Principle Of Equal Consideration Research Articles

Razvoj shvatanja o ekvivalentnosti uzajamnih prestacija kroz pravila o pravičnoj ceni od antičkog doba do početka XX veka

The origin and subsequent development of the principle of equal consideration in contract law are closely related to the rules on just price. This paper traces the evolution of the just price concept from antiquity, including the principles of Roman law, medieval interpretations, and its application in canon law, to the first codifications in the 19th and 20th centuries. We will demonstrate how the understanding of just price has changed, under what conditions it should be applied, whether it should be legislatively regulated and to what extent, and how this legal institution illustrates and safeguards the principle of equal consideration in contract law. Furthermore, we will consider the entanglement of this institution with the institution of laesio enormis, whose evolution has significantly influenced the formation of the just price concept as we know it today.

From livestock to nonhuman persons: Property status of animals

Eşit gözetim ilkesi, bir eylemin ahlaki anlamda doğruluğuna karar verirken eylemden etkilenenlerin benzer çıkarlarını gözetmeyi gerektirir. İnsan harici hayvanların da hissedebilir varlıklar olması sebebiyle bu değerlendirmeye dahil edilmesi hayvan etiğinin temellerinden biridir. Ancak bazı kuramcılar insan harici hayvanların gerek yasal anlamda gerekse halihazırdaki toplumsal normlar bağlamında mülk olarak konumlandırılmalarının hayvanların ahlaki bakımdan kayda değer bir biçimde gözetilmelerine engel teşkil ettiğini öne sürmektedir. Buradan yola çıkarak, eşit gözetimin mümkün olabilmesi için insan harici hayvanların mülk statülerinin kaldırılmasını ve “başkasının mülkü olmama hakkı” olarak tanımladıkları hakkın tüm hissedebilir varlıklar için bir temel hak olarak tanınmasını önermektedirler. Bu makalede, insan harici hayvanların mülk statüsünün kaldırılması yönündeki argümanlar ve bu argümanlara getirilen eleştiriler detaylı bir şekilde ele alınacaktır.

Unitarianism or Hierarchical Approach for Moral Status? A Very Subtle Difference

The article is inspired by Shelly Kagan’s recent book “How to Count Animals”, which focuses on the alternative between a unitarian and a hierarchical conception of the moral status of beings in the animal ethics debate. The paper finds a way of compromise between the two perspectives in the principle of equal consideration of interests, but above all it lessens the role of such opposition – especially its practical relevance – by emphasizing that, regardless of the fact of conceiving moral status in terms of all or nothing or in gradual terms, what really counts in our attitude towards non-human animals is to assign them an important moral consideration, that protects them not only from suffering, but also from an induced death in advance of natural times, a thesis that is compatible with both unitarianism and a hierarchical approach.

Misunderstanding and Truth About Peter Singer's Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests

Misunderstanding and Truth About Peter Singer's Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests

David DeGrazia on Animal Rights: A Critical Analysis

The article aims to critically discuss the theory of animal rights developed by American social philosopher David DeGrazia. It consists of two parts. The first one describes the main elements of DeGrazia’s approach, namely his views on animal minds, the principle of equal consideration, the idea of unequal moral status, the concept of border persons, and practical remarks concerning improving the treatment of animals by humans. The second part presents remarks about the points where DeGrazia’s proposals should be supplemented and corrected so as to make them more convincing and widely accepted. The conclusion of the essay is the proposal of a cultural revolution for the benefit of animals, which should be initiated by famous people, like actresses, actors, sportswomen and sportsmen, because of their influential position in contemporary societies.

David DeGrazia o prawach zwierząt – analiza krytyczna

The article aims to critically discuss the theory of animal rights developed by American social philosopher David DeGrazia. It consists of two parts. The first one describes the main elements of DeGrazia’s approach, namely his views on animal minds, the principle of equal consideration, the idea of unequal moral status, the concept of border persons, and practical remarks concerning improving the treatment of animals by humans. The second part presents remarks about the points where DeGrazia’s proposals should be supplemented and corrected so as to make them more convincing and widely accepted. The conclusion of the essay is the proposal of a cultural revolution for the benefit of animals, which should be initiated by famous people, like actresses, actors, sportswomen and sportsmen, because of their influential position in contemporary societies.

The Speciesism Debate: Intuition, Method, and Empirical Advances.

Simple SummaryAn influential idea in animal ethics is that moral favouritism towards members of one’s own species is a prejudice. This prejudice has been labelled ‘speciesism’, in analogy with racism and sexism. But not all ethicists subscribe to the view that speciesism is a prejudice. In fact, the tenability of speciesism is a topic of ongoing ethical debate. A recent exchange between Peter Singer and Shelly Kagan might leave the impression that this debate has essentially reached a stalemate, since the disputing parties rely on irreconcilable moral intuitions. In the present article, I argue that this impression is misleading. I highlight both philosophical and empirical research avenues that can help to move the speciesism debate forward, emphasizing that not all ethical intuitions about speciesism should be given equal weight. The article is part of the special issue ‘Animal Ethics: Questioning the Orthodoxy’.This article identifies empirical, conceptual and normative avenues to advance the speciesism debate. First, I highlight the application of Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (EDAs) as one such avenue: especially where (anti-)speciesist positions heavily rely on appeals to moral intuition, and EDAs have potential to move the debate forward. Second, an avenue for conceptual progress is the delineation of speciesism from other views in its vicinity, specifically from the view that biological differences between species are sometimes morally relevant (‘species-relativism’). Third, if we adopt Singer’s definition of speciesism, then a limitation of the current debate is that it is not obvious whether the core ethical principle that underlies anti-speciesist positions—the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests—is widely applicable. Arguably, the interests of animals are often too dissimilar to establish what equal consideration amounts to. I underscore the need for integrating philosophical and empirical research, to come to terms with the extent to which the interests of members of different species are alike, and with the question of whether any dissimilarities might be morally relevant.

Misadventures of Sentience: Animals and the Basis of Equality.

Simple SummaryEqual moral worth in animal ethics is an elusive moral notion not only because of the notorious human prejudice but also because grounding equal moral worth requires attending to the problem of the basis of equality. How can we ground equality given that all human and nonhuman individuals vary in all the morally considerable features? John Rawls claimed that we can use range properties, namely properties that are equally possessed by all people who pass a certain threshold of moral relevance (e.g., the age of majority gives equal right to vote). In this paper, I critically discuss two different attempts to defend an egalitarian theory in animal ethics: Alasdair Cochrane’s and Peter Singer’s. The former seeks to eschew the problem of range properties by appealing to a binary property naturally possessed by all sentient beings (the property of having interests). His attempt fails because this property has the same problems as range properties. The latter dispenses with equal moral worth altogether by defending the principle of equal consideration of interests. I argue that this principle has weak egalitarian credentials. I conclude by outlining the conditions that a sound theory in animal ethics should meet.This paper aims to put in question the all-purposes function that sentience has come to play in animal ethics. In particular, I criticize the idea that sentience can provide a sound basis of equality, as has been recently proposed by Alasdair Cochrane. Sentience seems to eschew the standard problems of egalitarian accounts that are based on range properties. By analysing the nature of range properties, I will show that sentience cannot provide such a solution because it is constructed as a sui generis range property. After criticizing the approaches seeking to ground animals’ equal status, I turn to Singer’s principle of equal consideration of interests. Despite its seeming non-controversiality, I argue that it cannot do without referring to the moral status of a being in order to determine the weight of a being’s interests. Moreover, it outlines a weak egalitarian basis because it relies on the presumption of equality of interests in virtue of our lack of knowledge of the weight of individuals’ interests. I conclude in a more positive tone by arguing that, irrespective of the troubles of range property egalitarianism, animal ethics can rely on other normative resources to defend the cause of animals.

Why the Concept of Moral Status Should be Abandoned

The use of the concept of moral status is commonplace today in debates about the moral consideration of entities lacking certain special capacities, such as nonhuman animals. This concept has been typically used to defend the view that adult human beings have a status higher than all those entities. However, even those who disagree with this claim have often accepted the idea of moral status as if it were part of an undisputed received way of thinking in ethics. This paper argues that the use of this concept, however common, distorts our understanding of how to behave towards different individuals in different circumstances. When moral status is identified with the interest in living or the capacity for well-being, it becomes an arbitrary and irrelevant criterion. When it is used as a synonym of moral consideration or considerability, in a way that is compatible with the principle of equal consideration, it becomes trivial and confusing. When used, instead, to defend the unequal moral consideration of interests of equal weight, it has several implausible implications. In particular, the claim that unequal status is justified because of the value (either final or intrinsic, or instrumental) of cognitive capacities implausibly entails that our exercising those capacities should have priority over the promotion of our wellbeing. The idea of full moral status is also problematic as it implies the possibility of status monsters. In addition, its use is based in a misconceived way of what it would really entail to have a full status by virtue of having rational capacities. The paper concludes that we have strong reasons to abandon the concept of moral status altogether.

Equality, its Basis and Moral Status: Challenging the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests

The principle of equal consideration of interests (ECOI) is a very popular principle in animal ethics. Peter Singer employs it to ground equal treatment and solve the problem of the basis of equality, namely the problem of why we should grant equal treatment despite the variability of people’s features. In this paper, I challenge Singer’s argument because ECOI does not provide plausible grounds to presume that the interests of diverse individuals are actually equal. Analyzing the case of pain and the interest in not suffering in particular, I contend that there are some insurmountable epistemic and axiological problems in accounting for the equality of interests. Besides criticizing ECOI as a basis of equality, I argue that we need to rely on an equality of moral status. I conclude by providing some considerations on the relation between equality and the principle of proportionality.

Why Speciesism is Wrong: A Response to Kagan

AbstractIn Animal Liberation I argued that we commonly ignore or discount the interests of sentient members of other species merely because they are not human, and that this bias in favour of members of our own species is, in important respects, parallel to the biases that lie behind racism and sexism. Shelly Kagan, in ‘What's Wrong With Speciesism’ misconstrues this argument, as well as the principle of equal consideration of interests, which I offer as an alternative to speciesism. Kagan also offers, as an alternative explanation of, and possible justification for, our discounting the interests of nonhuman animals, the suggestion that your interests count more if you are a member of a species whose typical adult members are persons. Although this view is not a form of speciesism, Kagan seems not to be aware of the fact that it is a view commonly defended by advocates of natural law ethics, on which there is already an extensive critical literature.

The principle of equal consideration and laesio enormis in the law of contracts

The principle of equal consideration is one of the basic principles of the law of the contracts. Its essence lies in finding a fair balance in exchange between parties when establishing bilateral (consensual) contracts parties. In the Law of Contracts and Torts this principle has been apostrophed as one of the basic ones. The Law also limited the authonomy of choice and provided the legal instruments for protecting the principle of equal consideration. One of the most significants legal instruments which serve that purpose is laesio enormis. The doctrine of laesio enormis originates from the Roman law and it further developed with time. Before the Law of Contracts and Torts came into force, the rules on laesio enormis from both The 1844 Civil Code of the Kingdom of Serbia and the 1811 Austrian Civil Code applied in the territory of today's Serbia. However, in the period from mid-1950s to mid-1970s special rules applied to contract of sale of real estate in the public property regime. In mid-1970s the laws introduced the principle of absolute equality of mutual consideration when it comes to the sale of real estate property. The Law of Contracts and Torts accepted the principle of proportion between the commitments of contracting parties in a bilateral contract. The legislator opted for the elastic method of establishing the disproportion of the contracting parties' commitments. In order for the rules of laesio enormis to be applied, it is necessary that there is an 'obvious disproportion' between commitments in contracting parties, i.e. disproportion which is evident and unquestionable. It is the Court's role to assess if that was the case in each individual case separately. Although the Law clearly states the obvious disproportion between the parties' commitments has to exist at the time of entering into contract, certain issues connected with the application of this rule have been heavily disputed both in legal theory and in judicial practice. Legal authors' opinion varies on the question if laesio enormis is essentially a deficiency ofwill, and of the nature of its legal consequences.

“Everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one”

The paper explores the meaning of the principle of equal consideration of interests as expressed by the famous dictum that John Stuart Mill attributed to Jeremy Bentham: “everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one”. It examines the contributions of these two authors and the comments by Henry Sidgwick, Stanley W. Jevons, Francis Y. Edgeworth and Arthur C. Pigou. The hedonistic and cardinalistic assumptions that these authors shared made the question of how to weigh the happiness of different individuals crucial for the application of utilitarian ethics, since the distribution of happiness and the distribution of the means of happiness were strictly related in this perspective. In particular, the hedonistic approach suggested to Edgeworth a strong argument in favour of inequality, and a comparison of his conclusions with those of his predecessors – and with those of Pigou after him – is essential to understand the limits of the egalitarian implications of utilitarian ethics.

Equality and Democracy

In a recent article, Thomas Christiano defends the intrinsic justice of democracy grounded in the principle of equal consideration of interests. Each citizen is entitled to a single vote, equal in weight to all other citizens. The problem with this picture is that all citizens must meet a threshold of minimal competence. My argument is that Christiano is wrong to claim a minimum threshold of competency is fully consistent with the principle of equality. While standards of minimal competency may be justifiable, these standards justify political inequality. This paper explores the relationship between equality and democracy in terms of minimal competency, demonstrating how minimal competency is justified and why it is inegalitarian in interesting ways.

The Prodigal and his Brother: Impartiality and the Equal Consideration of Interests

At the heart of Peter Singer's utilitarianism is the impartial weighing of the interests of those affected by our actions. Singer calls this the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests. This paper argues that Singer's Principle does not accord with our moral intuitions and the logic of our moral thinking. It discusses the Principle in the context of the parable of the Prodigal Son and his Brother--a parable that raises the issue of impartiality in a particularly challenging way. What the parable shows is, first, that our moral thinking often turns on judgements of fairness that are prior to any impartial weighing of interests; and, second, that impartial fairness itself is sometimes transcended by compassionate love. Both of these points have important implications for bioethics.

Refuting Peter Singer's ethical theory: the importance of human dignity

Introduction The Goal of Ethics The Source of Moral Value The Role of Reason in Ethics The Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests Why Singer's Principle of Equal Consideration is a Threat to Morality and Human Values On Human Dignity Bibliography Index

Sistemas de classificação de severidade: análise abolicionista da categorização do animal-coisa


 
 
 
 Este artigo tem por objetivo analisar os sistemas de classificação de severidade em experimentação animal, não somente em relação à efetuação dos princípios dos 3Rs, mas sobretudo a partir de uma perspectiva abolicionista. Os sistemas de classificação foram criados para implementar os princípios dos 3Rs e, consequentemente, minimizar o sofrimento dos animais na pesquisa científica. Sob a ótica abolicionista, todavia, tal tarefa se encontra eminentemente prejudicada a partir do momento em que o animal continua a ser concebido como propriedade. O que ocorre neste interim é a manutenção de uma relação assimétrica de dominação entre proprietário e propriedade, em que nunca ocorre efetivamente o balanço de interesses defendido pelo princípio da igual consideração de interesses. Para que este cenário se transforme, é imperativo construir um paradigma que assuma o animal como um sujeito, e não uma coisa.