Price Game Model Research Articles

On Short-term and Long-term Repeated Game Behavior- A Case Study of Oligopolistic Transportation Enterprises with Government Intervention under Fuzzy Environment

ABSTRACT The transportation sector has always been dedicated to energy conservation and emission reduction. In an effort to optimize the transportation structure and promote the energy conservation and emission reduction of the transportation sector, the government has implemented numerous intervention policies. This paper aims to explore how the implementation objects of the intervention strategy interact with one another. Based on the price game model, the fuzzy triangular variables are used to construct the duopoly game competition model under the different situations of subsidy, carbon quota, and carbon tax. According to the results, (1) Subsidy policy will lead to excessive dependence, although it can improve the price competitive advantage of railway transport most significantly. (2) Under the carbon quota policy, transportation companies maximize predicted profits and social benefit. In the long-term repeated game, railway transport has more space to adjust price than road transport. (3) Under government intervention policies, increasing the substitution rate of transport products can improve social benefits.

Research on dynamic pricing and coordination model of fresh produce supply chain based on differential game considering traceability goodwill

This study aims to solve the current pricing and coordination problems in the fresh produce supply chain by proposing a dynamic pricing and coordination differential game model based on traceability goodwill to optimize the operational efficiency and profitability of the supply chain. Freshness and traceability are critical consumer trust and brand value factors incorporated into the dynamic pricing and coordination model in the agricultural supply chain. The research methodology of this paper integrates critical factors such as supply chain cost and market demand to construct a comprehensive differential game model. It also highlights the motivation of dynamic pricing strategy and coordination mechanism based on traceability goodwill. Through traceability goodwill, operating companies can better assess and manage product quality and improve consumer trust in agricultural products, thus enhancing brand value. The dynamic pricing strategy based on traceability goodwill can flexibly adjust prices according to changes in the quality characteristics of agricultural products and market demand, realizing a dynamic balance between supply and demand. On the other hand, the mutual cost-sharing and coordination mechanism promotes the synergy between the various links of the supply chain. It improves overall efficiency through cooperation coo, coordination, and other means. The validity and reliability of the model are verified through numerical simulation experiments. The numerical simulation results show that the dynamic pricing and coordination model based on traceability will significantly improve supply chain efficiency and profitability compared with the traditional model. Specifically, the interests of supply chain participants are balanced, and the overall supply chain operational efficiency is improved. The main contribution of this study is to propose a dynamic pricing and coordination model based on traceability goodwill and verify its superiority through numerical simulation experiments. This study provides a valuable reference for fresh agricultural products supply chain management and offers new ideas for improving supply chain efficiency and profitability.

Complexity analysis of technology spillover supply chain with dual business objectives

ABSTRACT Based on the existence of technology spillover effect of manufacturers, considering the manufacturer's commercial goals of profit and market share, a dynamic price game model of technology spillover supply chain with dual commercial goals is established. Based on game theory and nonlinear dynamics theory, the equilibrium point and local stability of the system are analyzed. In addition, the effects of price adjustment rate, balance coefficient of business objectives, and technology spillover on model complexity, the change of manufacturer price and profit were analyzed through numerical simulation. The results show that the price adjustment rate, the balance coefficient of business objectives, and the technology spillover have an impact on the stability and complexity of the manufacturer's price competition model. Rationally controlling the price adjustment rate, and enhancing technological spillovers are beneficial to the healthy development of manufacturers and the healthy competition among manufacturers, maintaining the stability of product market prices, and effectively avoiding market chaos. Moreover, when considering market share, manufacturers can expand the system stability domain.

Dynamic pricing strategy for content products considering consumer fairness concerns and strategic behavior

PurposeThe development of the digital age has made data and information more transparent, enhancing the strategic perspectives of both buyers (strategic waiting) and sellers (price fluctuations) in their decision-making. This research investigates the optimal dynamic pricing strategy of the content product developer in relation to their consideration of consumer fairness concerns to elucidate the impact of consumer fairness concerns on the dynamic pricing strategy of the developer.Design/methodology/approachThis paper assumes that monopolistic content developers implement a dynamic pricing strategy for the content product. Through constructing a two-period dynamic pricing game model, this research investigates the optimal decisions of the content developer, contingent upon their consideration or disregard of consumer fairness concerns. In the extension section, the authors additionally account for the influence of myopic consumers on these optimal decisions.FindingsOur findings reveal that the degree of consumer fairness concerns significantly influences the developer’s optimal dynamic pricing decision. When a developer offers content products with lower depth, there is a propensity for the developer to refrain from incorporating consumer fairness concerns into a dynamic pricing strategy. Conversely, in cases where the developer offers a high-depth content product, consumer fairness concerns benefit the developer. Furthermore, our analysis reveals a consistent benefit for the developer from the inclusion of myopic consumers.Originality/valueFew studies have delved into the conjoined influence of consumer fairness concerns and strategic behavior on dynamic pricing strategy. Our findings indicate that consumer fairness concerns can enhance the efficiency of the value chain for content products under specific conditions. This paper not only enriches the existing literature on dynamic pricing by incorporating consumer fairness concerns theoretically but also offers practical insights. The outcomes of this research can guide content product developers in devising optimal dynamic pricing strategies.

Pricing decision for recycling and remanufacturing supply chain considering consumer online consumption preferences and recycled products’ quality

With the organic integration of the Internet and remanufacturing industry, traditional manufacturers can recycle used products and sell products (including new and remanufactured products) through e-commerce retail platforms. A recycling and remanufacturing supply chain with three members (manufacturer, e-commerce retail platform, third-party recycler) is constructed in this paper. Manufacturer has remanufacturing capabilities, and the e-commerce retail platform can provide logistics service. In response to the organic integration of the Internet and remanufacturing industry, we mainly consider the pricing decisions of consumer preferences for online sales models and recycled products’ quality. Based on the impact of consumer used product recycling promotion activities on supply chain, a pricing game model was constructed for three recycling channels: manufacturer, e-commerce retail platform, and third-party recycler. Optimal pricing decision, logistics service level, used product recycling promotion intensity index, and recycling rate were obtained. Research has shown that consumer preferences can significantly improve supply chain logistics service level, pricing, market demand, and profits; Strengthening consumer awareness of remanufacturing used products and improving recycled products’ quality can not only lower consumer purchase prices and expand consumer demand, but also increase profits of supply chain members.

Pricing competition in maritime transportation with blockchain technology and empty container repositioning

A duopoly maritime transportation system with two ocean carriers providing cargo transport services between two sea ports is investigated in this paper. Pricing game models are developed to describe the competitive relationship between the two ocean carriers with/without blockchain adoption. Empty container repositioning is characterized in the models. Through model analysis, the pricing equilibria are derived. Using theoretical analysis and numerical studies, we find that (1) only when the fixed cost of blockchain is low do carriers adopt blockchain technology; (2) regardless of whether or not the competitor adopts blockchain technology, the carrier is better off by adopting it; (3) when both participants choose to adopt blockchain technology, the impact of blockchain on actual demand is not always positive unless the original operational costs are relatively high; and (4) sometimes, empty containers caused by demand imbalance in the two transportation directions are helpful in increasing the carrier’s profit.

Study on multi-type flexible load control method of active distribution network based on dynamic time-sharing electricity price

Accurate load control is the basis of safe operation and optimal dispatching in active distribution network, and the demand response system of flexible electricity price mechanism and incentive mechanism is the premise of load control. Aiming at the complexity increase of load control caused by the integration of conventional loads, electric vehicles, and micro-grid multi-type user loads in the existing active distribution network, this study comprehensively takes the power consumption willingness of multiple typesof users in active distribution network into account for the first time. This study dominated by the user willingness selects a typical active distribution network load-related data onto a certain area to conduct a calculation example analysis. Firstly, a multi-type user load demand response model of active distribution network is constructed. Then, in order to achieve flexible control of active distribution network loads, a dynamic time-of-use electricity price game model considering the target function and the willingness of multiple usersis proposed, in order to achieve the maximum of user satisfaction and interests of power supply enterprises. Furthermore, the example results are compared with the intrinsic electricity price.Finally, the simulation results show that the time-of-use price established by the multi-type user load game is effective inguiding users to adjust their power consumption habits, making the load curve shift, controlling the electricity load within the maximum power supply limit, and thus alleviating the pressure of power grid expansion.

Game-theoretic analysis of the impact of crew overnight hotel cost on airlines’ fleet assignment and crew pairing

Crew costs account for a high proportion of the total operational costs of an airline. The cost of overnight stay for the crew at a hotel is an important additional cost. To address this problem, this study establishes an integrated model to depict the interaction between the fleet assignment problem and the crew pairing problem. Because this cost is largely determined by the price agreed by the agreement hotel group, we further present a Stackelberg price game model to capture the interdependence between the integrated fleet assignment and crew pairing of airlines and the price game among hotel groups that provide accommodation services for airlines. We combine the idle time re-allocation with a spatio-temporal graph convolutional network to ensure the robustness of crew pairing. The solvability of the model is improved using the Reformulation-Linearization Technique. To obtain the overall Nash equilibrium of the Stackelberg price game model, we design a heuristic algorithm based on a decomposition algorithm and a proximity search algorithm. A case study is made to demonstrate that our robust model is cost-saving for the airline.

Pricing Game Models of Hybrid Channel Supply Chain: A Strategic Consumer Behavior Perspective

The current sales model combining online and offline channels meets the diverse requirements of consumers. However, consumers’ inter-channel switching behavior and strategic behavior also pose significant challenges to pricing decisions in the hybrid channel. Using game theory and consumer utility theory, a retailer-driven pricing model is developed to study the optimal pricing problem for each channel in a mixed-channel supply chain considering the characteristics of channel competition and the waiting behavior of strategic consumers. Study results show there is a negative correlation between the proportion of strategic consumers and the optimal pricing and profit of each channel, and as the proportion of strategic consumers rises, the optimal pricing and profit of manufacturers and retailers all trend downward. Incorporating strategic consumers into the pricing model will assist the supply chain in elucidating the behavior of consumer heterogeneity during various decision-making periods and in making reasonable pricing decisions. Effective guiding strategies, such as pre-discount and purchase restrictions, can reduce the profit loss caused by strategic consumer behavior. The optimal combination of pre-announcement discount and strategic consumer ratio can generate the greatest profit for retailers and the supply chain.

Strategies of property developers in the context of carbon tax.

China needs to guide property developers in actively reducing emissions to reach carbon emission reduction targets and respond to global climate change. A carbon tax is an important policy tool. Still, to establish successful rules to steer property developers' reasonable carbon emission reduction behavior, we must first explore property developers' decision-making mechanisms. This study develops an emission reduction and price game model for property developers under the constraint of a carbon tax. It then applies reverse order induction and optimization methods to identify the game equilibrium solution for property developers. Using the game equilibria, we explore the carbon tax mechanism on emission reduction and property developer pricing strategies. We can derive the following conclusions if the carbon tax policy is not implemented: 1.House prices are related to the substitutability of the two types of competitive property developers. 2.The greater the substitutability, the greater the cost of emission reduction paid by consumers. 3.The game equilibrium carbon emission intensity is the average carbon emission intensity of the housing business. In the situation of enacting a carbon tax, we arrive at the following conclusions: 1.The profits of real estate developers who do not have the advantage of emission reduction continue to decline with the increase of carbon tax. 2. For real estate developers who have the advantage of decreasing emissions, profits declined initially and then increased as the carbon tax rate increased, and only when the carbon tax rate reaches Tm1* can they fully leverage the cost advantage and obtain ever-increasing profits. 3.Low tax rates should be adopted by the government at the start of the implementation of the carbon tax policy to provide a buffer time for real estate developers who do not have the advantage of emission reduction costs.

Inbound container storage pricing considering price-dependent container storage time and congestion in container terminals

ABSTRACT Congestion at ports and railheads is attracting more and more attention from both the government and industry. In this paper, we intend to improve container terminal operation efficiency from the perspective of inbound container storage pricing. We study a two-stage pricing game model for a profit-maximising shipping company and a container terminal operator. Two types of objective functions are investigated for the container terminal operator: profit maximisation and cost minimisation. Price-dependent container storage time is considered. After theoretical analysis, the pricing equilibria is derived. Through numerical studies, we find that the cost-minimising objective is recommended for the terminal operator to relieve the stress of yard congestion. Container terminal operators have an incentive to raise storage prices to cope with congestion in terminal yards.

Pricing game between repair-and-support ships and shipyards under multiple repair tasks on a remote ocean

Novel repair-and-support ships can conduct spot systemic maintenance and repair (MR) working for damaged offshore platforms on a remote ocean. This causes competition against shipyards when repair-and-support ships enter the MR market of offshore platforms. Therefore, to wisely decide the optimal strategy for repair-and-support ships, competition analysis is conducted between the repair-and-support ship and shipyard when providing MR services for damaged offshore platforms on a remote ocean from the three aspects of space, time and cost. A pricing game model of the repair-and-support ship and shipyard under multiple repair tasks on a remote ocean is formulated, considering the choice preference of repair decision-makers and the characteristics of the repair-and-support ship as a compound player. Aiming at the particularities of this model, a solution method based on an iterative algorithm is designed to address the pricing game model. It is proven that the designed solution method has advantages in global optimality and CPU running time by comparing it with an enumeration method. In the numerical part, we obtain the optimal pricing strategy and management insights into the technical gaps and damage degree of offshore platforms. The results can provide theoretical and decision support for the pricing strategy of repair-and-support ships entering the MR market of offshore platforms.

Multi-Oligopoly Sequential Pricing Mechanisms and Their Game Analysis in Raw Material Supply Chains

The sequential pricing game model is an approach that can be effectively used to solve the problem with multi-oligopoly pricing mechanisms in raw material supply chains. However, the existing sequential pricing mechanism does not fully consider constraints such as the purchase volume of downstream firms and the change information of each parameter, which leads to the pricing mechanism being detached from the real market. According to the concept of the sequential pricing game model being used among multi-oligopolies under constraints, we constructed the constrained sequential pricing game model by incorporating the parameters related to the product demand function, marginal production cost, dominant coefficient, following coefficient, and agreed minimum purchase volume as constraints, and the model was converted into a nonlinear bilevel programming model to facilitate model solving. Furthermore, we provided the analytical solution formulas for six special cases, thus making the model more similar to the real market. In addition, the effects of the agreed minimum purchase volume and the dominant and following coefficients on the equilibrium quoted prices and profits of the firms were analyzed. The results of the numerical simulation show that the constrained sequential pricing game model is more effective than the unconstrained sequential pricing game model in solving the problem with the multi-oligopoly pricing mechanism, which means that it can be used to establish a better pricing mechanism and provide a more reasonable and scientific basis for market operation and policymakers in solving practical problems.

Integrated pricing mechanism of China Railway Express whole-process logistics based on the Stackelberg game

China-Railway Express(CRE), an important product to promote the “Belt and Road”, has a far-reaching significance for the economic and trade cooperation of countries along the route. However, in the early stage, it relies on subsidies to attract supplies, resulting in higher freight rates in some sections. Also, there are many transportation participants and complex transaction entities, resulting in an improved trade cost. These issues have affected the strategic CRE pricing decisions. Integrated decision-making is important to reduce transaction costs, and improve decision-making efficiency. This thesis adopts game theory to research the whole-process integrated pricing mechanism of CRE with multi-agent interaction. Considering transaction costs and pricing dominance, a distributed, horizontal, and vertical integration Stackelberg pricing game model for CRE is established and it compares the Nash equilibrium solutions of 9 pricing models. By discussing the form of the equilibrium solution, it is concluded that the larger the number of participants in the alliance and the longer the coverage mileage, the higher profit the alliance will be obtained. At the same time, numerical experiments and sensitivity analysis of key parameters are carried out by taking the China Railway Express (CY) as an example. Results show that the gross profit of CRE is the lowest under the decentralized decision-making mode, and it is the highest under the vertical integration alliance decision-making mode. If the price cap is abolished, carriers with shorter segment mileage will raise prices, leading to higher costs for CRE, while forcing carriers with longer segment mileage to cut down prices, so overall profits will suffer. This research promotes establishing a more reasonable pricing mechanism for CRE and achieving global Pareto optimality. It helps CRE get rid of subsidy dependence and achieve sustainable development.

Can in-store recommendations for online-substitutive products integrate online and offline channels?

An increasing number of multichannel retailers have adopted an offline-to-online recommendation strategy (OORS) that provides information regarding products sold online to in-store shoppers via recommendation systems employing in-store technologies (e.g., in-store virtual shelves and smart fitting mirrors). We investigate the impact of an OORS on cross-channel integration for retailers mainly selling substitutable products via online and offline channels. Considering omnichannel shoppers (who strategically choose a channel for purchasing) and offline shoppers (who prefer to shop in store), pricing game models with and without an OORS are developed for a decentralized retailer operating offline and online channels as separate businesses. The results show that although an OORS enables the offline channel to cannibalize more omnichannel shoppers from the online channel, interestingly, it alleviates channel conflict, which is reflected in increased prices and shopping traffic in both online and offline channels, because an OORS drives more in-store customers who cannot find matched products to the online store than omnichannel shoppers who shift from online to offline. Thus, an OORS increases online and offline profits and creates a synergic effect for a retailer with a decentralized organization. Compared to multichannel centralization, an OORS can even generate a higher synergic effect, especially when the proportion of offline shoppers in the mixed market is high. Finally, an OORS always improves social welfare, but its impacts on consumer surplus vary. An OORS can be beneficial for customers in a centralized organization but detrimental in a decentralized organization.

Application of Price Competition Model Based on Computational Neural Network in Risk Prediction of Transnational Investment.

Aiming at the scenario where edge devices rely on cloud servers for collaborative computing, this paper proposes an efficient edge-cloud collaborative reasoning method. In order to meet the application's specific requirements for delay or accuracy, an optimal division point selection algorithm is proposed. A kind of multichannel supply chain price game model is constructed, and nonlinear dynamics theory is introduced into the research of the multichannel supply chain market. According to the actual competition situation, the different business strategies of retailers are considered in the modeling, which makes the model closer to the actual competition situation. Taking the retailer's profit as an indicator, the influence of the chaos phenomenon on the market performance is analyzed. Compared with the previous studies, this thesis uses nonlinear theory to better reveal the operating laws of the economic system. This paper selects company A in the financial industry to acquire company B in Sweden. It is concluded that company B is currently facing financial difficulties, but its brand and technical advantages are far superior to company A. The indirect financial risk index of company B, that is, the investment environment, is analyzed, and the final investment environment score of the country where company B is located is 90 points, which is an excellent grade by scoring the investment environment of the target enterprise. Combining the investment environment score and the alarm situation prediction score, it is concluded that the postmerger financial risk warning level of company A is in serious alarm.

Research on the Complexity of Oligopoly Game under Business Interruption Insurance of the Engineering Project

The convenience of business interruption insurance enables the manufacturer to develop direct channels. This dissertation discusses the price decision of duopoly manufacturers by considering the business interruption risk and the price game model of duopoly manufacturers under business interruption insurance, so that the duopoly manufacturers can produce alternative products and finally sell them to consumers. By using game theory and complex dynamics theory, combined with the numerical simulation method, the result shows that when the decision variable adjustment speed of the manufacturer is too fast, the system will fall into a state of chaos and disorder, and the introduction of business interruption insurance will increase the manufacturer’s optimal sales price and profit. It has a certain reference value to the risk management when the manufacturer faces the risk.

Price decisions of freebie promotion with retailer information sharing

This study investigates two-echelon pricing game models in which a manufacturer provides freebies during a promotional period and a retailer considers whether to share private demand information with the manufacturer. In particular, the manufacturer produces products (e.g., high-end cosmetics) and sells them wholesale to the retailer during the regular selling period. During the promotional period, the manufacturer offers freebies as a means of gaining more profits. First, we investigate four pricing game models by considering the manufacturer’s and retailer’s different power structures under the condition that the manufacturer provides freebies. Then, numerical examples are used to comparatively analyze the equilibria in the different models. The results offer valuable managerial insights by performing a sensitivity analysis of three parameters, which are the relative length of the promotional period and a sensitivity coefficient and cost coefficient of the freebies.

Study on the strategy of improving the life cycle economic sustainability of wind power heating projects in northern China.

The profitability of electric heating projects in Northern China is poor. A kind of combined market-oriented trading strategy to improve the economy of electric heating projects is put forward. The price game model for direct power purchase, compensation model for carbon emission reduction benefits and load aggregation revenue model are constructed, and the optimal proportion of clean energy and conventional energy consumed under the condition of ensuring heating reliability is analyzed. An electric heating project was analyzed as an example, the results showed that in the direct power purchase transaction, the power price is 0.2125 RMB/kWh, which is 0.0591 RMB/kWh lower than the catalogue tariff. Revenue from carbon trading and auxiliary service transaction is 469,913.87 RMB and 289,218.09 RMB, respectively, which is equivalent to reducing electricity cost of 0.0253 RMB/kWh and 0.0156 RMB/kWh, respectively. The ultimate power cost is 0.1716RMB/kWh, which is 0.1 RMB/kWh lower than the current catalogue tariff. Besides, the more clean energy an electric heating project consumes, the better its economy will be, and in this example, the best proportion of clean energy and conventional energy is 80% and 20%. The research results could help to promote the sustainable development of clean heating in northern China.

Complexity of Reverse Supply Chain Pricing Game Model Based on Recycler Heterogeneity Behavior

Recycling and remanufacturing is one kind of production and operation mode in which enterprises maintain harmony and compatibility with the environment. This paper constructs a competition model for the recycling of reverse supply chain considering the behavioral factors of recyclers. In accordance with the definition of the fixed point, we calculate the four equilibrium points of the system and also analyze the local and global stability of the system. Different from former researches, this paper emphasizes on the study of the impact on the long-term operation and profit of the system by those behavioral factors. The study shows that: those behavioral factors of the enterprise, like price adjustment speed, the fairness concern coefficient, and the trade-off coefficient of market share, have significant effects on the size of the stability region. Through some simulation methods like the system’s price bifurcation diagram, maximum Lyapunov exponent, price power spectrum and so on, the characteristics of the system with its chaotic dynamics will be illustrated in this paper. The paper also focuses on the study of the impacts on the system’s profits by heterogeneous behavioral factors. It is furthermore found that once some drastic pricing strategies are being adopted, both the profits of any party and the operating efficiency of the entire system will be damaged.