Profits Of Supply Chain Members Research Articles

Pricing Decision of Three-Level Agricultural Supply Chain Based on Blockchain Traceability and Altruistic Preference

The traceability of blockchain is crucial to the quality and safety of agricultural products, primarily when bacterial contamination occurs in the agricultural supply chain. To gain a deeper understanding of the impacts on the quality and safety of agricultural products, we built a three-level agricultural supply chain model comprising one retailer, one manufacturer, and one supplier. We aimed to explore the impact of blockchain traceability and retailers’ altruistic preference on pricing decisions and channel member profit, and to then examine the motivation of enterprises to participate in blockchain technology. Our study showed that: (1) blockchain technology has the potential to improve the prices and profits of supply chain members without considering the cost of blockchain; and (2) blockchain technology has the potential to improve the retailer’s price when the unit variable cost of blockchain is higher than a certain threshold. It can also reduce the manufacturer’s price and the supplier’s output. However, the excessive cost of blockchain can also aggravate the double marginalization effect of the supply chain. When both the unit variable cost and the fixed input cost of the blockchain are low, each enterprise has the incentive to participate in the blockchain. (3) In the scenario of the altruistically-preferred retailer, when the blockchain variable cost is lower than a certain threshold, the retailer’s altruistic preferences can improve the manufacturer’s and supplier’s profit, but it will reduce the retailer’s profit.

Research on the Sales Strategy of Online Brand Owners Expanding to Offline Channels Based on The Online Agent Mode

This paper studies the supply chain system composed of online brand owners based on pure network sales to offline expansion, takes the single network channel model, establishes two dual-channel structure models of offline direct selling model and offline distribution model, and compares and analyzes the influence of different channel structures on the pricing, demand and optimal profit of supply chain members. Research shows that online brands in the offline sales development strategy choice and open offline stores fixed cost and consumer channel preference, when open offline stores fixed cost is very low, or when the fixed cost centered and consumer offline channel preference over a certain threshold, the optimal strategy for offline direct sales model, otherwise for offline distribution model. In order to improve the cooperation efficiency of the supply chain members in the offline distribution model, a bilateral contract mechanism is designed to coordinate the supply chain. When the fixed transfer payment fee is within a certain range, the mechanism can optimize the members of the supply chain and the overall profit.

Pricing and coordination in a green supply chain with a risk-averse manufacturer under the reference price effect

This paper considers a green supply chain using manufacturers and retailers as the research objects. The pricing and coordination strategy of the green supply chain, considering a risk-averse manufacturer, is investigated under the reference price effect. We establish centralized, decentralized, and cost-sharing contract decision-making models and then provide the optimal balancing strategy for each model. Further, we analyzed the optimal equilibrium strategy of different models. In the end, validate them through numerical simulation. We have found that the cost-sharing contract model is better than the decentralized decision model. Besides, manufacturers’ degree of risk avoidance affects the wholesale price, product greenness, retail prices, and profits of supply chain members. It is verified that the cost-sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain system to increase the profit of members of the supply chain.

Optimal Decision-Making of Retailer-Led Dual-Channel Green Supply Chain with Fairness Concerns under Government Subsidies

Green innovation is the inevitable trend in the development of the supply chain, and thus the government adopts subsidy policies for the relevant enterprises to enhance their enthusiasm for green development. In view of the manufacturers’ fairness concerns in the dual-channel green supply chain that is composed of manufacturers and retailers, we propose a novel Stackelberg game model led by retailers and analyze the impact of manufacturers’ fairness concerns on the decision-making of manufacturers and retailers in the dual-channel green supply chain under government subsidies. The results show that only the wholesale price of products, manufacturers’ profits, and retailers’ profits are affected by manufacturer’s fair concerns. When manufacturer has fair concerns, product greenness and profits of supply chain members rise with the increase in government subsidies. The results can offer an effective reference for the dual-channel supply chain members with fairness concerns to make optimal decisions under government subsidies.

Research on financing strategies of retailers with capital constraints under the effect of showrooms

A supply chain made up of a financially constrained retailer and a well-financed manufacturer is constructed considering the showroom effect. The financing strategy choice of the retailer and the operational decisions of the supply chain members are investigated, in which the retailer can solve the capital constraint problem through a single financing strategy (ML and BL) and a combined financing strategy (MBL and BTL). Meanwhile, the impact of the showroom effect on the optimal decision and profit of supply chain members under different financing strategies and the optimal financing strategy decision is analyzed by numerical examples. The study shows that: (1) the increasing showroom effect has not inhibited retailers' enthusiasm to offer showroom services; on the contrary, it has prompted them to improve the level of showroom services. (2) The price of the products grows with the increases in the showroom effect, but the sales price of the online channel is more greatly affected. In addition, the showroom effect has a greater impact on the sales prices of online and offline channels and wholesale prices under the BL strategy than in other financing strategies. (3) When the showroom effect is small, the optimal strategy for retailers is to choose the ML strategy or the MBL strategy, while the BTL strategy is superior to the MBL strategy only when the equity financing ratio is very small. However, where the showroom effect exceeds a certain threshold, the BL strategy is the optimal funding strategy for retailers. (4) When the bank loan rate is too high, the ML and MBL strategies are better if the retailer's initial capital level is not too low.

Strategic inventory and supplier encroachment under asymmetric information

The existing literature has shown that using a strategic inventory strategy and supplier encroachment strategy exclusively or simultaneously may improve the efficiency of the supply chain. However, most research assumes that the demand information in the supply chain is symmetric. In real life, the retailer often has private demand information, and thus the demand information is asymmetric. The role of an information sharing strategy in the presence of strategic inventory and supplier encroachment has yet to be studied. The gap is filled by considering a two-period model consisting of a supplier and a retailer, for which information sharing, strategic inventory, and supplier encroachment are investigated with a focus on the effect of strategic inventory strategy on information sharing strategy, encroachment strategy, and the profit of supply chain members. We significantly contributed by considering the interaction between the retailer's strategic inventory strategy, information sharing strategy, and the supplier's encroachment strategy. Asymmetric information is first introduced in the strategic inventory model. Furthermore, our other significant contribution is presented to demonstrate that strategic inventory can hurt all firms when the demand information is asymmetric, which is different from the setting of perfect information. The following results are obtained. First, holding strategic inventory will not affect the retailer's information sharing strategy. Second, the use of strategic inventory by the retailer will restrain the use of encroachment strategy by the supplier, whether the information is shared or not. Finally, when the demand information is asymmetric, and the supplier does not encroach in the second period, the retailer can use strategic inventory to bring about 'lose-lose' or 'win-lose' outcomes besides 'win-win' or 'lose-win' outcomes.

Optimal recycling price strategy of clothing enterprises based on closed-loop supply chain

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>More and more garment enterprises begin to pay attention to the importance of recycling, take the corresponding recycling strategy to recycle garment products and remanufacture, forming a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). In reality, recycling is a complex system, the recycling strategy of clothing brands will not only affect the reverse channel of closed-loop supply chain, but also affect the consumer demand of forward channel, and then affect the profit of supply chain. In order to solve this problem, we propose a CLSC composed of a manufacturer, a retailer and a collector, establish three different Stackelberg leadership models, and derive the optimal recycling strategy. Our results show that consumers' sensitivity to the recycling price will affect the optimal decision of supply chain members. The increase of the recycling market is not always beneficial to the profits of supply chain members. By comparing the profits of the three models, it is found that the retailer leadership model is the most effective scenario of CLCS. The results of this paper provide a reference for garment enterprises to formulate recycling strategies.</p>

Pricing, carbon emission reduction and recycling decisions in a closed-loop supply chain under uncertain environment

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>This paper studies the pricing and recycling decision problems in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) containing a manufacturer, a downstream retailer, and a third-party recycling left. The manufacturer is subjected to the cap-and-trade regulation and determines the wholesale price of products and carbon emission reduction rate. The retailer determines its resale price to meet customer demands. The third-party recycling left determines the collection rate of recycling and remanufacturing used products. The new product demands, total carbon emissions, and recovery of these products are characterized as uncertain variables due to lack of historical data or insufficient data collected for research. By constructing three decentralized game models, we explore the equilibrium solutions under the corresponding decision-making situation and the corresponding analytical solutions. Finally, numerical experiments are performed to show the total profit of supply chain members for each structure and some special insights are drawn.</p>

Pricing Decision Models of the Dual Channel Supply Chain with Service Level and Return

The interests of upstream, midstream, downstream companies and consumers in the supply chain are jointly affected by service levels and returns. Improving service levels can increase market demand and improve market position, as well as reduce return rates. But the increase in service level will bring an increase in service cost. How to balance the service cost and return cost through pricing decision, so that the profit of supply chain members can be improved, is the problem studied in this paper. In this paper, we consider the effect of service level of network channel on consumers’ return behavior in the context of manufacturer’s dual-channel supply chain when dual channels provide services at the same time, and discuss the effect of service level and return rate on pricing decision of dual-channel supply chain. It was found that return behavior can stimulate manufacturers to improve service levels and increase overall supply chain profits. The higher the return rate in the network channel, the greater the benefits from improved service levels by the manufacturer and the less detrimental to retailers’ returns. This study enriches the research on pricing decisions in dual-channel supply chains, increases the motivation of merchants to improve service levels, and has some guiding implications for supply chain members to develop price and service strategies.

Optimal pricing strategy considering consumer sensitivity to water-saving and advertising in the apparel supply chains

PurposeMotivated by consumers' concerns about water resources, this paper studies the interactive impact of advertising efforts and water-saving on corporate profits in apparel supply chains. Moreover, this study attempts to find an effective way to improve the profit of supply chain members under different game scenarios. Therefore, this study explores the game scenarios with considering the cost-sharing contract.Design/methodology/approachThis paper constructs two basic game models considering different market power in the apparel supply chains, and explores the Pareto improvement combined with cost-sharing contracts based on the basic models. Furthermore, this study extends the models by considering cost-saving and non-linear demand.FindingsIn this paper, it can be found that advertising efforts and water-saving have complex interactive relationships. Counter-intuitively, the increase in advertising efforts may increase water savings. Furthermore, it presents a Pareto improvement when considering cost-sharing contracts, and both the manufacturer and the retailer's profits may improve simultaneously. Moreover, it does not affect the main conclusions when consider the effects of cost-saving and non-linear demand.Research limitations/implicationsAlthough some important findings have been reached, this paper can be extended in many ways in the future. For example, the coordination mechanism among supply chain members can be considered and the fair distribution of profits can be studied. Moreover, the influence of the government policies on the optimal strategy, as well as changes in social welfare can be considered.Practical implicationsThis study offers supply chain members the guidelines on coordinating water-saving investment and advertising efforts which provided new insight into the interaction of these two factors in the apparel supply chains. Moreover, it can provide a coordination mechanism for the supply chain members to improve their profits.Social implicationsThis paper explores the interactive relationship between water-saving and advertising efforts. It can not only save more water resources but also enable consumers to enjoy more environmentally friendly apparel products.Originality/valueThe current literature mainly focuses on the impact of advertising efforts on firm profit. However, this paper studies the interaction between advertising efforts and water-saving in apparel supply chains. Furthermore, this study explores the optimal pricing strategies and Pareto improvement by considering cost-sharing contracts. It can provide theoretical and practical guidance for the decision-maker in deciding on advertising and water-saving investment.

A Study on the Relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility and Supply Chain Profit Distribution in the Context of Common Prosperity

As the new mode of resource allocation and profit distribution governance, common prosperity will be achieved effectively through the “third distribution” of corporate social responsibility (CSR) to regulate profit. The performance level of CSR is directly related to the profitability of the entire supply chain and its member enterprises. In the study, based on the utilization of the Shapley value method, by incorporating CSR elements, a preliminary model of profit allocation for four cooperative scenarios in the supply chain is constructed and modified to take into account the level of CSR implementation. Based on the modified model, the relationship between the performance level of CSR and the total profit of the supply chain and the member enterprises’ profit is analyzed. The study shows that the total profit of the supply chain is linearly and positively correlated with the performance level of CSR. In contrast, the profit of supply chain members has a nonlinear positive correlation with CSR performance. The impact of the whole level of CSR fulfillment on the profitability of the entire supply chain varies at different stages. Finally, the findings are discussed from the perspectives of the government, industry organizations, supply chain managers, and supply chain member enterprises, providing valuable references for the research and practice of comprehensively promoting CSR fulfillment in supply chains and realizing common prosperity.

Optimized radio-frequency identification system for different warehouse shapes

Advanced technologies are receiving increased attention in every sector of industry. One of such technologies is radio-frequency identification. In some business models, a manufacturer’s responsibility is to correctly manage inventories for supply chain while maximizing profit for every member. On the other hand, the issue of supply chain member unreliability persists in the real situation. The manufacturer uses radio-frequency identification system in order to better control inventory, which then may manage inventory pooling and labor investment. An efficient number of a radio-frequency identification readers are required for detecting radio-frequency identification tags. However, radio-frequency identification system is different for different cases, especially when there are different layouts even in the same system. If radio-frequency identification technology is not deployed correctly according to the warehouse specifics, the issue of optimized benefits may arise. This study explores how radio-frequency identification technology can be used to increase profit of supply chain members in an uncertain situation like unreliability within the supply chain management. In terms of deployment, the optimal gap between the readers while having optimal number of readers for most common warehouse shapes is investigated in this study. Because the life of product sometimes is unpredictable, it is possible that no specified form of distribution function will be followed. To identify the global optimal solution, the Kuhn–Tucker approach is utilized. The numerical study shows that the manufacturer may gain more profit by implementing revenue sharing and the optimal spacing between readers while optimizing radio-frequency identification system costs for different layouts.

A game between green and non-green supply chains considering two-way government intervention and manufacturer competition

Enterprise competition has been transformed into chain-to-chain competition, and green development is imperative under the promotion of policies. Horizontal cooperation between green and non-green manufacturers provides a new direction for the supply chain to improve its core competitiveness. This paper develops competition and cooperation models between two manufacturers for the green and non-green supply chain under two-way government intervention to explore the impact of manufacturers’ horizontal cooperation on decisions and profits of supply chain members. In particular, for a situation without cooperation, we consider a Stackelberg game between two manufacturers. Model solutions and numerical analysis have shown that: 1) Cooperation among manufacturers can not only improve their own profits, but also strengthen environmental welfare. However, cooperation will damage consumer surplus. 2) When consumers are more sensitive to product prices, manufacturers’ cooperative behavior is not conducive to retailers, but with the improvement of consumer environmental awareness, retailers will gradually support their upstream cooperation. 3) Under the simultaneous implementation of government subsidy and punishment strategies, whether green consumption can be promoted is related to the adjustment factor of government subsidies, while the relationship between the green level floor for subsidy and product greenness is affected by the adjustment factor of subsidies and manufacturers’ cooperation. 4) The impacts of fierce price competition and green level competition on supply chain members are opposite; when the price competition is moderate or the green level competition is weak, the manufacturers’ cooperation is also beneficial to the improvement of retailers’ profits. This provides ideas for the development of green supply chain, and provides a reference for the implementation of two-way government intervention policy.

Availability and reliability of information transmission for supply chain coordination with demand information sharing

Information sharing enhances coordination in a supply chain, which mitigates the bullwhip effect and enables smooth production and inventory management for members of the chain. This study considers a two-echelon supply chain in which an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer are coordinated by revenue sharing, and investigates the effects that the reliability and availability of information sharing have on the profits of entire supply chain. Also, the retailer shares the demand information with the manufacturer through an information transmission mechanism, where the demand is fit by an autoregressive model. The costs of information transmission are quantitatively evaluated with the linear, exponential, and power law functional forms, and the variations in profits are accordingly investigated. This study contributes to the literature by providing a practical view on information sharing among supply chain members, because the reliability and availability are taken into account in the assessment of sharing quality. Unlike the previous studies, the proposed approach of this study integrates the relevant factors, such as the quality of information sharing in terms of reliability and availability, and the information transmission costs, to probe into the variations in profits of supply chain members. In this regard, the accuracy of production decisions, such as the optimal order quantities and inventory levels, would be better compared to other approaches on the basis of profit maximization for the entire supply chain. The results of sensitivity analyses show that the greater the reliability and availability of information sharing is, the better the supply chain management performance would be, and the supply chain members, especially the upstream manufacturer, would thus gain more profits. However, higher reliability and availability of information sharing would often incur greater expenditures, and as a result, the trade-off for the determination of the optimal reliability and availability of information sharing is critical for supply chain coordination.

Contract Coordination of Fresh Agri-Product Supply Chain under O2O Model

The development of the fresh-food e-commerce has led scholars to pay more attention to research on the agricultural product supply chain. This paper analyses the operation mode of the new O2O retail fresh supply chain by constructing the Stackelberg game model, takes the freshness and freshness-keeping efforts of fresh agricultural products as the main considerations, and analyses and compares the overall income of the supply chain under different decision-making modes. The results of the study show that: (1) In a centralized decision-making model, collaboration between suppliers and retailers online and offline can increase their respective revenues, and overall supply chain profits increase as the proportion of collaboration increases; (2) compared to decentralized decision-making, revenue-sharing contracts can increase the overall profitability of supply chain members and the supply chain when the revenue sharing factor is relatively high in the case of online and offline channel collaboration; (3) finally, the impact of revenue-sharing contracts on supply chain profitability is discussed through numerical analysis.

Bilateral information sharing in a supply chain with manufacturer competition

Information sharing has been regarded as a way to coordinate or to optimize the whole supply chain. Prior literature focuses on unilateral information sharing in a supply chain with single or substitutable products. This paper explores bilateral demand information sharing in a supply chain, in which two competing manufacturers provide substitutable products to a common retailer. All supply chain members have partial forecast information about the market demand. We establish three pricing decision models and derive the corresponding results by backward induction to study the effects of bilateral information sharing on pricing and expected profits of supply chain members under three information sharing strategies. The results show that (i) information sharing decreases the positive effect of manufacturer’s demand forecast on the optimal price, but increases the positive effect of retailer’s demand forecast; (ii) information sharing benefits two manufacturers and hurts the retailer, whereas benefits the whole supply chain under certain conditions; (iii) the retailer prefers to share information with one of manufacturers rather than both of manufacturers. Finally, we also provide some managerial insights with the help of computational studies.

Time-Of-Use pricing in an energy sustainable supply chain with government interventions: A game theory approach

In this study, the game theory approach has been used to perform Time-Of-Use (TOU) pricing for renewable and conventional energy supply chains with government intervention to achieve sustainable development goals. Also, a Demand Response Program (DRP) based on TOU pricing has been implemented to improve the profits of power producers and the energy consumption pattern of end customers. Decision variables included the price of conventional and renewable energy during low- and high-load periods, tax rate, and subsidies. These variables are determined in three scenarios with the goals of maximizing government revenue, maximizing social welfare, minimizing environmental impacts, and under two-game structures of cooperative and Nash between the producers. The equilibrium solutions of each game for the three scenarios were obtained by backward induction. The results showed that decisions related to energy prices and tariffs play a major role in achieving the goals of sustainable development, profits of supply chain members, and success in meeting consumer demand. For all three scenarios, the government revenue function and the social welfare functions earn higher values in the Nash game than in the cooperative game, but the environmental impacts and the producers' profit function earn respectively lower and higher values in the cooperative game.

The Differential Game of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Manufacturer Competition Considering Goodwill

The dynamic optimization of the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) is a hot research topic. Members’ competitive behavior and product goodwill play an important role in the decision making of CLSC members. In this paper, a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with competitive manufacturers and single retailers is studied, in which the manufacturer produces and recycles the products, and the retailer is responsible for the sales of the products. On this basis, a dynamic linear differential equation of product goodwill is constructed, the optimal dynamic path of each decision variable is found, and the influence of price competition among manufacturers on the decision making of members in a dynamic closed-loop supply chain is studied. The conclusion is verified by an example. The results show that goodwill directly affects the wholesale price, the retail price, the recovery price, and the profit of supply chain members. The wholesale price and the retail price of products are not only positively affected by their own goodwill, but also by the goodwill of competing products. The manufacturer competition intensity will affect the product price and the supply chain member profit. To a certain extent, the more intense the manufacturer’s competition is, the higher the wholesale price and the retail price, and the greater the profit of the supply chain members.

Impacts of production, transportation and demand uncertainties in the vaccine supply chain considering different government subsidies

Vaccine supply chain is a complex system. In the vaccine supply chain, there are lots of uncertainties in the design and production, delivery and demand of vaccines, in particular, with the continuous mutation of the virus, the components of the vaccine need to be updated in time. These uncertainties may result in huge losses to vaccine manufacturer and retailer. Thus, the government often provides the different subsidies respectively to the producing end or the purchasing end in vaccine supply chain so that the members can own sustainability. Motivated by the above, in this paper, we describe the uncertain characteristics of the vaccine supply chain and consider the different government subsidies. We aim to study the production and pricing decision problems of manufacturer and retailer. Late Rebate contract is one of the commonly used contracts in the vaccine supply chain. Thus, we consider Late Rebate contract in this paper and introduce government subsidies, which are divided into three situations: no subsidy, subsidized manufacturer, and subsidized retailer. We mainly explore whether the different government subsidies can improve the profits of vaccine manufacturer and retailer. Comparing the equilibrium profits of subsidizing manufacturer and subsidizing retailer with the benchmark under no subsidy, the conclusions are that subsidizing retailer can improve the profits of supply chain members, while subsidizing manufacturer cannot achieve this effect. The conclusions in this paper provide guidance and suggestions for the government and decision-makers.

A Game-Theoretic Approach for CSR Emergency Medical Supply Chain during COVID-19 Crisis

The COVID-19 pandemic has caused high fluctuations in the demand for medical supplies. Therefore, emergency medical supplies enterprises have faced challenges in decision making and need to consider more corporate social responsibility (CSR) in production. At the same time, the government needs to take considerable measures to support emergency medical supplies enterprises. As such, our paper researches the decision and coordination problems for emergency medical supply chain considering CSR with the government, manufacturer, and retailer. The manufacturer produces emergency medical supplies. It has additional production technological innovation efforts to improve supply efficiency and assume CSR. The retailer faces uncertain demands and is responsible for undertaking CSR to meet the demands. The government must implement a certain degree of subsidies to ease the impact of the pandemic on emergency medical supply chain enterprises. Meanwhile, our paper further explores the obligations of the economy, society, and efficiency of enterprises under the COVID-19 pandemic and the decision making of enterprises for the implementation of CSR. Based on the principle of maximizing social welfare, we discuss decentralized decision making (without government and with government) and centralized decision making, respectively. On this basis, our paper not only designs a wholesale price–cost sharing joint contract coordination mechanism but also proves that a joint contract can achieve supply chain coordination under certain conditions. Through the analysis, we observe: (1) Government subsidies can improve the enthusiasm of supply chain members to undertake CSR; (2) With the improvement of the retailer’s CSR level, the profits of supply chain members and overall performance have improved to a certain degree; (3) To improve supply efficiency and assume social responsibility, the manufacturer implements technological innovation investment. However, it will impose some burden on the manufacturer. Government subsidies allow the manufacturer to balance between social responsibility and its profit.