In Asia post-Cold War security discourse revolved mainly around concerns about a rising China, dangers of war in persisting regional flashpoints such as Koreas, Taiwan, and Kashmir, among others. Many nations in region also had to grapple with demands and effects of globalization, one of manifestations of which was Asian financial crisis in late 1990s. With September 11, terrorism came to dominate regional security concerns. The new dynamics affected both inter- and intra-regional strategic equations significantly. Ironically, however, for most of Asian countries, terrorism was nothing new. Asia's tryst with many forms of terrorism predates September 11. With separatist and irredentist struggles in many parts of Asia--Kashmir and northeastern parts of India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Philippines, Aceh, East Timor, West Papua in Indonesia, Rohingiyas in Myanmar, and in Southern Thailand--many of Asian nations have had a fair degree of exposure to threats of terrorism. In fact, Moro liberation movement in Philippines is one of longest-running insurgencies in world. Thousands have lost their lives in terrorist violence associated with Tamil separatist movement in Sri Lanka and for liberation of Kashmir in Indian sub-continent. In almost all these cases--and loss of innocent, non-combatant civilian lives not withstanding,--the threat had almost always been looked at as a domestic law enforcement problem and left to initiatives of individual states. Without exception, issue of terrorism was being peddled with much ambivalence translated into euphemisms such as one man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter. For West especially, terrorism was one of problems that Third World societies in impoverished countries would have to contend with. This was because many did not see themselves as targets of terrorism. In early 1990s, Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda network co-opted dispersed local conflicts in different parts of world. The platform of universal jihad brought disparate Islamist groups from Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, and Horn of Africa together. The movement subsumed Islamist struggles in many parts of world. However, emergence of transnational terrorist networks or desire to establish exclusionist Islamic states (in Southeast Asia, for example) did not necessarily stem from a greater awareness of Islam's global identity as peddled by Al-Qaeda. What is important here are global linkages that home-grown groups developed under influence of Al-Qaeda. The transfer of Al-Qaeda ideology and Afghan combat experience to local militant organizations raised level of sophistication and capacity for violence of these groups (Desker and Acharya 2004, pp. 65-66). The induction of Afghan veterans into Kashmir conflict, for example, marked one of bloodiest phases in militancy in Kashmir, beginning in early 1990s. Most of these groups continued to grow with Al-Qaeda. This alignment, which contributed to reach and lethality of groups, changed nature of militancy significantly (Acharya 2004a, p. 55). This also led to reorientation and upgrading of local terrorist training camps--Mindanao in Philippines, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar--and increasing radicalization of education in religious schools with extremist readings of sacred text (Desker 2003a, p. 495). In Asia, for example, madrasah became main disseminator of jihad cult--the breeding grounds for militant religious organizations. This in turn helped radical religious militant groups, gradually overwhelming moderate voice, to enlarge political space within their respective societies (Hussain 2003). Following September 11 attacks, Asia became main focus of counter-terrorism efforts in what US President Bush termed the first global war of twenty-first century. …