Abstract
Simple SummaryAn influential idea in animal ethics is that moral favouritism towards members of one’s own species is a prejudice. This prejudice has been labelled ‘speciesism’, in analogy with racism and sexism. But not all ethicists subscribe to the view that speciesism is a prejudice. In fact, the tenability of speciesism is a topic of ongoing ethical debate. A recent exchange between Peter Singer and Shelly Kagan might leave the impression that this debate has essentially reached a stalemate, since the disputing parties rely on irreconcilable moral intuitions. In the present article, I argue that this impression is misleading. I highlight both philosophical and empirical research avenues that can help to move the speciesism debate forward, emphasizing that not all ethical intuitions about speciesism should be given equal weight. The article is part of the special issue ‘Animal Ethics: Questioning the Orthodoxy’.This article identifies empirical, conceptual and normative avenues to advance the speciesism debate. First, I highlight the application of Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (EDAs) as one such avenue: especially where (anti-)speciesist positions heavily rely on appeals to moral intuition, and EDAs have potential to move the debate forward. Second, an avenue for conceptual progress is the delineation of speciesism from other views in its vicinity, specifically from the view that biological differences between species are sometimes morally relevant (‘species-relativism’). Third, if we adopt Singer’s definition of speciesism, then a limitation of the current debate is that it is not obvious whether the core ethical principle that underlies anti-speciesist positions—the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests—is widely applicable. Arguably, the interests of animals are often too dissimilar to establish what equal consideration amounts to. I underscore the need for integrating philosophical and empirical research, to come to terms with the extent to which the interests of members of different species are alike, and with the question of whether any dissimilarities might be morally relevant.
Highlights
Half a century after the term ‘speciesism’ was coined, the question of whether human beings have an elevated moral status is still a topic of live debate in animal ethics (Appendix A, 1)
In the remainder of this section, as well as the one, I will argue that this impression is misleading: even if speciesist and anti-speciesist positions rest on irreconcilable intuitions about which properties count as morally relevant, it would be a mistake to think that these intuitions should necessarily be given equal weight
One reason why this is a mistake, I will argue in Section 3, has to do with the different epistemic statuses of intuitions: if we know that a given moral intuition comes about through a process that typically gives rise to cognitive biases, this detracts from the plausibility of the intuition
Summary
Half a century after the term ‘speciesism’ was coined, the question of whether human beings have an elevated moral status is still a topic of live debate in animal ethics (Appendix A, 1). Kagan’s [1] discussion might leave the impression that the speciesism debate has essentially reached a stalemate since the disputing parties rely on irreconcilable moral intuitions. This impression is misleading, I will argue, and merits to be corrected. Further research is called for, preliminary findings from moral psychology suggest that at least some speciesist intuitions are proper targets of EDAs. In Section 4, I go on to argue that while empirical research—research on the question of whether ‘the folk’ endorses speciesism—can help to advance the ethical debate, such research faces various challenges and pitfalls that researchers have to overcome.
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