Mereology Research Articles

An origin of corporate spores is concerning the inheritance of the proper to the participant part in society

Problems which arise up at the decision of corporate disputes concerning the inheritance of the proper aparticipant part are examined in the offered article, a legislation, which regulates corporate legal relationshipswhich arise up after to the occasion given, is analysed, a theoretical base lights up in relation to the inheritanceof the proper a participant part, in particular referring on normatively legal acts.

Propositions and Parthood: The Universe and Anti-Symmetry

It is plausible that the universe exists: a thing such that absolutely everything is a part of it. It is also plausible that singular, structured propositions exist: propositions that literally have individuals as parts. Furthermore, it is plausible that for each thing, there is a singular, structured proposition that has it as a part. Finally, it is plausible that parthood is a partial ordering: reflexive, transitive, and anti-symmetric. These plausible claims cannot all be correct. We canvass some costs of denying each claim and conclude that parthood is not a partial ordering. Provided that the relevant entities exist, parthood is not anti-symmetric and proper parthood is neither asymmetric nor transitive.

The frustrating problem for four-dimensionalism

I argue that four-dimensionalism and the desire satisfaction account of well-being are incompatible. For every person whose desires are satisfied, there will be many shorter-lived individuals (‘person-stages’ or ‘subpersons’) who share the person’s desires but who do not exist long enough to see those desires satisfied; not only this, but in many cases their desires are frustrated so that the desires of the beings in whom they are embedded as proper temporal parts may be fulfilledI call this the frustrating problem for four-dimensionalism. In the first half of the paper I lay the groundwork for understanding the frustrating problem, and then in the second half, I will examine six possible responses to the frustrating problem on behalf of the four-dimensionalist, (i) the Parfit (1984) inspired claim that identity is not what matters, (ii) the personal pronoun revisionism of Noonan (Analysis 70(1):93–98, 2010), (iii) the indirect concern account of Hudson (A materialist metaphysics of the human person, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2001), (iv) the sensible stages account of Lewis (On the plurality of worlds, Wiley Blackwell Press, Oxford, 1986), (v) a multiple-concepts account of desire satisfaction, and (vi) a No Desire View according to which subpersons have no mental states and thus no desires to frustrate. I argue that none of these solutions will help the four-dimensionalist; she does better to reject the desire satisfaction theory, while the defender of the desire satisfaction theory does better to reject four-dimensionalism.

NEUROPATHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF CONSERVATIVE TREATMENT OF SCOLIOSIS – A THEORETICAL VIEW POINT

An upright body posture cannot be maintained passively for reasons including a high location of the centre of gravity (COG) and a small support area. Proper alignment of body parts is maintained automatically, tending towards a pattern encoded in the CNS. A particularly important role in posture regulation is played by the short muscles of the back, which respond to being stretched with a contraction. During the early phase of scoliosis, the CNS automatically corrects abnormalities, but over time habituation occurs and the CNS treats them as something normal. Any attempt to restore proper body alignment is treated as an error and CNS automatically restores this abnormal pattern. With a prolonged deviation in body part alignment, CNS treats it as a defect and runs compensatory mechanisms to restore the balance of the body as a whole. Balance is ensured by postural compensation, but this does not restore proper body part alignment. In the treatment of scoliosis, it is important both to slow down progression and to prevent the development of abnormal postural habits, which are part of a vicious circle even without progression. Secondary prevention is therefore needed in all patients. Passive observation limits the possibilities for prevention and contradicts the principle of early implementation of rehabilitation. Depending on the size of the angle of curvature, recommended treatments of scoliosis comprise observation, corset bracing, and surgery. Physiotherapy is often treated as an unconventional and ineffective treatment. Often, the biggest problem is transferring the resulting correction to automatic maintenance of a correct posture in the vertical position. The aim of this paper was to discuss the conservative treatment of scoliosis with regard to difficulties maintaining the correct alignment of the body parts in the vertical position that accompany scoliosis.

Six Challenges to Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology

Psychology is not a young science anymore: as the textbooks tell us, it won its independence, from philosophy, a century and a half ago, through the efforts of such luminaries as Gustav Fechner and William James. And yet, if an offhand remark by a long-dead philosopher on psychology’s conceptual confusion still touches a raw nerve in some of us psychologists, it is probably because psychology’s intellectual roots have been all along, and will likely remain, firmly planted in the philosophy of mind. Philosophy and psychology may be seen as rivals insofar as each counts the other as a proper part of its subject matter. This standoff can, however, be resolved in a peaceful and productive manner, if we only realize that psychological science and the philosophy of mind are also natural partners, because these disciplines have joint custody over some of the most daunting – and most exciting – questions that humanity ever dared to contemplate. This partnership is too precious to be treated casually: arguably, the most momentous theoretical advances in psychology are typically motivated by deeply philosophical considerations, and the best thinking in the philosophy of mind is inspired by, and reflects back upon, scientific findings and theories. An exemplary approach to the relationship between philosophy and psychology is the one advocated by Quine (1969, pp. 126–127): My position is a naturalistic one; I see philosophy not as a priori [...] groundwork for science, but as continuous with science. I see philosophy and science as in the same boat – a boat which, to revert to Neurath’s figure as I so often do, we can rebuild only at sea while staying afloat in it. There is no external vantage point, no first philosophy.

New light on Bergman complexes by decomposing matroid types

Bergman complexes are polyhedral complexes associated to matroids. Faces of these complexes are certain matroids, called matroid types, too. In order to understand the structure of these faces we decompose matroid types into direct summands. Ardila/Klivans proved that the Bergman Complex of a matroid can be subdivided into the order complex of the proper part of its lattice of flats. Beyond that Feichtner/Sturmfels showed that the Bergman complex can even be subdivided to the even coarser nested set complex. We will give a much shorter and more general proof of this fact. Generalizing formulas proposed by Ardila/Klivans and Feichtner/Sturmfels for special cases, we present a decomposition into direct sums working for faces of any of these complexes. Additionally we show that it is the finest possible decomposition for faces of the Bergman complex. Les complexes de Bergmann sont des complexes polyhedrales affectès à des matroides. Les faces de ces complexes sont des matroides pour leur part, on les appelle types de matroides. Pour pouvoir comprendre ces types de matroides nous les divisons en sommes directes. Ardila et Klivans ont prouvè que le complexe de Bergman dun matroide peut être subdivisè en le complexe dordre du propre treillis des flats. Au surplus, Feichtner/Sturmfels ont pu montrer que le complexe de Bergmann peut même être subdivisè en le nested set complexe qui est encore plus grossier. Nous y prèsenterons une preuve plus courte et plus gènèrale. Nous gènèraliserons des formules qui ont dèjà ètè rèdigèes pour des cas spèciaux par Ardila/Klivans. Ainsi, nous rèvèlerons une division des types de matroides en sommes directes qui est valable tous les complexes èvoquès. De plus, nous montrerons que cette division est la division la plus fine pour les faces du complexe de Bergmann.

Tensed Mereology

Tensed Mereology

Phénomène de Koebner au cours du pyoderma gangrenosum : la photothérapie dynamique peut être un facteur déclenchant

The importance of glia for the function of the nervous system has been widely acknowledged since Rudolf Virchow expressed his concept of neuroglia (nerve glue) in 1846. He postulated that glia is a substance ‘which lies between the proper nervous parts, holds them together and gives the whole its form’. With exception of the role of oligodendroglia and Schwann cells in speeding axonal conduction, our understanding of the role of glia has advanced little since then. There is increasing evidence that the glial elements, which outnumber neurons by about an order of magnitude, contribute to the structural and nutritive support of neurons, regulate the extracellular environment of ions and transmitters, guide migrating neurons during development and play an important role in repair and regeneration17. A molecular description of the functional elements of neuroglia would seem important to characterize the unique properties of glia and glial subclasses.

On the Flag f-vector of a Graded Lattice with Nontrivial Homology

It is proved that the Boolean algebra of rank n minimizes the flag f-vector among all graded lattices of rank n, whose proper part has nontrivial top-dimensional homology. The analogous statement for the flag h-vector is conjectured in the Cohen-Macaulay case.

Performance Indicators for Sapele Thermal Power Station, Nigeria: 1997-2006

Performance indices as measured by percentage of shortfall of energy generated, load factor, utilization factor and capacity factor of Sapele thermal power station, Nigeria in the period 1997 to 2006 is presented. The thermal station uses both steam and gas turbines. The station consists of six units of steam turbine and four units of gas turbine with total installed capacity of 1020 MW. But it was established that less than 17 % of the installed capacity was available. The percentage shortfall of energy generated for the period under review ranged from 27.4 to 49.1 %. This was due to aging of the plant, improper operation and maintenance. The load factor was between 39.9 and 64 % as against international best practice of 80 %. The inability of Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) to do turn-around maintenance on the plant was advanced for the dismal value. Average plant availability of the plant for the studied period was less than 21% as against Industry best practice of over 95 %. The capacity factor was even more dismal. For the period under review, it ranged from as low as 5.49 % in 2006 to the highest value of 17.19 % in 1997. Low capacity factor indicates excessive plant failure. Measures to improve the performance indices of the plant have been suggested such as training of operation and maintenance (O & M) personnel regularly, improvement in O & M practices, proper spare parts inventory, organizing regular management meetings and improving general housekeeping of the plant.

Reason is normative, and should be studied accordingly

AbstractReason aims at truth, so normative considerations are a proper part of the study of reasoning. Excluding them means neglecting some of what we know or can discover about reasoning. Also, the normativist position we are asked to reject by Elqayam & Evans (E&E) is defined in attenuated and self-contradictory ways.

Bottomless determination: How Yablo can get proportionality from gunk

To escape epiphenomenalism, Stephen Yablo (1992) appeals to the principle that causes be proportional to their effects. Consider Sophie, a pigeon trained to peck at red triangles to the exclusion of all other colours. Sophie will peck at a scarlet triangle. But that does not mean that the triangle being scarlet is the cause of Sophie’s pecking. She would have pecked at any red triangle. The cause is the most specific property that makes a difference. Red is a determinable of scarlet. Determinables necessitate systematic resemblances between their determinates – as detailed by a sequence of studies inaugurated by W. E. Johnson (1921) and most recently refined by Eric Funkhouser (2006). This organization of determinable properties makes them more plausible causes than disjunctive properties. Sophie’s peck was not caused by the triangle being either scarlet or burgundy. That would be double-counting causes. After all, scarlet was doing all the work. Given the Eleatic principle that only causes exist, many go further and deny that there are any disjunctive properties. This parsimony stops the proliferation of disjunctive properties. The determination relation is relative. Red is a determinable of scarlet but it is a determinate of colour. Aside from those who think reality might be vague, such as David Sanford (1970), all experts on the determination relation assume that all chains of determination bottom out with superdeterminate properties. Metaphysicians such as Tim Crane (2008) latch on to these superdeterminate properties as the only causally efficacious properties. From this lemma, Carl Gillett and Bradley Rives (2005) go on to apply the Eleatic principle. They conclude that only superdeterminate properties are real. This consensus that determination relations are always grounded in superdeterminate properties is jeopardized by the analogy between superdeterminates and atoms. Atoms sit at the bottom of the constitution relation. They are parts that lack proper parts. But physicists respect the possibility of gunk (objects with parts that always have proper parts). There is no guarantee that there are super-constituents. Accordingly, Ted Sider (1996) reasons that since there may be no atoms and yet there is something rather than nothing, physical constitution must be possible. If objects can be composed of gunk, then they can be composed of atoms. And once we permit a little composition, why not help ourselves to as much as is suggested by common sense and science?

The objects of bodily awareness

Is it possible to misidentify the object of an episode of bodily awareness? I argue that it is, on the grounds that a person can reasonably be unsure or mistaken as to which part of her body he or she is aware of at a given moment. This requires discussing the phenomenon of body ownership, and defending the claim that the proper parts of one’s body are at least no less ‘principal’ among the objects of bodily awareness than is the body as a whole. I conclude with some reasons why this should lead us to think that bodily awareness, unlike introspection, is a form of perception.

ONTOLOGY OR PHENOMENOLOGY? HOW THE LVAD CHALLENGES THE EUTHANASIA DEBATE

This article deals with the euthanasia debate in light of new life-sustaining technologies such as the left ventricular assist device (LVAD). The question arises: does the switching off of a LVAD by a doctor upon the request of a patient amount to active or passive euthanasia, i.e. to 'killing' or to 'letting die'? The answer hinges on whether the device is to be regarded as a proper part of the patient's body or as something external. We usually regard the switching off of an internal device as killing, whereas the deactivation of an external device is seen as 'letting die'. The case is notoriously difficult to decide for hybrid devices such as LVADs, which are partly inside and partly outside the patient's body. Additionally, on a methodological level, I will argue that the 'ontological' arguments from analogy given for both sides are problematic. Given the impasse facing the ontological arguments, complementary phenomenological arguments deserve closer inspection. In particular, we should consider whether phenomenologically the LVAD is perceived as a body part or as an external device. I will support the thesis that the deactivation of a LVAD is to be regarded as passive euthanasia if the device is not perceived by the patient as a part of the body proper.

Art of spin decomposition

We analyze the problem of spin decomposition for an interacting system from a natural perspective of constructing angular-momentum eigenstates. We split, from the total angular-momentum operator, a proper part which can be separately conserved for a stationary state. This part commutes with the total Hamiltonian and thus specifies the quantum angular momentum. We first show how this can be done in a gauge-dependent way, by seeking a specific gauge in which part of the total angular-momentum operator vanishes identically. We then construct a gauge-invariant operator with the desired property. Our analysis clarifies what is the most pertinent choice among the various proposals for decomposing the nucleon spin. A similar analysis is performed for extracting a proper part from the total Hamiltonian to construct energy eigenstates.

Simpler without a simplest: Ockham's Razor implies epistemic dilemmas

The atom (in the mereological sense of an object without proper parts) can explain much. This explanatory power increases if we relax constraints on the atom’s behaviour. For instance, Hud Hudson (2005: 113–116) considers suspending the rule that nothing can be in two places at the same time. Now fewer atoms are needed to compose an object. How few? Only one atom is needed. So parsimony favours this alternative over all others. Indeed, one atom is enough to constitute all the objects in the universe. Hudson’s atomic monism comports wonderfully with Ockham’s alternative formulation of his principle: ‘Plurality ought never to be posited without necessity.’ But what if Hud Hudson were working with gunk? Each part of gunk has proper parts, so it is infinitely divisible. How much multi-located gunk should Hudson postulate? However much he postulates, he should have postulated less! Other gunky scenarios invite the same inescapable excess – and not just for ‘things’. Alfred North Whitehead believed each region of space has proper subregions. But then how much space should Whitehead postulate? For any

Fantasies and facts: epistemological and methodological perspectives on rst- and third-person perspectives

In this paper, I challenge two Cartesian assumptions. The first assumption to be challenged is that there is an independent solitary self (material or immaterial) that is a proper part of a person (i.e., a human being). I challenge this assumption by setting out a materialistic alternative to Descartes – one that, on the one hand, abandons solitariness, yet on the other hand, retains the significance of the first-person perspective so prominent in Descartes’ account. On my view, persons have first-person perspectives essentially, and first-person perspectives provide persistence conditions for persons. However, persons have no inner selves or inner agents; they have no parts that are selves at all. The second assumption that I challenge is one that equates what is real with what is in some strict sense mind-independent. The assumption, so widespread today, is that what has ontological status can exist in a world without mentality. On this assumption, nothing mental or intentional belongs in the basic ontology of the world. I’ll try to show that this assumption is traceable to Descartes’ view of minds and bodies, and that it is wrong.

과수 형질전환 국내 연구 동향 및 전망

Abstract The paper reviewed research status and outlook of genetic transformation in fruit trees in Korea. Genetic transformation has been long considered as an alternative technique overcoming limitation of conventional breeding and conducted since early 1990’s. An efficient genetic transformation was established with major cultivars of apple, even in Fuji and Gamhong, and some transgenic apple plants have been transferred into the greenhouse for further analysis of gene expression. A few successes of genetic transformation have been reported and application to a variety of cultivars tried in citrus and kiwifruit. Successful genetic transformation has not been reported in the other fruit trees including grapevine, yet and it is considered being at the level of research. Those factors including replacement of antibiotics as a selective agent, use of transgenic rootstocks and manipulation of gene expression at proper parts and developmental stages have been prerequisites for the rapid commercialization of transgenic fruit plants.

The Role of Migrant Labour in China's Labour Policy

Migrant workers have become a major component of China's labour force in the manufacturing sector, and therefore an important force in the country's economic modernization. Yet, for a long time, migrant workers were perceived as peasants by the Chinese authorities, and were excluded from the scope of the state's labour policy. In the new century, the government has begun to consider them as an important part of the manufacturing labour force, and attempt to protect their rights through adjustments in its labour policy. However, in many aspects, migrant workers are still considered “pseudo labourers”. This article attempts to examine the issue of migrant workers within the framework of the state's labour policy. The socio-economic problems associated with migrant workers will not be resolved until they are treated as a proper part of the labour force, and granted the same legal and policy protection as urban workers.

Spacetime and Mereology

Unrestricted Composition (UC) is, roughly, the claim that given any objects at all, there is something which those objects compose. (UC) conflicts in an obvious way with common sense. It has as a consequence, for instance, that there is something which has as parts my nose and the moon. One of the more influential arguments for (UC) is Theodore Sider’s version of the Argument from Vagueness. (A version of the Argument from Vagueness was first presented by David Lewis (1986), pp. 212–213). That argument purports to show that some plausible claims concerning the nature of vagueness entail (UC). In this paper I will suggest a response to this argument. I will show that the proponent of Supersubstantivalism (SS)—the view that material objects are identical to regions of spacetime—can reject a premise of Sider’s argument without denying the plausible claims concerning vagueness. Doing so requires only rejecting a certain view concerning the relationship between the proper sub-region relation and the proper parthood relation. So, proponents of (SS) are in a better position than many of us to side with common sense regarding composition. In the first section of the paper, I will present Sider’s argument. In the second section, I will introduce (SS) and briefly discuss some reasons one might have to believe that it is true. In the third section, I will show how the proponent of (SS) can avoid commitment to (UC) and reject a premise of Sider’s argument. Last, I’ll briefly consider and respond to some objections.