Abstract
In the law and politics of jus ad bellum , three typical types of justifications for war have existed in the historical record, namely self-defence, preventative war, and punitive war. Since 1945, only self-defence in line with article 51 of the UN charter and UNSC authorized operations are legitimate according to the UN charter. However, as we have seen particularly since the end of the Cold War, punitivity has become an integral part of the justification to go to war with examples such as the 1 st or 2 nd Gulf War or the Libyan Civil War. This paper will seek to illuminate the importance of understanding the norm violation of punitivity in jus ad bellum since 1945 following a prohibition on the use of force. The Sino-Vietnamese war will serve as an example of one of the most overtly punitive wars from 1945-1991 which was met with little blowback from the international community, thus begging the question: how strong is the norm against punitivity in the law and politics of jus ad bellum, and what structural foci enable the continued integration of punitivity in war?
Highlights
In contemporary warfare following the institutionalisation of the prohibition on the use of force in 1945,1 justifications of military campaigns by state actors must be thoughtfully legitimized with care taken as to the perceived lawfulness of the campaign by the international community and at the domestic level
The Sino-Vietnamese war will serve as an example of one of the most overtly punitive wars from 1945-1991 which was met with little blowback from the international community, begging the question: how strong is the norm against punitivity in the law and politics of jus ad bellum, and what structural foci enable the continued integration of punitivity in war?
How is punitivity in war different from other wars, and how has it changed since 1945? How have punitive wars been articulated and accepted in practice both domestically and internationally, in keeping with aforementioned systematizations of international peace and security supposedly upheld by the UN charter? These key conceptual questions will be attempted to be answered with particular respect attributed to both international political norms and overarching norms of international humanitarian law (IHL) such as the principles of limitation, proportionality, and necessity.[4]
Summary
In contemporary warfare following the institutionalisation of the prohibition on the use of force in 1945,1 justifications of military campaigns by state actors must be thoughtfully legitimized with care taken as to the perceived lawfulness of the campaign by the international community and at the domestic level. The Sino-Vietnamese War of 19797 will be instrumental in portraying the law and politics of punitive warfare, and it will help illuminate the framework by which some more contemporary punitive wars like the first and second Gulf Wars were justified. The third section will establish that the Chinese incursion of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV but will be hereafter addressed as Vietnam) was a systematic abuse of Chinese hegemonic power, used symbolically to denote superiority and influence This war serves as an example of a punitive war that does not effectively prove to be lawful under the prohibition on the use of force and the principle of self-defence as expressed in the UN Charter, as well as through the established principles of proportionality and necessity in according to established jus ad bellum. This question is as follows: is the degree of acceptable violation of a norm against punitive action in international politics dominated by the normative foundations of the contextual international political climate or by the global collective security structure, namely Chapter VII of the Charter and the UN Security Council? This question will be explored considering the legality, justification by China, and the reception and initial responses of other states and organisations to the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
