Prepayment Penalties Research Articles

Shared appreciation mortgages: Lessons from the UK

The recent rise in shared appreciation mortgage (SAM) availability motivates careful consideration of underlying borrower incentives. The lender’s share of appreciation in SAMs (share) is essentially a dynamic prepayment penalty imposed on the borrower. However, the borrower faces a moral hazard due to his ability to affect the penalty by reducing maintenance. We adapt a competing risks mortgage-pricing model to calculate SAM theoretical equilibrium rates. Our borrower possesses rational expectations of both the house price market and interest rates. Our simulation results may help explain the lack of secondary market interest for the UK SAMs containing extreme contract terms.

Shared Appreciation Mortgages: Lessons from the UK

The recent rise in shared appreciation mortgage (SAM) availability motivates careful consideration of underlying borrower incentives. The lender's share of appreciation in SAMs (share) is essentially a dynamic prepayment penalty imposed on the borrower. However, the borrower faces a moral hazard due to his ability to affect the penalty by reducing maintenance. We adapt a competing risks mortgage-pricing model to calculate SAM theoretical equilibrium rates. Our borrower possesses rational expectations of both the house price market and interest rates. Our simulation results may help explain the lack of secondary market interest for the UK SAMs containing extreme contract terms.

The Impact of Local Predatory Lending Laws

Local authorities in North Carolina, and subsequently in at least 23 other states, have enacted laws intending to reduce predatory and abusive lending. While there is substantial variation in the laws, they typically extend the coverage of the Federal Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) by including home purchase and open-end mortgage credit, by lowering annual percentage rate (APR) and fees and points triggers, and by prohibiting or restricting the use of balloon payments and prepayment penalties. This paper provides a detailed summary of various local predatory lending laws that are effective as of the end of 2004. We also create an index that captures differences in the strength of the local laws along the two important dimensions of coverage and restrictions. In addition, our univariate results show that there is substantial heterogeneity in the observed market responses to the local laws.

Pricing Prepayment Option in C&I Loans at Origination

This paper presents a pricing model of commercial and industrial (C&I) loan prepayment option. Modeling of prepayment is essential in pricing mortgage contracts since prepayment truncates the timing and amount of expected cash flows. Lenders normally charge a penalty for prepayment, for example interest on unused principal. We first propose that prepayment penalties should be viewed as fees in arrears reflecting the value of a call option at origination. We then rationalize business prepayment behavior with both refinancing and non-refinancing incentives. Business borrowers make rational decisions to refinance when interest rates fall or their credit standing improves. Business borrowers also prepay with internal equity to optimize capital structure and reduce debt. Prepayment value in C&I loans reflects the option value depending on the market conditions, borrower's creditworthiness and the need to reduce debt. In the rest of the paper, we propose a contingent claims approach to the pricing C&I loan prepayment contract, given loans being defaultable, and transaction costs and fees being proportional to the loan amount. An implementation example is provided with prepayment option value being determined via a double non-recombining tree. The two underlying state variables are forward credit spread and forward interest rate specified in the HJM framework and their volatilities are exponentially dampened and proportional to the spot rates. We find that prepayment option value concentrates on the first few periods, and locking out these periods would reduce the option value signicantly. We also find that prepayment option value on a variablerate loan is insensitive to the forward interest rate volatility but very sensitive to the forward credit spread volatility.

Massachusetts Predatory Home Loan Practices Act and Other Amendments to Massachusetts Law

In August 2004, Massachusetts enacted the Predatory Home Loan Practices Act, replacing previous regulations applicable to high-cost home mortgages. With poorly defined provisions and indeterminate assignee liability, the Act follows in the footsteps of the ill-conceived anti-predatory lending laws in Georgia and New Jersey, which upended the secondary mortgage markets in those states. Although it is too soon to tell whether the Massachusetts Act will prompt a similar response, the Act will certainly have a major impact on the structured finance industry. The Act significantly expands the list of penalty provisions and alters the scope of several substantive prohibitions contained in previous regulations, including the limitations on lending without regard to repayment ability, financing points and fees, prepayment penalties, modification and deferral fees, and mandatory arbitration clauses. Any person who purchases or is otherwise assigned a Massachusetts high-cost home mortgage loan will be subject to this legislation.

The geography of subprime mortgage prepayment penalty patterns

Concern over abusive lending practices in the subprime mortgage market has grown in recent years. This article examines empirically the geographic variation in the use of prepayment penalties, a potentially abusive feature found in most subprime mortgage loans. While controlling for borrower and loan characteristics at the loan level, we use a comprehensive national database to estimate the effects of geography and minority concentration on the probability that subprime borrowers will receive mortgages with prepayment penalties of various lengths. Logistic regression model estimates indicate that, after controlling for a set of underwriting factors, loan type, and minority concentration, rural borrowers with subprime mortgage loans are generally more likely to receive prepayment penalties than their urban counterparts are. In addition, minority concentration shows a consistent, significantly positive correlation with the probability of receiving prepayment penalties. Our results call into question the use of such penalties in the subprime mortgage market.

Prepayment Modeling and Valuation of Dutch Mortgages

The Dutch mortgage-backed securities (MBS) market is the benchmark euro-denominated MBS market. It is also one of the few European markets where mortgage coupons are fixed for extended periods of time, so prepayment risk is an important factor. A general prepayment modeling framework is used to develop a model for Dutch MBS, using historical speeds on Dutch mortgage deals. A key issue for the refinancing component is reconciliation of the fast speeds observed in periods of low rates, such as in 1999, with the presence of severe prepayment penalties, which in theory should discourage refinancings. An innovative approach models the refinancing incentive not just in terms of the current level of rates, but also taking into account the relationship of rates to the past. An option-adjusted spread analysis of the fixed-rate A2 class of the Match 2002–1 MBS deal provides an illustration.

Commercial Mortgage Prepayments Under Heterogeneous Prepayment Penalty Structures

Much of the literature on pricing commercial mortgages and commercial mortgage-backed securities has assumed homogeneity in prepayment penalty structure. This study provides evidence that such an assumption is inappropriate and examines the effect of penalty structures observed in actual contracts. After conducting preliminary simulations, hazard models estimated from data on 1,165 multifamily mortgage loans are presented to show how empirical prepayment rates vary with alternative penalty structures. While yield maintenance and lockout provisions are relatively more effective than fixed or step down structures in reducing or postponing prepayment, none completely eliminates the risk. The empirical results generally confirm the theoretical findings of Kelly and Slawson (2001).

Fixed-Rate Endowment Mortgage and Mortgage Indemnity Valuation

Fixed rate endowment mortgages differ from fixed rate repayment mortgages primarily because, in the event of early termination, the amount owed by the borrower is a function of the evolution of the term structure of interest rates, whereas for a repayment mortgage it is pre-determined. We use a contingent claims framework for valuing the embedded options in certain British fixed-rate endowment mortgages, with a (capped) mortgage indemnity guarantee (MIG). We assume a mean-reverting interest rate and a lognormal house price diffusion process to arrive at a partial differential equation as the basis of the contingent claims and include conventional mortgage terms such as arrangement fees and prepayment penalties. This methodology provides a template for the borrower, lender and insurer to compare mortgage terms, including the fairness of contract rates, fees and any MIG premiums required, when borrowing more than 75% of the house value at origination. Given the conventional terms and the diffusion processes, we assume the parties have common expectations for some diffusion parameters, including expected future rate and price volatilities. Also we assume that borrowers are 'economic actors' regarding default and prepayment options, and that factors such as mobility, divorce, unemployment, and transaction costs are deterministic and can be ignored in this model, along with moral hazard problems between the insurer and the lender. Since the partial differential equation incorporating the general features of these mortgage contracts does not have a closed-form solution, an explicit finite difference method is used for the valuation (and sensitivity) results. We provide graphical representations (and interpretations) of each mortgage component as a function of house prices and interest rate levels. After empirical studies on the input parameters, each mortgage component may be compared with 'market values'. This model may also be useful as a 'mark-to-value' proxy for all parties, as expected parameters change (especially interest rate and house price levels, and expected future volatilities), for purposes of determining 'value added accounting', appropriate reserves, and indeed for setting premiums and business decisions. Finally, we compare endowment and repayment mortgages for different levels of loan-to-value ratios, interest rate and house price volatility.

Fixed-Rate Endowment Mortgage and Mortgage Indemnity Valuation

Fixed rate endowment mortgages differ from fixed rate repayment mortgages primarily because, in the event of early termination, the amount owed by the borrower is a function of the evolution of the term structure of interest rates, whereas for a repayment mortgage it is pre-determined. We use a contingent claims framework for valuing the embedded options in certain British fixed-rate endowment mortgages, with a (capped) mortgage indemnity guarantee (MIG). We assume a mean-reverting interest rate and a lognormal house price diffusion process to arrive at a partial differential equation as the basis of the contingent claims and include conventional mortgage terms such as arrangement fees and prepayment penalties. This methodology provides a template for the borrower, lender and insurer to compare mortgage terms, including the fairness of contract rates, fees and any MIG premiums required, when borrowing more than 75% of the house value at origination. Given the conventional terms and the diffusion processes, we assume the parties have common expectations for some diffusion parameters, including expected future rate and price volatilities. Also we assume that borrowers are 'economic actors' regarding default and prepayment options, and that factors such as mobility, divorce, unemployment, and transaction costs are deterministic and can be ignored in this model, along with moral hazard problems between the insurer and the lender. Since the partial differential equation incorporating the general features of these mortgage contracts does not have a closed-form solution, an explicit finite difference method is used for the valuation (and sensitivity) results. We provide graphical representations (and interpretations) of each mortgage component as a function of house prices and interest rate levels. After empirical studies on the input parameters, each mortgage component may be compared with 'market values'. This model may also be useful as a 'mark-to-value' proxy for all parties, as expected parameters change (especially interest rate and house price levels, and expected future volatilities), for purposes of determining 'value added accounting', appropriate reserves, and indeed for setting premiums and business decisions. Finally, we compare endowment and repayment mortgages for different levels of loan-to-value ratios, interest rate and house price volatility.

Valuing Agricultural Mortgage-Backed Securities

AbstractA model to value Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (Farmer Mac) agricultural mortgage-backed securities (AMBS) is developed and numerically solved. The results suggest prepayment penalties currently being used by Farmer Mac reduce yields on AMBS considerably. Even with prepayment penalties, it can be advantageous for profit maximizing mortgagors to optimally prepay or even default on agricultural mortgages. The model is used to quantify prepayment and default risk by valuing the embedded options in the mortgages. Monte Carlo simulation is also used to determine the probability of optimal prepayment given the term structure assumption used to develop the model.

Quantifying the impact of farmer mac prepayment penalties

Unlike most residential mortgage‐backed securities, Farmer Mac agricultural mortgage‐backed securities (AMBS) have prepayment penalties. To quantify the impact of prepayment penalties on the cost of funding loans, prepayment behavior, and AMBS value, an analytic AMBS model is developed and numerically solved using pathwise simulation and dynamic programming. The results suggest prepayment penalties currently being used by Farmer Mac reduce AMBS yields considerably relative to not charging prepayment penalties. Presumably, lower yielding AMBS imply more competitive loan pricing. Even with prepayment penalties in place, however, it can be advantageous for profit‐maximizing mortgagors to optimally prepay or even default on agricultural mortgages. The model is used to quantify prepayment and credit risk by valuing the embedded options in mortgages, namely, the right of the mortgagor to prepay and to default.

Quantifying the Refinance Incentive and Losses from Prepayments

A prime factor in prepayment risk is the refinance incentive. It is typically approximated by the ratio of the coupon rate and the prevailing mortgage rate minus one. This article shows that this is a very poor approximation for a wide range of relevant cases. Loan-level data can be used to compute the refinance incentive precisely, without making any approximations. Even in the presence of prepayment penalties, losses from prepayments due to refinancing can be substantial when measured in terms of market value.

Time-Varying Mortgage Prepayment Penalties

Recent empirical findings reveal that prepayment decisions of commercial property owners are slower than predicted by the pure options pricing model (OPM). Borrower decisions appearing slow, however, may be quite rational when prepayment penalties of a time varying nature are incorporated into the OPM. This paper uses a competing risks OPM, adjusted for each of four different categories of prepayment penalties, to analyze borrower prepayment behavior. We find the value of delaying prepayment is often higher for mortgages with declining rate penalties than for mortgages with static rate penalties, frequently requiring a substantially higher interest rate spread to trigger a refinance. Multifamily loan prepayment records reveal the type of prepayment pattern that the adjusted OPM indicate should occur, reducing the gap between empirical findings and theoretical predictions. The results have implications for the specification of regressions fit to historical data, for the pricing of newly originated commercial mortgages, and for pricing in the single-family market where prepayment penalties are reemerging.

Anatomy of Prepayments

Prepayment models have come to be widely used in the mortgage market. Effective models are based on fundamental relationships that are likely to persist over time, but allow time-varying values of key inputs in order to capture environmental changes over time. The authors explain the major causes of prepayments, and describe how the modeling framework deals with them through turnover, refinancing, default, and curtailment sub-models. They applied the model to five applications covering a range of borrower demographics and mortgage terms, including home equity loans, hybrid ARMs, and prepayment penalty mortgages. A “user9s guide” cautions readers about the conditional nature of projections and prepayment model error.

Declining Mortgage Prepayment Penalties and the Value of Delay

Mortgages are complicated instruments, and the pace of financial innovation complicates them further. Unlike standard single family mortgages, the terms on commercial loans are heterogeneous, and the motivations of property owners are not well understood. Single family lenders are increasingly adopting the prepayment penalties found in the commercial market. This paper fills in a gap in the study of mortgage finance by determining the optimal refinancing strategy under common forms of prepayment penalties. Our paper uses a bivariate binomial options pricing technique to value call options within various mortgages with different types of prepayment penalties. Using simulations, we calculate the spread between contract and prevailing interest rates needed to trigger an optimal refinance, and find that it is often substantially larger for mortgages with declining penalties than for mortgages with static penalties. The larger required spreads caused by the enhanced value of delay explain much of the slow prepayment behavior discovered in the multifamily market by Follain, Ondrich, and Sinha (1997). Therefore, borrower decisions which appear slow (or irrational) in a static setting may be quite rational in a dynamic setting. Our results have important implications for both the interpretation of regression results based on historical data, and for the pricing of newly originated mortgages. Declining prepayment penalties were used extensively for multifamily mortgages in the 1970's and 1980's. While their use has declined in the 1990's in favor of yield maintainance agreements, empirical studies which use 1970's and 1980's data need to incorporate the effects of these penalty structures or risk specification bias. At the same time that their use is declining in the multifamily market it is growing in the single-family market. Understanding the behavior of these mortgages will be crucial to their pricing.

An Econometric Analysis of the Demand for Life Insurance Policy Loans

Driving Forces of Policy Loan Demand Previous research has found several variables related to the demand for life insurance policy loans, including market interest rates (Schott, 1971; Bykerk and Thompson, 1979; Cummins, 1973), personal income (Wood, 1964; Rejda, 1966), the unemployment rate (Cummins, 1973), and costs of alternative sources of credit (Day and Hendershott, 1977). Policy loans constitute a form of disintermediation for insurers and are important because they disrupt insurer cash flow and impose an opportunity cost if the market interest rate exceeds the policy loan interest rate.(1) This article assesses the impact that redesigned life insurance policy loan provisions and changes in financial markets have had on the demand for policy loans and the risk of disintermediation. The research extends previous work - which has focused exclusively on periods of fixed loan rates - by investigating policy loan demand from 1970 through 1989, a period encompassing both fixed and variable loan rates.(2) Because the structure of policy loan demand may have shifted over the sample period, a test for structural change is performed. While previous econometric analyses of policy loan demand have used quarterly data, this study uses monthly data. Market Conditions On policies issued before 1980, loan rates generally were fixed at between 5 and 6 percent. Thus, for various reasons, when market interest rates were equal to or in excess of policy loan rates, relatively more policyowners exercised their option to access cash values, and insurers lost the use of large amounts of assets. Policy loans outstanding at the end of 1970 equaled $14.1 billion and grew to $34.8 billion by the end of 1979. In response to the problem of policy loan disintermediation, a number of remedies have been proposed to reduce the outflow of funds. Wood and Rottman (1970) examine the use of variable loan rates, and Kraegel and Reiskytl (1977) and Larsen (1981) discuss the use of adjusted dividends to borrowing policyowners. In an effort to mitigate disintermediation, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners adopted the Model Policy Loan Interest Rate Bill in 1980. A version of this bill is now law in all states. According to the Model Bill, insurers may not set interest rates on policy loans in excess of Moody's Composite Yield on seasoned corporate bonds two months prior to the interest rate determination date. As interest rates decline, insurers must reduce the loan interest rate accordingly (see Black and Skipper, 1987, p. 140). Thus, since the early 1980s, a growing percentage of policy loan interest rates has been sensitive to market conditions. Of course, the shift to variable loan rates was not immediate; typically only new policies contained the variable rate provision. However, insurers offered inducements to fixed loan rate policyowners to switch to variable rate policies. The inducements generally took the form of increased projected dividends or dividend scales dependent upon loan utilization. In the early 1980s, insurers began to offer enhanced dividends to policyowners in exchange for higher policy loan rates or variable loan rates. New fixed loan rates were often raised to 8 percent (see Black and Skipper, 1987). It is likely that the introduction of interest-sensitive policy loan rates has altered the demand structure for policy loans in the last decade. Other factors may be responsible for a shift in the demand structure for policy loans. The volatility of interest rates might affect demand for policy loans because the flexible nature of policy loan repayment enables policyowners to repay loans without incurring the prepayment penalties often associated with other types of loans. The deregulation of financial markets, which allows greater access to money market returns, also may have led to a shift in the demand for policy loans. The introduction of nontraditional policies, such as universal life and variable life, that are said to be less loan tolerant, may have had an impact on the demand for policy loans. …

Tax and direct expenditures: Perspectives on prepayment proposals

Abstract If the government were committed to replenishing the inventory of project‐based assisted housing units when losses occurred, owners’ prepayment rights, with prepayment penalties, would be a desirable feature of the program. Additional unsub‐sidized housing units would be created every time a prepayment occurred, the freed‐up subsidies and insurance commitments would support a replacement low‐income unit, and prepayment penalty income could be used to offset mortgage insurance losses and thereby reduce the cost of mortgage insurance. Under the much less than ideal conditions now prevailing, with no replacement project‐based housing available and no buy out arrangements in place, federal policy must attempt to limit prepayment by the owners of subsidized projects over the next few years. An approach to establishing a “maximum price” that the government should be prepared to pay to induce each prepayment‐eligible building owner not to prepay is presented.

Affordability and mortgage design: Permanent buydowns and buyups

Abstract A simulation model that mirrors the actual practices of lenders in setting qualification requirements for mortgage loans is used to assess the impact of permanent buydowns and buyups on the maximum sale price that buyers can afford. Buydowns are reductions in the coupon rate traded off against higher discount points; buyups are the reverse. Although buydowns have little effect on afford ability, buyups can have significant effects. Their potential is largely unrealized, however, because of the call risk to lenders of loans carrying premiums. The authors propose a “discount recovery” provision, which would be similar to a prepayment penalty except that the payment upon prepayment would be tied to the amount of the discount foregone by the lender. This would protect lenders against call risk, giving them every reason to offer buyups as a way of expanding demand.

Adverse Selection in a Model of Real Estate Lending

ABSTRACTWe provide a rationale for the presence of points in mortgage loan contracts. Our analysis builds on two key features. First, insurance markets are unavailable for labor income. Second, the “due‐on‐sale” clause allows banks to offer loan contracts which partially insure against fluctuations in labor income. If explicit prepayment penalties are prohibited by law, points serve effectively as prepayment penalties. We also examine environments where such penalties are not prohibited and show that points will be used if interest rates cannot depend on the size of the loan.