I. INTRODUCTIONThere is nothing more in our Mouths than Conscience wrote John Sharp in 1680s, echoing sentiment that had been expressed before in seventeenth century.1 Indeed, one modern writer has observed, uncontroversially, that that century justly be called Age of Conscience.2 Among foci of this preoccupation one can identify such topics as moral and religious casuistry and liberty of My focus in this paper is somewhat different: as criterion of judgment in Court of Chancery-the of equity-and particularly its meaning for Heneage Finch, Lord Nottingham, successively Lord Keeper and Lord Chancellor from 1673 to 1682, seminal figure in history of English equity.The intimate connection of with equitable jurisdiction is commonplace,3 and certain aspects of have been quite thoroughly studied.4 A central problem that has been identified with resort to as criterion of legal judgment is its subjective and hence ostensibly arbitrary nature. This concern goes back long way. Thomas Audley, in 1526, argued that was an uncertain ground of law because it depended upon 'arbitrament' of one man, chancellor alone.5 The author of The Replication of Serjeant at Laws of England similarly raised complaint of men, divers conscience.6 No doubt most remembered comment of this sort is John Selden's that spaciousness of chancellors' consciences might vary as much as length of their respective feet, so that equitable adjudication on basis of was a roguish thing.7 Nottingham himself balked at idea that justice might be according to kind of that amounted only to the pleasure of Court which took upon itself to be purely arbitrary.8Indeed, as father of systematic equity,9 Nottingham apparently devoted himself to project, undertaken in some measure by certain of his predecessors,10 of making jurisdiction regular. He repeatedly makes this point. In just cited, he observes that itself would cease to be Justice rules and measures of were not certain and known and that has to be dispensed by rules of (639). Rules, measures, and science are by-words of his preoccupation. Elsewhere, he asserts that if be tied to no rule . . . everything becomes arbitrary.11At same time, he did not abandon as kind of touchstone of equity. He refers to repeatedly, and often speaks of Chancery as court of conscience,12 as this was perfectly natural way of describing it. So question becomes: how did he reconcile tendency towards arbitrariness thought to be implicit in with ruled, measured, scientific system that he sought to develop? Or putting question slightly differently: how did he understand or limit notion of so as to make compatible with equity to which he aspired?What appears to have been crucial distinction for Nottingham in this regard was that between and public, or perhaps civic, conscience. In Prolegomena, he says that there is twofold conscience, viz. conscientia political et civilis, et conscientia naturalis et and that [mjany things are against inward and natural conscience, which cannot be reformed by regular and political administration of equity (194). He makes point again in the great case of Cook v. Fountain: With such which is only naturalis et interna this Court hath nothing to do; by which I am to proceed is merely civilis et politica, and tied to certain measures. . . .13 As Yale points out, this distinction was not new with Nottingham. The distinction between forum internum and forum externum was venerable;14 an anonymous Elizabethan distinguishes between matters of in which will intervene and those that must be left to party's own moral judgment;15 Francis Bacon recognized, at least as alternatives, party's private conscience and the general of realm, which is Chancery. …