Tax and direct expenditures: Perspectives on prepayment proposals

Abstract

Abstract If the government were committed to replenishing the inventory of project‐based assisted housing units when losses occurred, owners’ prepayment rights, with prepayment penalties, would be a desirable feature of the program. Additional unsub‐sidized housing units would be created every time a prepayment occurred, the freed‐up subsidies and insurance commitments would support a replacement low‐income unit, and prepayment penalty income could be used to offset mortgage insurance losses and thereby reduce the cost of mortgage insurance. Under the much less than ideal conditions now prevailing, with no replacement project‐based housing available and no buy out arrangements in place, federal policy must attempt to limit prepayment by the owners of subsidized projects over the next few years. An approach to establishing a “maximum price” that the government should be prepared to pay to induce each prepayment‐eligible building owner not to prepay is presented.