Pragmatic Justification Research Articles

Denying Infinity: Pragmatism in Abraham Robinson’s Philosophy of Mathematics

Abraham Robinson is well-known as the inventor of nonstandard analysis, which uses nonstandard models to give the notions of infinitesimal and infinitely large magnitudes a precise interpretation. Less discussed, although subtle and original–if ultimately flawed–is Robinson's work in the philosophy of mathematics. The foundational position he inherited from David Hilbert undermines not only the use of nonstandard analysis, but also Robinson's considerable corpus of pre-logic contributions to the field in such diverse areas as differential equations and aeronautics. This tension emerges from Robinson's disbelief in the existence of infinite totalities (any mention of them is ‘literally meaningless’) and the fact that much of his work involves them. I argue that he treats infinitary avenues of mathematics as useful tools to avoid this difficulty, but that this is not successful to the extent that these tools must be justified by a conservative extension from finitary mathematics. While Robinson provides a compelling and unorthodox pragmatic justification for the role of formal systems in mathematical practice despite their apparent infinitary presuppositions, he deflates mainstream mathematics to a collection of games that occasionally produces meaningful results. This amounts to giving up on a commitment to reconciling his finitism with his mathematical practice.

Radical Conventionalism and Hinge Epistemology

In the paper I explore some hints one can find in an updated version of Ajdukiewicz’s radical conventionalism that may help to resolve some controversies within hinge epistemology, i.e. a family of positions that invoke Wittgenstein’s idea of groundless grounds of knowledge. In particular I put into doubt whether there is a real difference between pragmatic and transcendental justification of hinges, I reject epistemological disjunctivism, and I argue for anti-realistic reading of truth in a context determined by particular hinges while retaining the classical notion of truth as a regulative idea of knowledge that governs the possible revisions of hinges.

Does Meta-induction Justify Induction: Or Maybe Something Else?

According to the Feigl–Reichenbach–Salmon–Schurz pragmatic justification of induction, no predictive method is guaranteed or even likely to work for predicting the future; but if anything will work, induction will work—at least when induction is employed at the meta-level of predictive methods in light of their track records. One entertains a priori all manner of esoteric prediction methods, and is said to arrive a posteriori at the conclusion, based on the actual past, that object-level induction is optimal. Schurz’s refinements largely solve the notorious short-run problem. A difficulty is noted, however, related to short-run worries but based on localized disagreement about the past, a feature characteristic of real debates (especially early modern) involving induction in intellectual history. Given the evidence about past events, unfiltered by induction, meta-induction might support a partly non-inductive method—especially as judged by proponents of esoteric prediction methods, who presumably believe that their methods have worked. Thus induction is justified meta-inductively in contexts where it was uncontroversial, while not obviously justified in key contexts where it has been disputed. This objection, momentarily sensed by Reichenbach regarding clairvoyance, is borne out by the Stoics’ use of meta-induction to justify both science and divination and by ancient Hebrew examples of meta-induction. Schurz’s recently introduced criteria for acceptance of testimony play a crucial role in arriving at object-level induction using meta-induction, but one might question them. Given the need for judgment in accepting testimony, it is unclear that the subjectivity of Howson’s Bayesian answer to Hume’s problem is overcome.

Confucian Ethics and Confederate Memorials

As self-conscious curators and critics of moral history, the early Confucians are relevant to the contemporary debate over the fate of memorials dedicated to morally flawed individuals. They provide us with a pragmatic justification that is distinct from those utilized in the current debate, and in many respects superior to the alternatives. In addition to supplying this curative philosophic resource, the early Confucian practices of ancestral memorialization suggest preventative measures we might adopt to minimize the chances of establishing divisive and oppressive memorials in the future.

Konseptualisering van Kommunikasiebestuursopleiding

Communication Management Training is an unfamiliar concept to somecommunication scholars. Although there seems to be general agreementon the pragmatic justification and viability of communication training in themanagement sciences, questions are being asked about the academiclegitimacy of Communication Management as educational model. Thisarticle sets out to explain communication management training through ananalysis of the four communication-focused subject areas that may belegitimately taught in the management sciences. This analysis will bebased on a conceptual analytical framework, derived from prior attemptsto differentiate communication-related subject fields. To conduct theanalysis, the author made use of an exploratory qualitative approach bystudying contributions in The Joumal of Business Communication,Management Communication Quarterly, ABC Bulletin, CommunicationMonographs and Public Relations Review.

Реактивные реплики с иллокуцией несогласия в контексте неформального интервью: форма выражения, прагматические функции, мотивы реализации

Within the framework of this study – based on the texts of informal interviews published in English-language tabloids – the illocution of reactive disagreement is defined as an effective pragmatic mechanism for the coherent unfolding of the text, jointly generated by the interlocutors. Based on the method of conversational analysis, the constructive potential of a negative response to the propositional content and assessments that form a stimulating assertive message of the interviewer is revealed. Attention is focused on the form and content of the responses, explicitly/implicitly expressing disagreement, their pragmatic functions and role in ensuring the coherence of dialogical unity, reflecting the discussion of a specific topic by the interlocutors. It is established that in order to minimize discursive confrontation, the respondent can react with disagreement, which has a delayed character, with a preliminary expression of concession in favor of the effectiveness of the interviewer’s point of view. At the same time, in order to create relevant conditions for the implementation of a relaxed / partial disagreement, the respondent can initiate several dialogical moves. As a result, the stimulating judgments of the interviewer are interpreted as one of the alternative versions of the interpretation of the event or fact being discussed, and an informal conversation produces a pragmatic effect of intrigue. A softened form of disagreement can also be implemented by reacting replicas with blurred semantics due to hedging and markers of epistemic modality, a detailed explanation of the facts associated with the topic under discussion, activation of the shift of the current attention of the interviewer and the target audience. The motives underlying the reactive implementation of direct/implicit disagreement are revealed: the respondent’s desire to hide information about the prospects of his creative activity, which is requested by the interviewer, to avoid disharmony in interpersonal interaction, the gap between the interlocutors’ background knowledge, the dissimilarity of their axiological positions regarding the topic of discussion. A pragmatic justification of these motives is given. It is concluded that the reactive remarks of disagreement, implemented in the context of an informal interview, predetermine the conflict-free unfolding of interpersonal interaction of interlocutors due to the deliberate minimization of the threat to their social face from the respondent.

Multiple Determiners in Magahi: DP Structure and the Complex N

The paper, describing the fact that definiteness cannot be treated on par with the phi-features, suggests a pragmatic-oriented approach towards the phenomenon of multiple determiners in Magahi. It is a linguistic strategy to make the reference deictically (spatially and temporally) available in the context. The paper, providing the pragmatic justification for the phenomenon, argues in favour of a mixed structural account whereby the predicate raising, and split-DP are taken into account. The paper provides both structural and semantics justification for the predicate rising analysis, as the additional determiner on the adjective has the function of both relativizer and nominalizer. Following Julien [29] and Compos & Stavrou [14], FP projection is assumed to host the head /-kɑ/ which agrees with the lower N in nominal features like gender and number. To take account of the complexity of the initial derivation of N in Magahi, a classifier language, an nP in Julien's [29] spirit is adopted with modification. A DP is also projected to host the nominal tense feature and strong referentiality. The proposed analysis captures the existing possible conflation within the NP and introduces a new kind of discussion in the literature through the novel data.

Confucian Ethics and Confederate Memorials

As self-conscious curators and critics of moral history, the early Confucians are relevant to the contemporary debate over the fate of memorials dedicated to morally flawed individuals. They provide us with a pragmatic justification that is distinct from those utilized in the current debate, and in many respects superior to the alternatives. In addition to supplying this curative philosophic resource, the early Confucian practices of ancestral memorialization suggest preventative measures we might adopt to minimize the chances of establishing divisive and oppressive memorials in the future.

Fragmented Pragmatism: On Sungmoon Kim’s Pragmatic Confucian Democracy

Fragmented Pragmatism: On Sungmoon Kim’s Pragmatic Confucian Democracy

Building collective control and improving health through a place-based community empowerment initiative: qualitative evidence from communities seeking agency over their built environment

ABSTRACT Both environmental improvement and collective agency over local decisions are recognised strategies for promoting health and health equity. However, both strategies have been critiqued for their association with policies that emphasise local resources and decision-making while the state disinvests in social and environmental determinants of health. This paper explores the role of place-based community empowerment initiatives in building collective control and improving health. We examined the perspectives of participating communities using qualitative data from interviews and observational fieldwork embedded within an evaluation of a national community empowerment initiative: Big Local (funded by The National Lottery Community Fund and overseen by Local Trust). We selected five examples of community action to improve and maintain built environments. We found that while academics (including the authors) are interested in mechanisms to health impacts, participants focused on something more general: delivering benefits to their communities and maintaining services threatened by state disinvestment. Participants sometimes used ‘health’ as a pragmatic justification for action. We posit that systemic pathways to health impact are plausible even when communities themselves do not forefront health goals. For example, ‘quick wins’ and ‘quick losses’ resulting from early community action have potential to galvanise or undermine collective agency, and so affect communities’ capability to deliver future improvements to social and environmental determinants of health. However, structural limitations and unequal access to resources limit the potential of communities to make health-promoting change, as some participants acknowledged. Collective agency may improve socio-environmental determinants of health but systemic barriers to empowerment and equity persist.

“Yes, but…” Yes, and…” - A Sympathetic Challenge (and Reframing) of Matusov’s “The Right for Freedom of Education.”

In this response to Matusov's "Right for Freedom in Education," I will offer two “yes, but…” concerns about crucial complexities of this freedom that I think Matusov leaves unaddressed, and a “yes, and…” alternative pragmatic justification of this freedom that differs from, but I think is more compelling than, Matusov’s.

The Proportionality Puzzle in Contract Law: A Challenge for Private Law Theory?

This article explores the emerging use of the proportionality concept in the contract law of the Anglo-common law world, first to understand its internal logic, and secondly, to situate its invocation within private law theory. What are judges doing when they appeal to “proportionality”?, and what does this say about the ideology of adjudication? I draw insights from the use of proportionality in other domains, in particular public law, to uncover its internal rationality as a means-ends rationality review coupled with a process of balancing competing considerations, which I illustrate with reference to the illegality, penalty, and cost of cure doctrines. I argue that proportionality reflects a method of pragmatic justification, expressing an aspiration towards a structured and transparent mode of argumentation that is anti-formal and anti-ideological, focusing from the bottom-up on contextual considerations, and occupying a distinct space against existing theories in private law driven, for instance, by “top-down”? rights-based ideologies or critical and communitarian perspectives.

Contract Damages, Moral Agency, and Henry James’ The Ambassadors

AbstractThis paper enters the dispute over the proper interpretation of the expectation measure of damages in contract law. Should damages be measured by the plaintiff’s financial loss or by the cost of acquiring a substitute performance (“cost of cure”)? I begin by presenting a moral (as opposed to an economic or a pragmatic) justification for the traditional contract principle that a plaintiff has a right to compensation for the financial loss flowing from breach but no right to performance. I do so by showing that implicit in the principle that the plaintiff has a right to compensation for financial loss alone is a conception of moral agency as a capacity for detachment from things. Through an exploration of Henry James’ novel The Ambassadors, I try to show what is valuable in that conception, although I argue that it is, in the end, incomplete. Then I consider the self-authorship conception of moral agency implicit in the moralist’s proposal to replace the financial loss remedy with a right to performance or to compensation for the cost of securing a substitute performance. Again, through a reading of James’ novel, I try to show what is valuable in this conception although I argue that it too is incomplete. I suggest that the conceptions of moral agency respectively implicit in the financial loss and cost of cure remedies are constituent parts of a complete conception. Once we see this, we arrive at a moral justification for a contract law which treats compensation for financial loss as the normal rule but exceptionally allows for a remedy that aims at securing performance.

THE META-INDUCTIVE JUSTIFICATION OF INDUCTION

ABSTRACTI evaluate Schurz's proposed meta-inductive justification of induction, a refinement of Reichenbach's pragmatic justification that rests on results from the machine learning branch of prediction with expert advice.My conclusion is that the argument, suitably explicated, comes remarkably close to its grand aim: an actual justification of induction. This finding, however, is subject to two main qualifications, and still disregards one important challenge.The first qualification concerns the empirical success of induction. Even though, I argue, Schurz's argument does not need to spell out what inductive method actually consists in, it does need to postulate that there is something like the inductive or scientific prediction strategy that has so far been significantly more successful than alternative approaches. The second qualification concerns the difference between having a justification for inductive method and for sticking with induction for now. Schurz's argument can only provide the latter. Finally, the remaining challenge concerns the pool of alternative strategies, and the relevant notion of a meta-inductivist's optimality that features in the analytic step of Schurz's argument. Building on the work done here, I will argue in a follow-up paper that the argument needs a stronger dynamic notion of a meta-inductivist's optimality.

Finding satisfaction in presentism

This paper argues for a pragmatic motivation for believing Presentism—the thesis that everything is present. After outlining a pragmatic source of justification for beliefs, in terms of their action-guiding aims, a pragmatic motivation for believing presentism is detailed and proffered. More specifically, the paper outlines two kinds of bases for our desires: a negative and a positive basis. The former concerns some dissatisfaction with a certain aspect of our present state, whilst the latter focuses instead on our potential future gratification or contentment. An account of desire satisfaction needs to, in some sense, “answers” to either of these kinds of bases. However, it is argued that only presentism can support an adequate conception of desire satisfaction (that allows for adequate “answers” to those bases). And although non-presentists can support a form of desire prevention (essentially preventing the arising of desire bases demanding “answers”), this severely lessens the effectiveness of beliefs to fulfil their aims. Accordingly, presentism is best able to support beliefs in achieving their action-guiding aims. It is claimed that this provides some pragmatic justification for believing presentism.

Philosophical difficulties of stakeholder theory

Philosophical difficulties of stakeholder theory—which plays an important role in CSR and business ethics—are mainly connected to the questions of its status and justification. What sense does stakeholder theory have: descriptive, instrumental or normative? And if normative, why then should executives worry about multiple stakeholder demands? It is well known that Freeman, one of the most important authors of stakeholder theory, deliberately disregarded these problems. In philosophical questions, he invoked Rorty’s pragmatism that in his opinion effectively undermined the “positivistic” dichotomy between facts and values, science and ethics, and enabled stakeholder theory to be understood as both descriptive and normative. The article presents some difficulties connected with this view, focusing on its dubious assumptions and unfavourable consequences. These assumptions contain a false dilemma, taken from Rorty, which states that knowledge follows either a rule of representation or a rule of solidarity. One of the unfavourable consequences is the conclusion that stakeholder theory may be true only if its followers are able to force the stakeholders to accept its truthfulness. The main thesis of the article says that, because of pragmatic justification, stakeholder theory became a sort of arbitrary narration, which is unable to deal with its (empirical) misuses. However, a more traditional view on facts and values enables us to appreciate the descriptive advantages of the theory and to identify difficulties connected with its normative layer. From this point of view, the attempt at a pragmatic interpretation of stakeholder theory was a misunderstanding that should be withdrawn from circulation.

The Adversary System of Excuse and the Lawyer’s Role

According to the standard view in legal ethics, hyper-zealous advocacy and the principle of non-accountability could be justified by relating to the adversary system argument. Lawyers play a special role in a system that serves social goals, for the universal acceptance among practitioners. Nevertheless, could adversary system argument justify the special a-moral role? The article focuses on the institutional excuse end special role obligations on those who inhabit the robe, especially from Luban’s critical perspective, who claims the adversarial system could receive only a pragmatic justification and can only offer weak and slight prima facie justifications.

Mind as Conceptual Structure: On Ethical Theory of C. I. Lewis’s Conceptual Pragmatism

Clarence I. Lewis (1883-1964) delineated the structure of mind based on his “conceptual pragmatism.” Human mind grounds itself on the ongoing dynamic interaction of relational processes, which is essentially mediated and structural. Lewis`s pragmatism anchors itself on the theory of knowledge that has the triadic structure of the given or immediate data, interpretation, and the concept. Lewis takes the a priori given as a starting point of meaningful experience. The interpretative work of mind is the mediator of the a priori given and the concepts. The a priori given is the principle that determines the application of concepts in our interpretative process. Our mind interprets the given in relating to other possible experience. In other words, the meaning of the a priori given is determined by mind, the subject of interpretative process, which performs constructive and legislative activity, and allows room for the existence of alternatives. Lewis`s theory of knowledge calls for pragmatic justification of value experience. In his ethical theory, Lewis pursues to find answers for how to build up the objectivity of value experience regarding the work of mind as conceptual apparatus. For Lewis, knowledge is a claim about valuation and normativity. In our value experience, the normative significance of our empirical assessments for action comprises objective significance for future experience. Mind is “principle-content apparatus” composed of imperatives as the a priori given principles and the contents of experience as a whole. Imperatives are the result of lessons accumulated from the past and function as rules for the future. Individuals start their experience from imperatives and organize their own experience by doing based on the inferential process, which is directional from the past to the future.

What Goes Wrong in Habermas’s Pragmatic Justification of (U)?

In his moral theory, named ‘discourse ethics,’ Jürgen Habermas holds that a norm is morally valid only when it is universalizable. He establishes the principle of universalization (U) as the procedural principle for testing the moral validity of norms in moral discourse. He argues that this principle can be derived from the pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation in general. By explicating the fiduciary status of pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation, and by distinguishing perspectival from comprehensive universalization, I argue that Habermas fails to justify his moral principle.

Statutory Pragmatism and Constitutional Structure

This essay examines two jurisprudential styles in Judge Posner’s statutory interpretation opinions. Both approaches invite judicial flexibility. The first, which reflects an earlier stage in Judge Posner’s career, justifies interpretive flexibility by defending a process of “imaginative reconstruction.” On that view, because a busy and error-prone Congress will not always capture its purposes in the words it chooses, the court should try to figure out what Congress would have wanted to accomplish in the circumstances before the court. The second, and more recent, framework is more openly pragmatic. On that view, Judge Posner justifies interpretive flexibility on the ground that judges properly “enrich positive law with the moral values and practical concerns of civilized society.” To simplify, the first approach treats interpretive flexibility as a better way of decoding Congress’s instructions; the second treats it as a proper exercise of judicial power. While reiterating a preference for textualism, the essay argues that, between the two approaches outlined by Judge Posner, his newer, more pragmatic justification gives a more accurate account of what is truly going on in the courts and is more sensitive to the underlying institutional considerations that necessarily inform rules of interpretation.