Where Should We Place the Treatise on Conscience in Moral Theology? Benedict Merkelbach O.P. Translated by Matthew K. Minerd Originally: Benedict Merkelbach, "Note: Quelle place assigner au traité de la conscience?," Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques 12, no. 2 (1923): 170–83. Translator's Introduction The topic of conscience has been at the center of many ecclesial discussions of late.1 Much is to be said positively about the desire to [End Page 1017] emphasize the importance of the inner sanctuary in which moral judgment springs forth in our lives. To refer to the heavily-cited passage from Gaudium et Spes §16,2 conscience does indeed represent a profound sanctuary in the heart of the human person. From its deepest roots in faith and synderesis,3 as well as in the gains added by moral culture, philosophy, and theology, all the way to the terminal judgment of prudence, our moral reasoning (when it is indeed right and certain) sets the human person upon the path of the personal moral and divine self-governance4 that "existentializes" the [End Page 1018] human conquest of freedom for the good. Very often the term "conscience" is used somewhat loosely to refer to all of these aspects of moral reasoning. For Saint Thomas, it had a more specific sense, properly referring to the act of moral judgment applying moral knowledge to a particular case (see Summa theologiae [ST] I, q. 79, a. 13). In the synthetic outlook presented in the Summa theologiae, conscience is not treated by itself as a subject set apart. However, soon after the thirteenth century, it became normal to discuss the nature of conscience somewhere in the neighborhood of the treatise on human acts (i.e., ST I-II, qq. 6–21), often swelling the discussion with later controversies and subtleties, especially those that arose in the context of the great debates over probabilism. The history became incredibly complex, and we find ourselves faced with a question: "Is this the best solution for synthetically treating the nature of conscience?" This article is presented as providing one possible approach to answering this question, one that seems seemed quite respectable to the famed Thomist Father Garrigou-Lagrange.5 In the text presented here by Nova et Vetera, Father Benedict Merkelbach (the author of the erudite and lengthy Summa theologiae moralis6) presents the results of his own research concerning these matters, providing a historical outline of the problem of conscience in the tradition of Catholic moral theology, as well as his opinion that a significant portion of this discussion should be conducted explicitly within the context of the treatise on prudence. Merkelbach and Garrigou-Lagrange7 argued that if right and certain conscience is [End Page 1019] [Begin Page 1022] the judgment declared as prudence's dictamen-judgment (in distinction from the imperium directing execution of the act), the only way to have a complete account of conscience is to discuss it in the company of the great host of virtues that are annexed to prudence, aiding in the lofty and difficult task of rectifying our natural and supernatural self-government in the moral and divine life. We thus come to see conscience as being centrally involved in the "conquest of the good" that is the task of prudence. Prudence provides the context within which further discussions can then take place: the necessity of the virtues for rectitude of will in relation to the ends of the acquired and infused moral virtues, the relationship of prudence to faith, synderesis, and "moral science" (as well as moral culture), the perfection of prudence by the Spirit's gift of counsel, the nature of practical truth as helping us understand the certitude involved in conscience, and so forth. Yet, before the specific details are considered, it is best to know the general terrain. Why not turn to a great master of a former age to consider this matter—especially when that master provides us with an erudite article like the one being presented here? Therefore, the intention of this translation is not to provide a mere "throwback" to past thought on the matter of conscience. Rather, it is to provide the...
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