranged together in a way that credibly suggests a system of coordinated meta-governance. After an introduction, Section I of this article examines the governance constitutions of multinational economic actors. Section II then turns to a consideration of corporate constitutionalism within a meta-governance framework. The focus is the governance framework of the G-20’s Financial Stability Board (FSB). The G20-FSB framework points to the future of governance systems in which the state participates in a collaborative governance structure, but in which states share rule making power with public and private non-state actors. The FSB template points to the organization of governance as a collegial enterprise in which states and traditional law-based systems interact with non-state actors and their norm-based systems to develop integrated governance with global reach. Thus reconstituted, a new set of arrangements might well arise, one in which amalgamations of the most powerful states and private regulatory bodies assert authority once reserved to states alone.

An Integrated Approach to Nanotechnology Governance

I. INTRODUCTION II. GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES PRESENTED BY NANOTECHNOLOGIES A. Industry Growth B. Technological Diversity C. Lack of Knowledge and Public Awareness D. Competitiveness E. Potential Benefits F. Risks G. Ethical, Legal and Social Issues III. THE EVOLUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IV. NANOTECHNOLOGY GOVERNANCE A. Government Regulation 1. Adaptive Regulations 2. Information Requirements B. Public Engagement 1. A National Nanotechnology Governance Dialogue 2. Upstream Public Involvement 3. Engaging Citizens C. Corporate Responsibility D. Codes of Conduct E. Liability F. Individual Decisionmaking V. CONCLUSION I. INTRODUCTION The rapid emergence of nanotechnologies presents significant challenges for environmental and public health governance systems. The unique risks nanomaterials pose because of their size and reactivity, together with a lack of information about the health and environmental effects of these materials, limit the value of traditional risk assessment tools. Further, existing regulatory programs are widely seen as moving too slowly to keep up with innovations in nanotechnologies. Although some nanochemicals and nanopesticides fall under the jurisdiction of the Toxic Substances Control Act (1) or the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, (2) these statutes only address a small slice of the nanotechnology universe. Even if nano-specific regulatory legislation is enacted, which does not appear likely in the near term, the breadth and rapid development of nanotechnologies will require the use of governance tools in addition to traditional regulation: only this combination will achieve an appropriate balance between the societal benefits of nanotechnologies and the potential risks of at least some of these technologies. This Article suggests the need for an integrated system of environmental and public health governance that relies on a combination of approaches including: an adaptive regulatory system; wider and earlier access to information; deployment of additional public engagement mechanisms; use of voluntary programs as a transitional tool; encouraging broader adoption of corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies; adoption of voluntary codes of conduct; retention of civil liability; and informed individual decisionmaking. In 1999, President Clinton's Council on Sustainable Development concluded [e]nvironmental progress will depend on individual, institutional, and corporate responsibility, commitment, and stewardship. (3) Today's complex environmental challenges such as climate change, fisheries depletion, estuary restoration and oversight of nanotechnology development cannot be solved using only regulatory tools; instead, they require all sectors--governments, companies, institutions, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and individuals--to assume responsibility for achieving desired outcomes. Responsibility is a simple term--the legal or ethical accountability for the care or welfare of another (4)--but a complex concept in the context of environmental and public health governance. Over the last thirty plus years, responsibility for environmental and public health management has been seen as primarily a function of government. However, realizing the benefits that new technology's promise while minimizing the risk that some of these technologies may pose requires an approach that also relies on companies, universities, civil society organizations and individuals assuming some responsibilities for careful management of technology research and the life cycle impacts of products. Further, because technological developments are moving rapidly, any governance approach will have to be flexible, allowing the system to adapt as new information becomes available. The United Kingdom's Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution recently observed [C]ontemporary society is characterized by the accelerating pace of the proliferation of new technologies. …

A Basic Model of Performance-Based Budgeting

This technical note presents a basic model of performance-based budgeting. It describes the characteristics of the model and explains how low-income countries should approach performance-based budgeting. The note emphasizes necessary preconditions for any move to performance-based budgeting—recognizing that performance-based budgeting, even in its basic form, should not be considered in countries with seriously dysfunctional public financial management and governance systems. The note also outlines reasons why more complex performance-based budgeting models of performance-based budgeting may not be appropriate in many countries.

Sending in the consultants: development agencies, the private sector and the reform of public finance in low-income countries

Private sector consultants have increasingly been called upon to assist aid-dependent countries in strengthening their public sector governance systems. This paper argues that the role of these consultants in shaping the reform process is not well understood. This paper offers a conceptual framework to capture the essential dynamics of the relationship between the donors, the governments and the donor-funded consultants in the implementation of Public Financial Management (PFM) reforms. Three main lines of inquiry are developed to assist in determining the lines of accountability that are drawn between these three sets of actors. The first, drawing on a rationalist principal-agent approach, focuses on the contractual process and the incentives that emerge from it at the micro level. The second, drawing from a constructivist approach, delves deeper into the normative agendas behind private sector participation and the meaning given to the concept of accountability in this context. Finally, a third line of inquiry centres upon the political environment within which the reforms are implemented and which acts as a filter both upon the contractual process and the ideas of best practice brought in by consultants. The implementation of an integrated financial management system in Ghana is used as an illustrative example.

An inquiry into good hospital governance: A New Zealand-Czech comparison

BackgroundThis paper contributes to research in health systems literature by examining the role of health boards in hospital governance. Health care ranks among the largest public sectors in OECD countries. Efficient governance of hospitals requires the responsible and effective use of funds, professional management and competent governing structures. In this study hospital governance practice in two health care systems – Czech Republic and New Zealand – is compared and contrasted. These countries were chosen as both, even though they are geographically distant, have a universal right to 'free' health care provided by the state and each has experienced periods of political change and ensuing economic restructuring. Ongoing change has provided the impetus for policy reform in their public hospital governance systems.MethodsTwo comparative case studies are presented. They define key similarities and differences between the two countries' health care systems. Each public hospital governance system is critically analysed and discussed in light of D W Taylor's nine principles of 'good governance'.ResultsWhile some similarities were found to exist, the key difference between the two countries is that while many forms of 'ad hoc' hospital governance exist in Czech hospitals, public hospitals in New Zealand are governed in a 'collegiate' way by elected District Health Boards. These findings are discussed in relation to each of the suggested nine principles utilized by Taylor.ConclusionThis comparative case analysis demonstrates that although the New Zealand and Czech Republic health systems appear to show a large degree of convergence, their approaches to public hospital governance differ on several counts. Some of the principles of 'good governance' existed in the Czech hospitals and many were practiced in New Zealand. It would appear that the governance styles have evolved from particular historical circumstances to meet each country's specific requirements. Whether or not current practice could be improved by paying closer attention to theoretical models of 'good governance' is debatable.

Вдосконалення системи публічної влади: суб’єктивні оцінки об’єктивної необхідності

Вдосконалення системи публічної влади: суб’єктивні оцінки об’єктивної необхідності

Ouverture de ‘Public Governance and Global Markets’

Traditional European governance models, created essentially to safeguard the prerogatives of nation-states, are unable to counter global networks because they are limited, on the one hand, to forming supranational institutions (to offset the influence of global networks) and, on the other, to decentralizing administrative power at the local level (to re-affirm their legitimacy in the system). Moreover, numerous exogenous factors (not effectively controllable at the local level and exceeding European boundaries because an expression of a wider globalisation process) compel individual nation-states to adopt a global, more integrated vision and a common Public Governance system.

Low state capacity in Southeast European transition countries

Under socialist rule, the state in Southeast European countries ranged from the totalitarian to the more liberal. When transition began about ten years ago, much discussion revolved around the role of the state, especially in a market economy. However, this new role was not understood or implemented correctly. Several state failures during transition in the Balkans paint a picture of low state capacity and weak states.1 Moreover, the state in several countries has failed to develop comprehensive reform strategies, evidenced by poor public governance, high corruption, inability to introduce a proper legal framework and weak institutions, public and private. How does one define low state capacity? Several state weaknesses have accompanied transition in Southeast Europe, including first, low capacities to provide public goods and services,2 such as public governance, health and education systems, social services and security; and second, an inability or unwillingness to enforce rules of law in a democratic context. This article examines how the concept of low state capacity in Southeast Europe relates to public governance, institutional reform, the extent of corruption and the unofficial economy, and structural changes and economic performance. The paper concludes with some policy implications.