Probability Of Apprehension Research Articles

The broken-windows theory of crime: A Bayesian approach

The broken-windows theory of crime is based on the idea that aggressive enforcement of petty crimes, like misdemeanors, will have a deterring effect on would-be perpetrators of more serious crimes. This paper develops a model of this theory that depends on three factors: (1) potential offenders make decisions about committing crimes based on their beliefs about the probability of apprehension; (2) those beliefs depend on prior observations or knowledge about the rate of petty crimes; and (3) there is a linkage across criminal categories (minor vs. serious crimes) as a component of actual enforcement policy. Our results show that even if these factors are all present, increased enforcement of low-harm crimes does not necessarily lead to fewer high-harm crimes.

Primary and Secondary Control as Antecedents to the Dark Traits in Predicting Attraction to Hacking Behavior

The current study examines the relationship between the need for control, the Dark Triad personality traits, and hacking intent. We surveyed 523 individuals using a scenario design and investigated the role of both primary and secondary control as antecedents to Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and narcissism leading to both white- (i.e., ethical) and black-hat hacking interest. Our findings suggest that primary control is a significant antecedent to all three dark personality traits such that a higher intrinsic need for control is positively associated with Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy. Secondary control, however, has comparatively different effects on dark personality traits, demonstrating a negative effect only on psychopathy. Both Machiavellianism and psychopathy predicted both white- and black-hat hacking interests along with the perceived probability of apprehension. Overall, our findings suggest that primary control drives all three dark personality traits, yet only two of the three dark personality traits – Machiavellianism and psychopathy – are related to hacking interest.

Arrests and convictions but not sentence length deter terrorism in 28 European Union member states.

While countries differ in how they handle terrorism, criminal justice systems in Europe and elsewhere treat terrorism similar to other crime, with police, prosecutors, judges, courts and penal systems carrying out similar functions of investigations, apprehension, charging, convicting and overseeing punishments, respectively. We address a dearth of research on potential deterrent effects against terrorism by analysing data on terrorism offending, arrests, charges, convictions and sentencing over 16 years in 28 European Union member states. Applying both count and dynamic panel data models across multiple specifications, we find that increased probability of apprehension and punishment demonstrate an inverse relationship with terrorism offending, while the rate of charged individuals is associated with a small increase in terrorism. The results for sentence length are less clear but also indicate potential backlash effects. These findings unveil overlaps between crime and terrorism in terms of deterrent effects and have implications for both the research agenda and policy discussion.

On Economic Theories of Criminal Punishment: Pricing, Prevention, or Proportionality?

Abstract This article examines competing economic theories of crime and punishment within a common analytical framework. The theories—due to Becker (1968), Posner (1985), and Adelstein (1981)—share the view of crime as exchange, but differ in the interpretation of punishment; specifically, is it aimed at pricing crime, preventing crime, or achieving corrective justice? The hybrid model used to address this question, originally developed by Hylton (2005), explicitly incorporates market exchange as an alternative to criminal exchange. The results show that the optimal enforcement policy generally involves maximal punishment (however that is defined), but the optimal probability of apprehension can be high or low, depending on the parameters of the model. In the latter case, crime may completely crowd out the market. (JEL K14, K42)

Revisiting the economic theory of crime A state-level analysis in India

The economic theory of crime tends to suggest that deterrence variables have a significant impact on crime rates in a society. From an economic perspective, criminals are rational economic agents who weigh the likelihood of being arrested and apprehended before committing a crime. An increase in the likelihood of arrest and apprehension should deter criminals as it increases the expected costs of committing crimes. This paper revisits the behavioral links between deterrence variables and crime rates in the Indian context. Empirically, we draw on state level data for India in 2001–2014 and employ the system GMM estimator technique to support our claims. The study reports that deterrence factors (probability of arrest and apprehension) have a perverse impact on India’s crime rates. The paper reveals that an increase in the probability of deterrence variables does not lead to a reduction in crime rates, indicating a fundamental flaw in India’s corrective mechanisms. The research recommends penal system reform in order to accurately reconfigure the behavioral links between deterrence variables and crime rates.

Stay or flee? Hit-and-run accidents, darkness and probability of punishment

Empirical studies on the economic theory of crime have extensively analyzed the importance of the probability of punishment with regard to premeditated criminal activities. Unplanned crimes also occur, however, and this paper will focus on a very serious and widespread example: the hit-and-run road accident. Using police records for every road accident with injuries or mortalities that took place in Italy in the period 1996–2016, we rely on changes in daylight, both when switching between daylight saving time and winter time and across seasons, as an exogenous source of variation affecting the probability of apprehension and find that the likelihood of hit-and-run conditional on an accident taking place increases by around 20% with darkness. Our results suggest that policies increasing the likelihood of apprehension could be effective in reducing hit-and-run.

The role of experience in deterring crime: A theory of specific versus general deterrence

AbstractThis paper examines the role of experience in determining the deterrent effect of criminal punishment. Economic models of crime typically assume potential offenders know the probability of apprehension. Thus, neither the individual's personal experience of being caught and punished nor the observation of someone else's punishment experience affects that individual's future behavior. This paper incorporates a role for experience in determining criminal activity, distinguishing between (1) how individuals form perceptions of the probability of punishment, including how those perceptions are influenced by what they experience or observe, and (2) how those perceptions, once formed, influence their decisions about criminal activity.

Optimal Fine Reductions for Self-Reporting: The Impact of Loss Aversion

Fine reductions for self-reported offenses entail a potential tradeoff. On the one hand, inducing offenders to self-report allows the social planner to save on enforcement costs and reduce harm through early detection. On the other hand, fine reductions may also reduce deterrence: offenders anticipate that if their probability of apprehension turns out to be higher than initially expected, they can exploit the possibility of a more lenient sanction. We analyze how this trade-off is affected by the offender's utility function, contrasting neoclassical standard preferences with loss aversion. For loss aversion, we apply the approach by Kőszegi and Rabin (2006), in which reference points are determined by the ex ante expectations of equilibrium strategies. Assuming that the private benefit from crime is lost in case of detection, we distinguish between loss aversion in the fine dimension and in the benefit dimension. Intuitively, one might assume that loss aversion facilitates law enforcement because losses loom larger than gains, which sets incentives to refrain from crime. This intuition, however, carries over to our model with self-reporting only if loss aversion in the fine dimension is sufficiently large compared to loss aversion in the benefit dimension.

Crime, different taxation, police spending and embodied human capital

AbstractWe develop a model with crime, embodied human capital, police spending and three different taxation. Based on propositions examined analytically, numerically and empirically using a cross‐country panel data on crime, we contribute to the literature by identifying a positive crime‐labor income tax nexus and a negative crime‐capital income tax nexus. The opposite effect between labor and capital income taxation on crime is novel in the literature. We also document positive association between crime and consumption tax, which suggests that apprehension probability (a proxy for the effectiveness of criminal justice system) is endogenous to fiscal mechanism. These findings have potential policy implications in that, there is a potential role for dedicated tax instruments to be used in supporting conventional crime prevention and deterrence policies.

Criminal law as a preventative tool of environmental regulation: compliance versus deterrence

The effective enforcement of environmental law is an issue which continues to engender considerable academic debate. The conclusions that may be drawn from such debate will have implications not only for the future of environmental law but also the wider regulatory reform agenda. This article commences with several noncontentious propositions. First, any regulatory regime ought to place considerable emphasis on preventing harm; within the context of environmental law, this view is encapsulated by the preventative principle. Secondly, one may be tempted to treat the criminal law as a purely reactive or curative mechanism were it not for the deterrent effect associated with the imposition of criminal sanctions. Therefore, the initial premise is that if environmental law is to become more preventative in scope, policymakers ought to consider how the deterrent effect of environmental criminal law may be bolstered. Academic publications and official reports are replete with assertions that the fines imposed by the courts for environmental crime are lamentably low. A preoccupation with the level of fine may lead one to overlook the fundamental importance of the likelihood of apprehension as an essential ingredient of the deterrence formula. Mainstream criminological discourse provides clear evidence that the probability of apprehension has a greater influence on deterrence than severity of sanction. In this context, the enforcement style adopted by the relevant enforcement agency is crucial; in particular, whether the style adopted augments the perception that apprehension is more probable. This article proceeds to argue that many of the assumptions on which the compliance style is based may be questioned, if not totally undermined. It is contended that a transition from compliance-orientated enforcement towards an approach more focused on deterrence has the potential to enhance the deterrent, and by extension the preventative effect, of environmental criminal law.

Economics of the Broken Window Theory

Abstract In this paper, we argue that there is strategic complementarity in criminal behavior. Strategic complementarity arises because the apprehension probability that affects the crime rate depends on the crime rate itself. The natural consequence is the possible multiplicity of the equilibrium crime rate. The actual crime rate is realized by the self-fulfilling nature of the crime rate. Our analysis provides an economic rationalization of the broken window theory as the result of strategic complementarity and self-fulfilling crime rates. Regardless of how effective polices prescribed by the broken window theory are (e.g. removing graffiti, reducing trash in the street, and repairing broken windows), our model demonstrates the theory’s important contribution of introducing to the economics of crime the idea of belief-based deterrence. We also show that the equilibrium crime rate is stable whenever the broken window policy targets the lowest among multiple equilibrium crime rates.

The Potential Economic Gains from Increasing Public Law Enforcement against Illegal Phoenix Activity

Illegal phoenix activity — the practice of liquidating or abandoning acompany with the intention of avoiding its obligations and then continuing the same or a similar business via a new or related company — is estimated to cost the Australian economy up to $3.5 billion per year and appears tobe increasingly prevalent. Yet public law enforcement agencies rarely take enforcement action against illegal phoenix activity. This article argues that, based on an analysis of the potential costs and benefits of increasing public law enforcement against illegal phoenix activity, enforcement should be increased, subject to periodic review. Empirical studies suggest that the aspects of enforcement that are most likely to produce general deterrence of wrongdoing are the perceived probability of apprehension (ie detection and commencement of enforcement action) and, to a lesser extent, the perceived probability of punishment (ie a sanction being imposed at the conclusion of enforcement action). As such, it is argued that enforcement agencies should increase the probability of apprehensionand punishment and use the media more innovatively to heighten potential perpetrators’ perceptions of such probability. Given the reportedly substantial and escalating costs of illegal phoenix activity, this increase in enforcement has the potential to be a high-return investment for the Australian economy.

Sanctuary City and Crime

A sanctuary policy is a policy that inhibits local law enforcement from cooperating with immigration authorities. Sanctuary policies have gained more attention in recent U.S. policy debates. Opponents claim that sanctuary policies attract criminals and lower the opportunity cost of crime through weaker sanctions and lower apprehension probability. Supporters counter that these policies produce a spiral of trust that supports police and raises informal social control over crime. Using city crime data from 1999 to 2010, I estimate the effect of sanctuary policies on crime. Using a difference-in-differences approach, this paper finds no evidence that sanctuary policies cause an increase in crime and some evidence that they may lead to a decrease in property crime. Moreover, further analysis confirms no pre-trend before the policy adoption and finds the effect strengthened over time after the adoption. The increased trust between residents and police is likely the reason for the negative effect.

Information Technology on the Beat: The Impacts of Body-Worn Camera and Facial Recognition Technology on Public Safety

Body-worn cameras (BWCs) have transformed the criminal justice system by facilitating information gathering and thereby enhancing public safety. Despite the promise of this technology, there is also much skepticism about its efficacy. This study examines the effect of BWC implementation on the likelihood of a suspect being arrested and on the overall crime rate. In addition, we delve into whether and how the BWC, an information gathering tool, interacts with facial recognition technology, a data analysis tool. To identify the impacts of BWC implementation, we exploit a quasi-experimental setting, in combination with a matching technique, by using a federal grant program for BWC implementation as a natural shock. Using granular crime incident–level data during the period 2010–2016, we find that the adoption of BWCs is positively associated with the probability of apprehension under its jurisdiction, especially on-view (warrantless) arrests based on a probable cause. Furthermore, machine learning–powered facial recognition technology appears to augment the effectiveness of BWC in apprehension. Using police agency–level data, the implementation of BWCs is found to be negatively associated with overall crime rates. This study sheds new light on the societal value of IT and machine learning in the public sector, beyond its business value, providing meaningful implications for policymakers and researchers.

Do Intensified Police Controls Change Perceptions of Apprehension Probability: A Field Experiment

The perceived sanction risk is an essential element in the theory of deterrence to link criminal policy and criminal behavior. Previous research has not made clear how or even if individuals update their perceived sanction risk in response to changes in actual criminal policy. This study presents the first field experiment on the updating of the perceived probability of apprehension. On one location the police intensified moped traffic controls during a period of 6 months, while the control intensity on a comparable location remained unchanged. Difference-in-difference estimates reveal that the increased police activity caused an upward revision of the perceived probability of apprehension of offenses such as operating a mobile phone while driving or driving under the influence of alcohol.

Stay or Flee? Probability Versus Severity of Punishment in Hit-and-Run Accidents

The empirical literature testing the economic theory of crime has extensively studied the relative importance of the probability and the severity of punishment with reference to planned criminal activities. There are, however, also unplanned crimes and in this paper we focus on a very serious and widespread one, hit-and-run road accidents. In fact, it is not only unplanned, but also largely committed by citizens without criminal records and the decision whether to stay or run must be taken within a few seconds. Using Italian data for the period 1996-2016, we rely on daylight as an exogenous source of variation affecting the probability of apprehension and find that the likelihood of hit-and-run conditional on an accident taking place increases by around 20% with darkness. Relying on two legislative reforms which increased the penalties in case of hit-and-run, we find no significant effect on drivers' behavior. Our results show that criminal activities in unplanned circumstances and under intense time pressure and emotional distress are deterred more by the certainty rather than the severity of legal sanctions.

The Effectiveness of Fear Appeals Featuring Fines versus Social Disapproval in Preventing Shoplifting Among Adolescents

ABSTRACTThe present study investigates the effectiveness of fear appeals, including type of punishment (social disapproval vs. fines), probability of getting caught when shoplifting, and severity of the punishment, in preventing shoplifting among adolescents. Results show that when the chance of getting caught is low, social punishment messages should stress severe levels of social disapproval. When social disapproval messages imply a high probability of apprehension, the severity of social rejection does not affect shoplifting intentions. Finally, messages focusing on fines should depict large instead of small fines, irrespective of the communicated probability of getting caught.

Alcohol‐Impaired Driving and Perceived Risks of Legal Consequences

Driving while impaired (DWI) is a threat to public health. Codified legal sanctions are a widely implemented strategy to reduce DWI. However, it is unclear that sanctioning affects individual risk perceptions so as to deter alcohol-impaired driving. Using survey data collected from individual drivers, police, and defense attorneys specializing in DWI in 8 U.S. cities, we investigated whether risk perceptions about legal consequences for alcohol-impaired driving, both the risk of being stopped if driving while alcohol-impaired and receiving specific penalties following a DWI, deter alcohol-impaired driving. First, we analyzed how different drivers' risk perceptions about being pulled over and facing criminal sanctions related to their self-reported alcohol-impaired driving in the year following the interview at which risk perceptions were elicited. Second, using data from an experimental module in which individual's risk perceptions were randomly updated by the interview, we analyzed how each driver's beliefs about his or her own future alcohol-impaired driving responded to randomly generated increases in the apprehension probability and sanction magnitude. Higher probabilities as estimated by the individuals of being pulled over corresponded to less alcohol-impaired driving in both analyses. Conversely, there was no statistical relationship between perceptions of criminal sanctions for DWI and alcohol-impaired driving with 1 exception-a small significant negative relationship between duration of jail time following a DWI conviction and alcohol-impaired driving. Perceptions regarding the threat of being apprehended for alcohol-impaired driving were related to actual self-reported driving, while perceived sanctions following a DWI conviction for DWI generally were unrelated to either actual self-reported alcohol-impaired driving or the person's estimate of probability that he or she would drive while alcohol-impaired in the following year. Increasing certainty of apprehension by increasing police staffing and/or conducting sobriety checks is a more effective strategy for reducing alcohol-impaired driving than legislating increased penalties for DWI.

Crime, apprehension and clearance rates: Panel data evidence from Canadian provinces

AbstractThe Becker model of crime establishes the importance of the probability of apprehension as a key factor in a rational individual's decision to commit a crime. In this respect, most empirical studies based on US data have relied on variation in the number of police officers to estimate the impact of the probability of apprehension or capture. We measure the probability of apprehension by clearance rates and study their effects on crime rates, employing a panel of Canadian provinces from 1986 to 2005. OLS, GMM, GLS and IV estimates yield statistically significant elasticities of clearance rates, ranging from −0.2 to −0.4 for violent crimes and from −0.5 to −0.6 for property crimes. These findings reflect the importance of police force crime‐solving productivity.

The Effect of Media Exposure of Suspects on Solving Crime

In this study we investigate the effect of showing suspects of crime in a TV programme on the probability of apprehension. We exploit exogenous variation in the number of viewers of the crime programme induced by Champions League games broadcast on competing channels. The estimates show that an increase in the number of viewers of the TV programme increases the probability of solving crime, especially for criminal cases with many potential observers or cases for which it is easier to recognise suspects due to the quality of the images. The implication of our findings is that media can be effectively used for detection of crime suspects.