ALFRED W. CROSBY'S The Measure of Reality: Quantification and Western Society, 1250-1600 is a broad survey of measurement animated by captivating examples drawn from four centuries of mathematics, astronomy, music, painting, and bookkeeping. The thesis he develops from this survey is that the unique success of European imperialism can be explained by a shift in Western mentalite in the late thirteenth century from a qualitative to a quantitative perception of reality. The larger significance of this book is that it is one of the more careful attempts to provide rigorous argument and historical documentation for a set of themes common in the historical literature of the twentieth century-radical breaks in Western thought and the uniqueness of the West. And as such, the shortcomings of Crosby's book suggest some of the larger problems in an entire genre of world history. The more focused historical problem that Crosby addresses-setting aside for a moment larger claims about the West and its uniqueness-is an exceedingly complex one: the explication of a series of historical contingencies that led to the superiority of specific European empires (and not others) as of the nineteenth century in weaponry, navigation, and bureaucratic administration. Tracing any facet of these developments in Europe is a monumental task. Weaponry alone, for example, requires analyses of the developments in chemistry, metallurgy, and technology, to name a few, that transformed cannons from ineffective to deadly weapons.' Another aspect of the explanation would be the enormous manpower invested in the study of cannons by Italian mathematicians,2 and the fortuitous fact that the problems of ballistics turned out to have mathematical solutions. But a complete explanation would also require comparative analysis, examining why other nations invested less in developing these particular technologies. The most obvious approach to explaining superiority in weapons, then, might be a comparative history of weapons. However, victors of military conquest often prefer loftier explanations for their superiority; and Europeans are hardly unique in their attempts to attribute their success to more noble cultural traits claimed to be uniquely their own. Crosby