Robb Dunphy's new book, Hegel and the Problem of Beginning: Scepticism and Presuppositionlessness, is a serious piece of scholarship intended for advanced readers of Hegel's Science of Logic (1812–6). The book completes three tasks: (1) It presents the opening of Hegel's Logic as a complex problem about how to begin a non-arbitrary science without presupposing anything. (2) It offers a comparative study of the relationship between dialectics and Pyrrhonian Scepticism. (3) It explicates Hegel's preliminary essay to the Logic ‘With what must the beginning of the science be made?’ (pp. 1–2). This review will discuss the value of completing these three tasks for the advancement of Hegel scholarship; it will also critically engage with what I believe is a limitation of Dunphy's reading of Hegel. Hegel's Logic is a challenging book to read, especially for the uninitiated, but one of the best ways to unlock the book is by coming to terms with the significance of Hegel's starting point. Hegel claims that a science of logic must begin from a non-arbitrary position, that is, also, radically free of all suppositions. In this way, Hegel's Logic shares a lot with the opening of Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy (1641). It aims to secure something that is indubitable, free of assumption, and can also act as a foundation for the rigorous dialectical unfolding of science. As Dunphy emphasises throughout his book, commencing the Logic is a real challenge for Hegel. The opening must be both mediated, in the sense that it must be proven by argumentation to be non-arbitrary, but also immediate, in the sense that it must be free of dogmatic assumptions about the nature of reality and thus immune to scepticism. How can something offer support without being a presupposition? This is the problem that Dunphy aims to solve in Hegel's text.
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