Six Challenges to Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology

Shimon Edelman

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00219

Abstract

Psychology is not a young science anymore: as the textbooks tell us, it won its independence, from philosophy, a century and a half ago, through the efforts of such luminaries as Gustav Fechner and William James. And yet, if an offhand remark by a long-dead philosopher on psychology’s conceptual confusion still touches a raw nerve in some of us psychologists, it is probably because psychology’s intellectual roots have been all along, and will likely remain, firmly planted in the philosophy of mind. Philosophy and psychology may be seen as rivals insofar as each counts the other as a proper part of its subject matter. This standoff can, however, be resolved in a peaceful and productive manner, if we only realize that psychological science and the philosophy of mind are also natural partners, because these disciplines have joint custody over some of the most daunting – and most exciting – questions that humanity ever dared to contemplate. This partnership is too precious to be treated casually: arguably, the most momentous theoretical advances in psychology are typically motivated by deeply philosophical considerations, and the best thinking in the philosophy of mind is inspired by, and reflects back upon, scientific findings and theories. An exemplary approach to the relationship between philosophy and psychology is the one advocated by Quine (1969, pp. 126–127): My position is a naturalistic one; I see philosophy not as a priori [...] groundwork for science, but as continuous with science. I see philosophy and science as in the same boat – a boat which, to revert to Neurath’s figure as I so often do, we can rebuild only at sea while staying afloat in it. There is no external vantage point, no first philosophy.

Highlights

The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a ‘young science.’ [. . . ] For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion
In the remainder of this brief note, I list some of the challenges that mark the frontiers of theoretical and philosophical psychology and that are motivated both by the lingering echoes of Wittgenstein’s criticism and by Quine’s positive outlook
The realization that values have a place in meta-theoretical discourse in psychology gives us license to set our sights considerably higher than merely gathering reliable and ample empirical findings with regard to whatever psychological phenomenon that is under investigation

Summary

How to paint the big picture

Perhaps the greatest challenge facing any attempt to understand how the mind works is the need to take in massive amounts of data. The present journal, Frontiers in Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, will adopt precisely this two-pronged approach. Which ones should I ignore as insignificant, even if they appear in the best journals? Which ones should I think hard about, even if the theoretical accounts offered by their authors make little sense to me? Which ones should I actively seek out, to fill a gap in my understanding of things? Insofar as these meta-scientific questions have to do with differential value that we place on different items of knowledge, they are philosophical. I have argued that my pragmatist teachers were right: “knowledge of facts presupposes knowledge of values.” I have argued that even when the judgments of reasonableness are left tacit, such judgments are presupposed by scientific inquiry. (judgments of coherence are essential even at the observational level: we have to decide which observations to trust, which scientists to trust — sometimes even which of our memories to trust.) . . . I have argued that my pragmatist teachers were right: “knowledge of facts presupposes knowledge of values.”

Truth and consequences

Ideas without borders

Explaining consciousness

Through the den of the metaphysician