Principle Of Religious Freedom Research Articles

Liberal equality and toleration for conservative religious minorities. Decreasing opportunities for religious schools in the Netherlands?

Liberal democratic states face new challenges in balancing between principles of religious freedom and non-discrimination and in balancing these constitutional principles with other concerns, including social cohesion, good education, and immigrant-integration. In a context of increased prominence of secular and anti-Islamic voices in political debate, there are demands to reduce legal ‘exceptions’ for (conservative) religious groups in the Netherlands. This article focuses in particular on public debate and jurisprudence with regard to education and explores discussions of associational freedoms that are of importance to religious schools, including the right to select and refuse pupils (the debate on the so-called duty to enrol (acceptatieplicht)), the possibilities for schools to refuse hiring staff who do not support the school's philosophy (for example in relation to sexual orientation), and teaching on sexuality and sexual diversity. The article concludes by arguing that the Netherlands is undergoing a shift in the conceptualisation of religious freedom in relation to liberal equality, which in the longer run may destabilise a tradition of toleration and substantial collective freedoms for conservative religious groups.

Religious Freedom in Early Modern Germany: Theology, Philosophy, and Legal Casuistry

It is sometimes presumed that early modern religious conflict can be understood (and judged) on the basis of philosophical principles of religious freedom that display the irrationality of such conflict. Some derive these principles from Lockean and Kantian doctrines purporting to show that religions can be a matter of free rational choice and mutual toleration. Others derive them from Thomistic and communitarian traditions that purport to show that religions can learn mutual toleration by viewing each other as independent virtue-realizing communities. In this article I provide some historical reasons for thinking that conflicting forms of early modern religious identity were embedded in religious cultures whose force was such that they swept such philosophical principles along with them, giving rise to partisan philosophies that were themselves incommensurate and incapable of resolving the conflicts. This incommensurateness applied to the principles of religious freedom themselves, which appeared in rival forms. In the German empire a culture of religious pluralism emerged not from philosophy but from the institutions and practices of public law, during the period between the treaties of Augsburg (1555) and Osnabrück (1648). I argue that this juridical culture was not grounded in a particular philosophy or ideology but arose instead from the institutional habitus of public law under the exigencies of polarized religious conflict, and that it was issued not in principles of religious freedom but in a casuistry for resolving the conflict between such principles.

Principle of religious freedom: basic normative elements

The idea of ​​human rights is based on the premise that all people are free, have inherent dignity and value, and attitude towards them requires justice and equality. This is important for promoting peaceful coexistence between people and societies. An integral and important part of modern human rights is the concept of religious freedom. Since everything in the world is becoming more and more interconnected, and meetings of various religions and worldviews are becoming more and more important, the principles of religious freedom are challenged. In my report, I will: 1) consider the principle of religious freedom: what it means, where it came from and what some of the most important modern documents on religious freedom and 2) agree with a few thoughts and comments. My starting point is that modern human rights include many religions and state neutrality in relation to religious and non-religious attitudes. I contend that these two elements, along with the right to change religion, are the most challenging.

Doctrine and Deep Structure in the Contraception Mandate Debate

This short essay is part of an exchange on religious liberty challenges to the so-called “contraception mandate,” which requires many employer-provided health insurance plans to cover contraception as part of preventative care.The general idea of religion-based exemptions to general laws has been controversial for a long time. But rarely has a specific claim for exemption provoked as much vehemence as in the current fight over the contraception mandate. Doctrinally, the legal problem here is hard but conceptually straightforward, and comes down to whether the government has a compelling interest in applying the rule to employers with sincere religious objections. Both sides, though, see larger stakes at play. Opponents of the mandate describe it as an attack on bedrock principles of religious freedom. And some supporters want to avoid even reaching the compelling interest analysis and argue that the mandate often infringes no legitimate religious interests to begin with.Both these extreme views are wrong. But they are also important. And they demand explanation. They suggest some imperfectly articulated undercurrents in the current American conversation about religion and the law. My goal here is therefore twofold – to analyze the legal problem, and to say something about the deep structure of the conflict, which goes beyond a simple legal dispute.

Konsep Toleransi Beragama Dalam Tafsir Al-Qur’an Tematik Karya Tim Departemen Agama Republik Indonesia

In a decade of post-reformation era, the religious life has been nuanced with the vast existence of radical-fundamental movements that underscore the non-compromised mode of action and tend to legalize violence pursuing their aims in Indonesia. At the same time, it is urgent to note the release of The Thematic Exegesis (Tafsir) of Al-Qur’an: The Inter-religious Relationship as the implementation of RPJMN 2004-2009 by the Ministry of Religious affairs the Republic of Indonesia. The issue of the exegesis serves as the benchmark of various Tafsir of either in a too-literal or a too-liberal one appeared in Indonesia. The issue is then the relationship between the condition of religious life in Indonesia and The Thematic Exegesis of AlQur’an: The Inter-religious Relationship as the government type of Tafsir.This research uses a critical discourse analysis in that it implements Teun A. van Dijk’s model of discourse analysis focused on three dimensional constructions of discourse: text, social cognition, and social context. To sum up, the concepts of religious tolerance offered in the exegesis are the principles of religious freedom, the tolerance of religious other, and the harmonious principle. Those three concepts of religious tolerance are a government version as it is imbued in the Exegesis produced by the government. This underlines the relationship of the Exegesis as a product of knowledge and power.

The Collaborations-Relations Between Western (Secular) Law and Religious Nomoi Groups in Today’s Multicultural Context: The Cases of France and Canada

In the last decade, under the pressing processes of immigration and globalisation, many Western constitutional democracies have moved from a number of religions sharing a common culture to today’s age of diversity. What current democracies are facing is the lack of overlapping consensus over basic constitutional “values”. The nature, scope and force of such values are likely to be affected by competing and, sometimes, contested fundamental reasons and worldviews. From here stems the dilemma between “unity” and “diversity”. This essay starts with a broad consideration on the principle of religious freedom, strictly related to the separation as well as collaboration between secular States and Churches; then the author analyses two case-studies (France and Canada), pointing out some specific legal approaches. In particular he focuses the analyses over the French “droit commun” and the Canadian arbitral tribunals that, especially in family law, allow disputes to be arbitrated using religious jurisdictions.

’n Etiese perspektief op godsdiensvryheid

An ethical perspective on religious freedom This article investigates the concept of religious freedom from a Christian-ethical perspective. In view of the current reality of religious fundamentalism in a growing heterogeneous world community, the concept of theocracy as justification of religious intolerance is investigated. A survey of the concept of theocracy in the Old and New Testament reveals that the official identification of the state with one particular religion, and the state thus giving prominence to that particular religion, cannot be founded on Christian-ethical principles. This practice is also detrimental to the execution of the principle of religious freedom. The conclusion is that the separation of church and state is the most suitable way to uphold the principle of religious freedom.

The Enlightenment Case for Vouchers

In this essay I argue that a system of vouchers better realizes the principles of the Framers in today's world than our current system, where all publicly funded primary and secondary schools are publicly controlled. The religion clauses of the Constitution are designed to allow citizens to express their values and opinions through their own religious choices, free from interference by the government. Empowering individuals to choose a school that reflects their values, religious or otherwise, better preserves such freedom than coercing individuals to pay twice for education - once for a government school that they reject and once for a private school that acts consistently with their values. My argument moves in three stages. First, I very briefly sketch some of the Framers' principles of religious freedom. Then through a series of hypotheticals I show that a voucher program can achieve all the legitimate goals for government involvement in education, such as providing equal opportunity. In contrast, I show that opposition to vouchers can be traced to educational goals that are in tension with the Framers' views, such as those of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Rousseau thought that the state must exercise substantial control over the ideological content of education in the name of equality and democracy. Such goals necessarily subordinate the liberty of opinion that the religion clauses were designed to protect.

Foreordained Failure: The Quest for a Constitutional Principle of Religious Freedom

Foreordained Failure: The Quest for a Constitutional Principle of Religious Freedom

A Scapegoat in the New Wilderness: The Origins and Rise of Anti-Semitism in America

Home to nearly one-half of the world's Jews, America also harbours its share of anti-Jewish sentiment. In a country founded on the principle of religious freedom, with no medieval past, no legal nobility and no national church, the questions arise of how anti-Semitism became a presence in America, and how did America's beginnings and history affect the course of this bigotry? Frederic Cople Jaher considers these questions in A Scapegoat in the New Wilderness, a history of anti-Semitism from its origins in the ancient world to its first widespread outbreak in America during the Civil War. Comprehensive in approach, the book combines psychological, sociological, economic, cultural, anthropological and historical interpretation to reveal the nature of anti-Semitism in the United States. Jaher sets up a comparative framework, in which American anti-Semitism is seen in relation to other forms of ethnic and religious bigotry. He compares America's treatment of Jews to their treatment in other eras and countries, and notes variations by region, social group and historical period. Jaher shows us that although anti-Semitism has been less pronounced in America than in Europe, it has had a significant place in its culture from the beginning, a circumstance traced to intertwining religious and secular forces reaching back to early Christianity, with its doctrinal animosity toward Jews. He documents the growth of this animosity in its American incarnation through the 1830s to its virulent and epidemic climax during the Civil War. Though Christianity's dispute with Judaism accounts for the persistence of anti-Semitism, Jaher reveals the deeper roots of this pathology of prejudice in the human psyche - in primal concerns about defeat, enfeeblement, and death, or in visceral responses of intergroup and interpersonal envy and rivalry. An in-depth study of all phases of anti-Jewish feeling as it is manifested in politics, economic behaviour, cultural myth and legend, religious and social interaction, and the performing arts, this comprehensive work offers insight into the New World's oldest ethnic and religious hatred.

Foreordained Failure: The Quest for a Constitutional Principle of Religious Freedom. Steven D. Smith

Foreordained Failure: The Quest for a Constitutional Principle of Religious Freedom. Steven D. Smith

Religious Freedom, Modern Democracy, and the Common Good: Conference Papers

The papers that follow were presented on April 27, 1996, at a conference entitled “Religious Freedom, Modern Democracy, and the Common Good” and devoted to Franklin I. Gamwell's The Meaning of Religious Freedom: Modern Politics and the Democratic Resolution (Albany: SUNY, 1995). The conference was sponsored by the Lilly Endowment and held at Eden Theological Seminary in St. Louis.Gamwell's constructive proposal is significant not as a further nuance on settled ways of understanding the relation of religion and politics in the United States, but rather as an explicit attempt to unsettle the current consensus in approaching this issue itself. As Gamwell shows, the contemporary discussion is dominated by so-called separationist and religionist understandings that alike assume, rather than argue, that religion is “nonrational.” He engages positions representing the entire spectrum of such understandings, including the “privatist” view of John Rawls, the “partisan” view of John Courtney Murray, and the “pluralist” view of Kent Greenawalt, in order to demonstrate that such a nonrational approach makes it impossible democratically not only to assert, but also to give coherent meaning to the political principle of religious freedom.

The Tragedy of Yugoslavia: the failure of democratic transformation

For all its foundation on the principles of religious freedom and human equality, American history contains numerous examples of bigotry and persecution of minorities. Now, author Philip Perlmutter lays out the history of prejudice in America in a brief, compact, and readable volume. Perlmutter begins with the arrival of white Europeans, moves through the eighteenth and industrially expanding nineteenth centuries the explosion of immigration and its attendant problems in the twentieth century and a fifth chapter explores how prejudice (racial, religious, and ethnic) has been institutionalized in the educational systems and laws. His final chapter covers the future of minority progress.

Birth, Death and Technology: The Limits of Cultural Laissez-Faire

(jI by CHRISTOPHER LASCH ndividualism has been essential to the growth of liberal democracy in the West. The essence of the democratic state is that it acts directly on individuals-rather than on corporations or estates-and that it treats all citizens alike; it is in this sense that the modern state represents the substitution of reason (embodied in the law) for force and favoritism. At the same time the modern state presupposed the redefinition of many activities, formerly regarded as matters concerning the entire community, as essentially private affairs, with which the state had no right to interfere. Economic life, for example, which had once been subjected to innumerable regulations, both local and national, came to be regarded, in the late 18th century, as a self-regulating mechanism requiring only that the state enforce the general rules of fair play and free competition. The achievement of economic individualism, in the 18th and 19th centuries, was paralleled by the triumph of individualism in cultural life. Religion offers the clearest example. The principle of religious freedom, first officially recognized in Virginia in 1784, and later written into the Bill of Rights, meant that religious belief was henceforth to be regarded as a purely private affair, something between the individual and his maker.

Recent Restrictions upon Religious Liberty

Within the last five years, the Supreme Court of the United States has added decisions of greater importance to the case law of religious freedom than had been accumulated in all the years since the adoption of the Bill of Rights. The importance of two of these recent decisions rests upon the subordination of freedom of action based on sectarian beliefs to the restrictions of society as a whole. In one of the two cases, the law of society was a board of education order that school children participate in the flag salute exercise on pain of expulsion from the public schools;' in the other, it was peddlers' license tax ordinances.2 Because neither of these decisions has been accepted as a firmly rooted precedent, it will be well to examine them in the light of the history of the federally secured right of religious freedom and in the light of the immediate public reactions to them. A considerable proportion of the early emigration to the thirteen original colonies was undoubtedly due to a desire to escape religious persecution in England and on the Continent. Those colonists, however, were as insistent that their own particular form of religion be adhered to as their oppressors had been. The story of Roger Williams, who was expelled from the colony of Massachusetts because of his non-conformist views and who established the colony of Rhode Island as a sanctuary of religious tolerance, and that of Ann Hutchinson, who also was exiled from the Bay Colony for a like reason, are monuments to the intolerance of the Puritans. But by the time of the adoption of the Constitution, the principle of religious freedom which Roger Williams so stoutly advocated and put into practice in Rhode Island had gained such headway that its omission from the law of the land was at once protested; and, significantly, the first tenet of the so-called Bill of Rights was a cure of that want: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, ... . It will be observed that this declaration is an inhibition only on the federal government. It does not prevent the states from doing

Before Areopagitica

The principle of religious freedom is declared by Masson to have been the precious fruit of the successive persecutions which attended the fission of English protestantism into sects more and more removed from Rome. He believes that the more each protesting body suffered from intolerance the more tolerant it became, that the more it was forced to contend for liberty for itself the more nearly it approached the conception of liberty for all, with the result that the implied principle was finally by the ultimate dissenters extricated from all the pain of cumulative persecution and kindled, as it were, “on the top of a light-house, on its own account.” To Milton, briefly anticipated by Roger Williams, Masson gives chief credit for enunciating this ideal of freedom as an end in itself. When other men argued for liberty, it was always a liberty with some limitation, liberty of such kind and degree as would suit some ulterior interest. When Milton spoke, it was to clarion forth a liberty pure, absolute, entire.