Abstract
This paper studies the factors which facilitate or support horizontal agreements between companies taking part in private and public auctions. The paper thus compares the various competing procedures by studying their vulnerability with the agreements and highlights the usual practices likely to support the exchange of information between firms and the stability of trusts. Secondly, it analyses models of econometrical detection and shows their limits. Lastly, it mentions the problem of law enforcement by Competition Authorities and presents some reflections aiming at supporting detection of cartels through Leniency Programs.
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