Knowability paradox, decidability solution?

Abstract

AbstractFitch's knowability paradox shows that for each unknown truth there is also an unknowable truth, a result which has been thought both odd in itself and at odds with views which impose epistemic constraints on truth and/or meaningfulness. Here a solution is considered which has received little attention in the debate but which carries prima facie plausibility. The decidability solution is to accept that Fitch sentences are unknowably true but deny the significance of this on the grounds that Fitch sentences are nevertheless decidable. The decidability solution is particularly attractive for those whose primary concern is an epistemic constraint on meaningfulness (‘verificationists’). For those whose main concern is truth (‘anti‐realists’), the situation is more complex: Melia takes the solution to exonerate anti‐realism completely; Williamson sees it as completely irrelevant. The truth lies between these two extremes: there is one broad anti‐realist commitment to which the solution does not apply, but there is also one, the “fundamental tenet” of anti‐realism according to Dummett, to which it does.