Affectivity and the distinction between minimal and narrative self

Anna Bortolan

doi:10.1007/s11007-019-09471-y

Abstract

In the contemporary phenomenological literature it has been argued that it is possible to distinguish between two forms of selfhood: the “minimal” and “narrative” self. This paper discusses a claim which is central to this account, namely that the minimal and narrative self complement each other but are fundamentally distinct dimensions. In particular, I challenge the idea that while the presence of a minimal self is a condition of possibility for the emergence of a narrative self, the dynamics which characterise narrative selfhood do not have a structuring effect on minimal self-experience. I do so by drawing on both classical and contemporary phenomenological literature to show that at least certain forms of affective experience are complex phenomena in which minimal and narrative forms of selfhood are deeply entwined. More specifically, I claim that, due to their evaluative character, intentional and non-intentional affective states convey a pre-reflective experience of constitutive aspects of the narrative self. This enables me to argue that minimal and narrative selfhood are phenomenologically inextricable.

Highlights

The contemporary debate on the nature of selfhood is characterised by the presence of a significant number of different notions of what a self is (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 219–220; Strawson 1999: 100; Zahavi 2008: 103), and it has been argued that at least some of these notions can be combined in a view of the self as a complex phenomenon
Colombetti observes that sometimes the bodily feelings associated with emotional experience have a prominent position in our experiential field, suggesting that these are the feelings on which the accounts of the bodily aspect of affectivity usually focus
Slaby (2008), for example, claims that the experience of the body integral to emotional feelings is to be comprised under the notion of “body schema” and maintains that this should be conceived not as an experience in which we focus on the body, but rather as an experience in which the body "functions as a vehicle of perception" (437)

Summary

Introduction

The contemporary debate on the nature of selfhood is characterised by the presence of a significant number of different notions of what a self is (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012: 219–220; Strawson 1999: 100; Zahavi 2008: 103), and it has been argued that at least some of these notions can be combined in a view of the self as a complex phenomenon. 2. the account of selfhood here at issue, I move to consider what sort of relationship might exist between affects and the forms of self-consciousness which are thought to be integral to minimal and narrative self. I argue that these accounts point towards the existence of forms of affective experience in which the minimal and narrative self are phenomenologically inextricable, challenging the idea that the structure of the minimal self is distinct from and impervious to the dynamics which take place at the level of the narrative self. My analysis provides grounds to question the claim that minimal and narrative selfhood are asymmetrically related, and that disruptions of the latter may leave the former unaffected

Minimal self

Narrative self

The multidimensional account

Bodily feelings and pre‐reflective self‐consciousness

Affectivity and consciousness of the narrative self

Conclusions