Prevention Of War Research Articles

The Normative Implications of “Knowing the Future” for Preventive War

ABSTRACTWhat if claims about the future informed us about the intentions and the capabilities of our opponents to wage war against ourselves? Would and should the existing norms that restrict the preventive use of force change in the wake of such transformation? This article highlights the potential normative consequences of this change and discriminates between several possible normative evolutions. Would and should the “knowability of the future” alter radically the traditional rule of self-defense? This rule could indeed be jeopardized but, as I argue in this paper, it should not (and might not necessarily). However, the distinction between preemption and prevention could become obsolete. Future claims about security will also induce new security doctrines as knowledge about the future would be used to signal one’s intentions and deter one’s opponent. This change would also have a significant impact on accountability, as citizens would have a more active role in discussions over foreign policy. Moreover, new modes of predictions and forecasting will challenge the traditional role of experts whose biases have hampered their analyses and anticipations. Thus, trustworthy future claims could bring significant progress in both ethical and political terms as they would trigger a debate on the role of knowledge in democratic societies.

The Law and Politics of a Norm Violation: Punitivity and the Sinovietnamese War of 1979

In the law and politics of jus ad bellum , three typical types of justifications for war have existed in the historical record, namely self-defence, preventative war, and punitive war. Since 1945, only self-defence in line with article 51 of the UN charter and UNSC authorized operations are legitimate according to the UN charter. However, as we have seen particularly since the end of the Cold War, punitivity has become an integral part of the justification to go to war with examples such as the 1 st or 2 nd Gulf War or the Libyan Civil War. This paper will seek to illuminate the importance of understanding the norm violation of punitivity in jus ad bellum since 1945 following a prohibition on the use of force. The Sino-Vietnamese war will serve as an example of one of the most overtly punitive wars from 1945-1991 which was met with little blowback from the international community, thus begging the question: how strong is the norm against punitivity in the law and politics of jus ad bellum, and what structural foci enable the continued integration of punitivity in war?

Understanding the Bush Doctrine: Preventive Wars and Regime Change

Understanding the Bush Doctrine: Preventive Wars and Regime Change

A Dynamic Theory of Nuclear Proliferation and Preventive War

AbstractWe develop a formal model of bargaining between two states where one can invest in a program to develop nuclear weapons and the other imperfectly observes its efforts and progress over time. In the absence of a nonproliferation deal, the observing state watches the former's program, waiting until proliferation seems imminent to attack. Chance elements—when the program will make progress and when the other state will discover this—determine outcomes. Surprise proliferation, crises over the suspected progress of a nuclear program, and possibly “mistaken” preventive wars arise endogenously from these chance elements. Consistent with the model's predictions and contrary to previous studies, the empirical evidence shows that the progress of a nuclear program and intelligence estimates of it explain the character and outcomes of most interactions between a proliferant and a potential preventive attacker. Counterintuitively, policies intended to reduce proliferation by delaying nuclear programs or improving monitoring capabilities may instead encourage it.

Превентивная война

Превентивная война

Sanctions and Preventive War

In this article, we demonstrate that through their use as tools of military containment, sanctions play an unappreciated role in international politics. We show that sanctions can be used to smooth shifts in relative power that would otherwise lead to preventive war. After presenting a model of shifting relative power and sanctions, we discuss two cases in which sanctions were imposed to destroy an adversary’s military capability. We also explore the implications of this argument for the evaluation of sanctions’ effectiveness. Because sanctions may be deployed as a mechanism to lock in the status quo rather than revise it, the outcome of a sanctions episode must be compared to its counterfactual rather than the status quo ante. Our argument suggests that sanctions may be effectively deployed in response to expected adverse shifts in relative power; therefore observed outcomes disadvantageous to the sanctioning state are insufficient proof that sanctions have failed.

Self-deterrence: Nuclear weapons and the enduring credibility challenge

In this article I argue that it is much harder to deter and compel non-nuclear states and terrorist groups through the threat of use of nuclear weapons than proponents of nuclear use contend. A counter-proliferation strategy relying on nuclear threat and preventive war has serious limitations and may well be a source of nuclear proliferation rather than non-proliferation. While the fear of a retaliatory attack constrains a nuclear state from using its nuclear weapons against another nuclear state, a nuclear state may not be able to mount and execute a nuclear retaliatory strike against a non-nuclear state or a non-state actor for reasons beyond military calculations. The nuclear state could be restrained by self-imposed reputational concerns arising from moral, legal, and other normative considerations. This form of restraint can be aptly termed “self-deterrence.” This article first elaborates the concept of self-deterrence and then explores the core reasons for its prevalence. There may be multiple reasons for self-deterrence, including domestic politics, bureaucratic politics, and leaders’ psychology, especially in terms of risk aversion. However, in light of the historical record—especially instances from US nuclear history—reputational considerations appear to be crucial in explaining self-deterrence. These reputational considerations derive largely from three sources: the tradition of non-use of nuclear weapons, moral restraints, and legal principles regarding the use of nuclear weapons. I conclude by arguing that deterrence theory and policy need to take into account this aspect of self-deterrence along with cultural, psychological, and domestic-level constraints that have been presented as challenges to that theory’s premises and applicability.

Сказка – ложь, да в ней намек (от мифологических архетипов к политическому сознанию)

The article focuses on the Russian epos as well as Russian fairy tales: the images that are frequently there tend to be projected on the contemporary political discourse. The author assumes that the analysis of the folklore stories might allow defining the archetypes, which in a certain manner affect the contemporary political thought in Russia. The author demonstrates the way in which the national cultural archetypes relate to the common cultural ones (Greek myths), on the one hand, and, on the other hand, contain their specific national modification. Thus, the Hero Archetype in Russian epos appears to be nationally marked (its Russianness is particularly stressed) as well as the image of an enemy, filling in the Shadow Archetype. Russian ‘bogatyr’ is traditionally on a state service and remains faithful to his grand duke, notwithstanding the injustice of the latter. The characters of fairy tales wage “preventive wars” in which they become the winners. The contemporary Russian political discourse inherits, to a certain extent, the value as well as the worldview aspects of the Russian epos.

Terrorism, Dynamic Commitment Problems, and Military Conflict

AbstractSince 9/11, several states have initiated military conflicts in the name of fighting terrorism. However, studies indicate that the costs of terrorism are insignificant compared to the damage created by war. This raises the question: Why do states initiate costly wars when the risk posed by terrorism appears marginal? This study presents two explanations. First, we argue that while terrorists frequently fail to achieve their strategic objectives, terrorists can accomplish tactical objectives and may transition to insurgencies by seizing control of pockets of territory. States may respond by initiating preventive wars to stop terrorists from consolidating control over their strategically valuable territories (e.g., resource‐rich areas). Second, rival states may opportunistically exploit terrorist violence by declaring that the government is a “weak state.” This allows rivals to seize portions of the government's territory under the cover of fighting terror. We test these hypotheses using post–Cold War African dyads from 1990 to 2006.

Arms Negotiation, War Exhaustion, and the Credibility of Preventive War

Why do some states agree to suspend their weapons programs in exchange for compensation while others fail to come to terms? I argue that the changing credibility of preventive war is an important determinant of arms construction. If preventive war is never an option, states can reach mutually preferable settlements. However, if preventive war is not credible today but will be credible in the future, a commitment problem results: the state considering investment faces a “window of opportunity” and must build the arms or it will not receive concessions later on. Thus, agreements fail under these conditions. I then apply the theoretical findings to the Soviet Union’s decision to build nuclear weapons in 1949. War exhaustion made preventive war not credible for the United States immediately following World War II, but lingering concerns about future preventive action induced Moscow to proliferate.

Preventive War as a Result of Long-Term Shifts in Power

This paper analyzes a complete information model of preventive war where shifts in the distribution of power play out over an arbitrary number of time periods. This analysis leads to a sufficient condition that implies war under a broader set of conditions than previously shown in the literature. This sufficient condition leads to two substantive implications: (1) preventive war can be caused by relatively slow, but persistent shifts in the distribution of power; and (2) a power shift that causes war may do so only after some delay. These insights serve to connect the long-term shifts emphasized in Power Transition Theory with the commitment problem explanation for preventive war analyzed in bargaining models of war.

THIS MEANS (BANK) WAR! CORRUPTION AND CREDIBLE COMMITMENTS IN THE COLLAPSE OF THE SECOND BANK OF THE UNITED STATES

The demise of the US central bank in the 1830s “Bank War” remains one of the most significant shifts in the history of American political and economic development. Traditional accounts frame the bank as the casualty of the inevitable clash of hard-money and soft-money interests and ideologies. This paper re-examines this shift through the lens of modern international relations theory. It argues that this “war,” like so many interstate wars, could have been—and very nearly was—averted. In the months prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the bank’s president (Nicholas Biddle) and the US president (Andrew Jackson) agreed to a set of reforms that both sides preferred to fighting. Jackson, however, came to believe that no amount of reform could curb the bank’s hegemonic ascent. Facing the logic of preventive war, Jackson issued a decisive veto that initiated a “total war.” His triumph in the 1832 election sealed the bank’s fate. This paper thus offers a novel interpretation of this key historical episode; and it demonstrates the value of using international relations theory to understand intrastate political dynamics.

Nuclear Weapons and Anticipatory Attacks: Implications for Russia and the United States

Anticipatory attacks come in two forms. Preemptive attacks are first strikes based on the assumption that the opponent has already set an attack in motion or is about to, and the purpose of the preemption is to mitigate or neutralize the effect of the enemy’s move. Preventive wars, on the other hand, are undertaken to preclude a threatening power from increasing its capabilities relative to ours, assuming that smaller differences in power will lead the challenger to become more risk acceptant. With respect to nuclear weapons, deterrence is intended to preclude both preemptive and preventive attacks, although the former is judged to be more likely than the latter. Leaders authorizing a nuclear preemption would need to have high confidence about the intentions as well as the capabilities of the other state, and the requirements for fine-grained intelligence would be considerable, prior to any actual launch of delivery systems. Seeing into the other side’s world view, regardless of its apparent rationality or lack thereof, would also be prudent before undertaking a decision of such magnitude.

Moshe Sharett—Right or Wrong?

Moshe Sharett was critical of the sequence of events that led to the 1956 War. “If we are to ‘act crazy’ the world will perceive us as lunatics and treat us accordingly,” he noted in his diary. Sharett was highly sensitive to reactions of the outer world towards Israel’s militaristic behavior. He saw the moral stature of Israel as a first-rate strategic asset. During a Knesset debate following an IDF action that was a clear breach of international law, he coined what became probably his most famous saying: “Is Israel to be a state of law, or of license?” However, while Sharett endeavored towards a de-escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and consequently opposed the mounting of large-scale military operations against Israel’s Arab neighbors, his stronger rivals PM Ben-Gurion and Chief of Staff Dayan favored a strong-hand policy and implemented it, and he ultimately concluded that a preventive war against Nasser’s Egypt was of vital necessity.

المرتكزات الاستراتيجية للسياسة الأمريكية تجاه العراق وإيران من 2009 إلى 2015

The period following the events of September 11, 2001, featured toward Iraq and Iran came in, thanks to preventive war strategy against Iraq and the threat of force against Iran, in order to force them to give up the nuclear program. This is the United States cost a lot of money that was pumped in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in particular, led to the US financial crisis that has been moved to the rest of the world. President Obama promised the need to rebuild the US economy from the inside instead of waiting for the financing of wars and compensation of oil from the Gulf. In this context came the requirements of the adoption of the concept of smart power to rebuild the strategic doctrine of the United States, which resulted in the combat withdrawal from Iraq and the signing of the nuclear deal with Iran.

Shifting Power, Commitment Problems, and Preventive War

Many scholars argue that leaders' expectations about future shifts in the distribution of power can result in preventive war. If a leader expects her adversary to be significantly stronger in the future, the leader may choose to go to war with that adversary rather than bargain with a stronger adversary in the future. However, quantitative evaluations of this argument prove difficult, as they require a measure of leaders' expectations about future shifts in power rather than simply a measure of observed power. In this paper, we develop an empirical model of future power to create this measure. We then use that measure to evaluate the preventive war hypothesis. Our results support the preventive war hypothesis. Increases in a state's expected future probability of winning in war increase its probability of another state in a dyadic relationship initiating war against it.

The Domestic Politics of Strategic Retrenchment, Power Shifts, and Preventive War

We present a formal model of international bargaining between two states in which one government must negotiate with a domestic opposition faction to secure tax revenue for military spending. The model examines how robust the international order is to domestic political crises that activate a stark trade-off to a governing coalition. Namely, offering fiscal relief to stave off domestic revolution can simultaneously undermine the larger international political order by facilitating military spending that can, under some circumstances, result in sizable shifts in the relative distribution of military power between states. We find that two key domestic conditions influence the likelihood of preventive war: the distribution of income within the state's economy and the relative economic stake that opposition groups possess in international settlements.

Deciding on preventive war

In this article I present a critique of the moral permissibility of preventive war. Preventive intervention is a murky issue in the just-war thinking, so just-war doctrine does not provide moral clarity in this debate. By invoking the concept of a just peace, I discuss prevention from a non-interventionist perspective and show how it can be an effective measure for national security and humanitarian policies. I draw on Amartya Sen’s idea of justice to reconstruct a justice-based, non-interventionist platform where, instead of enabling the act of warfare, as is the case if we start from a just-war approach, we are encouraged to devise an option that would make the case for preventive war redundant. I claim that it is high time that we shift our discourse from finding security in resorting to a just war to building security via a just peace.

The Influence of History on Nuclear Weapons Policy

Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age. By Francis J. Gavin. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012. 240 pp., $35.00 hardcover (ISBN-13: 978-0-801-45101-0). This book studies the history of nuclear weapons, especially the strategies for their employment, and the influence of those strategies on international politics. The history is interesting in its own right and bears directly upon contemporary and future policy, because author Francis J. Gavin is a rare sort of historian. Like his mentor, Marc Trachtenberg, Gavin doesn't shy away from challenging the conventional wisdom based on a careful reading of the relevant documents. And his myth-busting has a clear purpose—to improve policy. “Bad history is almost worse than no history” (p. 2). “We cannot begin to assess the merits of critical policies,” Gavin explains, “ranging from the goal of ‘global zero’ to threatened use of preventive war to reverse proliferation, until we have a much better understanding of the historical forces that brought us where we are today” (p. 11). Thus, his work is of interest not only to academic historians and political scientists, but also to contemporary policymakers and scholars in the wider foreign policy community. In clear, readable prose, Gavin, the Director of the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, and the Tom Slick Professor of International Affairs at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, addresses a series of discrete questions, organized more or less chronologically. He challenges the conventional view that John F. Kennedy's approach to nuclear weapons was dramatically different from Dwight D. Eisenhower's. From there, Gavin moves to the Berlin Crisis, which straddled the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, and then to the debate over nuclear nonproliferation in the wake of China's ascension into the nuclear club. Here, Gavin finds important discontinuities between Kennedy's and Lyndon Johnson's approaches to nonproliferation, particularly toward US allies such as West Germany. The book moves on to the …

UN Charter Article 51 and the Right to ‘Anticipatory Self-defense’: Validity of the US Preventive War Doctrine against Al Qaeda

This article investigates whether the US war against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan is a customary ‘inherent right’ under the right to force doctrine as codified in Article 51 of the UN Charter. While its fool-proof nucleus covers national states inter partes relations, the provision's applicability to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is unclear, especially in cases of conflicts, where a NGO is a party in an international conflict, such as the US-Al Qaeda conflict in Afghanistan. Because Article 51's foundation is in ‘a defensive strategy,’ states that deploy military troops across borders under the cover of self-defense must notify the UN Security Council immediately and must justify their actions. The distinction between armed attack and armed defense is the most important element defining the legality of a state's conduct. However, the Article 51 inherent right of self-defense arises solely to protect against ‘armed attacks,’ and under international law, an ‘armed attack’ alone triggers the right of self-defense. This raises the question as to whether a terrorist attack undertaken by a NGO qualifies as an armed attack? What guidance do the UN Security Council resolutions of September 2001 provide to support the US claim of anticipatory self-defense, as they do not invoke the notions of war, armed attack, or military measures, as they refer only to ‘terrorist attack,’ a term that is not a defined and internationally accepted term of war?