Abstract
Abstract This article examines competing economic theories of crime and punishment within a common analytical framework. The theories—due to Becker (1968), Posner (1985), and Adelstein (1981)—share the view of crime as exchange, but differ in the interpretation of punishment; specifically, is it aimed at pricing crime, preventing crime, or achieving corrective justice? The hybrid model used to address this question, originally developed by Hylton (2005), explicitly incorporates market exchange as an alternative to criminal exchange. The results show that the optimal enforcement policy generally involves maximal punishment (however that is defined), but the optimal probability of apprehension can be high or low, depending on the parameters of the model. In the latter case, crime may completely crowd out the market. (JEL K14, K42)
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