Proof-theoretic Semantics Research Articles

Representing model theory in a type-theoretical logical framework

In a broad sense, logic is the field of formal languages for knowledge and truth that have a formal semantics. It tends to be difficult to give a narrower definition because very different kinds of logics exist. One of the most fundamental contrasts is between the different methods of assigning semantics. Here two classes can be distinguished: model theoretical semantics based on a foundation of mathematics such as set theory, and proof theoretical semantics based on an inference system possibly formulated within a type theory. Logical frameworks have been developed to cope with the variety of available logics unifying the underlying ontological notions and providing a meta-theory to reason abstractly about logics. While these have been very successful, they have so far focused on either model or proof theoretical semantics. We contribute to a unified framework by showing how the type/proof theoretical Edinburgh Logical Framework (LF) can be applied to the representation of model theoretical logics. We give a comprehensive formal representation of first-order logic, covering both its proof and its model theoretical semantics as well as its soundness in LF. For the model theory, we have to represent the mathematical foundation itself in LF, and we provide two solutions for that. Firstly, we give a meta-language that is strong enough to represent the model theory while being simple enough to be treated as a fragment of untyped set theory. Secondly, we represent Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory and show how it subsumes our meta-language. Specific models are represented as LF morphisms. All representations are given in and mechanically verified by the Twelf implementation of LF. Moreover, we use the Twelf module system to treat all connectives and quantifiers independently. Thus, individual connectives are available for reuse when representing other logics, and we obtain the first version of a feature library from which logics can be pieced together. Our results and methods are not restricted to first-order logic and scale to a wide variety of logical systems, thus demonstrating the feasibility of comprehensively formalizing large scale representation theorems in a logical framework.

The categorical and the hypothetical: a critique of some fundamental assumptions of standard semantics

The hypothetical notion of consequence is normally understood as the transmission of a categorical notion from premisses to conclusion. In model-theoretic semantics this categorical notion is ‘truth’, in standard proof-theoretic semantics it is ‘canonical provability’. Three underlying dogmas, (I) the priority of the categorical over the hypothetical, (II) the transmission view of consequence, and (III) the identification of consequence and correctness of inference are criticized from an alternative view of proof-theoretic semantics. It is argued that consequence is a basic semantical concept which is directly governed by elementary reasoning principles such as definitional closure and definitional reflection, and not reduced to a categorical concept. This understanding of consequence allows in particular to deal with non-wellfounded phenomena as they arise from circular definitions.

RULES FOR SUBATOMIC DERIVATION

In proof-theoretic semantics the meaning of an atomic sentence is usually determined by a set of derivations in an atomic system which contain that sentence as a conclusion (see, in particular, Prawitz, 1971, 1973). The paper critically discusses this standard approach and suggests an alternative account which proceeds in terms of subatomic introduction and elimination rules for atomic sentences. A simple subatomic normal form theorem by which this account of the semantics of atomic sentences and the terms from which they are composed is underpinned, shows moreover that the proof-theoretic analysis of first-order logic can be pursued also beneath the atomic level.

Proof-theoretic semantics for a natural language fragment

The paper presents a proof-theoretic semantics (PTS) for a fragment of natural language, providing an alternative to the traditional model-theoretic (Montagovian) semantics (MTS), whereby meanings are truth-condition (in arbitrary models). Instead, meanings are taken as derivability-conditions in a “dedicated” natural-deduction (ND) proof-system. This semantics is effective (algorithmically decidable), adhering to the “meaning as use” paradigm, not suffering from several of the criticisms formulated by philosophers of language against MTS as a theory of meaning. In particular, Dummett’s manifestation argument does not obtain, and assertions are always warranted, having grounds of assertion. The proof system is shown to satisfy Dummett’s harmony property, justifying the ND rules as meaning conferring. The semantics is suitable for incorporation into computational linguistics grammars, formulated in type-logical grammar.

Proof-Theoretic Semantics for Subsentential Phrases

The paper briefly surveys the sentential proof-theoretic semantics for fragment of English. Then, appealing to a version of Frege’s context-principle (specified to fit type-logical grammar), a method is presented for deriving proof-theoretic meanings for sub-sentential phrases, down to lexical units (words). The sentential meaning is decomposed according to the function-argument structure as determined by the type-logical grammar. In doing so, the paper presents a novel proof-theoretic interpretation of simple type, replacing Montague’s model-theoretic type interpretation (in arbitrary Henkin models). The domains of derivations are collections of derivations in the associated “dedicated” natural-deduction proof-system, and functions therein (with no appeal to models, truth-values and elements of a domain). The compositionality of the semantics is analyzed.

On Reduction Rules, Meaning-as-use, and Proof-theoretic Semantics

The intention here is that of giving a formal underpinning to the idea of ‘meaning-is-use’ which, even if based on proofs, it is rather different from proof-theoretic semantics as in the Dummett–Prawitz tradition. Instead, it is based on the idea that the meaning of logical constants are given by the explanation of immediate consequences, which in formalistic terms means the effect of elimination rules on the result of introduction rules, i.e. the so-called reduction rules. For that we suggest an extension to the Curry– Howard interpretation which draws on the idea of labelled deduction, and brings back Frege’s device of variable-abstraction to operate on the labels (i.e., proof-terms) alongside formulas of predicate logic.

SOME PROBLEMS FOR PROOF-THEORETIC SEMANTICS

Proof-theoretic semantics is an approach to logical semantics based on two ideas, of which the first is that the meaning of a logical connective can be explained by stipulating that some mode of inference, e.g., a natural deduction introduction or elimination rule, is permissible. The second idea is that the soundness of rules which are not stipulated outright may be deduced by some proof-theoretic argument from properties of the rules which are stipulated outright. I examine the first idea. My main conclusion is that the idea is more problematic, and requires more discussion, than has been generally realized. I mention five problems which will have to be overcome before the idea can be accepted as definitely viable.

TRACTARIAN SÄTZE, EGYPTIAN HIEROGLYPHS, AND THE VERY IDEA OF SCRIPT AS PICTURE

Is it possible for a writing system to be based on pictures? In the philosophical literature, the hieroglyphic writing system of the Ancient Egyptians is sometimes taken as the example par excellence of a purely pictorial script. The hieroglyphs are assumed to be signs that do not indicate how they are supposed to be pronounced, as do the signs of the alphabets of, among other, the Indo-European languages; instead, they depict what they mean. Most prominently, Ludwig Wittgenstein draws an analogy between the pictorial semantics of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and the alleged pictorial script of hieroglyphic writing:

Existence and Identity in Free Logic: Two Comments

Professor Tennant and I agree on much regarding the proof-theoretic semantics of free logic. Here I point to two issues, one on which we disagree, the other on which I find it hard to say how closely we may agree. The first concerns the exact content of Tennant's Rule of Atomic Denotation. The second concerns the nature of assumptions whose formal counterparts contain parametric occurrences of names.

Existence, Freedom, Identity, and the Logic of Abstractionist Realism

From the point of view of proof-theoretic semantics, we examine the logical background invoked by Neil Tennant's abstractionist realist account of mathematical existence. To prepare the way, we must first look closely at the rule of existential elimination familiar from classical and intuitionist logics and at rules governing identity. We then examine how well free logics meet the harmony and uniqueness constraints familiar from the proof-theoretic semantics project. Tennant assigns a special role to atomic formulas containing singular terms. This, we find, secures harmony and uniqueness but militates against the putative realism.

Validity Concepts in Proof-theoretic Semantics

The standard approach to what I call “proof-theoretic semantics”, which is mainly due to Dummett and Prawitz, attempts to give a semantics of proofs by defining what counts as a valid proof. After a discussion of the general aims of proof-theoretic semantics, this paper investigates in detail various notions of proof-theoretic validity and offers certain improvements of the definitions given by Prawitz. Particular emphasis is placed on the relationship between semantic validity concepts and validity concepts used in normalization theory. It is argued that these two sorts of concepts must be kept strictly apart.

Introduction: Proof-theoretic Semantics

Introduction: Proof-theoretic Semantics

The Justification of the Logical Laws Revisited

The proof-theoretic analysis of logical semantics undermines the received view of proof theory as being concerned with symbols devoid of meaning, and of model theory as the sole branch of logical theory entitled to access the realm of semantics. The basic tenet of proof-theoretic semantics is that meaning is given by some rules of proofs, in terms of which all logical laws can be justified and the notion of logical consequence explained. In this paper an attempt will be made to unravel some aspects of the issue and to show that this justification as it stands is untenable, for it relies on a formalistic conception of meaning and fails to recognise the fundamental distinction between semantic definitions and rules of inference. It is also briefly suggested that the profound connection between meaning and proofs should be approached by first reconsidering our very notion of proof.

Proof-theoretic Semantics for Classical Mathematics

We discuss the semantical categories of base and object implicit in the Curry-Howard theory of types and we derive derive logic and, in particular, the comprehension principle in the classical version of the theory. Two results that apply to both the classical and the constructive theory are discussed. First, compositional semantics for the theory does not demand ‘incomplete objects’ in the sense of Frege: bound variables are in principle eliminable. Secondly, the relation of extensional equality for each type is definable in the Curry-Howard theory.

Structured belief bases

In this paper we discuss a formal approach to belief representation which stores proof-theoretic information together with formulae. It is illustrated how this additional information can be used in the context of belief revision. The general aims of this paper are the following three: First, we would like to give a descriptive approach to belief revision, in contrast to a normative one. Secondly, the given theory should avoid (the consequences of) logical omniscience of beliefs. Finally, from a broader point of view, the presented approach can be considered as a case study within the programme of proof-theoretic semantics. In this programme, the question is raised whether and how proof-theoretic information can be used as a basis for semantics.

A parametric approach to deductive databases with uncertainty

Numerous frameworks have been proposed in recent years for deductive databases with uncertainty. On the basis of how uncertainty is associated with the facts and rules in a program, we classify these frameworks into implication-based (IB) and annotation-based (AB) frameworks. We take the IB approach and propose a generic framework, called the parametric framework, as a unifying umbrella for IB frameworks. We develop the declarative, fixpoint, and proof-theoretic semantics of programs in our framework and show their equivalence. Using the framework as a basis, we then study the query optimization problem of containment of conjunctive queries in this framework and establish necessary and sufficient conditions for containment for several classes of parametric conjunctive queries. Our results yield tools for use in the query optimization for large classes of query programs in IB deductive databases with uncertainty.

Is There A Logic Of Confirmation Transfer

This article begins by exploring a lost topic in the philosophy of science:the properties of the relations evidence confirming h confirmsh' and, more generally, evidence confirming each ofh1, h2, ..., hm confirms at least one of h1’, h2’,ldots;, hn'.The Bayesian understanding of confirmation as positive evidential relevanceis employed throughout. The resulting formal system is, to say the least, oddlybehaved. Some aspects of this odd behaviour the system has in common withsome of the non-classical logics developed in the twentieth century. Oneaspect – its ``parasitism'' on classical logic – it does not, and it is this featurethat makes the system an interesting focus for discussion of questions in thephilosophy of logic. We gain some purchase on an answer to a recently prominentquestion, namely, what is a logical system? More exactly, we ask whether satisfaction of formal constraints is sufficient for a relation to be considered a (logical) consequence relation. The question whether confirmation transfer yields a logical system is answered in the negative, despite confirmation transfer having the standard properties of a consequence relation, on the grounds that validity of sequents in the system is not determined by the meanings of the connectives that occur in formulas. Developing the system in a different direction, we find it bears on the project of ``proof-theoretic semantics'': conferring meaning on connectives by means of introduction (and possibly elimination) rules is not an autonomous activity, rather it presupposes a prior, non-formal,notion of consequence. Some historical ramifications are alsoaddressed briefly.

The Idea of a Proof-Theoretic Semantics and the Meaning of the Logical Operations

This is a purely conceptual paper. It aims at presenting and putting into perspective the idea of a proof-theoretic semantics of the logical operations. The first section briefly surveys various semantic paradigms, and Section 2 focuses on one particular paradigm, namely the proof-theoretic semantics of the logical operations.

A declarative semantics for depth-first logic programs

Depth-first evaluation causes a gap between the result of the computation and the classical declarative semantics for logic programs. The paper presents a new semantics for logic programs closing that gap. Although not classical, this semantics, called biquantale semantics, is declarative, since it is based on a notion of validity in a certain class of models. Depth-first evaluation is sound and complete with respect to biquantale semantics. Thus, the computational result is exactly reflected. Complementing the model theoretic semantics by a proof theoretic one, a substructural calculus is presented which is sound and complete with respect to biquantale semantics. Although the main interest is in definite programs, we consider adding a form of negation. Both the model theoretic and the proof theoretic semantics can be generalised to programs with negation.

Relationlog: A typed extension to Datalog with sets and tuples

This paper presents a novel logic programming based language for nested relational and complex value models called Relationlog. It stands in the same relationship to the nested relational and complex value models as Datalog stands to the relational model. The main novelty of the language is the introduction of powerful mechanisms, namely, partial and complete set terms, for representing and manipulating both partial and complete information on nested sets, tuples and relations. They generalize the set grouping and set enumeration mechanisms of LDL and allow the user to directly encode the open and closed world assumptions on nested sets, tuples, and relations. They allow direct inference and access to deeply embedded values in a complex value relation as if the relation is normalized, which greatly increases the ease of use of the language. As a result, the extended relational algebra operations can be represented in Relationlog directly, and more importantly, recursively in a way similar to Datalog. Like Datalog, Relationlog has a well-defined Herbrand model-theoretic semantics, which captures the intended semantics of nested sets, tuples and relations, and also a well-defined proof-theoretic semantics which coincides with its model-theoretic semantics.