ABSTRACT How do ordinary citizens view elite-driven, post-conflict constitutional reforms? Established theories emphasize the role of constitutional reform in both postwar democratization and preventing conflict resurgence. This article contends that emphasis on fostering political inclusion and settling conflicts resonates differently across post-conflict societies. Focusing on Nepal, this study draws on a survey implemented with over 1,000 respondents shortly after the ratification of the country’s constitution in 2015. The exploratory analysis shows that even when post-conflict constitutions grant greater rights to historically marginalized groups in absolute terms, they may still perceive that greater concessions would be possible; this makes such groups more likely to oppose the constitution and more likely to prefer extended negotiation periods. Conversely, Nepalis exposed to higher violence during the Maoist insurgency from 1996 to 2006 view the constitution as the conclusion of the peace process and are more supportive of the constitution and opposed to longer negotiation periods. The analysis further highlights that some excluded groups were less likely to learn about constitutional negotiations at all. We identify new pathways influencing the democratic legitimacy of post-conflict constitutions, offering insights for internal and external stakeholders involved in constitutional reform processes and their aftermath.