Process Safety Management System Research Articles

Simulation of the Chlorination Process Safety Management System Based on System Dynamics Approach

Abstract It is important to investigate the influence factors of chlorination system safety since the chlorination process is exposed to the risk of chlorine leakages, fires and explosions, which are easy to cause severe casualties. To consider the chlorination process as a complex and dynamic system, a simulation model about the safety of chlorination process is established based on system dynamics. Four modules related to the workers, the management, the laws (and regulations) and the equipment, as well as a mutant factor related to the corrosion degree are comprehensively integrated. Through implementations of a series of scenarios with different inputs, it is found that the proposed SD model can obtain the influence pattern of corrosion degree of equipment in line with common sense, and the work skill has a cumulative, positive impact on system safety, whereas work stress mainly affects system safety over the second half of the life cycle. On the basis of these appreciable influences on the chlorination process safety, some suggestions are also provided for safety management. It is hoped that this work could provide some references for the prevention of accidents in chlorination process and some new ideas for simulation on safety issues in chemical industry.

And now for something completely different

Process safety management systems are generally credited with reducing major accident risk in the process industries. While those systems have been around for many years—the EU introduced the Seveso Directive in 1982, and US OSHA promulgated the PSM regulation 10 years later— many companies today are challenged by inadequate and/or stagnant process safety management system performance. Several companies have experienced major incidents, particularly when they are subject to prescriptive regulations such as OSHA PSM.Reliance on compliance with prescriptive regulations is no guarantee of preventing major incidents. No regulator anywhere has ever thought of everything that can cause a process safety incident and then written a regulation to safeguard against that occurrence. Good process safety requires that hazards are identified, the risks of these hazards are understood, and those risks are managed by “doing the right thing.” This frequently requires additional activities that go beyond regulatory compliance.In 2007, CCPS introduced Risk Based Process Safety (RBPS), which builds on lessons learned since the early 1980s, and applies management system principles of Plan, Do, Check, Act. Being risk‐based, RBPS is not prescriptive. It recognizes that all hazards and risks are NOT equal, and focuses more resources on the higher hazards and risks that have been identified. This enables finite company resources to be optimally deployed to efficiently improve process safety performance. The 20 elements of RBPS go beyond OSHA PSM to include other elements, such as risk analysis and performance metrics.Some companies have embraced RBPS and moved away from compliance‐driven process safety management systems. However, RBPS is primarily focused on process plant operations. While some elements of RBPS can be applied to large and small projects, RBPS and its guidance does not comprehensively address projects or certain other aspects of process safety.The paper highlights “some completely different” process safety elements for which no RBPS guidance is currently available, and discusses the application of a more comprehensive RBPS approach to fill these gaps. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Process Saf Prog 37:25–30, 2018

Reducing Process Safety Events: An approach proven by sustainable results

The Dow Chemical Company has significantly reduced the number of Tier 1 Process Safety events from 69 in 2008 to an average of 10 in 2013–2015. This paper will share some of the key elements that have led to this successful and sustainable reduction in incidents. The structure of the paper is focused around the concept of “Effective Process Safety Programs” published by Klein and Vaughen, Process Safety: Key Concepts and Practical Applications, CRC Press, 2017.In this paper, we will provide details on Dow's Operational Discipline systems that enable success on a day‐to‐day basis. These systems include Procedure Use Culture, Process Safety Training programs, and Process Safety Collaboration Networks. We will also describe our Process Safety Management Systems that enable long‐term success including Dow's Loss Prevention Principles (LPP), use of Process Hazards Analysis (PHA), Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) and other tools to manage risk, and Dow's Mechanical Integrity program. The success is built on a strong foundation of Safety Culture and Leadership. This paper will illustrate how Dow is structured to support the Process Safety efforts and examples will be shared about how leadership at all levels of the organization is practiced and demonstrated. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 326–337, 2017

Development of a safety management system (SMS) for drilling and servicing operations within OSHA jurisdiction area of Texas

Workers of oil and gas extraction industries are exposed to multiple safety hazards, resulting in high fatality rates. Texas has the highest employment and fatality of oil and gas industries. Current regulations that apply to the industries in Texas require no safety management system (SMS) and inadequately address the safety hazards associated with drilling and servicing operations. The objective of the study is to develop a SMS to improve safety performances of Texas drilling and servicing operations. First, current SMSs in the United States, i.e., Process Safety Management (PSM), and Safety and Environment Management Systems (SEMS) were studied to determine if they can be directly extended. According to analysis of Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) incident data, development of a new SMS is a better solution rather than extension of the two SMSs. A new SMS has been proposed by identifying and categorizing causal factors of incidents. The SMS has been developed to integrate both process and personnel safety and was designed right for Texas drilling and servicing operations. Industries can use the management system as a framework to establish their safety programs.

Developing a framework for dynamic risk assessment using Bayesian networks and reliability data

Process Safety in the oil and gas industry is managed through a robust Process Safety Management (PSM) system that involves the assessment of the risks associated with a facility in all steps of its life cycle. Risk levels tend to fluctuate throughout the life cycle of many processes due to several time varying risk factors (performances of the safety barriers, equipment conditions, staff competence, incidents history, etc.). While current practices for quantitative risk assessments (e.g. Bow-tie analysis (BT), Layer of protection analysis (LOPA) etc.) have brought significant improvements in the management of major hazards, they are static in nature and do not fully take into account the dynamic nature of risk and how it improves risk-based decision making.In an attempt to continually enhance the risk management in process facilities, the oil and gas industry has put in very significant efforts over the last decade toward the development of process safety key performance indicators (KPI or parameters to be observed) to continuously measure or gauge the efficiency of safety management systems and reduce the risks of major incidents. This has increased the sources of information that are used to assess risks in real-time. The use of such KPIs has proved to be a major step forward in the improvement of process safety in major hazards facilities. Looking toward the future, there appears to be an opportunity to use the multiple KPIs measured at a process plant to assess the quantitative measure of risk levels at the facility on a time-variant basis.ExxonMobil Research Qatar (EMRQ) has partnered with the Mary Kay O'Connor Process Safety Center – Qatar (MKOPSC-Q) to develop a tool that monitors, in real time, the potential increases in risk levels as a result of pre-identified risk factors and process safety related data, using Bayesian Belief Networks (BN). The development of the tool involved two phases: 1) Development of a methodology that establishes the framework for the tool and 2) Development of the tool itself with the use of JAVA programming language. The overall tool is to be called PULSE, which stands for Process Unit Life Safety Evaluation.In this context, the paper presents a case study of the quantitative risk assessment of a process unit using BN. The different steps of the development of the BN are detailed, including: translation of a Bowtie into a skeletal BN, modification of the skeletal BN to incorporate reliability data, and insertion of equipment failure evidence into the BN for dynamic modeling. In addition, an overview of PULSE is presented. The outcomes of the dynamic modeling of the BN with real time insertion of evidence are discussed and recommendation for the framework for a dynamic risk assessment tool are made.

Integrating Human Factors (HF) into a Process Safety Management System (PSMS)

Human factors and process safety management (PSM) have become key factors in preventing exposure to both hazardous materials and major accidents. Therefore, comprehensive process safety management is required to address all aspects of human factors. Currently, there are several‐process safety management models all of which have some weaknesses with respect to the control of human factors inherent in the process industry. Moreover, there is as yet no universally accepted process safety management model that treats process safety management as an integral part of the management system. Therefore, a need has arisen to integrate human factors and the existing frameworks and models into a single integrated management system to ensure a holistic approach of control and a continuous learning system. This article identifies the missing human factors in the current system and describes an integrated process safety management system (IPSMS) model drawn from screening all existing PSM frameworks, while integrating the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS). The model, which adopts the PLAN, DO, CHECK, and ACT framework, also outlines an implementation strategy. We conclude that IPSMS provides both a theoretical and a practical framework with which to manage, measure and analyse process safety management systems. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Process Saf Prog 37:67–85, 2018

Lack of safety management system led to fatal explosion

A 2016 Airgas facility explosion that killed one worker reveals a gap in federal process safety requirements for facilities that manufacture hazardous substances, a new report says. The plant in Cantonment, Fla., which makes nitrous oxide, was not in violation of federal regulations when the explosion happened, the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) says in an investigation report released last week. OSHA and EPA regulations that require chemical facilities to have process safety management systems largely do not apply to facilities that manufacture nitrous oxide. “Airgas lacked a safety management system to identify, evaluate, and control nitrous oxide process safety hazards, which led to the explosion,” CSB concludes. “Since 1973, the nitrous oxide industry has averaged one major explosion about every seven years,” says CSB, an independent federal agency that investigates serious chemical accidents in the U.S. but does not regulate. CSB says the explosion at the Airgas facility was

A new insight into the accident investigation: A case study of Tianjin Port fire and explosion in China

By figuring out the cause and learning the lessons, accident investigation serves to avoid the like accidents effectively. Incident Management is one of the twelve key factors among China's process safety management system (PSMS), while accident investigation is central to Incident Management. This paper selected “Tianjin Port 8.12 fire and explosion accident” (“Tianjin 8.12 Accident”) as an investigation case. Three core components: cause analysis, affixing the responsibility and corrective suggestions, were unfolded. Problems were analyzed from process safety and accident development point of view. A process analysis approach, which is based on event sequence‐barrier failed, was employed for accident investigation. Affixing responsibility process based on failed analysis was used for accident investigating and affixing. In order to give corrective suggestions, safety information‐based corrective suggestions are proposed by starting from systematic and interconnected perspective and combining with finding failed behaviors and an in‐depth analysis of the causes behind the behaviors. Subsequently, an integral accident investigation approach, which consists of cause analysis based on event sequence‐barrier failed, affixing responsibility process based on failed analysis and systematic corrective measures based on safety information, can effectively render scientific theoretical guidance to investigation and analysis of an accident. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 362–367, 2017

Chinese process safety management core elements and control measures

With the popularization and application of chemical process safety management (PSM) systems in the chemical industry, the use of such systems in China has become the focus of a large volume of research. In this article, 12 elements included in the current Chinese PSM system are divided into four stages from a structural point of view. This division will be helpful in the follow‐up analysis. After a careful analysis of the evaluation results for one PSM pilot study in Nanjing, some correlations have been found between the results of the elemental evaluation. Small‐ and medium‐sized chemical plants make up a large proportion of Chinese chemical plants and many chemical accidents take place in these plants, so a simplified PSM system in practical operation need to be found. Based on a previous PSM structural analysis, the secondary elements of the PSM system can be removed. This allows researchers to avoid the traditional method of analyzing PSM elements individually. In the concrete analysis process, a theoretical analysis of the correlation degree between elements can be combined with the results of accident investigations. The simplified Chinese PSM system consists of four core elements: Process safety information, process hazard analysis, training, and emergency management. Based on the current applications of these four core elements in China, a consideration of correlations between these elements is used to make several suggestions for improving China's PSM systems. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 378–381, 2017

Creating a resilient management system delivering a flexible foundation for growth in an energy organisation

Many organisations find it challenging to effectively integrate separate internal management systems and processes into one cohesive framework that supports organisational strategy. A management system is a framework of policies, processes and procedures developed to ensure an organisation can complete the tasks necessary to achieve its strategic objectives. International and industry standards typically take a functional view of management systems, often resulting in silos of information. In addition, inefficient and isolated safety, environmental, process safety, risk, compliance and quality management systems cost time and money, and can increase the likelihood of safety incidents in critical development and production environments. To support Woodside’s vision to be a global leader in upstream oil and gas, Woodside needed to establish a common approach to how it operates, wherever the location, and develop a strong foundation to support its strategic objectives. Woodside recently undertook an internally led company-wide project to renew its Woodside Management System (WMS) to improve integration between disparate functionally based management systems and capture the way we work more effectively. As part of the project, Woodside took the opportunity to redesign its WMS framework and streamline its processes and procedures by simplifying and removing duplicate or redundant existing information. Through the project, Woodside developed a single integrated management system that is independent of organisational structure and closely linked to our vision. The integrated control framework created within the WMS supports conformance to process and forms the foundation of assurance activities across the entire company. The WMS integrates a hierarchy of business processes, focused upon value stream activities, and clearly defines operational processes and activities. This paper discusses the objectives and outcomes of the project, some challenges during implementation and the change management approach to develop the culture and behaviours to drive continuous improvement and unlock the benefits of an integrated management system.

Process safety management at Woodside – creating a sustainable global approach

Woodside’s Process Safety Management (PSM) Initiative introduced a framework for a holistic, effective and sustainable PSM system. We adapted an international industry standard to develop our own company-specific PSM procedure. Embedding PSM requirements into the existing Woodside Management System and workforce behaviours enables the business to execute consistent, proactive PSM throughout the exploration and production lifecycle – across assets and countries. Change was facilitated through creating a shared vision for process safety, ‘We all own, understand and act to control process safety risks’. We set clear expectations for ourselves and those we work with (our contractors) through defined roles and responsibilities. Fundamentally we moved our mindset to being ‘Line-Led, Risk-Based’, placing high value on visible leadership and operational discipline. Behavioural change was supported with a comprehensive training curriculum aligned to competencies and a coaching program. To facilitate consistent application of PSM across our global operations, we implemented a system using a whole of company approach. A key focus was applying a deep understanding of the hazards and risks in the business to establish a framework for quality multi-discipline risk assessments and risk-based decision making. Implementation included a suite of supporting technical and management system changes to grow a high value process safety culture – where we actively seek out the challenging issues and see the red indicators as opportunity for improvement. Our PSM Initiative empowers sustainable process safety performance through a risk aware workforce where everyone knows their top process safety risks and is required to take action to manage those risks.

잠재적 폭발위험장소에서 내연기관에 의한 점화 위험성에 관한 연구

국내외의 가연성 또는 인화성물질을 취급하는 대형설비에서의 폭발위험장소에 대한 안전관리는 기업의 지속가능경영과 신뢰를 바탕으로 한 지역사회와의 공존에 있어 매우 중요하다. 폭발위험장소의 안전관리는 크게 가연성 또는 인화성 물질의 누출을 제어하는 시스템과 이러한 가연성 또는 인화성물질이 누출되어 폭발분위기를 형성할 때 점화원을 제어함으로써 화재 또는 폭발사고로 전이되지 않도록 하는 방폭시스템이 있다. 제도와 기술로 인해 전기적 점화원에 대한 방폭설비는 상당히 보급되어 관리되고 있다. 하지만 열적 점화원의 경우, 위험성에 대한 인식과 관련 기술개발이 미흡하다. 본 연구는 잠재적 폭발위험장소에서 내연기관의 점화 위험을 보고하기 위하여 수행되었다. 이를 위하여 문헌조사를 통하여 관련 국제표준과 사고사례 및 위험분석보고서를 연구하고, 국내 중부권 공정안전관리제도 대상 사업장의 디젤엔진의 불꽃방지기 등 안전장치 적용실태를 조사하였다. 실제적으로 본 연구결과를 석유화학 산업에 적용함에 있어, 디젤엔진과 같은 내연기관 점화원의 위험인식을 통해 잠재적 폭발위험장소에서의 폭발방지에 대한 안전관리방안으로 활용 될 수 있을 것이다. Safety management in hazardous areas with potentially explosive gas atmospheres (here in after referred to as hazardous areas) in large scale facilities dealing with combustible or flammable materials at home and abroad is very important (significant) for the coexistence of the company and local society based on business continuity management (BCM) and reliance. For the safety management in hazardous areas, two systems are mainly used: (1) the control system for the prevention of combustible or flammable substances and (2) the explosion proof system for the elimination of ignition sources when flammable gases are leaked to inhibit the transition to fire or explosion accidents. While technology and regulations on explosion proof facilities or devices for electrical ignition sources are well developed and defined, those for thermal ignition sources need to be more developed and established. In this study, the internal combustion engine in hazardous areas was investigated to determine the risk of ignition. For this purpose, document searches were conducted on the relevant international standards and accidents cases and risk analysis reports. In addition, this study assessed the application cases of the diesel engine's safety equipment, such as spark arresters regarding the site of process safety management (PSM) system in central Korea. To practically apply these results to the hydrocarbon industry, the safety management method for explosion prevention in hazardous areas was provided by risk identification for ignition sources of internal combustion engines, such as diesel engines.

공정안전관리(PSM)제도의 이행상태평가 개선방안

공정안전관리(PSM)제도의 이행상태평가 개선방안

A sustainability paradox? Sustainable operations in the offshore oil and gas industry: The case of Petrobras

Improved sustainability performance in increasingly complex business environments is a challenging task for organizations operating in many different industries. In the offshore oil and gas industry, the use of potentially hazardous materials and operation under progressively hostile environments increases the risk of major accidents. Regulators have been trying to catch up on the design of regulatory frameworks that prevent these types of events, aiming to protect people, assets, and the environment. Although there are some recommended practices that companies have been using as the basis for their process safety management systems (PSMS), lack of uniformity and inefficient enforcement remain as two fundamental problems. This paper explores these two problems and takes some first steps toward a broader discussion about these important issues. We draw from the literature on sustainable operations to develop a descriptive case study of the offshore oil and gas industry by employing document analysis and an analysis of the Health, Safety and Environment Management System (HSEMS) of Petrobras, a world leader energy company. By employing multiple primary and secondary data collection strategies, including a number of formal expert interviews, we map, explore and compare major recommended practices for PSMS, identify a series of gaps in policy and practice, and offer a number of recommendations and implications for practice, policy, and research.

The auditing of process safety

There is growing concern with respect to the effectiveness of auditing of process safety management systems as undertaken by major hazard operators. Although criticisms of process safety auditing are periodically expressed by accident investigators, competent authorities and respected commentators it is rare to hear from those who are involved in the process of audit. This paper attempts to redress the balance and its subject is the auditing of process safety from the viewpoint of those process safety practitioners who play a role in that process. An online survey was distributed to a cross section of process safety professionals which explored the themes of audit organisation, audit criteria and audit team composition and training provision. The majority of respondents declared that their business conducts dedicated process safety audits. Those that did not were split on the question of whether general safety audits diluted the auditing of process safety. No correlation was observed between process safety content in general safety audits and opinion on dilution. The majority of respondents declared that their business uses internal standards against which safety audits are performed and against which the audit is conducted. The role of part time auditor was the most commonly found member amongst audit teams with the majority of organisations choosing to deploy internal resources to train their own auditors.

Process safety data – The cornerstone of PSM and often it’s undermining

Excellence in process safety performance requires an integrated approach to addressing programs, culture and competency. One important aspect of competency is having the right information available, and accessible, to support and underpin the overarching safety management system. This includes both asset information such as P&ID’s, equipment specifications, instrumentation, piping and physical equipment inventory, safety systems, safety instrumented functions, etc and process information such as batch manufacturing records, quality/IPC procedures, raw material information, material safety data, process safety data, etc. Whilst the requirements for asset information and most process information is reasonably prescriptive – and hence can be reliably audited and assured – the specification of required process safety data is far from prescriptive. This often leads to ineffective or inefficient systems and can completely undermine otherwise excellent process safety management systems.

What Drives Process Safety Performance? A View from Experience at BASF

Process Safety performance can be defined as the absence of Process Safety incidents, particularly of severe incidents which cause fatalities, severe injuries, have significant impact on the public and the environment or cause significant financial losses. These severe incidents are too infrequent for statistical analysis.KPIs measuring smaller incidents have proven useful instruments in driving progress through monitoring number and severity of less severe incidents combined with causal analysis to establish areas of improvement.Influences of several elements of the Process Safety Management system are discussed regarding their effectiveness and side effects. This includes the discussion of broad programs vs. targeted initiatives to eliminate specific weaknesses and the importance of experience exchange between companies regarding successful practices.

Incident Investigation on the Basis of Business Process Model for Plant Lifecycle Engineering

The process safety incidents are directly caused by defects of protection layers, and process safety management (PSM) system should maintain the soundness of the protection layers. In general, the weakness of the PSM system is identified through the incident investigations, and the performance of the PSM has to be improved through the PDCA cycle using process safety metrics. However, PSM business process is comprehended in the plant lifecycle engineering business processes, so that even if the weakness of PSM system is identified, the key engineering business processes for that weakness cannot be recognized, so far. To overcome the above mentioned problem on process safety metrics, we propose the business process model based process safety incident investigation for process safety metrics.

What Do Gas Blows, Iron Dust Accumulations and Sulfidation Corrosion Have in Common?

This paper presents an analysis of three process incidents recently investigated by the US Chemical Safety Board (CSB): (i) Kleen Energy natural gas explosion (Middletown, CT), (ii) Hoeganaes Corporation iron dust flash fires and hydrogen explosion (Gallatin, TN), and (iii) Chevron Richmond refinery pipe rupture and fire (Richmond, CA). The starting point for the analysis is identification of the main hazardous materials, activities or conditions underlying the specific incident losses. These are, respectively: (i) Kleen Energy - purging of process pipelines with natural gas, (ii) Hoeganaes Corporation - accumulations of combustible iron dust in work areas, and (iii) Chevron Richmond refinery - a pipeline damage mechanism known as sulfidation corrosion. While the three incidents have many aspects in common, chief among the similarities are the key process safety concepts of inherently safer design (ISD), recognition of warning signs (precursor events), and safety culture. Each incident is analyzed for evidence of these concepts. The analysis is drawn from the relevant CSB investigation reports with the primary objective of illustrating the strong experiential learning that case histories of actual incidents can provide. While the lessons learned from these incidents are useful in and of themselves, capturing these lessons by incorporation in a safety management framework extends their usefulness to the prevention and mitigation of other potential process incidents. A typical process safety management system is employed in the current work to accomplish this secondary objective. Overall conclusions are made concerning the effectiveness of ISD, precursor recognition, and safety culture with respect to risk reduction in the process industries. It is anticipated that this work will help in communication of lessons learned to both the research and practice communities.

Interrelations between process safety management elements

OSHA PSM standard has been established with 14 elements that define the management principles to control process hazards and protect the workplace. One of the key factors to the success of Process Safety Management (PSM) implementation is that each element comes as a component in an integrated PSM program. Although various kind of integrated safety management systems have been introduced, direct integration system between PSM elements was not extensively studied due to vague concept on interrelation between PSM elements. This also hampers efforts in designing and developing integrated system for PSM. In this study, the interrelation of critical PSM elements was analyzed based on objectives and information functional of the elements stipulated in OSHA PSM regulations. From the conducted analysis, all the critical elements are interrelated at least with other seven PSM elements. Among the elements, Process Hazard Analysis and Mechanical Integrity were identified to have the highest interrelations comprising of 12 interrelated PSM elements. The developed PSM matrix has systematically showed the interrelation of critical PSM elements that useful for the development of Integrated PSM system. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 74–80, 2017