Pre-reflective Experience Research Articles

Phenomenology and Temporality in Psychopathology: Calibrating Qualitative Phenomenological Methods According to the Timescale of Subjective Reports

Many methodologies for systematic study of lived experience have been proposed in recent decades. These methods are typically calibrated in terms of the depth and complexity of data collection, and whether they consider reports on pre-reflective experience admissible. Even though it has been shown that lived experience occurs at different timescales (elementary, integrative, narrative), contemporary methods tend to focus on momentary experience. We trace the focus on momentary experience to the current cultural milieu and attitudes in the history of psychology. We point out the need for studying temporally extended experiences in the field of psychopathology. We propose that lived experiences at different timescales are nested within each other and that this principle can be used to organize data collected with qualitative methods for the study of experience. We suggest that temporally extended experiences occur at the narrative level of description (i.e. they consist of experiential reports and sense-making).

Mapping the pre-reflective experience of “self” to the brain - An ERP study

The neural underpinnings of selfhood encompass pre-reflective and reflective self-experience. The former refers to a basic, immediate experience of being a self, while the latter involves cognition and introspection. Although neural correlates of reflective self-experience have been studied, the pre-reflective remains underinvestigated.This research aims to bridge this gap by comparatively investigating ERP correlates of reading first- vs. third-person pronouns – approximating pre-reflective self-experience – and self- vs. other-related adjectives – approximating reflective self-experience – in 30 healthy participants.We found differential neural engagement between pre-reflective and reflective self-experience at 254–310 ms post-stimulus onset. Source estimation suggested that our sensor-level results could be plausibly explained by the involvement of cortical midline structures and default mode network in the general sense of self but selective recruitment of anterior cingulate and top-down dorsal attention network in the pre-reflective self. These findings offer a deeper understanding of the experiential self, especially pre-reflective, providing a foundation for investigating self-disorders.

The memory and identity theory of ICD-11 complex posttraumatic stress disorder.

The 11th version of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-11) includes complex posttraumatic stress disorder (CPTSD) as a separate diagnostic entity alongside posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). ICD-11 CPTSD is defined by six sets of symptoms, three that are shared with PTSD (reexperiencing in the here and now, avoidance, and sense of current threat) and three (affective dysregulation, negative self-concept, and disturbances in relationships) representing pervasive "disturbances in self-organization" (DSO). There is considerable evidence supporting the construct validity of ICD-11 CPTSD, but no theoretical account of its development has thus far been presented. A theory is needed to explain several phenomena that are especially relevant to ICD-11 CPTSD such as the role played by prolonged and repeated trauma exposure, the functional independence between PTSD and DSO symptoms, and diagnostic heterogeneity following trauma exposure. The memory and identity theory of ICD-11 CPTSD states that single and multiple trauma exposure occur in a context of individual vulnerability which interact to give rise to intrusive, sensation-based traumatic memories and negative identities which, together, produce the PTSD and DSO symptoms that define ICD-11 CPTSD. The model emphasizes that the two major and related causal processes of intrusive memories and negative identities exist on a continuum from prereflective experience to full self-awareness. Theoretically derived implications for the assessment and treatment of ICD-11 CPTSD are discussed, as well as areas for future research and model testing. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

“What’s done is done, the bullet’s left the gun”: Questions on the Application, Origin, and Metaphysics of the «Course-of-Experience Framework»

The Course-of-Experience presents an interesting method for working with others’ experience, drawing on Micro-phenomenology (MP), Enactivism, and Peircean semiotics. It addresses possible applications to cognitive science, answering to a call about how to reliably integrate phenomenological data and experimental methods. I applaud the ambitious framework presented in the target paper, and hope that Poizat and colleagues in response or in later work will address three potential shortcoming: (1) How does the framework fare in comparison to similar methods. (2) Why is Peircean semiotics necessary for the framework? 3) Does it need to copy what seems to be epistemological and metaphysical infelicities concerning pre-reflective experience directly from MP?

Self-Consciousness without an “I”: A Critique of Zahavi’s Account of the Minimal Self

Abstract This paper takes Zahavi’s view to task that every conscious experience involves a “minimal sense of self.” Zahavi bases his claim on the observation that experience, even on the pre-reflective level, is not only about the object, but also has a distinctive qualitative aspect which is indicative of the fact that it is for me. It has the quality of what he calls “for-meness” or “mineness.” Against this I argue that there are not two phenomena but only one. On the pre-reflective level, experience is transparent. Conscious experience may well be reflexive (insofar as it is relation to me) but this does not imply that I additionally have a sense of what it is like for me to have that experience. I do not just happen to disagree with Zahavi’s account of pre-reflective experience but, more importantly, I am concerned that he imposes it onto his interpretation of Edmund Husserl. Zahavi claims that when Husserl argues that consciousness is necessarily a form of self-consciousness, he must be committed to the view that we necessarily have a sense of ownership. However, Husserl only claims that I am self-conscious but not that I am a self that owns its consciousness. Zahavi thus misses the novelty of Husserl’s position, namely that I do not need to have a sense of abiding ownership, to have experience.

Behavioural evidence of altered sensory attenuation in obesity.

Body ownership (i.e., the conscious belief of owning a body) and sense of agency (i.e., being the agent of one's own movements) are part of a pre-reflective experience of bodily self, which grounds on low-level complex sensory-motor processes. Although previous literature had already investigated body ownership in obesity, sense of agency was never explored. Here, we exploited the sensory attenuation effect (i.e., an implicit marker of the sense of agency; SA effect) to investigate whether the sense of agency was altered in a sample of 18 individuals affected by obesity as compared with 18 healthy-weight individuals. In our experiment, participants were asked to rate the perceived intensity of self-generated and other-generated tactile stimuli. Healthy-weight individuals showed a significantly greater SA effect than participants affected by obesity. Indeed, while healthy-weight participants perceived self-generated stimuli as significantly less intense as compared to externally generated ones, this difference between stimuli was not reported by affected participants. Our results relative to the SA effect pinpointed an altered sense of agency in obesity. We discussed this finding within the motor control framework with reference to obesity. We encouraged future research to further explore such effect and its role in shaping the clinical features of obesity.

La pensée des lieux de Paul Ricœur à l’épreuve du paysage. Un dialogue possible entre herméneutique, esthétique performative et phénoménologie

In this article, we argue that Paul Ricœur’s hermeneutics of spaces and the aesthetics vision of the landscape as a performance, based on the contemporary theories of Erika Fischer-Lichte, can integrate each other through the mediation of Mikel Dufrenne’s phenomenology of the a priori. In particular, we will show how the representations and the hermeneutics of a landscape as a peculiar “text” are essentially connected with its the pre-reflective experience, which, being made possible by the activation of precise material – and therefore historical and cultural – a priori, can be thus translated into images and words. By intertwining hermeneutics, phenomenology, and performative esthetics we will provide with a non-reductive philosophical description of a landscape, i.e., a definition that does not neglect the aspects of it suggested by its linguistic pre-comprehension and artistic representations.

The pre-reflective roots of the madeleine-memory: a phenomenological perspective

This paper investigates the madeleine-memory (so-called from Proust's novel In Search of Lost Time) as a case of pre-reflective experience, from the genesis of its sedimentation into the body. Indeed, I aim to address the question of the literary protagonist Marcel on the roots of his happiness and the genesis of his memories. Until now, the madeleine-memory has been described as bodily and involuntary. In phenomenology, a wide literature has confirmed the relationship between the sense of body ownership and pre-reflective self-awareness. I aim to build upon such a mutual link and show that the pre-reflective roots of the madeleine-memory have to be traced back to the genesis of the involuntary recollections. To this purpose, I will illustrate that the epistemological relationship between the object and the subject plays a relevant role in the way the subject remembers. First, I will present that madeleine-memory is a unique case of bodily memory, by analyzing the main features that characterize it. Secondly, I will analyze the original experience of the madeleine within the phenomenological logic of transcendence in immanence. For this aim, I will rely on the Husserlian notions of “epistemological inadequacy of perception” and “background experiences”. Through these notions, I will show that Proustian involuntary recollections are pre-reflective experiences because previously subjects have pre-reflectively experienced the content of recollections.

The sense of agency does not evidence regulative control

Libertarians assume that the sense of agency supports their belief in the agent’s ability to have done otherwise; however, they do not present arguments in favor of their assumption beyond introspection. Although agents may hold this belief, the mechanisms that give rise to the sense of agency—the comparator model and the perception of the relation between action and events in the environment—do not provide reasons to support it. Nonetheless, these mechanisms can help explain why agents hold the belief in the first place, and the investigation makes clear that the workings of the mechanisms that give rise to the sense of agency are compatible with determinism. Here, I will defend that a compatibilist explanation can be given as to why the sense of agency may seem to support libertarian beliefs. Hence, the sense of agency does not support the libertarian position in the free will debate; it is merely the pre-reflective experience of action as self-caused, and it is associated with control mechanisms.Keywords: Sense of agency, Regulative control, Incompatibilism, Comparator model, Guidance control.

A Heideggerian pedagogy of disruption

The phenomenological tradition developed sophisticated techniques to draw attention to pre-theoretic or pre-reflective experience. This article examines how one of the most famous, Heidegger’s ‘broken tool’, might work in a pedagogical context. I contend that it can be highly effective there, fleshing out his vision of teaching as ‘letting learn’ with a distinctive educational method. At the same time, that context suggests fundamental changes to the standard reading of the ‘broken tool’, shifting the focus towards what I call ‘information tools’. My conclusions link to recent research stressing disruption in the learning process, and I close by contrasting my position with ‘bricolage’ theories and work by Applebaum and others.

A Psychophysical Window onto the Subjective Experience of Compulsion.

In this perspective, we follow the idea that an integration of cognitive models with sensorimotor theories of compulsion is required to understand the subjective experience of compulsive action. We argue that cognitive biases in obsessive–compulsive disorder may obscure an altered momentary, pre-reflective experience of sensorimotor control, whose detection thus requires an implicit experimental operationalization. We propose that a classic psychophysical test exists that provides this implicit operationalization, i.e., the intentional binding paradigm. We show how intentional binding can pit two ideas against each other that are fundamental to current sensorimotor theories of compulsion, i.e., the idea of excessive conscious monitoring of action, and the idea that patients with obsessive–compulsive disorder compensate for diminished conscious access to “internal states”, including states of the body, by relying on more readily observable proxies. Following these ideas, we develop concrete, testable hypotheses on how intentional binding changes under the assumption of different sensorimotor theories of compulsion. Furthermore, we demonstrate how intentional binding provides a touchstone for predictive coding accounts of obsessive–compulsive disorder. A thorough empirical test of the hypotheses developed in this perspective could help explain the puzzling, disabling phenomenon of compulsion, with implications for the normal subjective experience of human action.

Autonomous technologies in human ecologies: enlanguaged cognition, practices and technology

Advanced technologies such as drones, intelligent algorithms and androids have grave implications for human existence. With the purpose of exploring their basis for doing so, the paper proposes a framework for investigating the complex relationship between such devices and human practices and language-mediated cognition. Specifically, it centers on the importance of the typically neglected intermediate layer of culture which not only drives both technophobia and philia but also, more fundamentally, connects pre-reflective experience and socio-material practices by placing advanced technologies in the loop. Theoretically, the paper draws on contributions from performativist Science and Technology Studies and Radically Embodied Cognitive Science and pushes new grounds by stressing their compatibility. Yet, it also emphasizes the importance of the enlanguaged side of cognition which is a requirement for human-style socio-material practices and, hence, the emergence of cultures that fetishizes certain technologies.

Making Sense of Suffering: Merleau-Ponty and Keats's "Vale of Soul-Making"

Unlike the traditional view of suffering in philosophy and theology as a deviation from the ideal, John Keats's vale of soul-making attends to the potentiality of the suffering body in the world for fashioning the identities of the modern subject. Keats thereby exhibits a notion of the body that shows more affinity with Maurice Merleau-Ponty's emphasis on the primary role of perception in knowledge than with John Locke's empiricist account of sensation. Turning to the prereflective experience, Merleau-Ponty concedes the limits of reasoning in the face of an opaque world and hints at a quality similar to Keats's negative capability.

A world-involving theory of agency: review of Sensorimotor Life: An Enactive Proposal by Ezequiel Di Paolo, Thomas Buhrmann, and Xabier Barandiaran. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017

Sensorimotor theory of perception has been criticized for its ambiguity about the need for internal representations and the lack of a proper account of agency and subjective experience. The book under review offers a compelling non-representational, world-involving interpretation, and operationalization of this theory, showing that alternatives to representationalism are viable. It also provides a thought-provoking theory of sensorimotor agency and the pre-reflective experience of action that builds on the enactive notions of autonomy and sense-making. The account provided in this book fits into a radically embodied, enactive, and extended cognitive science. However, the notion of the environment requires further conceptual clarification by the enactive camp.

Implicit influence on body image: methodological innovation for research into embodied experience

With growing social science interest in the potential for images to facilitate access to embodied experience, this study re-examines the relative value of visual and verbal methods in body-oriented research. Taking one lead from Kyrölä’s (2016) idea of body image as the relationship between representation and corporeality, and another from Gendlin’s (1993, 1995, 1997) methods for attending to and articulating from pre-reflective experience, we develop a method that juxtaposes words and images to explore the role of pre-reflective understanding on body image among teenage girls. The study highlights both an influencing role for pre-reflective understanding in body image and the availability of pre-reflective understanding to participants. While recognising persistent challenges in communicating embodied experience, we propose a method for engaging and working with embodied or pre-reflective experience in social science research by integrating the verbal and the visual in a specific way.

The Experience of Persons with Parkinson’s Disease: a Hermeneutic-Phenomenological Exploration

Abstract This study seeks to understand the subjective experience or lived world typical of patients with Parkinson’s disease (PD). It uses qualitative methodology, grounded in a hermeneutic-phenomenological perspective, to consider lived experience in a small sample of 7 individuals (4 published accounts, 3 subjects interviewed in depth). The analysis identified four themes that appear to be characteristic of the experience of PD: A) Denial, B) Emotion and symptom expression, C) Volitional and spontaneous action, and D) Alteration of temporal perspective. Concepts from existential-phenomenological philosophy (including the notions of “bad faith,” reflective versus pre-reflective experience, being-in-itself versus being-for-itself, and temporality) were used to reflect upon these themes to achieve a synthetic account of the subjective experience of PD. The findings of the study are compared to other findings in the phenomenological literature, and suggestions for further research are posed.

Sartre and Fanon: The Phenomenological Problem of Shame and the Experience of Race

ABSTRACT This paper argues that existing accounts of shame are incomplete in so far as they don’t take account of the problem of shame. This is the problem concerning the possibility of a primary experience of shame. It is the problem Sartre considers under the terms of a “primitive shame” or shame “in its primary structure” that grounds other more complex experiences of shame. This problem is centred on the tension between shame as an immediate, pre-reflective experience and the requirement that shame must involve an awareness of some definitive aspect of the self. I’m going to suggest, correlatively, how by trying to resolve this problem we end up with a more nuanced understanding of shame. In the second part of the paper, I go on to look at how this new interpretation of shame helps us understand race. Looking at Fanon, I explore how a fundamental and overlooked ineffability in our relation to others impacts upon responses to racialized shame.

Affectivity and the distinction between minimal and narrative self

In the contemporary phenomenological literature it has been argued that it is possible to distinguish between two forms of selfhood: the “minimal” and “narrative” self. This paper discusses a claim which is central to this account, namely that the minimal and narrative self complement each other but are fundamentally distinct dimensions. In particular, I challenge the idea that while the presence of a minimal self is a condition of possibility for the emergence of a narrative self, the dynamics which characterise narrative selfhood do not have a structuring effect on minimal self-experience. I do so by drawing on both classical and contemporary phenomenological literature to show that at least certain forms of affective experience are complex phenomena in which minimal and narrative forms of selfhood are deeply entwined. More specifically, I claim that, due to their evaluative character, intentional and non-intentional affective states convey a pre-reflective experience of constitutive aspects of the narrative self. This enables me to argue that minimal and narrative selfhood are phenomenologically inextricable.

Are shared models always cultural models? A study of the cultural model of affect and emotion in Chuuk

This article investigates a theoretical tension in cultural models theory between their sharedness and their origin in social and culturally mediated experiences. To address this tension empirically, this article presents a mixed-methods analysis of the shared understanding of a typology of emotion in Chuuk Lagoon. Based on a review of contemporary theory, one would expect that while people in Chuuk would have distinct cultural models for specific culturally meaningful paradigmatic emotions, the shared model for the entire typology of emotion would be structured by two universal dimensions of core affect (arousal and hedonic quality). But this theoretical literature ignores the importance of an intersubjective dimension of prereflective experience. This dimension may be culturally muted in industrial, educated, and rich contexts where most prior research has been conducted but culturally emphasized in places like Chuuk. The mixed-methods analysis finds that an intersubjective dimension along with a hedonic quality dimension structures the shared model of a typology for affect and emotion in Chuuk, while the arousal dimension found elsewhere is muted. Thus, shared models of affect and emotion are cultural models both in terms of specific, culturally elaborated emotions and in terms of the cultural emphasis given to underlying affective and intersubjective dimensions.

Recomposing Ecopoetics: North American Poetry of the Self-Conscious Anthropocene. Lynn Keller. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2017. Pp. xv+284.

<i>Recomposing Ecopoetics: North American Poetry of the Self-Conscious Anthropocene</i>. Lynn Keller. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2017. Pp. xv+284.