Principles Of Peaceful Coexistence Research Articles

Keynote Speech at the International Colloquium on the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and the Development of International Law

1. In light of the focus of our discussion today, which places an emphasis on both the historical contributions of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and the challenges presented by contemporary international relations, I would like to concentrate my own introductory remarks on three main topics. The first is to trace, from the perspective of the United Nations, the impact of the Five Principles on international law and international relations; the second is to speak more broadly about what I see as the role of first-order “principles” in formulating answers to complex international legal questions; and the third is to investigate, if only on the surface level, how the current international environment, with all the challenges and opportunities that it presents, can lead those of us who operate within it to both question and confirm our principles. My goal with these remarks, as I hope you will appreciate, will not necessarily be to provide concrete answers. Rather, I would like to raise a number of issues for our mutual consideration, which might form the basis for more in-depth discussion throughout the day.

The Chair's Summary of the Colloquium on "The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the Development of International Law" Held in Beijing on May 27, 2014

The Chair's Summary of the Colloquium on "The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the Development of International Law" Held in Beijing on May 27, 2014

Following the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and Jointly Building a Community of Common Destiny

Following the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and Jointly Building a Community of Common Destiny

The exceptional state in Africa: Image management in Sino-African relations

China's relations with African states have undergone significant changes in recent years. China has projected its relationship with Africa as one of equality and ‘mutual help’. Such perceptions of foreign policy stem from the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the shared experience of imperialist domination and economic underdevelopment. Moreover, various public statements by China's elites suggest that China is expected to play a much more prominent, even exceptional role in Africa. This purportedly entails moving beyond the hegemonic West's interventionist aid or security policies, and is also implicitly designed to highlight the West's shortcomings in promoting African economic growth or peace. Yet where does this perception of exceptionalism come from? Why does Beijing feel that it has to play a leading role in Africa's development? How can Beijing distinguish itself from the nations of the West, who are regularly criticised for being paternalistic?

“Researching Sino-Cambodian Relations: Some Personal Reflections”

“Researching Sino-Cambodian Relations: Some Personal Reflections” Sophie Richardson (bio) I have been asked to share some reflections on the challenge of researching Sino-Cambodian relations in China, particularly with regard to the era before the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). The bulk of the research for my dissertation and book, China, Cambodia, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Columbia University Press 2009), drew on both interviews and archival sources. I will first discuss here the eighty-plus interviews conducted for this project. My initial goal was not just to find out why Chinese policy makers had pursued the choices they made; it was also to ascertain why they had not chosen other options that, in some senses, might have been more expedient or efficient. So the interviews had to be long and detailed, and I needed interviewees who would be able to remember not only what they chose to do but what their other options had been. As I formally started this research in Beijing in August 2002, it became clear that finding people with that ability, willingness, and recall—between twenty and forty years after the fact—was going to be difficult. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) does not make it very easy to know which diplomats served at which posts during particular periods of time. There are gazettes of MFA personnel, although those were published [End Page 365] only sporadically until the late 1980s, so I depended almost entirely on retired diplomats I had previously met to introduce me to their former colleagues, as well as to a few associations of retired diplomats. The latter in particular turned out to be an invaluable conduit. Many of these people were extremely generous with their connections and their time; arguably one of my best research days included lunch with a half dozen retired diplomats who had served across Southeast Asia between roughly 1960 and 1980—lunch went on for four hours as they reminisced. In some instances the spouses or grown children of the retired diplomats assisted in their discussions with me. While I did not feel it appropriate to cite information provided by family members, some of their descriptions of key political players or of life as a Chinese diplomatic family provided important contextual information about the circumstances in which these people had worked. One inherent challenge of interviews, of course, is that it can be hard to know whether the stories people are telling you are the truth, particularly when those stories concern unpleasant events about which your interviewees clearly still have strong feelings, or when you challenge or probe their stories for inconsistencies. In some ways, the conversations were made easier because I was asking for a frame of reference—why people had chosen X rather than Y—but even in extremely polite, naïve, graduate-student-sounding Chinese, it was hard to avoid the implied subtext. Some were extremely defensive, particularly on the subject of Chinese state support to the Khmer Rouge; others were not shy about saying it had been a terrible decision. Two of those I interviewed from this period were clearly very upset to be discussing their time in Cambodia in the mid-1970s; one of them broke down crying and could not finish. A few other interviewees decided mid-conversation that I must be an agent of the United States government sent to gather damning details about Chinese policy; despite this erroneous assumption none halted the interview. But, remarkably, virtually all of those I interviewed that year—about sixty people who had served in Southeast Asia at some time between 1950 and 2000—were able to provide quite a bit of detail about how they and the Chinese government perceived the situation and players in Cambodia and the region, and why they chose the policies they did. I feel genuinely privileged to have heard about their lives and experiences, which had been tied up [End Page 366] with some of the most pivotal events for China in the post–World War II era. One of the other challenges was relying on people as sources: the last of the only four people I interviewed who had actually...

Idealism under Pressure: China's Foreign Policy Principles and the Korean Peninsula Crisis

As an emerging power, China hopes to reconstruct the existing international system in East Asia and create better conditions to support its interests without adopting an aggressive posture at the same time. Taking the initiative to start the six-party talks in 2003 to negotiate North Korea's nuclear programme, Beijing wished to become the leader of a new chapter in East Asia's history. On the one hand, China hoped to take control over the process of North Korea's denuclearisation; on the other hand, it wanted to use the momentum to build its positive image and reputation in the international arena. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence have been used as the guide for China's foreign policy since the 1950s. Since the 1980s, Chinese foreign policy has aimed to promote a peaceful international and regional environment for its domestic economic development. This article puts across the argument that, contrary to the desired goals of these principles, China has unintentionally contributed to the deterioration of the situation on the Korean peninsula. As a result, it may need to adjust its approach to better deal with this difficult foreign policy challenge in the years ahead. Major factors that have jeopardised the Chinese initiative in the process are analysed here: China's peaceful but inflexible foreign policy principles, North Korea's independent policy, the nuclear crisis and the United States' role in East Asia. The argument posited is that although Chinese policymakers and scholars took an optimistic approach by claiming that China's Korean peninsula policy serves the interests of China and others involved, the problem has now become more serious than ever. (1) China's Foreign Policy Principles The peaceful principles of Chinese foreign policy are rooted in the Middle Kingdom's pre-Opium War tributary system and trade-oriented foreign relations, and reflect the Chinese traditional virtues of being passive and self-oriented. China has claimed that only by the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence can international problems, such as the Korean peninsula nuclear issue, be resolved. In various Chinese Communist Party's documents published in the early 1950s, especially after the Bandung Conference in 1955, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence--mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence--had become the flagship of the New China's diplomacy. (2) Since then, Chinese diplomats and policymakers have used these principles as guidelines for Chinese diplomacy. In Chinese culture, the notion of an ideal order under heaven differs from the Western understanding. In China, the solid basis for being moral is found in the Confucian school. First of all, the moral order stems from the family hierarchical order. Next, this order constitutes the basis for social order. Moral leadership is exemplified by enlightened rulers, who live in accordance with the norms and spread them through wise measures of education and social control. The values embodied include harmony, stability and hierarchy. From the Confucius tradition, only individuals with moral forces are capable of building relationships with others. Such cultural values also apply to nation-states. Although China joined the non-Chinese world after its forced opening in the mid-19th century, it hoped to build and maintain its unique and superior character. In the late 1990s, along with national studies fever (guo xue re), the Chinese authorities started to revive the Confucian traditions in order to present China as a positive and peaceful power. The Confucian rhetoric reached its peak in the harmonious world and harmonious society concepts of Hu Jintao. In Hu's opinion, there are four major parts to upholding a lasting peace (chijiu heping). …

Chinese Practice in Public International Law: 2010

This survey covers materials reflecting Chinese practice in 2010 relating to: I. Fundamental principles of international law (Five principles of peaceful coexistence; Rule of law at the national and international levels); II. International law of treaties (Effects of armed conflicts on treaties; Mr. HUANG Huikang elected as member of the International Law Commission (ILC); China‐DPRK Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance); III. China’s territorial integrity (China’s core interest; Taiwan; Tibet; Diaoyu Island and its affiliated islands; Xisha Islands; Nansha Islands); IV. International law of the sea (General position; Development of the Chunxiao oil and gas field in the East China Sea; Military activities in the Yellow Sea; Freedom of navigation in the South China Sea; Nature of the Douglas Reef (Okinotori Reef); Somali piracy); V. International law on civil aviation (Beijing Convention and Protocol on Aviation Security); VI. International human rights law (General position on human rights; Racism and self-determination; Human organ transplantation; Freedom of information; Call for repatriation of Uighur terrorist suspects in Guantanamo to China; Expulsion of aliens; North Korean asylum seekers; UN High Commissioner for Refugee (UNHCR); Human Rights Council; Implementation of human rights instruments); VII. International humanitarian law (Protection of civilians in armed conflicts; Occupied Arab territories; Humanitarian assistance; The 1972 Sino-Japan Joint Statement); VIII. International law on disasters (Protection of persons in the ∗ Note by the Editors: This survey is provided only for information. Readers are advised to consult the official documents themselves in their research. In international dealings, the Chinese government normally uses Chinese. The English quotations in this survey are therefore normally translations, but they are taken from official websites or another official source, unless otherwise noted. The abbreviations used in the quotations are from those official websites. Throughout this survey, “FM” stands for “Foreign Ministry”; “UN”, “United Nations”; “UNGA”, “United Nations General Assembly”; and “UNSC”, “United Nations Security Council”.

China, Cambodia, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. By Sophie Richardson. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. 344 pp. $50.00 (cloth).

China, Cambodia, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. By Sophie Richardson. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. 344 pp. $50.00 (cloth).

Chinese Practice in Public International Law: 2009

Chinese Practice in Public International Law: 2009

China, Cambodia, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence

China, Cambodia, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, by Sophie Richardson. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. xii + 332 pp. US$50.00/£34.50 (hardcover). Sophie Richardson argues in her study of Sino-Cambodian relations that the Five Principles of peaceful coexistence, articulated at the dawn of the new Communist era in the 1950s, are not just rhetoric and are grounded in a view of the world that has been remarkably consistent. The Five Principles (of peaceful co-existence, mutual respect of territory and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in the affairs of others, and mutual equality and benefit) were rooted, as she explains, in China's traumatic experience of colonialism and invasion. They managed to balance the need for preserving sovereign integrity while managing external threats from more powerful nations when the People's Republic was being formed. In that sense, they gave China a unique and cohesive foreign relations strategy, one that defended its own interests while allowing it to build international links with countries that were similarly poor, developing and recovering from a history of economic, military and political aggression from developed countries. This book is the result of Richardson's PhD thesis, but it benefits from her extensive use of Chinese-language primary source materials and, equally importantly, a range of interviews with Chinese and Cambodian officials and academics who had firsthand experience of the history that she records. China's relations with Cambodia from the 1950s onwards were highly problematic. As Richardson notes, there was no compelling reason, initially, that China, led by Communist rulers, should have cultivated good relations with what was then a conservative monarchy. Of course, the US was becoming an increasingly important player in the region, and that did play some part in China's strategic minking, but the Chinese elite developed links with almost all the main players in Cambodian society, reaching above and beyond mere pragmatic, self-interested bonds. As part of this overall strategy of engagement, in 1966 at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, a leader of one of the parties more ideologically close to the Chinese Communists, Pol Pot, visited China. Scholars like David Chandler have argued that this exposure was to give the Khmer Rouge the inspiration for their own extreme form of internal revolution, which, once they had gained victory over the Lon NoI regime in 1975, was to lead to three tragic, catastrophic years. Somehow, Beijing had managed to balance good relations with both Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge, prevailing on the King to return to Phnom Penh in 1975. Behind their public support for the regime, which was consistent with the Five Principles' emphasis on non-interference, no less a figure than Zhou Enlai, then suffering from cancer, warned the Khmer Rouge not to go too fast (a warning evidently not heeded). Richardson explains later that this public support for the Khmer Rouge was to be hugely damaging to China, laying it open to accusations it was the main funder and international supporter of one of the most murderous regimes in history. …

China, Cambodia, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Sophie Richardson

Previous articleNext article No AccessREVIEWSChina, Cambodia, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Sophie Richardson Kerry BrownKerry Brown Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The China Journal Volume 64July 2010 Published on behalf of the Australian Centre on China in the World at the Australian National University Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/tcj.64.20749287 Views: 15Total views on this site © The China JournalPDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

India and Eastphalia

Much of the attention paid to the growth in the political, economic, and strategic importance of Asia focuses on East and Southeast Asia, with China's rise featuring most prominently in analyses. However, examination of the possible development of an international order influenced by Asian power and ideas must also include consideration of the other big, emerging Asian power—India. This article explores India's complex role in the potential dawning and functioning of an Eastphalian international system. First, we look at features of India's economic and political rise in the past ten to fifteen years in order to give the reader a sense of India's place in the shift of power and influence in international relations toward Asia. Second, we examine India's commitment to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as an ordering framework for India's worldview and foreign policy. Third, we argue that despite India's increasing geopolitical prominence, Indian leaders have failed to develop consistent and coherent strategies for India in relation to the shifts taking place in world politics and economics. Fourth, we argue that India's indecisiveness may combine with massive domestic problems the country faces, such as crippling levels of continuing poverty, to render Indian power and influence increasingly impotent in and irrelevant to the evolution of an Eastphalian world order. Fifth, we explore whether India could carve a path other than irrelevance, a path that would instead make India the nation in stabilizing the Eastphalian world. By indispensable we mean the country that could bridge East and West in the multipolar world this century will experience and, in the process, play a decisive role in melding the lingering promise of democracy with the stubborn imperative of sovereignty.

China, Cambodia, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (review)

China, Cambodia, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (review)

Handling Relations with Myanmar in a Chinese Way: A Personal Reflection

AbstractDuring the political storm in Myanmar (Burma) in 1988, China adhered to a policy of non-interference, non-involvement and keeping aloof, in conformity with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which has been jointly initiated by China, India and Myanmar in 1954. This enabled China to restore gradually its traditional friendly relations with Myanmar when the situation became stable again after the military takeover in September 1988. At the same time, China kept friendly contacts with the opposition party led by Aung San Suu Kyi until she was placed under house arrest in 1989. Cheng Ruisheng served as China’s Ambassador to Myanmar from 1987 to 1991 and is now the only person in the Chinese Foreign Ministry who is personally acquainted with Aung San Suu Kyi. By sharing recollections of his time in Yangon, Cheng Ruisheng provides valuable insights into the principles and practice of China’s diplomacy.

The International Relations Theoretical Discourse in China: One World, Different Explanations

This article argues that, even though there is a dearth of systematic theorizing, there indeed is a rich IR theoretical discourse in China which developed over the course of the 60 years of the Peoples Republic of China. It attempts to synthesize and analyze that discourse, which largely reflects China’s diplomatic thinking and implicitly or explicitly affects its foreign policy making. It focuses on six sub-topics which include: (1) war, peace, and development; (2) the concept of contradictions; (3) the distribution of power and multipolarity; (4) the new international economic and political order; (5) the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence; and (6) Harmonious World.

Chinese Practice in Public International Law: 2008

This Survey covers materials reflecting Chinese practice in 2008 relating to: I. Fundamental Principles of International Law (Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence; Respect of State Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity; NonIntervention of Internal Affairs; Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes); II. International Peace and Security (Fight against Terrorism; Women, Peace and Security; The Zimbabwe Situation; The Darfur Situation in Sudan; The Kosovo Issue); III. International Law on Disarmament and Arms Control (Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation; Chemical Weapons; Biological Weapons); IV. International Law on Recognition (Kosovo; South Ossetia and Abkhazia); V. China’s Territorial Integrity and Boundaries (Taiwan; Tibet; Xisha Islands and Nansha Islands; Diaoyu Islands; China‐Russia Boundary; China‐India Boundary); VI. International Law of the Sea (Delimitation of the East China Sea; Delimitation of the Outer Limits of Continental Shelf Beyond 200 NMs; Straits Use for International Navigation; Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity beyond Areas of National Jurisdiction; International Seabed Authority; International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS); China’s Convoy Fleet in Somalia Coast); VII. International Law on Outer Space (Peaceful Use of Outer Space; Anti-Satellite Weapons); VIII. International Law on the Treatment of Aliens (Frontier Health and Quarantine; North Korean Asylum-seekers in China); IX. International Law on Human Rights (Rule of Law; Death Penalty; Rights of the Child; Women’s Rights; Torture; Rights of the Persons with Disabilities; Dialogue on Human Rights; Human Rights Council; Implementation of Human Rights Instruments); X. International Humanitarian Law (Children in Armed Conflict; Landmines; Explosive Remnants of War; Cluster Munitions; Tear Gas; Right of Individual Claims for Violations of International Humanitarian Law; Search of US soldiers remains in China and North Korea); XI. International

International Law Making in Times of Competing Ideologies or Clashing Civilizations: Peaceful Coexistence and Soviet-Western Legal Dialogue in the Cold War Era

Summary“Peaceful Coexistence,” a basic premise for minimum world public order during the Cold War, has re-emerged as a possible paradigm-model for world order in the present era of clashing or colliding civilizations. When the idea of codifying the general principles of peaceful coexistence was first advanced in the still-continuing Cold War, it was rejected by specialist legal bodies like the United Nations' International Law Commission and also the Institut de droit international as too “political” and thus incapable of being reduced to a scientific-legal foundation. The resulting intellectual-legal gap was promptly filled, however, by the non-governmental International Law Association (ILA), which established its own expert committee. Long-range fruits of this ILA initiative — apart from the all-important opening of a direct East-West legal dialogue — were the celebrated UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 of October 1970 and the acceptance of the pragmatic, empirical, problem-solving, step-by-step approach to resolving East-West conflicts in concrete cases — the ultimate road to détente on a deliberately nonideological case-by-case basis. The Canadian Branch of the ILA, with the support of the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs' Legal Division, was a leader in the ILA's decision to take up that project and participated fully until its successful completion.

China's Peaceful Rise and Sino-Indian Relations

China and India rank among the world's largest developing nations, fastest growing economies, most populous states, and greatest ancient civilisations. But most importantly, they are among the foremost rising powers in Asia. In the past quarter of century, both China and India's productive forces and overall national strength have been constantly enhanced, which are now widely perceived as ‘the rise of China’ 1 and ‘the emerging India’ (see, for example Cohen 2001; Ma 2002). The rise of China has to be grasped not only in terms of the past (when the Chinese people stood up, became enriched and strengthened under the first, second and third generation of leaders, respectively), but also in terms of the present and future (of a ‘peaceful rise’ under the new generations of leaders and in the wake of globalisation). Fifty years ago, Beijing and New Delhi jointly proposed ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ (known as Panchsheel in India) to guide bilateral relations between the two newly independent countries. However, the Sino-Indian relationship has experienced an up-and-down process since then, and the resolution of bilateral issues and the establishment of mutual trust still have a long way to go. Therefore, it is extremely necessary to reiterate and materialise Panchsheel, especially in the context of the simultaneous rise of China and India in Asia.

Carrying Forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the Promotion of Peace and Development*

Carrying Forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the Promotion of Peace and Development*

The renewed vitality of the International Law Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the post-Iraq invasion era: The 50th Anniversary of the China/India Pancba Shila Agreement of 1954

The renewed vitality of the International Law Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the post-Iraq invasion era: The 50th Anniversary of the China/India Pancba Shila Agreement of 1954