Four- and 5-year-old (primarily) Euro-American children (40 girls, 34 boys) participated in a study of moral reasoning, vicarious emotional responding, and prosocial behavior. Children's prosocial behavior and self-reported and facial reactions of vicarious emotion were obtained in response to 2 peer distress films and 2 adult distress simulations. Moral reasoning was assessed with prosocial moral dilemmas. Children's emotional responses were found to be related to analogous types of moral reasoning and were associated in expected ways with helping of peers and adults. Higher levels of moral reasoning were positively related to prosocial behavior. Children high in both other-oriented moral cognitions and sympathy were most helpful toward peers. The pattern of findings suggested that linkages are being formed in the preschool years not only between other-oriented affect and cognitions but also between those that are self-focused in nature. Affective empathy and higher level moral reasoning frequently have been theoretically and empirically linked with children's and adults' prosocial behavior (Batson, 1991; Eisenberg, 1986; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). However, despite associations of both to prosocial behavior, neither the relation between empathy and moral reasoning nor their potential role in jointly predicting prosocial action has received much empirical attention. In research on the association of empathy to prosocial behavior, it is essential to distinguish between other-oriented and selforiented vicarious emotional responding. In current developmental and social-psychological work (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990; Hoffman, 1982a), empathy has been defined as an affecrive response resulting from another's state or condition that is the same or very similar to the other's emotional state (e.g., selfreported or facial indexes of sadness, happiness, or concern). Moreover, empathy frequently may elicit other vicariously induced reactions. When accompanied by a cognitive sense of the other as distinct from the self, empathic arousal may lead to a feeling of compassion or sympathy for the other (e.g., otheroriented self-reports or facial indexes of concern for the other). Conversely, when empathic arousal becomes too intense, it may