Logical Priority Research Articles

Duhem’s Analysis of Newtonian Method and the Logical Priority of Physics over Metaphysics

This article offers a discussion of Duhemian analysis of Newton's method in the Principia considering both the traditional response to this analysis (Popper et alii) and the more recent ones (Harper et alii). It is argued that in General Scholium to the Principia, Newton is not advocating what Duhem suggests in his best-known criticism, but he is proposing something very close to the establishment of a logical priority of physics over metaphysics, a familiar thesis defended by the French physicist himself.

Coherence, Causality, and Effectiveness of the EU Environmental Policy System: Results of Complementary Statistical and Econometric Analyses

This paper presents the first empirical test of coherence (i.e., consistency of policies within a framework), causality (i.e., logical priority of objectives over policies), and effectiveness (i.e., ability of policies to tackle challenges as defined by objectives) of the overall EU environmental policy system. To do so, I applied complementary statistical (cross-sectional and time series) and econometric (dynamic tri-probit) analyses to an original panel dataset, based on addressed issues (i.e., pollution vs. resource, trans-boundary vs. domestic; flow vs. stock) rather than on implemented policies (i.e., EU legislation aiming at optimal pollution production, optimal resource use, and market competition). It would be impossible to perform similar analyses by referring to realized policies rather than tackled issues due to the unbalanced sample characterizing the former with respect to the latter, as well as due to overlapping objectives, interrelated policies, and non-univocal relationships between objectives and policies. In contrast with previous studies of single EU environmental policies, characteristics of the EU environmental policy, or EU environmental objectives, I found that the overall EU environmental policy system is internally coherent, dynamically causal, and ex ante effective. Moreover, the evidence suggests that many issues are correlated: trans-boundary issues became more relevant in 2012, pollution production was more significant than resource use, and flow issues were more important than stock issues from 1995 to 2010. Finally, I show that few objectives overlapped: a “safe environment” objective (1987–1997) was preferred to a “greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction” objective (2003–2012, but pursued with a 2-year lag), although the latter has recently become preferred to the former. In addition, a “GHG reduction” objective was preferred to “a sustainable development” objective (1998–2002).

Striking a balance: A mixed-methods approach to impact-oriented evaluation

It is commonsensical to assume that a program needs to be implemented in order to have an impact. However, most impact evaluation studies tend to pay little attention to the issue of program implementation. This paper argues for the logical priority of program implementation through a mixed-methods evaluation of a language intervention program initiated in one of the largest urban school districts in the United States. By selecting a mixed-methods evaluation approach, the evaluation yielded results that have implications for addressing implementation issues in an impact-oriented evaluation. At the local district level, the evaluation results of what works, what does not, and how the implementation varies across teachers and classrooms have a direct implication for program staff. They can use this information to monitor the program implementation and make necessary adjustments to enhance the effectiveness of the program so that the ultimate program goal can be accomplished.

Why Kant Is Not a Kantian

A central debate in early modern philosophy, between empiricism and rationalism, turned on the question which of two cognitive faculties—sensibility or understanding—should be accorded logical priority in an account of the epistemic credentials of knowledge. As against both the empiricist and the rationalist, Kant wants to argue that the terms of their debate rest on a shared common assumption: namely that the capacities here in question—qua cognitive capacities—are self-standingly intelligible. The paper terms this assumption the Layer-Cake Conception of Human Mindedness and focuses on Kant’s argument against the empiricist version of the assumption, in particular, as that argument is developed in the B version of the Transcendental Deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason . The paper seeks to show how a proper understanding of the structure of the B Deduction reveals its aim to be one of making sense of each of these two capacities (sensibility and understanding) in the light of the other. For the front of the argument that is directed against the empiricist, this means coming to see how a reading of the text that is informed by the layer-cake conception (and which therefore takes the Transcendental Aesthetic to furnish us with the full story about the nature of our faculty for sensory apprehension) is mistaken. For the front of the argument which is directed against the rationalist, this requires coming to see how a mere inversion of the central claim of such a reading would be equally wrong. It would require seeing how a discursive faculty of understanding able to traffic in nothing more than empty concepts would no more amount to a genuinely cognitive power than would a faculty of intuition able to traffic in nothing more than blind intuitions. That is, it requires seeing how each of these faculties depends on its relation to the other to be the sort of faculty that it is in a finite rational being.

The Misguided Search for the Nature of Law

Within analytic jurisprudence the question “what is law?” is often taken to be of primary significance for two distinct reasons. First, it is thought to assume logical priority to normative questions: before one can say something about law, one needs to know what law is. Second, this inquiry is also thought to be uniquely philosophical, a non-empirical, pre-sociological investigation that can then tell empirical investigators what they need to look for if they want to find instances of law in the world. This article offers a general critique of this view. I start with examining several arguments claiming that jurisprudence is not conceptual, since if these arguments are true, they imply that critiques of conceptual jurisprudence are misguided. I argue that such arguments involve a terminological change more than a challenge or a substantive alternative to conceptual jurisprudence. I then turn to examining conceptual jurisprudence itself. I distinguish between two families of views on concepts, “externalism,” which conceives of concepts as abstract entities, and “internalism,” which conceives of concepts as basic units of thought. Because of this difference, these two views lead to two quite different characterizations of conceptual jurisprudence, each calling for different response. Nevertheless, I argue that both are unsuccessful. I offer a series of arguments against each view: the main argument against the externalist position is that it is viciously circular (as it necessarily assumes the view of law it defends); the main argument against the internalist view is a bad form of sociology. I conclude with brief hints as to what a non-conceptual jurisprudence would look like.

Coherence, Efficiency, and Independence of the EU Environmental Policy System: Results of Complementary Statistical and Econometric Analyses

This paper presents the first empirical test of coherence (i.e., consistency of policies within a framework), efficiency (i.e., ability of policies to meet their objectives), and independence (i.e., logical priority of objectives over policies) of the overall EU environmental policy system. To do so, I applied statistical (cross-sectional and time series) and econometric (dynamic tri-probit) analyses to an original panel dataset, based on addressed issues rather than on implemented policies. In contrast with previous studies of single EU environmental policies, characteristics of the EU environmental policy, or EU environmental objectives, I found that the overall EU environmental policy system is coherent, efficient, and independent. Moreover, the evidence suggests that many issues are correlated: trans-boundary issues became more relevant in 2012, pollution production was more significant than resource use, and flow issues were more important than stock issues from 1995 to 2010. Finally, I show that few objectives overlapped: a “safe environment” objective (1987 to 1997) was preferred to a “greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction” objective (2003 to 2012, but pursued with a 2-year lag), although the latter has recently become preferred to the former. In addition, a “GHG reduction” objective was preferred to “a sustainable development” objective (1998 to 2002).

The Philosophical Importance of James’s Late Style

Critics have approached the complexity and ambiguity of James's late style as an effort to capture the sensitivity of the characters (Martha Nussbaum) or the collapsing moral codes of the era (Robert Pippin). In this reading, James's works open an ontological dimension to the question of language and normativity, a question that modernity's moral languages—whether based on deontology, utility, or virtue—fail to articulate. His texts interrogate what normativity is rather than just portraying the sensitivity of the characters or the uncertainty of the historical moment.

Knowing, Counting, Being: Meillassoux, Heidegger, and the Possibility of Science

ABSTRACT In his book After Finitude, Quentin Meillassoux criticizes post-Kantian philosophy for its inability to explain how science is able to describe a world without human beings. This article addresses that challenge through a consideration of Heidegger's thought and his thinking about science. It is argued that the disagreement between Meillassoux and Heidegger comes down to a question of first philosophy and the priority of logic or ontology in philosophy. Ultimately, Heidegger's emphasis on ontology in philosophy is superior in its ability to give a more comprehensive account of science and thinking about things themselves.

Is God Necessarily Who God Is? Alternatives for the Trinity and Election Debate

AbstractAs a contribution to discussions of the relationship between trinity and election, in this article I explore the helpfulness of a return to ancient modal and metaphysical theological distinctions. At the forefront of trinity/election debates has been Bruce McCormack's controversial claim that election could be conceived as logically prior to, and the motivation for, God's being triune. Steering clear of questions about the right interpretation or trajectory of Karl Barth's theology, I attempt to identify the motivating theological convictions of this debate's interlocutors and find constructive options which maintain or address those convictions. One option I defend is the possibility that triunity is not logically prior to election.I begin with an analysis of three central theological convictions which seem to be at the heart of the trinity/election debates. They are: (1) a revelation axiom – that knowledge of God's nature is governed by the particular historical revelation of God in Christ; (2) a nuanced commitment to divine immutability; and (3) divine libertas a coactione – God's being free in nature and action from external constraint. I then contend that if more attention is paid to modal and metaphysical options with respect to the existence and essence of God, one will see that there are a number of viable positions which respect these convictions.I argue that at least some of the conceptual difficulties of McCormack's position can be eliminated if we properly distinguish kinds of necessity in reference to God's being and if we dispense with any notion of priority between God's essence and God's willing God's essence. With respect to kinds of necessity, I recall the ancient distinction between properties that are (a) necessary consequents of God's essence, (b) contingent and (c) a necessary consequence of God's essence given certain contingent states of affairs. Those distinctions, along with clarifications about the nature of divine freedom vis-à-vis his essence and actions, allow us to see the range of theological positions which remain faithful to the relevant concerns of the revelation axiom, divine immutability and divine freedom.I conclude that, while it is problematic to defend the logical priority of election over triunity, McCormack is justified in his claim that granting election as part of God's essence does no violence to divine freedom and he is perfectly entitled to the view that God's essential properties, including both God's fit-for-election-hypostatic-configuration and God's being the electing God are mutual aspects of God's single self-caused being.

Where Should We Expect Social Change in Non-Ideal Theory?

This essay considers the relationship between ideal theory and non-ideal theory. It begins with Rawls’s conception of ideal theory and A. John Simmons’s articulation of non-ideal theory. Both defend the priority of ideal theory over non-ideal theory. The essay then considers three different conceptions of the social barriers standing in the way of an ideal society, taken broadly from Mill, Marx, and Foucault. Each conception of power suggests a divergent strategy for pursuing non-ideal theory. The Foucauldian conception also suggests reasons to mistrust our own political and moral judgments. The essay advocates a more limited view of the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory than is commonly described, in which ideal theory retains its logical priority but not its temporal priority. In other words, the essay argues that we will fare best when we focus first on reducing specific injustices while setting aside further speculation about the character of an ideal society.

The Logical Priority of the Question: R. G. Collingwood, Philosophical Hermeneutics and Enquiry-Based Learning

The thesis that all learning has the character of enquiry is advanced and its implications are explored. R. G. Collingwood's account of ‘the logical priority of the question’ is explained and Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutical justification and development, particularly the rejection of the re-enactment thesis, is discussed. Educators are encouraged to consider the following implications of the character of the question implied in all learning: (i) that it is a question that is constituted in the event rather than prepared or given in advance, and that this leads to a necessary tension between learning and the curriculum or scheme, (ii) that it is a question that concerns some subject matter or issue that is at stake for both the student and the object of study, which draws our attention to the ‘intentionality’ of learning, and (iii) that it is a question that operates on the level of being—students are ‘called into question’, and thus transformed, by the object of study.

Idealism, New-Realism and Pragmatism: The American Debate on Reality from Royce to Lewis

In the first decades of the twentieth century new realistic tendencies arose in the United States as a reaction to the idealism dominating American academia. The foremost idealist at that time was Josiah Royce and the first realistic tendency against his idealism was directed by Ralph B. Perry and William P. Montague. In 1910 they promoted the manifesto of the American new realism.In this paper I offer an analysis of the debate that led to the birth of the new realism: it will provide a different perspective on the history of American philosophy and will open new reflections on the impact of the debate.In this debate “reality” was faced as an epistemological issue rather than an ontological one: the origin of this trend was an ambiguity in Royce’s work. Although initially new realists moved on the ground prepared by Royce, later they attempted to release the notion of reality from epistemology and to return it to metaphysics, claiming the priority of logic in both fields. However, the trend was definitive...

‘In the Beginning is Relation’: Martin Buber’s Alternative to Binary Oppositions

In this article we develop a relational understanding of sociality, that is, an account of social life that takes relation as primary. This stands in contrast to the common assumption that relations arise when subjects interact, an account that gives logical priority to separation. We will develop this relational understanding through a reading of the work of Martin Buber, a social philosopher primarily interested in dialogue, meeting, relationship, and the irreducibility and incomparability of reality. In particular, the article contrasts Buber’s work with that of poststructuralist theorists who take as their starting point the deconstruction of the Hegelian logic of binary oppositions. Deconstruction understands difference as the excess that undoes the binary, but Buber, we argue, shows how difference derives from the primacy and ontological undefinability of relation. Relational logic does not exclude the logic of separations and oppositions: relation is the primal ground that makes separations possible.

CRIMALDDI: a co-ordinated, rational, and integrated effort to set logical priorities in anti-malarial drug discovery initiatives.

Despite increasing efforts and support for anti-malarial drug R&D, globally anti-malarial drug discovery and development remains largely uncoordinated and fragmented. The current window of opportunity for large scale funding of R&D into malaria is likely to narrow in the coming decade due to a contraction in available resources caused by the current economic difficulties and new priorities (e.g. climate change). It is, therefore, essential that stakeholders are given well-articulated action plans and priorities to guide judgments on where resources can be best targeted.The CRIMALDDI Consortium (a European Union funded initiative) has been set up to develop, through a process of stakeholder and expert consultations, such priorities and recommendations to address them. It is hoped that the recommendations will help to guide the priorities of the European anti-malarial research as well as the wider global discovery agenda in the coming decade.

Russell's Paradox and Legal Positivism

In 1902, Bertrand Russell overturned set theory, which aspired to reduce all sets to their rules of recognition. These rules were to have logical priority to empirical sets posited by empirical human beings. As a result of Russell's Paradox, set theory gave up the hope of theorizing sets. This paper claims Russell's Paradox can be applied directly to jurisprudence. The result is that legal positivism (carefully defined as the claim that law can be reduced to rules of recognition) is invalid and must be abandoned. The corollary to this proposition is that law cannot be entirely separated from morality.

God's self-specification: his being is his electing

AbstractThe article considers the relationship between divine will and being as revealed in election, particularly according to Karl Barth's unique formulation of the doctrine. It comes at the salient features of this relationship by way of a public disagreement between Bruce McCormack and Paul Molnar. In agreement with McCormack, the author contends, on the basis of Barth's provocative claim that Jesus Christ is not just object but subject of election, that we cannot speak of God's being apart from his will for humanity, and this from all eternity, or in God's most intimate primordiality. Yet echoing Molnar, this observation does not entail the logical priority of grace to being. The author argues that a thoroughgoing commitment to conceiving of the being of God in the act of electing means affirming the eternal simultaneity and indeed reciprocity of will and being, as Jesus Christ is the full and total revelation of both. One cannot serve as ground for the other. As such, a preferable way of construing election is as the decisive statement of Godself – the primordial, eternal iteration of God for humanity – or the specification of divine being.

The Moral Truth about Discourse Theory

Abstract. The fundamental impulse of Discourse Theory is to eschew the moral substantivism of ethical rationalism in favour of a pragmatic, procedural approach to ethical and legal analysis. However, this paper argues that even if the analysis of Communicative Action as reconstructed by Habermas’s “Universal Pragmatics,” and the implied procedural rules of practical discourse advanced by Robert Alexy are accepted, the validation or “redemption” of all authoritative and distributive claims must, in terms of logical priority, encounter the substantively general necessity of Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency. This result operates as a reductio ad absurdum of the project of Universal Pragmatics and prompts us to reconsider the epistemological status and the political and ethico-legal function of Discourse Ethics in Civil Society.

The ontologicalization of the Confucian concept of Xin Xing: Zhou Lianxi’s founding contribution to the Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism

The Confucian concept of “cheng” (integrity) emphasizes logical priority of value realization over “zhen shi” (reality or truth). Through value realization and the completion of being, zhenshi can be achieved. Cheng demonstrates the original unity of value and reality. Taking the concept of cheng as the core, Zhou Lianxi’s philosophy interpreted yi Dao (the Dao of change), and integrated Yi Jing (The Book of Changes) and Zhong Yong (The Doctrine of the Mean). On the one hand, it ontologicalized the Confucian concept of xin xing (mind nature), and proved and established the significance of Dao ti (the ontological Dao) as the principle and origin of the utmost goodness. On the other hand, it also extended the significance of value realization to the process of qi hua (transformation of qi) and transformation of myriad things. He proved li yi (the One Principle) of Dao ti from its many manifestations and established his own metaphysical system. Zhou Lianxi’s philosophy sets up a new theoretical direction for the Song-Ming Confucians to reconstruct Confucian Metaphysics.

The abduction of phylogenetic hypotheses

The formal structure of the inference of a phylogenetic hypothesis is analyzed in the context of the different classes of reasoning applied in all fields of science. Rather than making the traditional distinction between deductive and inductive reasoning, it is shown that phylogenetic hypotheses are derived from a form of non-deductive inference commonly known as abduction. In making distinctions between abductive, deductive, and inductive inferences, the relationships between the origins of hypotheses and their testing become apparent. Abduction serves to provide explanatory hypotheses as tentative answers to specifiable causal questions. It is by way of deduction that specific potential test consequences are determined, whereas induction sensu stricto characterizes the act of carrying out a particular test. The formal structure of phylogenetic inference as a form of abduction is presented. Significant implications arise in recognizing that phylogenetic hypotheses are the products of abductive inference. The most apparent of these are that the distinctions between parsimony and likelihood as methodological criteria are unfounded. Parsimony refers to the relation between a causal question(s) and the hypothesis that serves as an answer for that question(s), whereas likelihood refers to the relation between the evidence as premises and the hypothesis allowed by those premises. The consequence is that parsimony has logical priority over likelihood in abduction, such that the likelihood of any hypothesis is maximized in the event that a causal theory of descent with modification is applied as fully as possible to observed shared similarities. In contrast, the application of rate-dependent theories, under the guise of maximum likelihood, are at odds with observations of shared similarities among two or more species and the causal questions regarding such observations; any rate-dependent theory only pertains to effects that are only tokogenetic in scope, not phylogenetic (sensu Hennig 1966). In recognizing phylogenetic hypotheses as answers to causal questions, the popular conception of testing such hypotheses by the introduction of new characters is incorrect. New character distributions cannot be deduced from a cladogram since such a structure only has causal relevance to the characters for which the hypothesis was inferred. The proper testing of a phylogenetic hypothesis requires the deduction of specific consequences as closely related as possible to the specified causal events of character origins and fixation, and subsequent speciation events. Such consequences must be effects that are independent of the class of effects the hypothesis was intended to explain, i.e., character data. As a result, effects that stand as legitimate potential test evidence are those effects that best support the different sets of causal events presented in the hypothesis. Problems with the popular applications of support indices, as offered by the bootstrap, jackknife, and permutation tests, are discussed. The main problem with these techniques is that they are only useful for testing statistical hypotheses, not explanatory hypotheses. Similarly, Bremer support analysis cannot provide indications of clade support because it is empirically meaningless to compare cladograms of different length, as each hypothesis only has relevance to the respective observations it explains.

An “Empirical Science” of Literature

In this article the outlines are sketched of an empirical science of literature as close as possible to the model of the natural sciences. This raises the question of what the standards of an empirical science in the strictest sense should generally be. Practical relevance of its results soon turns up as the fundamental condition for an explanatory empirical science, if the ideology of nearing an empirical truth is no longer accepted and a mere pragmatic justification rejected as its insufficient substitute. As a consequence the logical priority of scientific explanation over scientific description is considered irrefutable. The so-called “sciences of understanding” – among them a “science of literature” – are confronted with a special difficulty, if they want to become explanatory empirical sciences. Their practical problems to be solved are related to linguistically or semiotically coded facts. To empirically describe these problematic facts causes this difficulty, which the author tries to overcome with recourse to ideas from Wittgenstein. And the practical relevance, which may be achieved with the help of nomological explanations, here doesn’t consist in predictions for better practical production of means, direct or indirect, for survival, but in the provision of rational understanding for better practical teaching or criticism. This practical relevance is shown in the explanation of valuing acts of readers of The Golden Bowl by Henry James. The meaning of a literary text is no longer taken as a possible object of scientific empirical explanation, nor its rational justification as a scientific goal that might be practically relevant.