Prima Facie Plausibility Research Articles

What does it mean for a duty to be directed in joint action?

It is often stated that joint actions are linked to so-called directed duties. It is not just that we should “do our part” in a joint action simply because it is the right thing to do or because it is in our best interest. Instead, we “owe” it to the other participants. Despite its prima facie plausibility, this claim is not well understood. Is it true that duties in joint action are directed? Which notion of directedness is relevant to understanding the normativity of joint action? I first argue that we can characterize the notion of directed duties in joint action in terms of a network of inferentially related normative relations and practices. I apply this analysis to show that duties in joint action are directed. This analysis supports the view that the normativity in joint action is special as it involves what Stephen Darwall calls “individual authority” without entailing “representative authority”. A perhaps surprising conclusion derived from this account is that actions in joint action are owed to everyone involved in the group equally. This supports Margaret Gilbert’s joint commitment account of joint intention.

Knowability paradox, decidability solution?

AbstractFitch's knowability paradox shows that for each unknown truth there is also an unknowable truth, a result which has been thought both odd in itself and at odds with views which impose epistemic constraints on truth and/or meaningfulness. Here a solution is considered which has received little attention in the debate but which carries prima facie plausibility. The decidability solution is to accept that Fitch sentences are unknowably true but deny the significance of this on the grounds that Fitch sentences are nevertheless decidable. The decidability solution is particularly attractive for those whose primary concern is an epistemic constraint on meaningfulness (‘verificationists’). For those whose main concern is truth (‘anti‐realists’), the situation is more complex: Melia takes the solution to exonerate anti‐realism completely; Williamson sees it as completely irrelevant. The truth lies between these two extremes: there is one broad anti‐realist commitment to which the solution does not apply, but there is also one, the “fundamental tenet” of anti‐realism according to Dummett, to which it does.

Hamstrung Horses: Dating Constantine's Departure from the Court of Galerius

This article reconciles contradictory ancient evidence concerning the date and circumstances of Constantine's departure from the court of Galerius to join his father, Constantius I. Modern consensus places this departure in mid-305 on the strength of evidence derived from Pan. Lat. 6.7.5–8.2, which states that Constantine joined his father in Gaul, and a military diploma unearthed in Italy in 1958, which lists Constantius as Britannicus Maximus II. This article deconstructs the case for this chronology on three grounds: firstly, that there is a prima facie plausibility to the fourth-century narrative of Constantine's hostage status with Galerius, who had worked hard to keep the sons of Maximian and Constantius from power; secondly, the 306 diploma is subjected to scrutiny and arguments offered for rejecting the iteration Britannicus Maximus II, not least because such other evidence of victory titles as exists contradicts it; thirdly and finally, a historical argument is made, on the basis of Pan. Lat. 7(6) and 6(7), that no major victory was ever won by Constantius in northern Britain. In all, it is argued that the story of Constantine's flight should be treated as historical and dated to the summer of 306.

Anti-Skepticism Under a Linguistic Guise

In this paper I consider the plausibility of developing anti-skepticism by framing the question in linguistic terms: instead of asking whether we know, we ask what falls within the extension of the word “know”. I first trace two previous attempts to develop anti-skepticism in this way, from Austin (particularly as presented by Kaplan) and from epistemic contextualism, and I present reasons to think that both approaches are unsuccessful. I then focus on a recently popular attempt to develop anti-skepticism from the “function-first” approach associated with Craig, which I also show to be problematic. I then argue that the apparent prima facie plausibility of fighting skepticism on linguistic grounds is due to a methodological spill-over from linguistics. Once we recognize this, it becomes clear that the skepticism debate should not be conducted in linguistic terms.

Metaphysical Emergence

<i>Metaphysical Emergence</i>

The World in the Wave Function

<i>The World in the Wave Function</i>

The epistemic value of independent lies: false analogies and equivocations

Here I critically assess an argument put forward by Kuorikoski et al. (Br J Philos Sci, 61(3):541–567, 2010) for the epistemic import of model-based robustness analysis. I show that this argument is not sound since the sort of probabilistic independence on which it relies is unfeasible. By revising the notion of probabilistic independence imposed on the models’ results, I introduce a prima-facie more plausible argument. However, despite this prima-facie plausibility, I show that even this new argument is unsound in most if not all cases of model-based robustness analysis. This I do to demonstrate that the epistemic import of model-based robust analysis cannot be satisfactorily defended on the basis of probabilistic independence.

Between the Cherubim: The ‘Mercy Seat’ as Site of Divine Revelation in Romans 3.25

Although the long-standing debate about the meaning of hilastērion in Rom. 3.25 has led to no consensus, readings are nearly always either (1) metaphorical ( hilastērion as place of atonement/expiation) or (2) metonymic ( hilastērion as a means of atonement/expiation). However, in many Second Temple Jewish texts, the word refers to a place of divine revelation. Proposing a fresh semantic topology of usages of hilastērion, this article argues that there is no unambiguous metonymic usage of the word, and that references to atonement in Lev. 16 are secondary to the revelatory function of the ‘mercy seat’. Attending to overlooked intertextual complexities, it suggests that the hilastērion was the site where God promised to reveal the definitive interpretation of his law. The revelatory function of the hilastērion possesses prima facie plausibility as a reading of Rom. 3.21-26, which is driven by the theme of God’s self-revelation in Jesus.

A St Petersburg Paradox for risky welfare aggregation

Abstract The principle of Anteriority says that prospects that are identical from the perspective of every possible person’s welfare are equally good overall. The principle enjoys prima facie plausibility, and has been employed for various theoretical purposes. Here it is shown using an analogue of the St Petersburg Paradox that Anteriority is inconsistent with central principles of axiology.

How Plausible Is the Implausible? Students\u2019 Plausibility and Prevalence Ratings of the Self-Report Symptom Inventory

Some self-report symptom validity tests, such as the Self-Report Symptom Inventory (SRSI), rely on a detection strategy that uses bizarre, extreme, or very rare symptoms. Thus, items are constructed to invite respondents with an invalid response style to affirm pseudosymptoms that are usually not experienced by genuine patients. However, these pseudosymptoms should not be easily recognizable, because otherwise sophisticated over-reporters could strategically avoid them and go undetected. Therefore, we tested how well future psychology professionals were able to differentiate between genuine complaints and pseudosymptoms in terms of their plausibility and prevalence.Psychology students (N = 87) received the items of the SRSI online and were given the task to rate each item as to its plausibility and prevalence in the community.Students evaluated genuine symptoms as significantly more plausible and more prevalent than pseudosymptoms. However, 56% of students rated pseudosymptoms as moderately plausible, whereas 17% rated them as moderately prevalent in the general public.Overall, it appears that psychology students are successful in distinguishing bizarre, unusual, or rare symptoms from genuine complaints. Yet, the majority of students still attributed relatively high prima facie plausibility to pseudosymptoms. We contend that if such a trusting attitude is true for psychology students, it may also be the case for young psychology practitioners, which, consequently, may diminish the probability of employing self-report validity measures in psychological assessments.

Relationality of intentionality

ABSTRACT At face value, intentionality is a relational notion. There are, however, arguments intended to show that it is not. I categorize the strongest arguments against the relationality of intentionality into three major groups: Brentanian arguments, Fregean arguments, and Quinean arguments. I argue that, despite their prima facie plausibility, none of these arguments eventually succeeds. I then conclude that, in the absence of defeating evidence against what at face value looks correct, we are justified to consider intentionality as a relational notion.

Cerebrospinal Fluid Cavitation as a Mechanism of Blast-Induced Traumatic Brain Injury: A Review of Current Debates, Methods, and Findings.

Cavitation has gained popularity in recent years as a potential mechanism of blast-induced traumatic brain injury (bTBI). This review presents the most prominent debates on cavitation; how bubbles can form or exist within the cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) and brain vasculature, potential mechanisms of cellular, and tissue level damage following the collapse of bubbles in response to local pressure fluctuations, and a survey of experimental and computational models used to address cavitation research questions. Due to the broad and varied nature of cavitation research, this review attempts to provide a necessary synthesis of cavitation findings relevant to bTBI, and identifies key areas where additional work is required. Fundamental questions about the viability and likelihood of CSF cavitation during blast remain, despite a variety of research regarding potential injury pathways. Much of the existing literature on bTBI evaluates cavitation based off its prima facie plausibility, while more rigorous evaluation of its likelihood becomes increasingly necessary. This review assesses the validity of some of the common assumptions in cavitation research, as well as highlighting outstanding questions that are essential in future work.

Philosophie in der Welt und für die Welt – Realitätsbezüge einer Disziplin zweiter Ordnung

According to a widely accepted conception, philosophy is essentially a second-order discipline raising second-order questions about the procedures and products of first-order reasonings (concepts; principles; theories etc.). While this conception has considerable prima facie plausibility and, carefully put, contains a grain of truth, it also invites serious misunderstandings that may be detrimental to an adequate understanding and public image of philosophy. To work out the grain of truth while avoiding the misunderstandings, I begin by asking: What is philosophical understanding? In answering this question, understanding in philosophy is compared and contrasted with everyday understanding, on the one hand, and scientific understanding, on the other hand. While philosophy itself is a scientific practice in a wide sense, in contrast to normal understanding within a special scientific discipline (physics; chemistry; biology; psychology; etc.) philosophical understanding is characterized by a particular critical attitude and particular principles of rational acceptability.

Uneven and combined development: convergence realism in communist regalia?

Leon Trotsky’s notion of ‘uneven and combined development’ (UCD) has been gaining traction as an explanatory theory of international relations over the past decade, notably in work by Justin Rosenberg and Alexander Anievas. The idea that the uneven sequencing of economic development between countries affects both their relative power relationships and domestic political stability, in particular, carries prima-facie intuitive plausibility. The potential consequences for international stability of such relative power shifts and domestic upheavals suggest, furthermore, that there may be significant explanatory payoffs from this line of investigation. At the same time, however, the UCD intuition raises other questions about causal foundations and theoretical affiliations. What accounts for the sequencing of uneven development, for example? And how exactly do both relative power shifts and domestic political instability elevate war risks? This paper will address these lacunae, by demonstrating that – at the level of its underlying micro-foundations – UCD can be understood as a compound of catch-up convergence growth theory and security-dilemma realism. Such a recognition paves the way, in turn, for a fruitful application of UCD to contemporary questions in international politics.

Provisional Measures and the Link Requirement

Abstract In the context of requests for provisional measures, the link requirement has not attracted much scholarly attention and might be regarded as raising limited controversy. However, this article argues that the link is an unnecessary requirement for granting provisional measures by the International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. First, the function which the link purports to fulfil is already fulfilled by other requirements (i.e., prima facie jurisdiction, plausibility and real and imminent risk of irreparable prejudice). Second, if the link is understood as requiring provisional measures to be tailored to the rights of which protection is sought, the ICJ and ITLOS have the power to indicate measures different from those requested. One may suggest that the link therefore emerges as an unnecessary requirement which overburdens provisional measures proceedings.

A Critique of Thaddeus Metz's Modal Relational Account of Moral Status

This article is a critique of Thaddeus Metz’s modal relational approach to moral status in African ethics (AE). According to moral relationalism (MR), a being has moral status if it exhibits the capacity for communal relationship as either a subject or an object. While Metz defends a prima facie plausibility of MR as an African account of moral status, this article provides a fresh perspective to the debate on moral status in environmental and ethical discourse. It raises two objections against MR: (1) the capability criterion inherent in MR is not only exogenous to African thought but also undermines the viability of MR; and (2) MR cannot account for the standing of species populations. Both objections have severe implications for biodiversity conservation efforts in Africa and beyond.

What’s wrong with ‘deliverology’? Performance measurement, accountability and quality improvement in English secondary education

ABSTRACT Informed by the ideology of ‘deliverology’, performance measurement has become a core component of how English schools are held accountable for the quality of their provision. A wealth of research conducted in diverse national contexts where this approach has been influential has suggested that the unintended harms it generates – including a widening of inequalities, a test-driven pedagogic culture and a narrowing of the curriculum – may be outweighing its benefits. In an attempt to circumnavigate such perverse effects, the performance measures used in England have become increasingly sophisticated in recent years, giving them a prima facie plausibility that has led to them being welcomed by some progressive educators as a means of increasing access to high-status knowledge for disadvantaged students. This paper uses data from a survey of English school teachers to interrogate this plausibility. The analysis suggests that when we drill down into the daily life of schools and its underlying logic it becomes increasingly difficult to be comfortable with the progressive defence of the performance measures currently in use; and that, far from improving educational quality, the measures themselves, and the wider deliverology framework with which they are associated, are in certain fundamental respects incompatible with quality improvement.

Rigid/non-rigid grounding and transitivity

ABSTRACTWhile extant replies to Jonathan Schaffer’s putative counterexamples to the transitivity of grounding have made significant strides against the charge of transitivity failure, the replies pay insufficient attention to the common structure of the counterexamples, overlooking a deeper structural feature that contributes to their prima facie plausibility. Putative counterexamples to the transitivity of grounding, I argue, trade on the distinction between what I call ‘rigid’ and ‘non-rigid’ grounding, and confusion over how rigid and non-rigid grounding react when combined pumps the intuition that the counterexamples’ chained conclusions are false. The rigid/non-rigid grounding distinction also reveals plausible weakening inference rules that have been overlooked in treatments of the logic of grounding.

Dretske on Self-Knowledge and Contrastive Focus: How to Understand Dretske’s Theory, and Why It Matters

Dretske’s theory of self-knowledge is interesting but peculiar and can seem implausible. He denies that we can know by introspection that we have thoughts, feelings, and experiences. But he allows that we can know by introspection what we think, feel, and experience. We consider two puzzles. The first puzzle, PUZZLE 1, is interpretive. Is there a way of understanding Dretske’s theory on which the (potential) knowledge affirmed by its positive side is different than the (potential) knowledge denied by its negative side? The second puzzle, PUZZLE 2, is substantive. Each of the following theses has some prima facie plausibility: (a) there is introspective knowledge of thoughts, (b) knowledge requires evidence, and (c) there are no experiences of thoughts. It is unclear, though, that these claims form a consistent set. These puzzles are not unrelated. Dretske’s theory of self-knowledge is a potential solution to PUZZLE 2 in that Dretske’s theory is meant to show how (a), (b), and (c) can all be true. We provide a solution to PUZZLE 1 by appeal to Dretske’s early work in the philosophy of language on contrastive focus. We then distinguish between “Closure” and “Transmissibility”, and raise and answer a worry to the effect that Dretske’s theory of self-knowledge runs counter to Transmissibility. These results help to secure Dretske’s theory as a viable solution to PUZZLE 2.

Today in Paradise?: Ambiguous Adverb Attachment and the Meaning of Luke 23:43

Nearly all modern scholars interpret σήμερον in Luke 23:43 as modifying ἔσ. ("today you will be with me in paradise"). The alternative, that σήμερον modifies λέγω ("Truly I say to you today"), is usually dismissed, if mentioned at all. This study argues that the latter reading has prima facie plausibility, since it can be understood—in line with a widely accepted eschatologisation of "today" in Luke (cf. 4:21; 19:9)—as emphasising the immediacy of Jesus' response in contrast to the temporal vagueness of the penitent thief's request ("Remember me when …"). A thorough investigation of this issue is undertaken, using both a survey of patristic evidence and a methodologically innovative statistical analysis of syntactic patterns in Luke-Acts. The evidence indicates that the conventional paradise-today reading is more likely, albeit not certain; translations and commentaries should at least alert readers to the alternative. The meaning of σήμερον under the paradise-today reading is briefly discussed, arguing that despite a probable eschatological connotation, the literal chronological sense should be retained. Accordingly, the saying is best understood as a pronouncement of clemency with immediate results: the penitent thief is to enter paradise with Jesus that very day.